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1809 lines
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1809 lines
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"Our Presidents should not be able to conduct secret
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operations which violate our principles, jeopardize our rights,
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and have not been subject to the checks and balances which
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normally keep policies in line."
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Morton Halperin
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Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of
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Defense for International Affairs
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"In its consideration of covert action, the Committee was
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struck by the basic tension--if not incompatibility--of covert
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operations and the demands of a constitutional system. Secrecy
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is essential to covert operations; secrecy can, however, become a
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source of power, a barrier to serious policy debate within the
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government, and a means of circumventing the established checks
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and procedures of government. The Committee found that secrecy
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and compartmentation contributed to a temptation on the part of
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the Executive to resort to covert operations in order to avoid
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bureaucratic, congressional, and public debate."
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The Church Committee
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"The nation must to a degree take it on faith that we too
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are honorable men, devoted to her service."
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Richard Helms, then DCI
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April, 1971
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Table of Contents
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CHAPTER ONE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
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Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
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CHAPTER TWO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
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CIA Proprietaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
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Propaganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
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Political Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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Economic Covert Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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Paramilitary Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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CHAPTER THREE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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Project NKNAOMI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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Project MKULTRA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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LSD Experimentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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Project BLUEBIRD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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Project ARTICHOKE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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CHAPTER FOUR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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The National Security Act of July 1947 . . . . . . 19
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Radio Free Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
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Radio Liberty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
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Taiwan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
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Operation Mongoose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
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Guatemala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
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The Bay of Pigs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
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Laos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
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The Phoenix Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
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Chile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
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CHAPTER FIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
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Plausible Deniability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
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CIA Case Officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
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Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
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CHAPTER ONE
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INTRODUCTION
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On January 22, 1946, President Harry S. Truman issued an
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executive order setting up a National Intelligence Authority,
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and under it, a Central Intelligence Group, which was the
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forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency. Truman
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recognized the need for a centralized intelligence apparatus
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in peacetime to help ensure that nothing like the Japanese
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surprise attack on Pearl Harbor would ever again happen.
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The organization that was to become the CIA took on a life of
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its own and over the past four decades has become the secret
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army of the President of the United States. Presidents from
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Truman to Ronald Reagan have used this secret army whenever
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they found it impossible to achieve their policy goals
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through overt means.
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Over the years, the CIA has evolved from an agency whose
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primary assignment was to gather intelligence into a powerful
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entity whose help is enlisted to help attain American foreign
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policy goals. Since 1947, the Agency has been involved in
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the internal affairs of over fifty countries on six different
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continents. Although an exact number is impossible to
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determine, there are over 20,000 employees affiliated with
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the organization. Of these, more than 6,000 serve in the
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clandestine services, the arm of the CIA that is responsible
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for covert operations.
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The purpose of this work will be to survey the covert
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operations that have been undertaken by the CIA in the past
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forty years and to assess the effectiveness of a number of
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these activities. We shall begin by examining the various
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shapes that covert operations may take. They are propaganda;
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political action; economic activities; and paramilitary
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operations. After surveying the various types of covert
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operations, we will look at examples of CIA involvement
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around the world. Since there have been eighty-five or so
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such operations since 1948, we will not attempt to look at
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every one (See Appendix I). However, we will examine a
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number of covert operations to get an idea of what exactly
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the CIA does and continues to do. We will evaluate both the
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particular operations examined in this work and covert
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operations in general. Afterwards, we should be able to
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establish a number of criteria that separate good covert
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operations from bad ones. Finally, we will look towards the
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future and try to see what it has in store for the Central
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Intelligence Agency.
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CHAPTER TWO
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According to the CIA's own definition, covert action
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means "any clandestine or secret activities designed to
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influence foreign governments, events, organizations, or
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persons in support of U.S. foreign policy conducted in such
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manner that the involvement of the U.S. Government is not
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apparent." Before we explore the various types of covert
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operations in which the Agency engages, we should examine one
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of the methods that the CIA uses to mask its activities.
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What is being referred to is the establishment of "front"
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organizations, better known as proprietaries.
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CIA proprietaries are businesses that are wholly owned
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by the Agency which do business, or appear to do business,
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under commercial guise. Proprietaries have been used by the
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CIA for espionage as well as covert operations. Many of the
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larger proprietaries are also, and have been in the past,
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used for paramilitary purposes.
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The best-known of the CIA proprietaries were Radio Free
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Europe and Radio Liberty. The corporate structures of the
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two radio stations served as a prototype for later Agency
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proprietaries. Each functioned under the cover provided by a
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board of directors made up of prominent Americans, who in the
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case of Radio Free Europe incorporated as the National
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Committee for a Free Europe and in the case of Radio Liberty
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as the American Committee for Liberation. However, CIA
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officers in the key management positions at the stations made
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all of the important decisions regarding the activities of
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the station.
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Other CIA proprietaries, organized in the 1960s, were
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the CIA airlines--Air America, Air Asia, Civil Air Transport,
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Intermountain Aviation, and Southern Air Transport--and
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certain holding companies involved with the airlines or the
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Bay of Pigs project, such as the Pacific Corporation and
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Double-Chek corporation. In early 1967, it became known that
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the CIA had subsidized the nation's largest student
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organization, the National Student Association. This
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revelation prompted increased press interest in CIA fronts
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and conduits. Eventually, it became known that the CIA
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channeled money directly or indirectly into a multitude of
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business, labor, and church groups; universities; charitable
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organizations; and educational and cultural groups.
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PROPAGANDA
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Propaganda is any action that is "intended to undermine the
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beliefs, perceptions, and value systems of the people under the
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rule of the adversary government..." The ultimate aim of
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propaganda is to convert the people under the opposition
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government into accepting the belief system of the country which
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is distributing the propaganda. Half of the battle is won if the
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people of the target country begin to question the belief system
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of the government under whose authority they live.
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Propaganda is among the oldest of techniques employed by
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governments in dealing with their foes. There are many different
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propaganda methods that are used by governments to undermine the
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political machinery in other countries, some of which are overt.
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One of these is the use of radio broadcasts. Radio provides a
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way to reach the people of the adversary country that cannot be
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kept out by building walls.
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In addition to the overt means of distributing propaganda
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that have been mentioned, there are covert means that are
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sometimes employed. Covert action is used and becomes relevant
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when a country attempts to control the media of the enemy state.
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This control is accomplished by influencing writers, journalists,
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printers, publishers, and so forth through money, exchanges of
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favors, or other means. In the case of radio, covert action
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involves the operation of "black radio" which will be discussed
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in a moment.
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In their book The Invisible Government, authors David Wise
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and Thomas B. Ross make the following observations about the
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radio activities of the Central Intelligence Agency:
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United States radio activities have ranged all the
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way from overt, openly acknowledged and advertised
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programs of the Voice of America to highly secret
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CIA transmitters in the Middle East and other areas
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of the world. In between, is a whole spectrum of
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black, gray, secret and semi-secret radio
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operations. The CIA's Radio Swan, because it
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became operationally involved at the Bay of Pigs,
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never enjoyed more than the thinnest of covers.
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But Radio Swan was a relatively small black-radio
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operation. Other radio operations, financed and
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controlled in whole or in part by the Invisible
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Government [The CIA and the U.S. Intelligence
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Community as a whole], are more skillfully
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concealed and much bigger.
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It may now be helpful to examine exactly what is meant
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by black and white propaganda. Black propaganda conceals its
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origin while white propaganda is an open, candid charge
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against an opponent. An example of black propaganda would be
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the CIA's circulation of a supposedly Soviet anti-Islamic
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pamphlet in Egypt in October 1964. The effort was intended
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to hurt the image of the Soviet Union in that country.
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"Black radio", in the specialized language of the
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intelligence community, is generally understood to mean the
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operation of a radio broadcasting system which, after being
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captured by the intelligence network of the adversary nation,
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is operated in the name of the original owner to conduct
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hostile, but subtle, propaganda against the owner while
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pretending that the station is still in the original hands.
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Sometimes "black radio" simply means radio operations
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controlled directly or indirectly by any intelligence
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apparatus. "Black radio" operations of this sort have been
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conducted by both super-powers on a large scale in every form
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since the beginning of the Cold War. U.S. activities have
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ranged from the open Voice of America broadcasting station to
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secret CIA transmitters in different parts of the world.
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One more type of propaganda effort which deserves
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further mention here is printed propaganda. Every year, the
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CIA engages in publishing slightly misleading newspaper and
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magazine articles, books, and even occasionally the memoirs
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of Soviet officials or soldiers who have defected. The
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Agency also wages a silent war through disinformation and
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various other counterespionage techniques. The distribution
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through this method sometimes proves to be more difficult
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than conducting radio broadcasts.
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POLITICAL ACTION
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Another type of influence that may be exerted through
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covert means is political action. Such action may be defined
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as attempts to change the power structure and policies of
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another state through secret contacts and secret funds by
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means which are stronger than mere persuasion (propaganda)
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and less severe than military action. Following the Korean
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War and the shift in the perception of the Soviet threat as
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more political and less military, the CIA concentrated its
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operations on political action, particularly in the form of
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covert support for electoral candidates and political
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parties.
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Covert political action may be carried out in the form
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of support of a friendly government or against its domestic
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opposition, a type of covert action known as subversive. It
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may also manifest itself in the form of support to a group
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that is the domestic opposition of an unfriendly government.
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The latter type of covert action is known as benign.
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Another and somewhat darker form of covert political
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activity is assassination. From time to time, a dictator
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unfriendly to the United States or its interests will take
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control of a country that the U.S. deems to be of vital
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significance. Perhaps the leader has a heavy Marxist bent
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like Fidel Castro or a somewhat unpredictable tendency to
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cause turmoil in the world like Moammar Gadhafi. In cases
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where such a person has seized power, the U.S. is often
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interested in removing the dictator by any means available.
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In cases where the leaders in the United States feel that the
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immediate removal of an unfriendly dictator is absolutely
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necessary if the U.S. is to enjoy continued security, U.S.
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leaders may resort to the unpleasant option of assassination.
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In 1975, in light of questions about the conduct of the
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CIA in domestic affairs in the United States, the Senate
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Select Committee on Intelligence, headed by Senator Frank
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Church of Idaho, began hearings on the CIA and its
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activities. The Church Committee (as it become known) issued
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a report in 1975 entitled "Alleged Assassination Plots
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Involving Foreign Leaders" which provided a unique inside
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account of how such plans originate. The CIA was allegedly
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involved in assassination plots against Fidel Castro of Cuba,
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Patrice Lumumba of the Congo, and Ngo Din Diem of South
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Vietnam. The Agency also allegedly schemed to assassinate
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President Sukarno of Indonesia and Francois "Papa Doc"
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Duvalier of Haiti. The Agency had provided arms to
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dissidents within Indonesia and Haiti, but witnesses before
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the Church Committee swore that those weapons were never
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given for the purpose of murdering either man.
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In addition to plotting to assassinate foreign leaders,
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the CIA often supplied dissidents within foreign countries
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controlled by unfriendly governments with arms and
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ammunition. In Chile, the CIA passed three .45 calibre
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machine guns, ten tear-gas grenades, and five-hundred rounds
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of ammunition. For Castro dissidents, the Agency prepared a
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cache composed of a rifle with a telescope and silencer and
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several bombs which could be concealed in a suitcase.
