textfiles-politics/regexConsp/fema-2.xml

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----FEMA pt 2 continued ----------------------------------------------



 Even those Executive Orders which have been made public tend to
  raise as many questions as they answer about what actions were
  considered and actually implemented.  On January 8, 1991, Bush signed
  Executive Order 12742, National Security Industrial Responsiveness,
  which ordered the rapid mobilization of resources such as food,
  energy, construction materials and civil transportation to meet
  national security requirements.  There was, however, no mention in
  this or any other EO of the National Defense Executive Reserve (NDER)
  plan administered under FEMA.  This plan, which had been activated
  during World War II and the Korean War, permits the federal government
  during a state of emergency to bring into government certain
  unidentified individuals.  On January 7, 1991 the "Wall Street Journal
  Europe" reported that industry and government officials were studying
  a plan which would permit the federal government to "borrow" as many
  as 50 oil company executives and put them to work streamlining the
  flow of energy in case of a prolonged engagement or disruption of
  supply.  Antitrust waivers were also being pursued and oil companies
  were engaged in emergency preparedness exercises with the Department
  of Energy.[5]

  Wasting the Environment
 In one case the use of secret powers was discovered by a watchdog
  group and revealed in the press.  In August 1990, correspondence
  passed between Colin McMillan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
  Production and Logistics and Michael Deland, Chair of the White House
  Council on Environmental Quality.  The letters responded to
  presidential and National Security Council directives to deal with
  increased industrial production and logistics arising from the
  situation in the Middle East.  The communications revealed that the
  Pentagon had found it necessary to request emergency waivers to U.S.
  environmental restrictions.[6]
 The agreement to waive the National Environmental Policy Act (1970)
  came in August.  Because of it, the Pentagon was allowed to test new
  weapons in the western U.S., increase production of materiel and
  launch new activities at military bases without the complex public
  review normally required.  The information on the waiver was
  eventually released by the Boston-based National Toxic Campaign Fund
  (NTCF), an environmental group which investigates pollution on the
  nation's military bases.  It was not until January 30, 1991, five
  months after it went into effect, that the "New York Times," acting
  on the NTCF information, reported that the White House had bypassed
  the usual legal requirement for environmental impact statements on
  Pentagon projects.[7]  So far, no specific executive order or
  presidential finding authorizing this waiver has been discovered.
 Other environmental waivers could also have been enacted without
  the public being informed.  Under a state of national emergency, U.S.
  warships can be exempted from international conventions on
  pollution[8] and public vessels can be allowed to dispose of
  potentially infectious medical wastes into the oceans.[9]  The
  President can also suspend any of the statutory provisions regarding
  the production, testing, transportation, deployment, and disposal of
  chemical and biological warfare agents (50 USC sec. 1515).  He could
  also defer destruction of up to 10 percent of lethal chemical agents
  and munitions that existed on November 8, 1985.[10]
 One Executive Order which was made public dealt with "Chemical and
  Biological Weapons Proliferation."  Signed by Bush on November 16,
  1990, EO 12735 leaves the impression that Bush is ordering an
  increased effort to end the proliferation of chemical and biological
  weapons.  The order states that these weapons "constitute a threat to
  national security and foreign policy" and declares a national
  emergency to deal with the threat.  To confront this threat, Bush
  ordered international negotiations, the imposition of controls,
  licenses, and sanctions against foreign persons and countries for
  proliferation.  Conveniently, the order grants the Secretaries of
  State and the Treasury the power to exempt the U.S. military.
 In February of 1991, the Omnibus Export Amendments Act was passed
  by Congress compatible with EO 12735.  It imposed sanctions on
  countries and companies developing or using chemical or biological
  weapons.  Bush signed the law, although he had rejected the identical
  measure the year before because it did not give him the executive
  power to waive all sanctions if he thought the national interest
  required it.[11]  The new bill, however, met Bush's requirements.

