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100 lines
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Plaintext
100 lines
4.6 KiB
Plaintext
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EFF Responds to the recent Clinton Crypto policy...
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Polekat #1 @5285
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Thu Apr 22 18:19:18 1993
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Electronic Frontier Foundation
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April 16, 1993
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INITIAL EFF ANALYSIS OF CLINTON PRIVACY AND SECURITY PROPOSAL
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The Clinton Administration today made a major announcement on
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cryptography policy which will effect the privacy and security of millions
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of Americans. The first part of the plan is to begin a comprehensive
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inquiry into major communications privacy issues such as export controls
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which have effectively denied most people easy access to robust encryption
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as well as law enforcement issues posed by new technology.
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However, EFF is very concerned that the Administration has already
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reach a conclusion on one critical part of the inquiry, before any public
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comment or discussion has been allowed. Apparently, the Administration is
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going to use its leverage to get all telephone equipment vendors to adopt a
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voice encryption standard developed by the National Security Agency. The
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so-called "Clipper Chip" is an 80-bit, split key escrowed encryption scheme
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which will be built into chips manufactured by a military contractor. Two
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separate escrow agents would store users' keys, and be required to turn
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them over law enforcement upon presentation of a valid warrant. The
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encryption scheme used is to be classified, but they chips will be
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available to any manufacturer for incorporation into their communications
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products.
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This proposal raises a number of serious concerns .
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First, the Administration appears to be adopting a solution before
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conducting an inquiry. The NSA-developed clipper chip may not be the most
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secure product. Other vendors or developers may have better schemes.
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Furthermore, we should not rely on the government as the sole source for
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clipper or any other chips. Rather independent chip manufacturers should
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be able to produce chipsets based on open standards.
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Second, an algorithm can not be trusted unless it can be tested.
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Yet, the Administration proposes to keep the chip algorithm classified.
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EFF believes that any standard adopted ought to be public and open. The
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public will only have confidence in the security of a standard that is open
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to independent, expert scrutiny.
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Third, while the use of the use of split-key, dual escrowed system
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may prove to be a reasonable balance between privacy and law enforcement
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needs, the details of this scheme must be explored publicly before it is
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adopted. What will give people confidence in the safety of their keys?
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Does disclose of keys to a third party waive individual's fifth amendment
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rights in subsequent criminal inquiries?
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In sum, the Administration has shown great sensitivity to the
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importance of these issues by planning a comprehensive inquiry into digital
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privacy and security. However, the "Clipper chip" solution ought to be
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considered as part of the inquiry, not be adopted before the discussion
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even begins.
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DETAILS OF THE PROPOSAL:
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ESCROW
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The 80-bit key will be divided between two escrow agents, each of whom hold
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40-bits of each key. Upon presentation of a valid warrant, the two escrow
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agents would have to turn the key parts over to law enforcement agents.
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Most likely the Attorney General will be asked to identify appropriate
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escrow agents. Some in the Administration have suggested one non-law
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enforcement federal agency -- perhaps the Federal Reserve, and one
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non-governmental organization. But, there is no agreement on the identity
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of the agents yet.
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Key registration would be done by the manufacturer of the communications
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device. A key is tied to the device, not the person using it.
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CLASSIFIED ALGORITHM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF BACK DOORS
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The Administration claims that there are no back doors -- means by which
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the government or others could break the code without securing keys from
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the escrow agents -- and that the President will be told there are no back
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doors to this classified algorithm. In order to prove this, Administration
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sources are interested in arranging for an all-star crypto cracker team to
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come in, under a security arrangement, and examine the algorithm for trap
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doors. The results of the investigation would then be made public.
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GOVERNMENT AS MARKET DRIVER
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In order to get a market moving, and the show that the government believes
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in the security of this system, the feds will be the first big customers
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for this product. Users will include the FBI, Secret Service, VP Al Gore,
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and maybe even the President.
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FROM MORE INFORMATION CONTACT:
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Jerry Berman, Executive Director
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Daniel J. Weitzner, Senior Staff Counsel
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