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Finally, in the Dominican Republic, where the United States
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disliked Rafael Trujillo, the CIA prepared to drop twelve
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untraceable rifles with scopes. That drop was never
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executed.
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In all of the plots in which the Agency was involved, it
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made sure that its role was indirect. Never once did an
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American CIA agent actually make any of the assassination
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attempts. According to Loch Johnson in A Season of Inquiry:
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In no case was an American finger actually on the
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trigger of these weapons. And even though the
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officials of the United States had clearly
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initiated assassination plots against Castro and
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Lumumba, it was technically true--as Richard Helms
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had claimed--that neither the CIA nor any other
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agency of the American government had murdered a
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foreign leader. Through others, however, we had
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tried, but had either been too inept...or too late
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to succeed.
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|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
Economic covert operations are those in which an attempt
|
|||
|
|
is made to affect the economic machinery within a country
|
|||
|
|
with the aim of achieving a desired result. An example would
|
|||
|
|
be the CIA's involvement in trying to contaminate part of a
|
|||
|
|
cargo of Cuban sugar that was bound for the Soviet Union.
|
|||
|
|
This type of activity might also come in the form of helping
|
|||
|
|
a country become more economically efficient and hoping that
|
|||
|
|
the success will be noticed by other countries who will then
|
|||
|
|
embrace the democratic ideals and methods through which the
|
|||
|
|
"model" country has become prosperous.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
Perhaps the most tangible type of covert action engaged
|
|||
|
|
in by the CIA is in the form of paramilitary operations.
|
|||
|
|
This category of covert operations is also potentially the
|
|||
|
|
most politically dangerous. With the onset of the Cold War
|
|||
|
|
and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, military operations
|
|||
|
|
became both necessary and dangerous at the same time. In
|
|||
|
|
countries where other forms of persuasion did not seem to be
|
|||
|
|
working, it often seemed necessary to use military forces to
|
|||
|
|
further the foreign policy goals of the United States. The
|
|||
|
|
perceived threat of Soviet domination of the Third World
|
|||
|
|
served to increase the pressure for military intervention.
|
|||
|
|
It was thus decided by U.S. leaders that the nation should
|
|||
|
|
have paramilitary capabilities. The responsibility for
|
|||
|
|
devising and carrying out these operations naturally settled
|
|||
|
|
upon the shoulders of the CIA.
|
|||
|
|
Though the United States began to work on developing a
|
|||
|
|
paramilitary capability after World War II, with the
|
|||
|
|
exception of an operation in Guatemala in 1954, the scale of
|
|||
|
|
activities was minimal before 1961. When President John F.
|
|||
|
|
Kennedy took office in 1961, he and his closest advisors were
|
|||
|
|
convinced of the need for the U.S. to develop an
|
|||
|
|
unconventional warfare capability to counter the growing
|
|||
|
|
evidence of communist guerilla activities in Southeast Asia
|
|||
|
|
and Africa. The aim of "counterinsurgency" (as it became
|
|||
|
|
known) was to prevent communist supported military victories
|
|||
|
|
without causing a major U.S./Soviet confrontation.
|
|||
|
|
Simultaneously, Kennedy directed the CIA to develop and use
|
|||
|
|
its paramilitary capabilities around the world. Thus, in the
|
|||
|
|
decade of the 1960s, developing a paramilitary capability
|
|||
|
|
became the primary objective of the CIA's clandestine
|
|||
|
|
activities, and by 1967, spending on paramilitary activities
|
|||
|
|
had surpassed both psychological and political action in the
|
|||
|
|
amount of budgetary allocation.
|
|||
|
|
In the early 1960s, the decolonization of Africa sparked
|
|||
|
|
an increase in the scale of CIA clandestine activities on
|
|||
|
|
that continent. CIA activities there paralleled the growing
|
|||
|
|
interest within the State Department and the Kennedy
|
|||
|
|
Administration in Third World Countries, which were regarded
|
|||
|
|
as the first line of defense against the Soviets. The U.S.
|
|||
|
|
Government assumed that the Soviets would attempt to encroach
|
|||
|
|
upon the newly independent states. Thus the African
|
|||
|
|
continent, which prior to 1960 was included in the CIA's
|
|||
|
|
Middle-Eastern Division became a separate division. In
|
|||
|
|
addition, between 1959 and 1963, the number of CIA stations
|
|||
|
|
in Africa increased by 55.5%. Also, the perception of a
|
|||
|
|
growing Soviet presence both politically and through guerilla
|
|||
|
|
activity in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia, resulted in a 40%
|
|||
|
|
increase in the size of the Western Hemisphere Division
|
|||
|
|
between 1960 and 1965.
|
|||
|
|
Throughout the 1960s, the CIA was involved in
|
|||
|
|
paramilitary operations in a number of countries. Its
|
|||
|
|
involvement included efforts in Angola, Vietnam, Laos, and
|
|||
|
|
Cuba. Many of the CIA's undertakings were either
|
|||
|
|
unsuccessful or without any clear result and some of them
|
|||
|
|
will be discussed later. Before leaving this category of
|
|||
|
|
covert operations, it is interesting to consider a story
|
|||
|
|
recounted by Fred Branfman, in a book entitled Uncloaking the
|
|||
|
|
CIA by Howard Frazier.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
There are many stories I could tell about him, but
|
|||
|
|
I will tell just one. In the late 1960s a friend
|
|||
|
|
of mine was a pilot for a private CIA airline. The
|
|||
|
|
agent threw a box on the airplane one day and said
|
|||
|
|
"Take this to Landry in Udorn". (Pat Landry was
|
|||
|
|
the head of the CIA in Udorn, coordinating the
|
|||
|
|
Burma-Thailand-Laos-North Vietnam theatre). My
|
|||
|
|
friend started flying the plane and noticed a bad
|
|||
|
|
odor coming from the box. After some time he could
|
|||
|
|
not stand it anymore and opened up the box. Inside
|
|||
|
|
was a fresh human head. This was a joke. The idea
|
|||
|
|
was to see what Pat Landry would do when someone
|
|||
|
|
put this box on his desk. You cannot throw a human
|
|||
|
|
head in the wastepaper basket, you cannot throw it
|
|||
|
|
in the garbage can. CIA paramilitary activities
|
|||
|
|
were and are being carried out by people, like this
|
|||
|
|
agent, who have gone beyond the pale of civilized
|
|||
|
|
behavior. There are hundreds of these people now
|
|||
|
|
working in the Third World. This fact is, of
|
|||
|
|
course, not just a disgrace, but a clear and
|
|||
|
|
present danger.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
CHAPTER THREE
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
In the first two decades following its establishment,
|
|||
|
|
the CIA initiated a number of programs to develop a chemical
|
|||
|
|
and biological warfare capacity. Project NKNAOMI was begun
|
|||
|
|
to provide the CIA with a covert support base to meet its
|
|||
|
|
clandestine operational requirements. This was to be
|
|||
|
|
accomplished by stockpiling several incapacitating and lethal
|
|||
|
|
materials for specific use by the Technical Services Division
|
|||
|
|
of the CIA. Under this plan, the TSD was to maintain in
|
|||
|
|
operational readiness special and unique items for the
|
|||
|
|
dissemination of biological and chemical materials. The
|
|||
|
|
project also provided for the required surveillance, testing,
|
|||
|
|
upgrading, and evaluation of materials and items in order to
|
|||
|
|
assure the absence of defects and the complete predictability
|
|||
|
|
of results to be expected under operational conditions. In
|
|||
|
|
1952, the Special Operations Division of the U.S. Army was
|
|||
|
|
asked to assist the CIA in developing, testing, and
|
|||
|
|
maintaining biological agents and delivery systems for the
|
|||
|
|
purposes mentioned above.
|
|||
|
|
The SOD helped the CIA develop darts coated with
|
|||
|
|
biological agents and different types of pills. The two also
|
|||
|
|
devised a special gun which could fire darts enabling an
|
|||
|
|
agent to incapacitate guard dogs, enter the installation the
|
|||
|
|
dogs were guarding, and return the dogs to consciousness upon
|
|||
|
|
departure from the facility. In addition, the CIA asked the
|
|||
|
|
SOD to study the feasibility of using biological agents
|
|||
|
|
against crops and animals. Indeed, a CIA memo written in
|
|||
|
|
1967 and uncovered by the Church Committee gives evidence of
|
|||
|
|
at least three methods of covert attack against crops which
|
|||
|
|
had been developed and evaluated under field conditions.
|
|||
|
|
Project NKNAOMI was discontinued in 1970, and on
|
|||
|
|
November 25, 1969, President Richard Nixon renounced the use
|
|||
|
|
of any form of biological weapons that could kill or
|
|||
|
|
incapacitate. Nixon also ordered the disposal of existing
|
|||
|
|
stockpiles of bacteriological weapons. On February 14, 1970,
|
|||
|
|
Nixon clarified the extent of his earlier order and indicated
|
|||
|
|
that toxins--chemicals that are not living organisms but
|
|||
|
|
produced by living organisms--were considered bacteriological
|
|||
|
|
weapons subject to his previous directive. Despite the
|
|||
|
|
presidential order, a CIA scientist acquired around 11 grams
|
|||
|
|
of a deadly shellfish toxin from SOD personnel at Fort
|
|||
|
|
Detrick and stored it in a little-used CIA laboratory where
|
|||
|
|
it remained, undetected, for over five years.
|
|||
|
|
Another project, MKULTRA, provided for the research and
|
|||
|
|
development of chemical, biological, and radiological
|
|||
|
|
materials which could be employed in clandestine operations
|
|||
|
|
to control human behavior. According to the Church
|
|||
|
|
Committee, a CIA memo was uncovered which stated the purpose
|
|||
|
|
of the project. The memo indicated that MKULTRA's purpose
|
|||
|
|
was
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
to develop a capability in the covert use of
|
|||
|
|
biological and chemical materials...Aside from the
|
|||
|
|
offensive potential, the development of a
|
|||
|
|
comprehensive capability in this field of covert
|
|||
|
|
chemical and biological warfare gives us a thorough
|
|||
|
|
knowledge of the enemy's theoretical potential,
|
|||
|
|
thus enabling us to defend ourselves against a foe
|
|||
|
|
who might not be as restrained in the use of these
|
|||
|
|
techniques as we are.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
Eighty-six universities or institutions were involved to some
|
|||
|
|
extent in the project.
|
|||
|
|
As early as 1947, the CIA had begun experimentation with
|
|||
|
|
different types of mind-altering chemicals and drugs. One
|
|||
|
|
Project, CHATTER, involved the testing of "truth drugs" for
|
|||
|
|
interrogation and agent recruitment. The research included
|
|||
|
|
laboratory experiments on animals and human volunteers
|
|||
|
|
involving scopolamine, mescaline, and Anabasis aphylla in
|
|||
|
|
order to determine their speech-inducing qualities. The
|
|||
|
|
project, which was expanded substantially during the Korean
|
|||
|
|
War, ended in 1953.