   ____________________________________________________________________
   |      |
   |    BUSH'S EXECUTIVE ORDERS   |
   |      |
   |  * EO 12722 "Blocking Iraqi Government Property and  |
   |  Prohibiting Transactions With Iraq," Aug. 2, 1990.    |
   |      |
   |  * EO 12723 "Blocking Kuwaiti Government Property," Aug. 2,  |
   |  1990.       |
   |      |
   |  * EO 12724 "Blocking Iraqi Government Property and  |
   |  Prohibiting Transactions With Iraq," Aug. 9, 1990.    |
   |      |
   |  * EO 12725 "Blocking Kuwaiti Government Property and    |
   |  Prohibiting Transactions With Kuwait," Aug. 9, 1990.  |
   |      |
   |  * EO 12727 "Ordering the Selected Reserve of the Armed  |
   |  Forces to Active Duty," Aug. 22, 1990.    |
   |      |
   |  * EO 12728 "Delegating the President's Authority To   |
   |  Suspend Any Provision of Law Relating to the Promotion, |
   |  Retirement, or Separation of Members of the Armed Forces,"  |
   |  Aug. 22, 1990.      |
   |      |
   |  * EO 12733 "Authorizing the Extension of the Period of  |
   |  Active Duty of Personnel of the Selected Reserve of the |
   |  Armed Forces," Nov. 13, 1990.     |
   |      |
   |  * EO 12734 "National Emergency Construction Authority," Nov.  |
   |  14, 1990.       |
   |      |
   |  * EO 12735 "Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation,"   |
   |  Nov. 16, 1990.      |
   |      |
   |  * EO 12738 "Administration of Foreign Assistance and Related  |
   |  Functions and Arms Export Control," Dec. 14, 1990.    |
   |      |
   |  * EO 12742 "National Security Industrial Responsiveness," |
   |  Jan. 8, 1991.     |
   |      |
   |  * EO 12743 "Ordering the Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces  |
   |  to Active Duty," Jan. 18, 1991.   |
   |      |
   |  * EO 12744 "Designation of Arabian Peninsula Areas, Airspace  |
   |  and Adjacent Waters as a Combat Zone," Jan. 21, 1991.   |
   |      |
   |  * EO 12750 "Designation of Arabian Peninsula Areas, Airspace  |
   |  and Adjacent Waters as the Persian Gulf Desert Shield   |
   |  Area," Feb. 14, 1991.     |
   |      |
   |  * EO 12751 "Health Care Services for Operation Desert   |
   |  Storm," Feb. 14, 1991.      |
   |      |
   --------------------------------------------------------------------

  Going Off Budget
 Although some of the powers which Bush assumed in order to conduct
  the Gulf War were taken openly, they received little public discussion
  or reporting by the media.
 In October, when the winds of the Gulf War were merely a breeze,
  Bush used his executive emergency powers to extend his budget
  authority.  This action made the 1991 fiscal budget agreement between
  Congress and the President one of the first U.S. casualties of the
  war.  While on one hand the deal froze arms spending through 1996, it
  also allowed Bush to put the cost of the Gulf War "off budget."  Thus,
  using its emergency powers, the Bush administration could:

 * incur a deficit which exceeds congressional budget authority;

 * prevent Congress from raising a point of order over the
   excessive spending;[12]

 * waive the requirement that the Secretary of Defense submit
   estimates to Congress prior to deployment of a major defense
   acquisition system;

 * and exempt the Pentagon from congressional restrictions on
   hiring private contractors.[13]

 While there is no published evidence on which powers Bush actually
  invoked, the administration was able to push through the 1990 Omnibus
  Reconciliation Act.  This legislation put a cap on domestic spending,
  created a record $300 billion deficit, and undermined the Gramm-
  Rudman-Hollings Act intended to reduce the federal deficit.  Although
  Congress agreed to pay for the war through supplemental appropriations
  and approved a $42.2 billion supplemental bill and a $4.8 billion
  companion "dire emergency supplemental appropriation,"[14] it
  specified that the supplemental budget should not be used to finance
  costs the Pentagon would normally experience.[15]
 Lawrence Korb, a Pentagon official in the Reagan administration,
  believes that the Pentagon has already violated the spirit of the 1990
  Omnibus Reconciliation Act.  It switched funding for the Patriot,
  Tomahawk, Hellfire and HARM missiles from its regular budget to the
  supplemental budget;  added normal wear and tear of equipment to
  supplemental appropriations;  and made supplemental requests which
  ignore a planned 25% reduction in the armed forces by 1995.[16]

