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369 lines
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The BIRCH BARK BBS / 414-242-5070
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==================================================================
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Submitted by:
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THE NEW AMERICAN -- July 25, 1994
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Copyright 1994 -- American Opinion Publishing, Incorporated.
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P.O. Box 8040, Appleton, WI 54913 414-749-3784
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==================================================================
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ARTICLE: American Opinion
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TITLE: "High-Tech Nightmare"
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SUBTITLE: "Traveling Big Brother's information superhighway"
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AUTHOR: William F. Jasper
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==================================================================
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Since its publication in 1949, George Orwell's terrifying novel 1984
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has provided a foreboding look at a possible future world in which
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both man and machine have become mere instruments to serve the evil
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purposes of the totalitarian state. In the book's opening chapter,
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through the eyes and mind of protagonist Winston Smith, we gradually
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glimpse and feel the suffocating omnipresence of an omnipotent government.
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Smith and other tragic inhabitants of his grim world can scarcely look
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in any direction without coming under the watchful gaze of the ever-present
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visage of the black-mustachioed, Stalinesque Big Brother. Beneath the
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ubiquitous posters of the supreme dictator blares the caption: BIG BROTHER
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IS WATCHING YOU.
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In the grotesque world of Big Brother we see the individual stripped of
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all freedom, worth, dignity, and privacy. Technology is harnessed to
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penetrate and subjugate every area of their lives, even their dreary,
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pathetic homes. This is the chilling description of Smith's apartment:
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The telescreen received and transmitted simultaneously.
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Any sound that Winston made, above the level of a very
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low whisper, would be picked up by it; moreover, so long
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as he remained within the field of vision which the metal
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plaque commanded, he could be seen as well as heard. There
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was of course no way of knowing whether you were being
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watched at any given moment. How often, or on what system,
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the Thought Police plugged in on any individual wire was
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guesswork. It was even conceivable that they watched
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everybody all the time. But at any rate they could plug in
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your wire whenever they wanted to. You had to live -- did live,
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from habit that became instinct -- in the assumption that
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every sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness,
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every movement scrutinized.
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Our technological capabilities today are more than adequate to implement
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this same kind of Orwellian nightmare, and politically we are headed in
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that direction. In the past year the Clinton Administration has been
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aggressively pushing a number of statist, privacy-invading initiatives
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that have groups and individuals all across the political spectrum screaming
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"Big Brother." Clinton proposals for a national identification card, a
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national "information super highway," and installation of a federal
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"Clipper chip" in our telephones, computers, fax machines, and other
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electronic devices to allow government monitoring certainly justify the
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concern that we have embarked on the "slippery slope."
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It is perfectly apropos, of course, that Bill Clinton's Orwellian statist
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programs be introduced with Orwellian "Newspeak," in which words often
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mean the opposite of what we normally take them to mean. In 1984 the
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Ministry of Truth proclaims, "War Is Peace," "Freedom Is Slavery," and
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"Ignorance Is Strength." In like manner, the Clinton Administration seems
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to be saying, "Intrusion Is Privacy." With its Clipper chip proposal,
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Team Clinton is saying, in effect: "In order to protect your privacy,
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Fedgov has to have the ability to invade your privacy -- but you can trust
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us not to."
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The Clinton pitch is playing to a real and legitimate concern. In this
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"information age" our lives are transparent. Our employment history, credit
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rating, banking transactions, school and medical records, shopping habits,
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travel, telephone and electronic communications, and many other intimate
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details of our personal lives are floating in the ether of cyberspace,
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available for abuse by government, commercial interests, hackers, personal
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enemies, or other interested parties. In order to protect against
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unauthorized use of this information, many individuals, companies, and
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institutions are making use of data and voice encryption devices and software.
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But encryption, says the Administration, threatens legitimate law enforcement
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interests, by making it very difficult or impossible for police agencies to
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decipher wire taps of dangerous criminal and terrorist elements. The growth
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of digital telephone technology and new computer-enhanced efficiency
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techniques that allow compressing, hopping, and spreading of telephone
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and data transmissions has already made phone tapping extremely hard.
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The Administration's solution is to force the private telephone systems
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to develop software that will track and decipher transmissions, and to give
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the government a monopoly on encryption.
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Janet Reno and FBI Director Louis Freeh are pushing Congress to enact
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requirements that telecommunications providers -- local telephone services,
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cellular phone companies, wireless services, long distance networks, etc. --
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be able to intercept targeted telephone calls and data transmissions. The
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FBI is not proposing to dictate how companies will accomplish these
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surveillance tasks; it simply wants to impose a three-year deadline for
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companies to come up with methods and technology to do them.