|
|||
|
|
Another, more controversial, program involved testing
|
|||
|
|
the hallucinogenic drug LSD on human subjects. LSD testing
|
|||
|
|
by the CIA involved three phases. In the first phase, the
|
|||
|
|
Agency administered LSD to 1,000 soldiers who volunteered for
|
|||
|
|
the testing. Agency scientists observed the subjects and
|
|||
|
|
noted their reactions to the drug. In the second phase of
|
|||
|
|
research, Material Testing Programme EA 1729, 95 volunteers
|
|||
|
|
received LSD to test the potential intelligence-gathering
|
|||
|
|
value of the drug. The third phase of the testing, Projects
|
|||
|
|
THIRD CHANCE and DERBY HAT, involved the interrogation of
|
|||
|
|
eighteen unwitting non-volunteers in Europe and the Far East
|
|||
|
|
who had received LSD as part of operational field tests.
|
|||
|
|
A tragic twist in the LSD experimentation occurred on
|
|||
|
|
November 27, 1953. Dr. Frank Olson, a civilian employee of
|
|||
|
|
the U.S. Army died following participation in a CIA
|
|||
|
|
experiment with LSD. He unknowingly received 70 micrograms
|
|||
|
|
of LSD which was placed in his drink by Dr. Robert Lashbrook,
|
|||
|
|
a CIA officer, as part of an experiment. Shortly after the
|
|||
|
|
experiment, Olson exhibited the symptoms of paranoia and
|
|||
|
|
schizophrenia. Accompanied by Lashbrook, Olson began
|
|||
|
|
visiting Dr. Harold Abrahamsom for psychological assistance.
|
|||
|
|
Abrahamson's research on LSD had been funded indirectly by
|
|||
|
|
the CIA. Olson jumped to his death from a ten-story window
|
|||
|
|
in the Statler Hotel while receiving treatment.
|
|||
|
|
It was disclosed by Senate Committees investigating the
|
|||
|
|
activities of the CIA in 1977 that the Agency was involved in
|
|||
|
|
testing drugs like LSD on "unwitting subjects in social
|
|||
|
|
situations". In some situations, heroin addicts were enticed
|
|||
|
|
into participating in order to get a reward--heroin. Perhaps
|
|||
|
|
most disturbing of all is the fact that the extent of
|
|||
|
|
experimentation on human subjects cannot readily be
|
|||
|
|
determined, since the records of all MKULTRA activities were
|
|||
|
|
destroyed in January 1973 at the instruction of then CIA
|
|||
|
|
director Richard Helms.
|
|||
|
|
At least one project undertaken by the CIA in 1950 was
|
|||
|
|
aimed at finding ways to protect the security of agents in
|
|||
|
|
the field. Project BLUEBIRD attempted to discover means of
|
|||
|
|
conditioning personnel to prevent unauthorized extraction of
|
|||
|
|
information from them by known means. The project
|
|||
|
|
investigated the possibility of controlling an individual by
|
|||
|
|
employing special interrogation techniques. BLUEBIRD also
|
|||
|
|
looked into memory enhancement and ways to establish
|
|||
|
|
defensive means against the hostile control of Agency
|
|||
|
|
personnel. As a result of interrogations conducted overseas
|
|||
|
|
during the project, another goal was established--the
|
|||
|
|
evaluation of the offensive uses of unconventional
|
|||
|
|
interrogation methods, including the use of hypnosis and
|
|||
|
|
various drugs.
|
|||
|
|
In August 1951, the project was renamed ARTICHOKE.
|
|||
|
|
Project ARTICHOKE included "in-house experiments on
|
|||
|
|
interrogation techniques, conducted 'under medical and
|
|||
|
|
security controls which would ensure that no damage was done
|
|||
|
|
to the individuals who volunteer for the experiments'".
|
|||
|
|
Although the CIA maintains that the project ended in 1956,
|
|||
|
|
evidence indicates that the Office of Security and Office of
|
|||
|
|
Medical Services use of "special interrogation" techniques
|
|||
|
|
continued for several years thereafter.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
CHAPTER FOUR
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
The National Security Act of July 1947 established the
|
|||
|
|
CIA as it exists today. Under the Act, the CIA's mission was
|
|||
|
|
loosely defined, since any efforts to flesh out its duties in
|
|||
|
|
specific terms would have unduly limited the scope of its
|
|||
|
|
activities. Therefore, under the Act, the CIA was charged to
|
|||
|
|
perform five general tasks. The first is to advise the
|
|||
|
|
National Security Council on matters relating to national
|
|||
|
|
security. The second is to make recommendations to the NSC
|
|||
|
|
regarding the coordination of intelligence activities of the
|
|||
|
|
various departments. The third duty is to correlate and
|
|||
|
|
evaluate intelligence data and provide for its appropriate
|
|||
|
|
dissemination. Fourth, the CIA is to carry out "service of
|
|||
|
|
common concern". Finally, the CIA is authorized "to perform
|
|||
|
|
all other functions and duties related to intelligence
|
|||
|
|
affecting the national security as the NSC will from time to
|
|||
|
|
time direct...".
|
|||
|
|
It is from this final directive that the wide-ranging
|
|||
|
|
power to do everything from plotting political assassinations
|
|||
|
|
and government overthrows to buying off local newspaper
|
|||
|
|
owners and mining harbors has come. The wording of that
|
|||
|
|
final directive has allowed presidents of the United States
|
|||
|
|
to organize and use secret armies to achieve covertly the
|
|||
|
|
policy aims that they are not able to achieve through overt
|
|||
|
|
means. It allows presidents both present and future to use
|
|||
|
|
the resources of the nation's top intelligence agency as they
|
|||
|
|
see fit.
|
|||
|
|
Now that we have become more educated regarding the
|
|||
|
|
Central Intelligence Agency and some of its numerous
|
|||
|
|
activities, we shall proceed to the main purpose of this
|
|||
|
|
analysis. This work is intended to give the reader a clear
|
|||
|
|
understanding of the types of covert operations in which the
|
|||
|
|
CIA involves itself. We will then assess the effectiveness
|
|||
|
|
of various techniques used by the Agency. Doing so will help
|
|||
|
|
us draw conclusions about the proper scope of CIA activities
|
|||
|
|
and will enable us to address questions about areas of
|
|||
|
|
legitimate involvement by the CIA. We shall begin by looking
|
|||
|
|
at a number of CIA covert operations since 1947.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADIO LIBERTY
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
In 1949, the CIA founded the National Committee for a
|
|||
|
|
Free Europe and the Committee for the Liberation of Peoples
|
|||
|
|
of Russia. The immediate result of the establishment of
|
|||
|
|
these two committees was the founding of two broadcasting
|
|||
|
|
stations, Radio Free Europe in Munich and Radio Liberation.
|
|||
|
|
These stations were staffed with emigres who broadcast to
|
|||
|
|
their countrymen in their native languages. Radio
|
|||
|
|
Liberation, which became Radio Liberty in 1956, was targeted
|
|||
|
|
mainly at the Soviet Union and broadcast in fourteen
|
|||
|
|
different languages. The main target of Radio Free Europe
|
|||
|
|
was the satellite countries of Eastern Europe. The primary
|
|||
|
|
advantage of the emigre staffs was that the broadcasters were
|
|||
|
|
able to keep abreast of recent developments in their former
|
|||
|
|
homelands by communicating to recent emigres and direct
|
|||
|
|
contacts inside their native countries. As a result of the
|
|||
|
|
close contact, broadcasters were able to speak knowledgeably
|
|||
|
|
and intimately to their fellow countrymen.
|
|||
|
|
The initial broadcasts by Radio Free Europe and Radio
|
|||
|
|
Liberation were designed to intensify the passive resistance
|
|||
|
|
of the people in the target countries in hopes that such
|
|||
|
|
action would undermine European regimes by weakening the
|
|||
|
|
control of the Communist party. The broadcasts were also
|
|||
|
|
intended to give the targeted listeners the strength to hold
|
|||
|
|
on to their hope for ultimate freedom. Later, after Stalin
|
|||
|
|
died and relations between the East and West began to
|
|||
|
|
improve, U.S. leaders began to realize that slow change was
|
|||
|
|
more likely than a dramatic shift in power. Therefore, the
|
|||
|
|
messages which were broadcast dwelt less on liberation and
|
|||
|
|
more on themes involving political and social change.
|
|||
|
|
In addition to broadcasting in Europe, the CIA used this
|
|||
|
|
persuasive propaganda technique elsewhere, most notably, in
|
|||
|
|
Cuba. In 1961, the Agency used a broadcasting station in
|
|||
|
|
conjunction with other arrangements that were made to support
|
|||
|
|
the invasion at the Bay of Pigs. The CIA used Radio Swan to
|
|||
|
|
mislead the Cuban government, encourage the rebels, and to
|
|||
|
|
make it seem like there was massive support for a rebellion
|
|||
|
|
within Cuba.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
ECONOMIC COVERT ACTIVITIES: TAIWAN
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
A good example of the positive type of economic covert
|
|||
|
|
action is the success story of Taiwan. The Republic of China
|
|||
|
|
is an example of the successful use of economic assistance
|
|||
|
|
(especially in agriculture) to further the interests of the
|
|||
|
|
United States. In Taiwan, early land reform gave ownership
|
|||
|
|
of the land to those who worked it. Coupled with
|
|||
|
|
technological guidance on modern farming techniques, the
|
|||
|
|
system provided a praiseworthy model for other developing
|
|||
|
|
countries. The introduction of miracle seeds and chemical
|
|||
|
|
fertilizers helped to make Taiwan an economic showcase.
|
|||
|
|
Around 1960, the U.S. came up with the idea of helping the
|
|||
|
|
Chinese Nationalists set up food-growing demonstration
|
|||
|
|
projects in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, where
|
|||
|
|
both their techniques and personnel were suited to the task
|
|||
|
|
of helping primitive agricultural societies.
|
|||
|
|
The project in Taiwan was not only an economic aid
|
|||
|
|
program helping to build prestige and political contacts for
|
|||
|
|
the Nationalist Chinese, it also provided a demonstration of
|
|||
|
|
what Chinese people working under a free market system were
|
|||
|
|
capable of doing. The prosperity of the Taiwanese as seen
|
|||
|
|
against the backdrop of the economic shortcomings of Mao's
|
|||
|
|
programs on the mainland was the kind of creative propaganda
|
|||
|
|
campaign that supported U.S. policies and principles. The
|
|||
|
|
CIA's role was to use its contacts in the other developing
|
|||
|
|
countries to explain the mutual benefits and get the
|
|||
|
|
undertaking going. The economic assistance program that was
|
|||
|
|
implemented could have been an overt one, but acknowledged
|
|||
|
|
U.S. sponsorship would have caused some governments to shy
|
|||
|
|
away from it. Furthermore, an overt pushing of the program
|
|||
|
|
by the United States might have embarrassed Taiwan by giving
|
|||
|
|
the impression that it was forced to do the job by the U.S.