  The Cost In Liberty Lost
 Under emergency circumstances, using 50 USC sec. 1811, the
  President could direct the Attorney General to authorize electronic
  surveillance of aliens and American citizens in order to obtain
  foreign intelligence information without a court order.[17]  No
  Executive Order has been published which activates emergency powers to
  wiretap or to engage in counter-terrorist activity.  Nonetheless,
  there is substantial evidence that such activities have taken place.
  According to the New York-based Center for Constitutional Rights, the
  FBI launched an anti-terrorist campaign which included a broad sweep
  of Arab-Americans.  Starting in August, the FBI questioned, detained,
  and harassed Arab-Americans in California, New York, Ohio,
  Pennsylvania, Virginia, Maryland, and Colorado.[18]
 A CIA agent asked the University of Connecticut for a list of all
  foreign students at the institution, along with their country of
  origin, major field of study, and the names of their academic
  advisers.  He was particularly interested in students from the Middle
  East and explained that the Agency intended to open a file on each of
  the students.  Anti-war groups have also reported several break-ins of
  their offices and many suspected electronic surveillance of their
  telephones.[19]

  Pool of Disinformation
 Emergency powers to control the means of communications in the U.S.
  in the name of national security were never formally declared.  There
  was no need for Bush to do so since most of the media voluntarily and
  even eagerly cooperated in their own censorship.  Reporters covering
  the Coalition forces in the Gulf region operated under restrictions
  imposed by the U.S. military.  They were, among other things, barred
  from traveling without a military escort, limited in their forays into
  the field to small escorted groups called "pools," and required to
  submit all reports and film to military censors for clearance.  Some
  reporters complained that the rules limited their ability to gather
  information independently, thereby obstructing informed and objective
  reporting.[20]
 Three Pentagon press officials in the Gulf region admitted to James
  LeMoyne of the "New York Times" that they spent significant time
  analyzing reporters' stories in order to shape the coverage in the
  Pentagon's favor.  In the early days of the deployment, Pentagon press
  officers warned reporters who asked hard questions that they were seen
  as "anti-military" and that their requests for interviews with senior
  commanders and visits to the field were in jeopardy.  The military
  often staged events solely for the cameras and would stop televised
  interviews in progress when it did not like what was being portrayed.
 Although filed soon after the beginning of the war, a lawsuit
  challenging the constitutionality of press restrictions was not heard
  until after the war ended.  It was then dismissed when the judge ruled
  that since the war had ended, the issues raised had become moot.  The
  legal status of the restrictions--initially tested during the U.S.
  invasions of Grenada and Panama--remains unsettled.

  A National Misfortune
 It will be years before researchers and journalists are able to
  ferret through the maze of government documents and give a full
  appraisal of the impact of the President's emergency powers on
  domestic affairs.  It is likely, however, that with a post-war
  presidential approval rating exceeding 75 percent, the domestic
  casualties will continue to mount with few objections.  Paradoxically,
  even though the U.S. public put pressure on Bush to send relief for
  the 500000 Iraqi Kurdish refugees, it is unlikely the same outcry
  will be heard for the 37 million Americans without health insurance,
  the 32 million living in poverty, or the country's five million hungry
  children.  The U.S. may even help rebuild Kuwaiti and Iraqi civilian
  infrastructures it destroyed during the war while leaving its own
  education system in decay, domestic transportation infrastructures
  crumbling, and inner city war zones uninhabitable.  And, while the
  U.S. assists Kuwait in cleaning up its environmental disaster, it will
  increase pollution at home.  Indeed, as the long-dead Prussian field
  marshal prophesied, "a war, even the most victorious, is a national
  misfortune."

  FOOTNOTES:

 1. The administrative guideline was established under Reagan in Executive
  Order 12656, November 181988, "Federal Register," vol. 23, no. 266.

 2. For instance, National Security Council policy papers or National
  Security Directives (NSD) or National Security Decision Directives
  (NSDD) have today evolved into a network of shadowy, wide-ranging and
  potent executive powers.  These are secret instruments, maintained in
  a top security classified state and are not shared with Congress.  For
  an excellent discussion see:  Harold C. Relyea, The Coming of Secret
  Law, "Government Information Quarterly," Vol. 5, November 1988;  see
  also:  Eve Pell, "The Backbone of Hidden Government," "The Nation,"
  June 191990.