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Freeh says that in the digital information age the American people must
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be willing to give up a degree of personal privacy in exchange for safety
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and security. Moreover, said the FBI head in an interview earlier this
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year in which he defended the Clinton Administration's support for the
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Digital Telephony and Communications Privacy Improvement Act of 1994,
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taxpayers would be asked to pay up to half a billion dollars to develop
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the computer software necessary to secure the telecommunications
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infrastructure. "The costs are high, but you have to do a cost-benefit
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analysis," said Freeh. "The damage to the World Trade tower and the
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economic interests of the country are conservatively estimated at
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$5 billion," he said, referring to the 1993 bombing of the World Trade
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Center in New York. "I think the American people will agree that this
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is a credible solution to the problem we face."*
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Credible? Hardly. Dangerous? Absolutely. Not only are the Clinton proposals
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doomed to failure as effective law enforcement measures against criminals,
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but they are threatening precedents that would invite government abuse.
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"Do not be fooled," the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an industry lobbying
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group, warned on its computer bulletin board. "The FBI scheme would turn the
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data superhighway into a national surveillance network of staggering
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proportions."
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In March, the Digital Privacy and Security Working Group, a coalition of
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computer professionals, companies, trade associations, and privacy groups,
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wrote a letter to President Clinton, challenging the Administration's
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proposed digital telephony bill. "We still see no evidence that current
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law enforcement efforts are being jeopardized by new technologies," the
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group told the President. "Nor are we convinced that future law enforcement
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activities will be jeopardized given industry cooperation." So far, the
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Administration and other advocates of the new federal surveillance powers
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have not cited any specific cases where criminals have eluded the long
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arm of the law due to encryption or failure of telephone carriers to cooperate.
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Undaunted, the police statists push onward. Confrontations in Congress
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over the Clipper chip are now underway. Hearings on the matter were held
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by the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 3rd. The Clipper chip is a product
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of the National Security Agency, the super-secret federal spy agency
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headquartered at Fort Meade, Maryland. According to Dr. Clinton Brooks,
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the NSA scientist who led the Clipper chip research team, the chip project
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began in 1989 and cost more than $2.5 million. "Cryptomathematicians" and
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other specialists from NSA and the National Institute of Standards and
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Technology (NIST) developed a powerful encryption formula, dubbed Skipjack,
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which was built into a microprocessor now known as the Capstone chip, for
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use in computers to scramble data. The chip is embedded on a circuit board
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known as a Tessera Card and connected to the innards of the computer.
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The NSA designers then modified the Capstone chip for telephone encryption
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and named the new creation the Clipper chip. The Clipper/Capstone chips
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can either be built into the telephones, computers, and fax machines
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themselves or put into separate devices about the size of a video cassette
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tape which telephones, computers, and fax machines could be plugged into.
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In order for the encryption to work, both the caller and the receiver have
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to be using equipment with the Capstone/Clipper chips.
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As presently proposed by the Administration, the Clipper encryption would
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only be activated when two people decide they want to secure their
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communications and initiate encryption by pushing a button on their phones
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or devices. Their conversation or data transmission would then be scrambled
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and rendered meaningless to outsiders by the Clipper chip, since only the
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caller and receiver would have the "secret" numerical keys to encode and
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decode the transmission.
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Except that in the interest of "national security" and "law and order,"
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the federal government would hold master keys to each Clipper chip. In
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order to protect against government abuse, the master keys would be divided
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in half and each half held in "escrow" by different federal agencies.
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(The NIST and the Treasury Department have been selected as the custodial
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"key escrow" agents.) Before a law enforcement agency could decode a
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Clipper-encrypted transmission it would have to present its search warrant
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authorizing the wiretap to each custodial agency. Combining the halves of
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the key from each "key escrow" custodian, the law enforcement agency could
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then decode the call.
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Electronic privacy specialist Winn Schwartau writes in his new book,
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Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway, that there are
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a number of flaws in this plan:
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First, unless everyone uses Clipper, the entire effort is futile.
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In order for everyone to use it, it would have to become a mandate
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or law, therefore making other forms of encryption illegal. That
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will never happen in an open society. Second, for the Clipper to
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be accepted, the Government has to be trusted not to abuse their
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capabilities to decrypt private transmissions without proper court
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authorization, as is required today.