|
|||
|
|
Ray Cline, then a touring case officer for the CIA,
|
|||
|
|
explained the project in "off the record talks with Chiang
|
|||
|
|
Ching-kuo, the savvy son of Chiang Kai-shek, who was perhaps
|
|||
|
|
the most far-sighted political leader in Taiwan." Cline
|
|||
|
|
added,
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
Ching-kuo grasped the concept immediately and saw
|
|||
|
|
the benefits, as did other Taiwanese Foreign and
|
|||
|
|
Agricultural policy officials. The program was
|
|||
|
|
organized by the Chinese with a minimum of American
|
|||
|
|
help and it worked well for about ten years. In
|
|||
|
|
some regions, it continued to work even longer, and
|
|||
|
|
everyone has profited from the program.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
Thus, the success of the program in Taiwan was a testimonial
|
|||
|
|
to the potential for success for well planned economic covert
|
|||
|
|
actions conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
OPERATION MONGOOSE
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
In order to get a better idea of the kind of planning
|
|||
|
|
that went into the assassination schemes devised by the CIA,
|
|||
|
|
we will look at the case of Fidel Castro. In addition, at
|
|||
|
|
the end of this work appears a number of messages that were
|
|||
|
|
transmitted between the CIA station chief in Leopoldville and
|
|||
|
|
headquarters in Washington regarding the CIA attempts to
|
|||
|
|
assassinate Patrice Lumumba (Appendix II). Now let us look
|
|||
|
|
at the story behind Operation Mongoose, the CIA plan to
|
|||
|
|
eliminate Fidel Castro.
|
|||
|
|
When Castro took power in Cuba in 1959, U.S. leadership
|
|||
|
|
made it a top priority to remove him. According to Ray
|
|||
|
|
Cline, former Deputy-Director of the CIA,
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
The CIA had advocated the 'elimination of Fidel
|
|||
|
|
Castro' as early as December 1959, and the matter
|
|||
|
|
was discussed at Special Group meetings in January
|
|||
|
|
and March of 1960. At an NSC meeting on March 10,
|
|||
|
|
1960, terminology was used suggesting that the
|
|||
|
|
assassination of Castro, his brother Raul, and Che
|
|||
|
|
Guevara was at least theoretically considered.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
Describing the political climate by the time Kennedy took
|
|||
|
|
office, Cline comments in his book Secrets, Spies, and
|
|||
|
|
Scholars, "There was almost an obsession with Cuba on the
|
|||
|
|
part of policy matters" and it was widely believed in the
|
|||
|
|
Kennedy Administration "that the assassination of Castro by a
|
|||
|
|
Cuban might have been viewed as not very different in the
|
|||
|
|
benefits that would have accrued from the assassination of
|
|||
|
|
Hitler in 1944." It should also be noted that after the
|
|||
|
|
failure at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, the pride of the United
|
|||
|
|
States was hurt and U.S. leaders wanted more than ever to
|
|||
|
|
dispose of Castro.
|
|||
|
|
The number of strategies devised by the CIA to carry out
|
|||
|
|
the deed and the diversity of their applications illustrates
|
|||
|
|
the creativity and shrewdness of planners within the agency.
|
|||
|
|
Johnson points out a number of ingenious plots that were at
|
|||
|
|
least considered by planners within the agency at one time or
|
|||
|
|
another. This brief excerpt from his book is by no means an
|
|||
|
|
exhaustive list.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
The several plots planned at CIA headquarters
|
|||
|
|
included treating a box of Castro's favorite cigars
|
|||
|
|
with a botulinum toxin so potent that it would
|
|||
|
|
cause death immediately upon being placed to the
|
|||
|
|
lips; concocting highly poisonous tablets that
|
|||
|
|
would work quickly when immersed in just about
|
|||
|
|
anything but boiling soup; contaminating a diving
|
|||
|
|
suit with a fungus guaranteed to produce a chronic
|
|||
|
|
skin disease called Madura foot and, through and
|
|||
|
|
intermediary, offering the suit as a gift to
|
|||
|
|
Castro; constructing an exotic seashell that could
|
|||
|
|
be placed in reefs where Castro often went skin-
|
|||
|
|
diving and then exploded at the right moment from a
|
|||
|
|
small submarine nearby; and providing an agent with
|
|||
|
|
a ballpoint pen that contained a hypodermic needle
|
|||
|
|
filled with the deadly poison Black-leaf 40 and had
|
|||
|
|
so fine a point it could pierce the skin of the
|
|||
|
|
victim without his knowledge.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
Perhaps more frightening than any of the above plots was
|
|||
|
|
the revelation that the CIA also attempted to launch a plot
|
|||
|
|
against Castro through its contacts with underworld figures
|
|||
|
|
with connections in Cuba. The fact that the agency was
|
|||
|
|
willing to resort to such desperate action illustrates the
|
|||
|
|
desire of the men in charge in Washington to eliminate
|
|||
|
|
Castro. One source told a reporter in 1962 that then
|
|||
|
|
Attorney-General Robert Kennedy had stopped a deal between
|
|||
|
|
the CIA and the Mafia to murder Fidel Castro.
|
|||
|
|
The CIA asked a mobster named Roselli to go to Florida
|
|||
|
|
on its behalf in 1961 and 1962 to organize assassination
|
|||
|
|
teams of Cuban exiles who would infiltrate their homeland and
|
|||
|
|
assassinate Castro. Rosselli called upon two other crime
|
|||
|
|
figures, Sam Giancana, a mobster from Chicago, and the Costra
|
|||
|
|
Nostra chieftain for Cuba, Santos Trafficante, to help him.
|
|||
|
|
Giancana, using the name "Sam Gold" in his dealings with the
|
|||
|
|
CIA, was on the Attorney General's "Ten Most Wanted
|
|||
|
|
Criminals" list.
|
|||
|
|
Castro was still permitting the Mafia gambling syndicate
|
|||
|
|
to operate in Havana, for tourists only, and Trafficante
|
|||
|
|
traveled back and forth between Havana and Miami in that
|
|||
|
|
connection. The mobsters were authorized to offer $150,000
|
|||
|
|
to anyone who would kill Castro and were promised any support
|
|||
|
|
the Agency could yield. Giancana was to locate someone who
|
|||
|
|
was close enough to Castro to be able to drop pills into his
|
|||
|
|
food while Trafficante would serve as courier to Cuba,
|
|||
|
|
helping to make arrangements for the murder on the island.
|
|||
|
|
Rosselli was to be the main link between all of the
|
|||
|
|
participants in the plot.
|
|||
|
|
Fortunately for the CIA, the Attorney General intervened
|
|||
|
|
before the plan was carried out. Had the plan succeeded and
|
|||
|
|
it then become public knowledge that the CIA and the Mafia
|
|||
|
|
worked together intimately to murder Castro, the startling
|
|||
|
|
revelation might have been too much for the American public
|
|||
|
|
to stomach. It most likely would have done serious damage to
|
|||
|
|
the credibility of an agency which was already beginning to
|
|||
|
|
rouse public suspicion.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
GUATEMALA: THE OVERTHROW OF ARBENZ
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
In 1951, leftist leader Juan Jose Arevalo was succeeded
|
|||
|
|
by his minister of defense, Jacobo Arbenz, who continued to
|
|||
|
|
pursue Arevalo's hard leftist policy both domestically and in
|
|||
|
|
Foreign Affairs. The United States Government found Arbenz's
|
|||
|
|
policy objectives unacceptable and cut off all military aid
|
|||
|
|
to Guatemala. President Eisenhower encouraged the CIA to
|
|||
|
|
overthrow the Arbenz government in 1954.
|
|||
|
|
Arbenz had angered the Eisenhower Administration by
|
|||
|
|
legalizing the Communist party and inviting it to join his
|
|||
|
|
government. The real trigger for the action in Guatemala,
|
|||
|
|
however, was Arbenz's brazen rejection on September 5, 1953,
|
|||
|
|
of an American protest denouncing Guatemala's proposed
|
|||
|
|
"expropriation " from the American owned United Fruit Company
|
|||
|
|
of 355,000 acres on the Pacific and 174,000 acres on the
|
|||
|
|
Atlantic side of the country. The protest said that the
|
|||
|
|
$600,000 in agrarian bonds proposed to be paid for these
|
|||
|
|
acres "bears not the slightest resemblance to a true
|
|||
|
|
evaluation." In addition, John Foster Dulles, who by that
|
|||
|
|
time realized there would be no roll-back of communism in
|
|||
|
|
Eastern Europe, was determined to block communist regimes
|
|||
|
|
from taking power elsewhere in the world, and especially in
|
|||
|
|
the Western Hemisphere. As a matter of fact, the Eisenhower
|
|||
|
|
administration had earmarked $20 million for an operation
|
|||
|
|
against Guatemala.
|
|||
|
|
The U.S. put political and economic pressure on the
|
|||
|
|
Arbenz government at the public level while the CIA
|
|||
|
|
diligently worked behind the scenes. On the covert level,
|
|||
|
|
the CIA began trying to convince top Guatemalan military
|
|||
|
|
officers to defect while simultaneously launching a campaign
|
|||
|
|
of radio and leaflet propaganda against Arbenz. The CIA
|
|||
|
|
engineered a brilliant campaign (considered as much a
|
|||
|
|
propaganda success as a paramilitary one) using small-scale
|
|||
|
|
military action along with psychological warfare to cause
|
|||
|
|
quite a disturbance in the Latin American country.
|
|||
|
|
The main attempt by the CIA was to support a military
|
|||
|
|
plot to overthrow the government that was already in
|
|||
|
|
progress. Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas had begun plotting a
|
|||
|
|
coup against the Arbenz regime in 1952 with the help of
|
|||
|
|
leaders in Nicaragua and Honduras, and the encouragement of
|
|||
|
|
the United Fruit Company. The CIA action was aimed mainly at
|
|||
|
|
alienating the Guatemalan Army from Arbenz. CIA operatives
|
|||
|
|
sought to attain this goal by inciting the Army through radio
|
|||
|
|
broadcasts and other propaganda, and by supplying arms to the
|
|||
|
|
insurgents.
|
|||
|
|
The operation began on May 1, 1954, a Guatemalan
|
|||
|
|
holiday. Steadily escalating psychological pressures were
|
|||
|
|
brought to bear on the Arbenz government. It was no secret
|
|||
|
|
that Castillo Armas was training an army of several hundred
|
|||
|
|
men in Honduras, and the United States officially denounced
|
|||
|
|
the Arbenz regime, leading the Guatemalan dictator to believe
|
|||
|
|
that a large-scale U.S. effort to help overthrow him was
|
|||
|
|
underway. Since the poorly equipped Guatemalan Army was no
|
|||
|
|
match for a U.S.-backed invasion, Arbenz was alarmed and his
|
|||
|
|
top advisors were divided over how to deal with the
|
|||
|
|
situation.
|
|||
|
|
On June 17, 1954, Colonel Castillo, using about 450
|
|||
|
|
troops, initiated a paramilitary operation against Arbenz
|
|||
|
|
which ended on the 18th. Castillo and his men crossed over
|
|||
|
|
into Guatemala from Honduras to attack the Arbenz government.
|
|||
|
|
Castillo set-up camp six miles inside Guatemala, and his Air-
|
|||
|
|
Force, a mixed handful of B-26s and P-47 fighters, dropped
|
|||
|
|
leaflets, made strafing runs in outlying districts, and
|
|||
|
|
dropped a few bombs. The attacks were militarily
|
|||
|
|
insignificant, but they contributed to the wide-spread fear
|
|||
|
|
of all-out raids.
|
|||
|
|
Meanwhile, the Voice of Liberation, the CIA-run
|
|||
|
|
broadcasting station, was active around the clock, reporting
|
|||
|
|
phantom "battles" and spreading rumors. Arbenz was bombarded
|
|||
|
|
with conflicting reports. Without even one serious military
|
|||
|
|
engagement having occurred, Arbenz found himself confused,
|
|||
|
|
excited, undecided, and alone.