 3. "Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the National Emergency
  With Respect to Iraq," February, 11, 1991, "Weekly Compilation of
  Presidential Documents:  Administration of George Bush," (Washington,
  DC:  U.S. Government Printing Office), pp. 158-61.

 4. The U.S. now has states of emergency with Iran, Iraq and Syria.

 5. Allanna Sullivan, "U.S. Oil Concerns Confident Of Riding Out Short Gulf
  War," "Wall Street Journal Europe," January 7, 1991.

 6. Colin McMillan, Letter to Michael Deland, Chairman, Council on
  Environmental Quality (Washington, DC:  Executive Office of the
  President), August 24, 1990;  Michael R. Deland, Letter to Colin
  McMillan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics
  (Washington, DC: Department of Defense), August 291990.

 7. Keith Schneider, "Pentagon Wins Waiver Of Environmental Rule," "New York
  Times," January 30, 1991.

 8. 33 U.S. Code (USC) sec. 1902 9(b).

 9. 33 USC sec. 2503 l(b).

 10. 50 USC sec. 1521(b) (3)(A).

 ll. Adam Clymer, "New Bill Mandates Sanctions On Makers of Chemical Arms,"
   "New York Times," February 22, 1991.

 12. 31 USC O10005 (f);  2 USC O632 (i), 6419 (d), 907a (b); and Public
   Law 101-508, Title X999, sec. 13101.

 13. 10 USC sec. 2434/2461 9F.

 14. When the Pentagon expected the war to last months and oil prices to
   skyrocket, it projected the incremental cost of deploying and
   redeploying the forces and waging war at about $70 billion.  The
   administration sought and received $56 billion in pledges from allies
   such as Germany, Japan and Saudi Arabia.  Although the military's
   estimates of casualties and the war's duration were highly inflated,
   today their budget estimates remain at around $70 billion even though
   the Congressional Budget office estimates that cost at only $40
   billion, $16 billion less than allied pledges.

 15. Michael Kamish, "After The War:  At Home, An Unconquered Recession,"
   "Boston Globe," March 6, 1991;  Peter Passell, "The Big Spoils From a
   Bargain War," "New York Times," March 3, 1991;  and Alan Abelson, "A
   War Dividend For The Defense Industry?" "Barron's," March 18, 1991.

 16. Lawrence Korb, "The Pentagon's Creative Budgetry Is Out of Line,"
   "International Herald Tribune," April 5, 199l.

 17. Many of the powers against aliens are automatically invoked during a
   national emergency or state of war.  Under the Alien Enemies Act (50
   USC sec. 21), the President can issue an order to apprehend, restrain,
   secure and remove all subjects of a hostile nation over 13 years old.
   Other statutes conferring special powers on the President with regard
   to aliens that may be exercised in times of war or emergencies but are
   not confined to such circumstances, are:  exclusion of all or certain
   classes of aliens from entry into the U.S. when their entry may be
   "detrimental to the interests of the United States" (8 USC sec. 1182(f));
   imposition of travel restrictions on aliens within the U.S. (8 USC sec.
   1185);  and requiring aliens to be fingerprinted (8 USC sec. 1302).

 18. Ann Talamas, "FBI Targets Arab-Americans," "CAIB," Spring 1991, p. 4.

 19. "Anti-Repression Project Bulletin" (New York: Center for
   Constitutional Rights), January 23, 1991.

 20. James DeParle, "Long Series of Military Decisions Led to Gulf War News
   Censorship," "New York Times," May 5, 1991.

 21. James LeMoyne, "A Correspondent's Tale:  Pentagon's Strategy for the
   Press:  Good News or No News," "New York Times," February 17, 1991.

______________________________________________________________________________
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--
     daveus rattus

   yer friendly neighborhood ratman

    KOYAANISQATSI

 ko.yan.nis.qatsi (from the Hopi Language)  n.  1. crazy life.  2. life
 in turmoil.  3. life out of balance.  4. life disintegrating.
   5. a state of life that calls for another way of living.



    KOYAANISQATSI

 ko.yan.nis.qatsi (from the Hopi Language)  n.  1. crazy life.  2. life
 in turmoil.  3. life out of balance.  4. life disintegrating.
   5. a state of life that calls for another way of living.


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