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Schwartau notes also that "since no one outside of a select few will be able
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to examine the internal workings of the Clipper system, we have to take on
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faith that the Government doesn't have a so-called back-door to bypass the
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entire escrow system." Considering the trustworthiness of governments
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throughout history, it is probably wise in such matters to remain agnostic.
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James Bidzos, president of RSA Data Security, a computer security firm, is
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one expert who remains skeptical. He sees the Clipper chip as perhaps only
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the "visible portion of a large-scale covert operation on U.S. soil by NSA."
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John Perry Barlow of the Electronic Frontier Foundation is another nonbeliever.
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"Relying on the government to protect your privacy is like asking a Peeping
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Tom to install your window blinds," said Barlow, in one of the most relevant
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and on-target comments concerning the Clipper.
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Clintonistas protest that Clipper opponents are getting all worked up over
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nothing. "Voluntary, voluntary, voluntary," says Edward A. Roback, one of
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NIST's computer specialists. "We're certainly not forcing anyone to use it
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[Clipper chip technology]." "Domestically, anybody can use whatever they want,"
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Roback insists. "There are no domestic restrictions and, no, the Administration
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has no plans to propose any."
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Winn Schwartau is not convinced. In Information Warfare he comments:
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Perhaps the Government is engaged in a campaign to desensitize
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the American public, a sophisticated form of Information Warfare.
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First they attempt to pass a law, then they back off when attacked
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by privacy advocates and adverse publicity. Next, they make the
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very technology available that would have been used to implement
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the proposed law, if it had been passed. Then Clipper is announced
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and the flak hits the fan, so they back off again. They try to
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convince the public that Clipper really is OK. Then maybe they'll
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try to sneak it in another law, perhaps in a few months or a year.
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See what happens. Sooner or later, the reasoning goes, the public
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will cease to care and Clipper will become the law of the land.
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It is a scenario that does not take great imagination to conjure.
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It depends upon who is behind Clipper, the depth of their pockets,
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their political wherewithal, and their motivation and resolve.
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Right now it is the federal government that is behind Clipper, and it has
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pretty deep pockets. As the largest buyer and user of computer and
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telecommunications equipment and services, it is in a good position to
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force "voluntary" adoption of its favored technologies and policies.
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Defense contractors and other major providers of products and services
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to government agencies may soon find themselves forced into the situation
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of either adopting Clipper technology or losing government contracts.
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"It's starting to look like economic coercion -- use this or else -- even
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though the [Clipper] standard is supposed to be voluntary," says David
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Peyton, vice president of the Information Technology Association of America.
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Daniel Wietzner of the Electronic Frontier Foundation agrees. "The government
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is going to use its purchasing power to try and make this a de facto standard,"
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he argues.
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The only currently available Clipper chip product is the AT&T Surety
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Telephone Device 3600, which sells for about $1,200. The federal government
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is ordering thousands of them even though it is an unproven commodity.
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"The Clipper chip was developed in secrecy," notes Jim Schindler, an
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information security manager at Hewlett-Packard, "and everyone begins to
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question its strength without peer review."
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The Clipper "flunked" its first equivalent of limited peer review. On June
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2nd of this year news accounts reported that a computer scientist at AT&T
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Bell Laboratories, Dr. Matthew Blaze, had discovered a basic flaw in the
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Clipper technology. He didn't break the code; in fact, just the opposite --
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he found a weak link in the Clipper chip that would allow users to further
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scramble their transmissions so that they couldn't be decoded by the
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government even with the use of its escrow keys. If this is the case --
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and the NSA has not disputed Dr. Blaze's findings -- the Clipper will be
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no more useful for apprehending criminals and terrorists than other
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encryption devices and software programs that law enforcement cannot decode.
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The NSA has all but conceded that the Clipper flaw exists, but has attempted
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to minimize its significance. "Anyone interested in circumventing law-
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enforcement access would most likely choose simpler alternatives," the NSA's
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director of policy, Michael A. Smith, said in a written statement issued in
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response to the Blaze report. "More difficult and time-consuming efforts,
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like those discussed in the Blaze paper, are very unlikely to be employed."
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This is a very significant and interesting admission. Smith seems to be
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conceding that: 1) with sufficient knowledge, resources, and motivation,
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criminals could evade Clipper via the Blaze technique; and 2) there are
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ways to evade Clipper's surveillance requiring even less knowledge,
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resources, and motivation than the Blaze method. Either way, it is the
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ostensible targets of Clipper -- criminals and terrorists -- who are most
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likely to have the knowledge, resources, and motivation to evade the
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technology.