|
|||
|
|
In mid-campaign, Castillo Armas had lost two of his
|
|||
|
|
three P-47s without which he would be incapable of
|
|||
|
|
maintaining a show of force. The United States negotiated
|
|||
|
|
the "sale" of a number of planes to the Nicaraguan Air-Force.
|
|||
|
|
Sorties were flown in the planes for Castillo Armas by CIA
|
|||
|
|
pilots.
|
|||
|
|
Arbenz was forced to flee, and on June 25, 1954, he
|
|||
|
|
sought asylum in the Mexican Embassy. Two days later, he
|
|||
|
|
resigned. A few days later, Castillo Armas, having taken
|
|||
|
|
charge, arrived victorious in Guatemala on the plane of U.S.
|
|||
|
|
Ambassador John Peurifoy. Peurifoy's wrote the following
|
|||
|
|
jingle which appeared in Time magazine July 28, 1954, which
|
|||
|
|
seemed to sum up nicely the U.S. attitude about the CIA-
|
|||
|
|
sponsored operation in Guatemala:
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
Sing a song of quetzals, pockets full of peace!
|
|||
|
|
The junta's in the palace, they've taken out a lease.
|
|||
|
|
The Commies are in hiding, just across the street;
|
|||
|
|
To the embassy of Mexico they beat a quick retreat.
|
|||
|
|
And pistol-packing Peurifoy looks mighty optimistic
|
|||
|
|
For the land of Guatemala is no longer Communistic.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
CUBA: THE BAY OF PIGS
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
As surely as the successful operation in Guatemala was an
|
|||
|
|
example of how to conduct a covert action, the debacle in Cuba
|
|||
|
|
was a primary example of what not to do. The disaster at the Bay
|
|||
|
|
of Pigs in Cuba seriously altered the perception of the CIA's
|
|||
|
|
ability to plan and conduct covert paramilitary operations.
|
|||
|
|
Indeed, as Satish Kumar pointed out in his book The CIA in the
|
|||
|
|
Third World: A Study in Crypto-Diplomacy, "it is certain that
|
|||
|
|
the Cuban operation cast serious doubts as to the efficacy of
|
|||
|
|
large-scale para-military operations as an instrument of covert
|
|||
|
|
action." Says Harry Rositzke, a former CIA operative,
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
Para-military operations are the "noisiest" of all
|
|||
|
|
covert actions. When they fail, they become public
|
|||
|
|
fiascos, and no official denials are plausible.
|
|||
|
|
The history of American para-military operations as
|
|||
|
|
an element of America's containment policy is one
|
|||
|
|
of almost uniform failure.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
Such was the case with the ill-fated Bay of Pigs operation in
|
|||
|
|
Cuba.
|
|||
|
|
The idea of a Soviet-oriented communist dictatorship a mere
|
|||
|
|
ninety miles from the United States was a grave concern for U.S.
|
|||
|
|
leaders in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Neither President
|
|||
|
|
Eisenhower nor his predecessor John Fitzgerald Kennedy were
|
|||
|
|
pleased to have a neighbor with such undemocratic ideals. As
|
|||
|
|
early as 1959, the CIA had advocated the elimination of Castro,
|
|||
|
|
and as has already been pointed out, the Agency began an
|
|||
|
|
operation (Operation MONGOOSE) aimed at accomplishing just that.
|
|||
|
|
The alternative of initiating guerilla operations against
|
|||
|
|
Castro had been abandoned by the CIA in 1960. Instead,
|
|||
|
|
Eisenhower set-up a CIA-run program for training hundreds of
|
|||
|
|
highly motivated anti-Castro Cuban refugees in the arts of
|
|||
|
|
guerilla combat, planning to possibly use the force to overthrow
|
|||
|
|
the Castro government. Vice President Richard Nixon was a strong
|
|||
|
|
supporter of a program to topple the Castro regime, and
|
|||
|
|
Eisenhower, upon the advice of the NSC Subcommittee responsible
|
|||
|
|
for reviewing covert action schemes, approved the paramilitary
|
|||
|
|
training project as a contingency plan, leaving the decision of
|
|||
|
|
whether or not to execute it up to the incoming Kennedy
|
|||
|
|
administration.
|
|||
|
|
President Kennedy decided to go ahead with the plan after
|
|||
|
|
taking office. Senate Foreign Relations Chairman William
|
|||
|
|
Fulbright, upon learning of plans for the proposed invasion, sent
|
|||
|
|
a memorandum to the White House that said that if American forces
|
|||
|
|
were drawn into the battle in Cuba,
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
We would have undone the work of thirty years in
|
|||
|
|
trying to live down earlier interventions...To give
|
|||
|
|
this activity even covert support is of a piece
|
|||
|
|
with the hypocrisy and cynicism for which the
|
|||
|
|
United States is constantly denouncing the Soviet
|
|||
|
|
Union in the United Nations and elsewhere. This
|
|||
|
|
point will not be lost on the rest of the world nor
|
|||
|
|
our own consciences. And remember always, the
|
|||
|
|
Castro regime is a thorn in the side but not a
|
|||
|
|
dagger in the heart.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
The Senator's views were no doubt on Kennedy's mind when he
|
|||
|
|
later declined to commit American troops after the invasion
|
|||
|
|
began to fall apart.
|
|||
|
|
The CIA trained some 1400 Cuban emigres for action
|
|||
|
|
against Castro. Some of the Cubans were trained as ground
|
|||
|
|
forces and the remainder as pilots. It was eventually
|
|||
|
|
decided that the guerilla brigade would make an amphibious
|
|||
|
|
landing in the Bay of Pigs. Air support for the operation
|
|||
|
|
was to be supplied for the operation by emigre pilots flying
|
|||
|
|
in American B-26s made up to look like Cuban Air Force
|
|||
|
|
planes. This would help create the illusion that Castro's
|
|||
|
|
own men were rebelling against him. On April 15, 1961, eight
|
|||
|
|
U.S.-made planes conducted air strikes against three Cuban
|
|||
|
|
air bases with the intention of destroying the Cuban Air
|
|||
|
|
Force on the ground. These attempts proved to be
|
|||
|
|
unsuccessful. The events that followed spelled disaster for
|
|||
|
|
the Cuban guerrillas and the CIA.
|
|||
|
|
When the invasion force landed at the Bay of Pigs, it
|
|||
|
|
met considerably more resistance than had been expected.
|
|||
|
|
Despite broadcasts by the CIA run Radio Swan, the Cuban
|
|||
|
|
militia and citizens were not incited to rebel against the
|
|||
|
|
Castro regime as the CIA had estimated. Instead, the Cuban
|
|||
|
|
forces fought valiantly against the exile force. The Castro
|
|||
|
|
Air Force, which had not been completely destroyed, began to
|
|||
|
|
inflict severe damages on both the rebel air and ground
|
|||
|
|
forces. For all intents and purposes, the invasion was over
|
|||
|
|
almost as quickly as it had begun, with Castro's forces
|
|||
|
|
easily quashing the rebellion.
|
|||
|
|
Fatal to the operation were a number of bad breaks.
|
|||
|
|
U.S. air cover that was to be provided for one hour at the
|
|||
|
|
onset of the invasion never materialized because of a
|
|||
|
|
miscommunication between the rebels and the U.S. Air Force.
|
|||
|
|
The rebel Air Force sustained such heavy casualties that CIA
|
|||
|
|
pilots had to fly missions in a futile attempt to salvage
|
|||
|
|
the operation. As has already been mentioned, the Cuban
|
|||
|
|
people did not react as had been expected, and without
|
|||
|
|
popular support, the invasion had little chance of success.
|
|||
|
|
Even before the operation was a confirmed failure, the CIA
|
|||
|
|
cover story began to fall apart and later revelations about
|
|||
|
|
U.S. involvement in the fiasco greatly embarrassed the United
|
|||
|
|
States.
|
|||
|
|
The Castro forces took more than eleven-hundred
|
|||
|
|
prisoners during the fighting. Most of them were traded on
|
|||
|
|
Christmas eve of 1962 to the United States for $10 million in
|
|||
|
|
cash and $53 million in medicines, baby foods, and other
|
|||
|
|
supplies and equipment exempted from the American embargo on
|
|||
|
|
shipments to Cuba. Of the approximately 1300 guerrillas that
|
|||
|
|
actually had gone ashore, 114 were killed during the three
|
|||
|
|
fatal days of the operation.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
LAOS: THE SECRET ARMY
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
The CIA was involved in what has been regarded by many
|
|||
|
|
experts as the most outstanding example of the depth and
|
|||
|
|
magnitude of the clandestine operations of a major power in
|
|||
|
|
the post-war period. What is being referred to is the CIA's
|
|||
|
|
operations in Laos, known as the "secret army". The CIA's
|
|||
|
|
"secret war" in Laos went on for over a decade, involving "a
|
|||
|
|
military force of over 100,000 men, and in which were dropped
|
|||
|
|
over two million tons of bombs, as much as had been loosed on
|
|||
|
|
all Europe and the Pacific Theatre in World War II".
|
|||
|
|
The CIA involvement in Laos began with a presence in the
|
|||
|
|
country in the late 1950s. Initially, the operation involved
|
|||
|
|
air supply and paramilitary training of the Meo tribesmen to
|
|||
|
|
help them defend their country against the North Vietnamese.
|
|||
|
|
However, the operation gradually evolved into a full-scale
|
|||
|
|
management of the ground war in Laos by the CIA.
|
|||
|
|
According to Fred Branfman, what the CIA did in Laos was
|
|||
|
|
very simple.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
It created an army of its own, an army paid,
|
|||
|
|
controlled, and directed by American CIA officials
|
|||
|
|
entirely separately from the normal Laotian
|
|||
|
|
government structure...Some troops from every
|
|||
|
|
people in Southeast Asia were bought into Laos as
|
|||
|
|
part of what became known as "the secret army".
|
|||
|
|
The CIA trained the secret army; directed it in
|
|||
|
|
combat; decided when it would fight; and had it
|
|||
|
|
carry out espionage missions, assassinations of
|
|||
|
|
military and civilian figures, and sabotage.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
As was mentioned earlier, the U.S. dropped over two-
|
|||
|
|
million tons of bombs on Laos. The majority of those raids
|
|||
|
|
were targeted by CIA officials, not Air Force officials. The
|
|||
|
|
CIA officials worked at Udorn Air Force base. They were a
|
|||
|
|
special team of photo reconnaissance people who, because the
|
|||
|
|
CIA had men at Udorn and on the ground, bureaucratically
|
|||
|
|
decided which targets would be bombed.
|
|||
|
|
In Laos, the CIA put a great deal of emphasis on
|
|||
|
|
psychological warfare. Americans were told in the early '60s
|
|||
|
|
that the core of our program in Laos would be to win the
|
|||
|
|
"minds and hearts" of the people. Indeed, a tremendous
|
|||
|
|
attempt was made to do just that through land reform,
|
|||
|
|
education, and economic assistance. However, by the time
|
|||
|
|
President Nixon took office, winning the "hearts and minds"
|
|||
|
|
of the people had failed and the emphasis was shifted to
|
|||
|
|
controlling their behavior. The reasoning behind the shift
|
|||
|
|
in emphasis was simple. Although the United States might not
|
|||
|
|
be able to change the way the people thought, it could
|
|||
|
|
certainly control their political behavior.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
SOUTH VIETNAM: THE PHOENIX PROGRAM
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
Another country in Asia in which the CIA found itself
|
|||
|
|
heavily involved was Vietnam. From 1962-1965, the CIA worked
|
|||
|
|
with the South Vietnamese government to organize police
|
|||
|
|
forces and paramilitary units. After 1965, the CIA became
|
|||
|
|
engaged in a full-scale paramilitary assistance program to
|
|||
|
|
the South Vietnamese Government. The CIA commitment
|
|||
|
|
paralleled the growing U.S. commitment to South Vietnam.
|
|||
|
|
Perhaps one of the most grisly of all CIA paramilitary
|
|||
|
|
operations in any country was the Phoenix Program, which was
|
|||
|
|
initiated in South Vietnam in 1968. The program was
|
|||
|
|
originally designed to "neutralize", assassinate, or imprison
|
|||
|
|
members of the civilian infrastructure of the National
|
|||
|
|
Liberation Front (NLF). Offices were set up from Saigon all
|
|||
|
|
the way down to the district level. CIA advisors were
|
|||
|
|
present at every level. The function of the Phoenix offices
|
|||
|
|
was to collate intelligence about the "Vietcong
|
|||
|
|
infrastructure", interrogate civilians picked up at random by
|
|||
|
|
military units carrying out sweeps through villages, and
|
|||
|
|
"neutralize" targeted members of the NLF. The task of
|
|||
|
|
"neutralizing" NLF members was carried out by CIA-led South
|
|||
|
|
Vietnamese soldiers, organized into Provincial Reconnaissance
|
|||
|
|
Units.
|
|||
|
|
The original concept of the Phoenix Program was quickly
|
|||
|
|
diluted for two major reasons. One was that the pressure
|
|||
|
|
from the top to fill numerical quotas of persons to be
|
|||
|
|
neutralized was very great. The second was the difficulties
|
|||
|
|
encountered at the bottom levels in identifying members of
|
|||
|
|
the NLF civilian infrastructure who were often
|
|||
|
|
indistinguishable from the general population. The end
|
|||
|
|
result of these two problems was an increase in the numbers
|
|||
|
|
of innocent persons rounded up, detained, imprisoned, and
|
|||
|
|
murdered in an effort to show results.
|
|||
|
|
William Colby, the director of the Phoenix Program,
|
|||
|
|
testified before Congress in 1971 that Phoenix was an
|
|||
|
|
American responsibility:
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
The Americans had a great deal to do with starting
|
|||
|
|
the program...we had a great deal to do in terms of
|
|||
|
|
developing the ideas, discussing the need,
|
|||
|
|
developing some of the procedures, and so
|
|||
|
|
forth...maybe more than half the initiative came
|
|||
|
|
from us originally.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
According to Fred Branfman, high-ranking American
|
|||
|
|
officials in South Vietnam bear the sole responsibility for
|
|||
|
|
the practice of setting quotas of civilians to be rounded up
|
|||
|
|
under the program each month. Branfman continues, "The
|
|||
|
|
United States clearly set quotas in an attempt to force the
|
|||
|
|
GVN (Government of South Vietnam) officials into something
|
|||
|
|
they preferred not to undertake". As a matter of fact,
|
|||
|
|
Vietnam Information Notes, published by the U.S. State
|
|||
|
|
Department in July 1969 reported that, "The target for 1969
|
|||
|
|
calls for the elimination of 1800 VCI per month" as
|
|||
|
|
fulfillment of the quotas set by those running the Phoenix
|
|||
|
|
Program.
|
|||
|
|
The CIA-backed Phoenix Program assassinated and jailed
|
|||
|
|
large numbers of Vietnamese civilians without evidence of
|
|||
|
|
judicial procedure. This fact was confirmed by Colby in an
|
|||
|
|
admission to Representative Reid in his July 1971 testimony
|
|||
|
|
before Congress. According to Colby, the Phoenix Program had
|
|||
|
|
resulted in the deaths of 20,587 persons as of May 1971.
|
|||
|
|
That number, proportionate to population, would have totaled
|
|||
|
|
over 200,000 Americans deliberately assassinated over a
|
|||
|
|
three-year period had Phoenix been conducted in the United
|
|||
|
|
States.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
CHILE: ACTIVITIES AGAINST ALLENDE
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
A good example of the CIA's use of the type of political
|
|||
|
|
action mentioned above is the Agency's involvement in the
|
|||
|
|
internal political affairs of Chile beginning in 1963 and
|
|||
|
|
reaching a climax in 1973. In 1964, the United States became
|
|||
|
|
involved in a covert assistance program to Eduardo Frei in
|
|||
|
|
his campaign for the presidency of Chile. Frei was running
|
|||
|
|
against Salvador Allende, a candidate disliked by U.S.
|
|||
|
|
leaders for his leftist leanings. The CIA had judged
|
|||
|
|
previously that Frei would come to power regardless, with a
|
|||
|
|
plurality of the vote, and the assistance given by it to Frei
|
|||
|
|
was supposedly to help strengthen the Democratic process in
|
|||
|
|
Chile. Although Frei won the election, the United States
|
|||
|
|
continued to meddle in the internal affairs of Chile for
|
|||
|
|
another nine years.
|
|||
|
|
The largest covert operation in Chile from 1963-1973 was
|
|||
|
|
propaganda. The CIA station in Santiago placed materials in
|
|||
|
|
the Chilean media, maintained a number of assets or agents on
|
|||
|
|
major Chilean newspapers, radio, and television stations, and
|
|||
|
|
manufactured and disseminated "black" propaganda. Examples
|
|||
|
|
of CIA activities ranged from support of the establishment of
|
|||
|
|
a commercial television service in Chile to the placement of
|
|||
|
|
anti-Soviet propaganda on eight radio news stations and in
|
|||
|
|
five provincial newspapers. The most significant
|
|||
|
|
contribution in this area of covert activity was the money
|
|||
|
|
provided to El Mercurio, the major Santiago daily newspaper
|
|||
|
|
during the Allende regime. The CIA spent over $12 million on
|
|||
|
|
the Chilean operation.
|
|||
|
|
Another category of CIA involvement in Chile was that of
|
|||
|
|
political action. The most impressive of these actions
|
|||
|
|
undertaken was the massive effort made from 1963 to 1974 to
|
|||
|
|
influence elections. The CIA spent over $3 million in
|
|||
|
|
election programs alone. In addition to attempting to
|
|||
|
|
influence elections, the Agency combatted the principle
|
|||
|
|
Communist-dominated labor union in Chile and wrested control
|
|||
|
|
of Chilean university student organizations from the
|
|||
|
|
Communists.
|
|||
|
|
As was discussed earlier, the United States never liked
|
|||
|
|
Salvador Allende, and in 1970, the CIA began covert political
|
|||
|
|
operations against the government of Allende under express
|
|||
|
|
orders from President Richard Nixon and his National Security
|
|||
|
|
Assistant, Dr. Henry Kissinger. Both the CIA and the State
|
|||
|
|
Department were apparently reluctant to become involved in
|
|||
|
|
what appeared to be an infeasible program to keep President
|
|||
|
|
Salvador Allende out of office, even though he had won by
|
|||
|
|
plurality in the September, 1970 election.
|
|||
|
|
Nevertheless, the President and Mr. Kissinger directed
|
|||
|
|
the CIA, much against its officers' better judgments, to
|
|||
|
|
stage a coup in Chile. The project never developed into
|
|||
|
|
anything substantial. However, the CIA provided large sums
|
|||
|
|
of money (around $8 million) to support parliamentary
|
|||
|
|
opposition to Allende and to keep alive an opposition press.
|
|||
|
|
For all its efforts, the CIA was unsuccessful in defeating
|
|||
|
|
Allende although on September 11, 1973, he was overthrown in
|
|||
|
|
a coup which, though not under U.S. control, may well have
|
|||
|
|
been caused by U.S. anti-Allende pressures.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
CHAPTER FIVE
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
A major requirement of covert operations over the years
|
|||
|
|
has been that in the event something goes wrong, the
|
|||
|
|
president, as head of state in the U.S., should be able to
|
|||
|
|
believably deny any knowledge of the clandestine activity.
|
|||
|
|
This concept is known as plausible deniability and it has
|
|||
|
|
been a cornerstone in the foundation of presidential
|
|||
|
|
decisions to authorize covert operations. The misconception
|
|||
|
|
that plausible deniability is a valid method of concealing
|
|||
|
|
U.S. involvement in covert activities has led to a number of
|
|||
|
|
problems over the years.
|
|||
|
|
The doctrine of plausible deniability led to many of the
|
|||
|
|
widespread abuses of power that occurred in the CIA before
|
|||
|
|
the Intelligence Reform Era in the mid-1970s. It led the
|
|||
|
|
agency to believe that CIA officers had a green light to
|
|||
|
|
conduct almost any actions they saw fit to reach their goals.
|
|||
|
|
McGeorge Bundy, a former Special Assistant for National
|
|||
|
|
Security Affairs to President's Kennedy and Johnson, has
|
|||
|
|
stated:
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
While in principle it has always been the
|
|||
|
|
understanding of senior government officials
|
|||
|
|
outside the CIA that no covert operations would be
|
|||
|
|
undertaken without the explicit approval of "higher
|
|||
|
|
authority", there has also been a general
|
|||
|
|
expectation within the Agency that it was proper
|
|||
|
|
business to generate attractive proposals and to
|
|||
|
|
stretch them, in operation, to the furthest limit
|
|||
|
|
of any authorization actually received.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
It is easy to see how this misperception on the part of
|
|||
|
|
the CIA developed. A president, hoping to pursue his goals,
|
|||
|
|
would communicate his desire for a sensitive operation
|
|||
|
|
indirectly, thereby creating sort of a "blank check". CIA
|
|||
|
|
officers, intending to carry out the wishes of the president,
|
|||
|
|
would then set about furthering the expressed desires of the
|
|||
|
|
Commander in Chief. However, instead of informing the
|
|||
|
|
president of the progress of the covert planning, the
|
|||
|
|
officers would be tempted to keep him unaware of it, thereby
|
|||
|
|
enabling him to "plausibly deny" any knowledge of the scheme.
|
|||
|
|
Darrel Garwood, the author of a comprehensive work on
|
|||
|
|
CIA activities entitled Under Cover writes,
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
"Plausible deniability" could be regarded as one of
|
|||
|
|
the most wretched theories ever invented. Its
|
|||
|
|
application...was based on the idea that in an
|
|||
|
|
unholy venture a president could be kept so
|
|||
|
|
isolated from events that when exposure came he
|
|||
|
|
could truthfully emerge as shiningly blameless. In
|
|||
|
|
practice, whether he deserved it or not, a
|
|||
|
|
president almost always had to take the blame for
|
|||
|
|
whatever happened.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
Also, as the Senate Intelligence Committee pointed out about
|
|||
|
|
plausible deniability, "this concept...has been expanded to
|
|||
|
|
mask decisions of the President and his senior staff
|
|||
|
|
members."