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That leaves the average, law-abiding citizen as the logical primary target
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of the Clipper. There is a parallel here, of course, with the Clinton drive
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for more gun control laws, which (as always) are ignored by the criminal
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element and serve only to penalize and criminalize the responsible gun owner.
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But the cult of Big Brother is not stopping with surveillance of
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telecommunications; Clipper is just the beginning. According to the
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computer industry journal PC Week, "The Clinton administration is
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working on creating an identification card that every American will
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need to interact with any federal government agency." In its May 9th
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issue, PC Week reported, "Sources close to the administration said
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President Clinton is also considering signing a pair of executive
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orders that would facilitate the connection of individuals' bank
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accounts and federal records to a government identification card."
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According to PC Week, the national ID proposal was presented by the
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U.S. Postal Service in April at the Card Tech/ Secure Tech Conference
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in Crystal City, Virginia as a "general purpose U.S. services smart
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card" to be used by individuals and companies when sending or receiving
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electronic mail (E-mail), transferring funds, and interacting with
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government agencies.
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The computer weekly reported that Postal Service representative Chuck
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Chamberlain outlined at the conference "how an individual's U.S. Card
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would be automatically connected with the Department of Health and
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Human Services, the U.S. Treasury, the IRS, the banking system, and a
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central database of digital signatures for authenticating E-mail and
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other transactions."
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"While the U.S. Card is only a proposal," noted PC Week, "the Postal
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Service is prepared to put more than 100 million of the cards in citizens'
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pockets within months of administration approval, which could come at
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any time," according to Chamberlain.
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"There won't be anything you do in business that won't be collected and
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analyzed by the government," charges William Murray, a security consultant
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to accounting firm Deloitte and Touche in New Canaan, Connecticut, who
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attended the Crystal City conference. "This is a better surveillance
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mechanism than Orwell or the government could have imagined."
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The "smart card" is also a central feature of the Clinton "health care
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reform" program. However, some "Friends of Hillary" have even grander
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visions. Mary Jane England, MD, a member of the executive committee of
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the White House Health Project and president of the Washington Business
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Group on Health, a national outfit comprised of some of the nation's
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leading corporate welfare statists, is especially excited about the
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potential for implanting smart chips in your body. Addressing the 1994
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IBM Health Care Executive Conference last March in Palm Springs,
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California, Dr. England said:
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The Smart Card is a wonderful idea, but even better would be
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capacity not to have a card, and I call it "a chip in your ear,
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" that would actually access your medical records, so that no
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matter where you were, and if you came into an emergency room
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unconscious -- and for those of you who treat or know anything
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about adolescents, forget the card because they're not going to
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have the card when they need it anyway -- [we would have] some
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capacity to access that medical record. We need to go beyond the
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narrow conceptualization of the Smart Card and really use some
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of the technology that's out there. The worst thing we could do
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is put in place a technology that's already outdated, because
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all of you are in the process of building these systems. Now is
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the time to really think ahead....
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I don't think that computerized, integrated medical records with
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a capacity to access through a chip in your ear is so far off and
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I think we need to think of these things.
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Considering the Orwellian mind-set of the Clinton regime, the Administration's
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fervent campaign for creating a national (federally funded and controlled)
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"information network" that will "link every home, business, lab, classroom
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and library by the year 2015" becomes positively frightening. This is the
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same Administration, remember, that is advocating a huge new National Police
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Corps; implementing warrantless searches for firearms; advocating severe
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restrictions on firearms ownership by law-abiding citizens; usurping control
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of state jurisdiction over law enforcement and criminal justice; and
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attempting to purge all religious expressions and symbols from the workplace.
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It is the same Administration that wants to take away your right to medical
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privacy, but refused to make the records of its own health care task force
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public (and even defied a court order to do so). It is the same regime that
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(whether through criminal malice or criminal incompetence) wielded its police
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powers in such a blatantly tyrannical fashion that it is responsible for the
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deaths and incineration of more than 80 members of an arguably harmless
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religious sect.
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With due respect to Electronic Frontier's Mr. Barlow, trusting this
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government to protect your privacy and your rights is more like asking
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Jack the Ripper to install the locks on your home.
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END OF ARTICLE
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==================================================================
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THE NEW AMERICAN -- July 25, 1994
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Copyright 1994 -- American Opinion Publishing, Incorporated.
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P.O. Box 8040, Appleton, WI 54913
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