|
|||
|
|
A recent example of how problems linked to this concept
|
|||
|
|
can occur is the so-called "Iran-Contra Affair" which made
|
|||
|
|
the headlines in late 1986 and earlier this year. The fiasco
|
|||
|
|
was an embarrassing illustration of the example which was
|
|||
|
|
discussed above. Although the CIA itself was not directly
|
|||
|
|
implicated in the scandal, Colonel Oliver North and other
|
|||
|
|
members of the government were discovered to have been
|
|||
|
|
carrying out the aims of the President--by channeling funds
|
|||
|
|
from arms sales to Iran to the Contras in Nicaragua--
|
|||
|
|
supposedly without his knowledge. Whether or not President
|
|||
|
|
Reagan actually knew about the diversion of funds is unclear,
|
|||
|
|
but in any event, top level planners of the operation
|
|||
|
|
believed that the President would be able to plausibly deny
|
|||
|
|
any knowledge of the diversion of funds. However, because of
|
|||
|
|
the intense scrutiny placed upon the operation by the media
|
|||
|
|
and Congress, President Reagan was unable to convince them
|
|||
|
|
and the country as a whole that he had no knowledge of the
|
|||
|
|
diversion. As the president and his men learned the hard
|
|||
|
|
way, "inevitably, the truth prevails and policies pursued on
|
|||
|
|
the premise that they could be plausibly denied in the end
|
|||
|
|
damage America's reputation and the faith of her people in
|
|||
|
|
their government".
|
|||
|
|
One of the major reasons that the CIA has gone astray
|
|||
|
|
over the last forty years is the veritable freedom from any
|
|||
|
|
type of control or restriction that it has enjoyed. Though
|
|||
|
|
Congress investigated the activities of the Agency in 1975
|
|||
|
|
and subsequently instituted more stringent oversight
|
|||
|
|
procedures, the CIA of today is once again an agency that is
|
|||
|
|
able to do almost as it pleases. The strictures placed on
|
|||
|
|
the CIA by the Ford and Carter Administrations were relaxed
|
|||
|
|
in 1981 when Ronald Reagan took office. To understand how
|
|||
|
|
the Agency has become so omnipotent since 1947 will require a
|
|||
|
|
look back to a time when the Agency really did as it pleased.
|
|||
|
|
To get an idea of the characteristics of the men in the
|
|||
|
|
Agency during its first three decades, we shall look at a
|
|||
|
|
description of CIA case officers.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
CIA men abroad were called case officers within the
|
|||
|
|
organization. As individuals, they were generally
|
|||
|
|
efficient, dedicated, highly motivated and
|
|||
|
|
incorruptible. The trouble in the CIA was likely
|
|||
|
|
to be that, for anything short of the meanest of
|
|||
|
|
all-out wars, they were too highly motivated. A
|
|||
|
|
severe beating administered to a reluctant
|
|||
|
|
informant, or the assassination of a would-be left-
|
|||
|
|
wing dictator, could seem trivial to them in the
|
|||
|
|
light of their goal of outscoring the nation's
|
|||
|
|
potential enemies. And naturally, until one
|
|||
|
|
happened, they could not imagine a nationwide furor
|
|||
|
|
over actions which to them seemed unimportant.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
In a speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors
|
|||
|
|
in April, 1971, then DCI Richard Helms said, "The nation must
|
|||
|
|
to a degree take it on faith that we too are honorable men,
|
|||
|
|
devoted to her service."
|
|||
|
|
CIA officials were not the only ones who believed that
|
|||
|
|
the CIA could be trusted to carry out the objectives of the
|
|||
|
|
United States Government. The Agency had a number of
|
|||
|
|
champions in the Congress of the United States as well.
|
|||
|
|
Feelings about the sanctity of sensitive information dealt
|
|||
|
|
with by the Agency led to wide support for a laissez faire
|
|||
|
|
policy in Congress regarding the CIA. For example, Richard
|
|||
|
|
Russell, the Democratic Senator from Georgia, once gave the
|
|||
|
|
following explanation of why he led the fight against a
|
|||
|
|
resolution to provide for closer Congressional surveillance
|
|||
|
|
of the CIA.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
Russell noted that the statement had been made on
|
|||
|
|
the floor that the Armed Services subcommittee of
|
|||
|
|
which he was a member had not revealed to the
|
|||
|
|
country what it had learned about CIA operations.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
"No, Mr. President," Russell said, "we have not
|
|||
|
|
told the country, and I do not propose to tell the
|
|||
|
|
country in the future, because if there is anything
|
|||
|
|
in the United States which should be held sacred
|
|||
|
|
behind the curtain of classified matter, it is
|
|||
|
|
information regarding the activities of this
|
|||
|
|
agency...It would be better to abolish it out of
|
|||
|
|
hand than it would be to adopt a theory that such
|
|||
|
|
information should be spread and made available to
|
|||
|
|
every member of Congress and to the members of the
|
|||
|
|
staff of any committee.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
With such a powerful man and others like him on its side, it
|
|||
|
|
is small wonder that the CIA got away with the things that it
|
|||
|
|
did prior to 1975.
|
|||
|
|
CIA officers cleverly played upon the fears of Congress
|
|||
|
|
to consolidate the power of the Agency. Former CIA director
|
|||
|
|
Allen Dulles, speaking before a Congressional committee,
|
|||
|
|
warned,
|
|||
|
|
Any investigation, whether by a congressional
|
|||
|
|
committee or any other body, which results in
|
|||
|
|
disclosure of our secret activities and operations
|
|||
|
|
or uncovers our personnel, will help a potential
|
|||
|
|
enemy just as if the enemy had been able to
|
|||
|
|
infiltrate his own agents right into our shop.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
Such statements led Senators like John Stennis to comment,
|
|||
|
|
"If you are going to have an intelligence agency, you have to
|
|||
|
|
protect it as such...and shut your eyes some, and take what's
|
|||
|
|
coming".
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
Appendix I
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
The following is a partial list of United States Covert
|
|||
|
|
action abroad to impose or restore favorable political
|
|||
|
|
conditions, 1946-1983. The list was prepared by Tom Gervasi
|
|||
|
|
of the Center for Military Research and Analysis in 1984, and
|
|||
|
|
it was compiled using information available in the public
|
|||
|
|
domain.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1946: GREECE. Restore monarch after overthrow of Metaxas
|
|||
|
|
government. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1946-1955: WEST GERMANY. Average of $6 million annually to
|
|||
|
|
support former Nazi intelligence network of General
|
|||
|
|
Reinhard Gehlen. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1948-1968: ITALY. Average of $30 million annually in
|
|||
|
|
payments to political and labor leaders to supportanti-
|
|||
|
|
Communist candidates in Italian elections. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1949: GREECE. Military assistance to anti-Communist forces
|
|||
|
|
in Greek civil war. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1949-1953: UKRAINE. Organize and support a Ukrainian
|
|||
|
|
resistance movement. Unsuccessful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1949-1961: BURMA. Support 12,000 Nationalist China troops
|
|||
|
|
in Burma under General Li Mi as an incursion force into
|
|||
|
|
People's Republic of China. Unsuccessful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1950-1952: POLAND. Financial and military assistance for
|
|||
|
|
Polish Freedom and Independence Movement. Unsuccessful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1950: ALBANIA. Overthrow government of Enver Hoxha.
|
|||
|
|
Unsuccessful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1951-1954: CHINA. Airdrop guerilla teams into People's
|
|||
|
|
Republic of China. Unsuccessful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1953: IRAN. Overthrow Mossadegh government and install
|
|||
|
|
Zahedi. Cost: $10 million. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1953: PHILLIPINES. Assassination and propaganda campaign to
|
|||
|
|
overcome Huk resistance and install government of Ramon
|
|||
|
|
Magsaysay. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@Copyright 1984 by the Center for Military Research and
|
|||
|
|
Analysis
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1953: COSTA RICA. Overthrow government of Jose Figueres.
|
|||
|
|
Unsuccessful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1954: SOUTH VIETNAM. Install government of Ngo Dinh Diem.
|
|||
|
|
Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1954: WEST GERMANY. Arrange abduction and discreditation of
|
|||
|
|
West German intelligence chief Otto John, and replace
|
|||
|
|
with Reinhard Gehlen. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1954: GUATEMALA. Overthrow government of Jacobo Arbenz
|
|||
|
|
Guzman and replace with Carlos Castillo Armas.
|
|||
|
|
Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1955: CHINA. Assassinate Zhou Enlai en route to Bandung
|
|||
|
|
Conference. Unsuccessful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1956: HUNGARY. Financial and military assistance to
|
|||
|
|
organize and support a Hungarian resistance movement,
|
|||
|
|
and broad propaganda campaign to encourage it.
|
|||
|
|
Unsuccessful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1956: CUBA. Establish anti-Communist police force, Buro de
|
|||
|
|
Represion Actividades Communistas (BRAC) under Batista
|
|||
|
|
regime. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1956: EGYPT. Overthrow Nasser government. Unsuccessful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1956: SYRIA. Overthrow Ghazzi government. Aborted by
|
|||
|
|
Israeli invasion of Egypt.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1956-1957: JORDAN. Average of $750,000 annually in personal
|
|||
|
|
payments to King Hussein. According to United States
|
|||
|
|
government, payments ceased when disclosed in 1976.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1957: LEBANON. Financial assistance for the election of
|
|||
|
|
pro-American candidates to Lebanese Parliament.
|
|||
|
|
Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1958: INDONESIA. Financial and military assistance,
|
|||
|
|
including B-26 bombers, for revel forces attempting to
|
|||
|
|
overthrow Sukarno government. Unsuccessful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1958-1961: TIBET. Infiltrate Tibetan guerrillas trained in
|
|||
|
|
United States to fight Chinese Communists. Unsuccessful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1959: CAMBODIA. Assassinate Prince Norodum Shianouk.
|
|||
|
|
Unsuccessful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1960: GUATEMALA. Military assistance, including the use of
|
|||
|
|
B-26 bombers for government of Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes
|
|||
|
|
to defeat rebel forces. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1960: ANGOLA. Financial and military assistance to rebel
|
|||
|
|
forces of Holden Roberto. Inconclusive.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1960: LAOS. Military assistance, including 400 United
|
|||
|
|
States Special Forces troops, to deny the Plain of Jars
|
|||
|
|
bad Mekong Basin to Pathet Lao. Inconclusive.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1961-1965: LAOS. Average of $300 million annually to
|
|||
|
|
recruit and maintain L'Armee Clandestine of 35,000 Hmong
|
|||
|
|
and Meo tribesmen and 17,000 Thai mercenaries in support
|
|||
|
|
of government of Phoumi Nosavan to resist Pathet Lao.
|
|||
|
|
Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1961-1963: CUBA. Assassinate Fidel Castro. Six attempts in
|
|||
|
|
this period. Unsuccessful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1961: CUBA. Train and support invasion force of Cuban
|
|||
|
|
exiles to overthrow Castro government, and assist their
|
|||
|
|
invasion at the Bay of Pigs. Cost: $62 million.
|
|||
|
|
Unsuccessful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1961: ECUADOR. Overthrow government of Hose Velasco Ibarra.
|
|||
|
|
Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1961: CONGO. Precipitate conditions leading to
|
|||
|
|
assassination of Patrice Lumumba. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1961: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. Precipitate conditions leading to
|
|||
|
|
assassination of Rafael Trujillo. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1961-1966: CUBA. Broad sabotage program, including
|
|||
|
|
terrorist attacks on coastal targets and bacteriological
|
|||
|
|
warfare, in effort to weaken Castro government.
|
|||
|
|
Unsuccessful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1962: THAILAND. Brigade of 5,000 United States Marines to
|
|||
|
|
resist threat to Thai government from Pathet Lao.
|
|||
|
|
Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1962-1964: BRITISH GUIANA. Organize labor strikes and riots
|
|||
|
|
to overthrow government of Cheddi Jagan. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1962-1964: BRAZIL. Organize campaign of labor strike and
|
|||
|
|
propaganda to overthrow government of Joao Goulart.
|
|||
|
|
Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1963: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. Overthrow government of Juan
|
|||
|
|
Bosch in military coup. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1963: SOUTH VIETNAM. Precipitate conditions leading to
|
|||
|
|
assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1963: ECUADOR. Overthrow government of Carlos Julio
|
|||
|
|
Arosemena. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1963-1984: EL SALVADOR. Organize ORDEN and ANSESAL domestic
|
|||
|
|
intelligence networks under direction of General Jose
|
|||
|
|
Alberto Medrano and Colonel Nicolas Carranza, and
|
|||
|
|
provide intelligence support and training in
|
|||
|
|
surveillance, interrogation and assassination
|
|||
|
|
techniques. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1963-1973: IRAQ. Financial and military assistance for
|
|||
|
|
Freedom Party of Mulla Mustafa al Barzani in effort to
|
|||
|
|
establish independent Kurdistan. Unsuccessful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1964: CHILE. $20 million in assistance for Eduardo Frei to
|
|||
|
|
defeat Salvador Allende in Chilean elections.Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1964: BRAZIL, GUATEMALA, URUGUAY, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.
|
|||
|
|
Provide training in assassination and interrogation
|
|||
|
|
techniques for police and intelligence personnel.
|
|||
|
|
Inconclusive.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1964: CONGO. Financial and military assistance, including
|
|||
|
|
B-26 and T-28 aircraft, and American and exiled Cuban
|
|||
|
|
pilots, for Joseph Mobutu and Cyril Adoula, and later
|
|||
|
|
for Moise Tshombe in Katanga, to defeat rebel forces
|
|||
|
|
loyal to Lumumba. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1964-1967: SOUTH VIETNAM. Phoenix Program to eliminate Viet
|
|||
|
|
Cong political infrastructure through more than 20,000
|
|||
|
|
assassinations. Infiltrated by Viet Cong and only
|
|||
|
|
partially successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1964-1971: NORTH VIETNAM. Sabotage and ambush missions
|
|||
|
|
under Operations Plan 34A by United States Special
|
|||
|
|
Forces and Nung tribesmen. Inconclusive.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1965-1971: LAOS. Under Operations Shining Brass and Prairie
|
|||
|
|
Fire, sabotage and ambush missions by United States
|
|||
|
|
Special Forces personnel and Nung and Meo tribesmen
|
|||
|
|
under General Bang Pao. Inconclusive.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1965: THAILAND. Recruit 17,000 mercenaries to support
|
|||
|
|
Laotian government of Phoumi Nosavan resisting Pathet
|
|||
|
|
Lao. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
1965: PERU. Provide training in assassination and
|
|||
|
|
interrogation techniques for Peruvian police and
|
|||
|
|
intelligence personnel, similar to training given in
|
|||
|
|
Uruguay, Brazil and Dominican Republic, in effort to
|
|||
|
|
defeat resistance movement. Unsuccessful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1965: INDONESIA. Organize campaign of propaganda to
|
|||
|
|
overthrow Sukarno government, and precipitate conditions
|
|||
|
|
leading to massacre of more than 500,000 members of
|
|||
|
|
Indonesian Communist Party, in order to eliminate
|
|||
|
|
opposition to new Suharto government. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1967: BOLIVIA. Assist government in capture of Ernesto Che
|
|||
|
|
Guevara. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1967: GREECE. Overthrow government of George Papandreou and
|
|||
|
|
install military government of Colonel George
|
|||
|
|
Papadopolous after abdication of King Constantine.
|
|||
|
|
Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1967-1971: CAMBODIA. Under Projects Daniel Boone and Salem
|
|||
|
|
House, sabotage and ambush missions by United States
|
|||
|
|
Special Forces personnel and Meo tribesmen.
|
|||
|
|
Inconclusive.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1969-1970: CAMBODIA. Bombing campaign to crush Viet Cong
|
|||
|
|
sanctuaries in Cambodia. Unsuccessful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1970: CAMBODIA. Overthrow government of Prince Norodom
|
|||
|
|
Sihanouk. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1970-1973: CHILE. Campaign of assassinations, propaganda,
|
|||
|
|
labor strikes and demonstrations to overthrow government
|
|||
|
|
of Salvador Allende. Cost: $8,400,000. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1973-1978: AFGHANISTAN. Military and financial assistance
|
|||
|
|
to government of Mohammed Duad to resist rise to power
|
|||
|
|
of Noor Mohammed Taraki. Unsuccessful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1975: PORTUGAL. Overthrow government of General Vasco dos
|
|||
|
|
Santos Goncalves. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1975: ANGOLA. Military assistance to forces of Holden
|
|||
|
|
Roberto and Jonas Savimbi to defeat forces of Popular
|
|||
|
|
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) during
|
|||
|
|
Angolan civil war, and prevent MPLA from forming new
|
|||
|
|
government. Unsuccessful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1975: AUSTRALIA. Propaganda and political pressure to force
|
|||
|
|
dissolution of labor government of Gough Whitlam.
|
|||
|
|
Successful.
|
|||
|
|
1976: JAMAICA. Military coup to overthrow government of
|
|||
|
|
Michael Manley. Unsuccessful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1976-1984: ANGOLA. Financial and military assistance to
|
|||
|
|
forces of Jonas Savimbi to harass and destabilize Neto
|
|||
|
|
and succeeding governments. Inconclusive.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1979: IRAN. Install military government to replace Shah and
|
|||
|
|
resist growth of Moslem fundamentalism. Unsuccessful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1979-1980: JAMAICA. Financial pressure to destabilize
|
|||
|
|
government of Michael Manley, and campaign propaganda
|
|||
|
|
and demonstrations to defeat it in elections.
|
|||
|
|
Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1979: AFGHANISTAN. Military aid to rebel forces of Zia
|
|||
|
|
Nezri, Zia Khan Nassry, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Sayed Ahmed
|
|||
|
|
Gailani and conservative mullahs to overthrow government
|
|||
|
|
of Hafizullah Amin. Aborted by Soviet intervention and
|
|||
|
|
installation of new government.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1980-1984: AFGHANISTAN. Continuing military aid to same
|
|||
|
|
rebel groups to harass Soviet occupation forces and
|
|||
|
|
challenge legitimacy of government of Babrak Karmal.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1979: SEYCHELLES. Destabilize government of France Albert
|
|||
|
|
Rene. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1980: GRENADA. Mercenary coup to overthrow government of
|
|||
|
|
Maurice Bishop. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1980: DOMINICA. Financial support to Freedom Party of
|
|||
|
|
Eugenia Charles to defeat Oliver Seraphim in Dominican
|
|||
|
|
elections. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1980: GUYANA. Assassinate opposition leader Walter Rodney
|
|||
|
|
to consolidate power of government of Forbes Burnham.
|
|||
|
|
Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1980-1984: NICARAGUA. Military assistance to Adolfo Colero
|
|||
|
|
Portocarrero, Alfonso Robelo, Alfonso Callejas, Fernando
|
|||
|
|
Chamorro Rappacioli, Eden Pastora Gomez, Adrianna
|
|||
|
|
Guillen, Steadman Fagoth and former Somoza National
|
|||
|
|
Guard officers, to recruit, train and equip anti-
|
|||
|
|
Sandinista forces for sabotage and terrorist incursions
|
|||
|
|
into Nicaragua from sanctuaries in Honduras and Costa
|
|||
|
|
Rica, in effort to destabilize government of Daniel
|
|||
|
|
Ortega Saavedra.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1981: SEYCHELLES. Military coup to overthrow government of
|
|||
|
|
France Albert Rene. Unsuccessful.
|
|||
|
|
1981-1982: MAURITIUS. Financial support to Seewoosagar
|
|||
|
|
Ramgoolam to bring him to power in 1982 elections.
|
|||
|
|
Unsuccessful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1981-1984: LIBYA. Broad campaign of economic pressure,
|
|||
|
|
propaganda, military maneuvers in Egypt, Sudan and Gulf
|
|||
|
|
of Sidra, and organization if Libyan Liberation Front
|
|||
|
|
exiles to destabilize government of Muammar Qaddafi.
|
|||
|
|
Inconclusive.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1982: CHAD. Military assistance to Hissen Habre to
|
|||
|
|
overthrow government of Goukouni Oueddei. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1982: GUATEMALA. Military coup to overthrow government of
|
|||
|
|
Angel Anibal Guevara. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1982: BOLIVIA. Military coup to overthrow government of
|
|||
|
|
Celso Torrelio. Successful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1982: JORDAN. Military assistance to equip and train two
|
|||
|
|
Jordanian brigades as an Arab strike force to implement
|
|||
|
|
United States policy objectives without Israeli
|
|||
|
|
assistance.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1982-1983: SURINAM. Overthrow government of Colonel Desi
|
|||
|
|
Bouterse. Three attempts in this period. Unsuccessful.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
1984: EL SALVADOR. $1.4 million in financial support for
|
|||
|
|
the Presidential election campaign of Jose Napoleon
|
|||
|
|
Duarte. Successful. Appendix II
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
The Congo 1960: State Terrorism and Foreign Policy*
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
A 1975 report of the Church Committee entitled "Alleged
|
|||
|
|
Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders" provides a
|
|||
|
|
rare inside account of how such operations are planned and
|
|||
|
|
carried out--in this case, the CIA's attempt to assassinate
|
|||
|
|
Patrice Lumumba in the Congo in 1960. Lumumba, a popular
|
|||
|
|
politician considered pro-Soviet by U.S. policymakers, had
|
|||
|
|
briefly served as prime minister after the Congo gained its
|
|||
|
|
independence from Belgium in June of that year. According to
|
|||
|
|
the Senate report, "It is likely that President
|
|||
|
|
Eisenhower's...strong...concern about Lumumba...was taken by
|
|||
|
|
[CIA director] Allen Dulles as authority to assassinate
|
|||
|
|
Lumumba." CIA officials ordered a staff scientist (code-
|
|||
|
|
named "Joe") to prepare "toxic biological materials" that
|
|||
|
|
would "produce a disease...indigenous to that area [of
|
|||
|
|
Africa]" and to deliver the poison to the CIA station chief
|
|||
|
|
in Leopoldville, who was to assassinate Lumumba. But before
|
|||
|
|
the station chief could carry out his orders, Lumumba was
|
|||
|
|
captured by the forces of Joseph Mobutu, the U.S. supported
|
|||
|
|
nationalist leader who is still dictator of the country, and
|
|||
|
|
delivered to his archenemies in Katanga, where he was
|
|||
|
|
murdered. Following are excerpts from the cables, published
|
|||
|
|
by the committee, that were exchanged by CIA headquarters in
|
|||
|
|
Washington and the officers in the Congo.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
August 18, 1960. Station chief, Leopoldville, to CIA
|
|||
|
|
headquarters:
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
EMBASSY AND STATION BELIEVE CONGO EXPERIENCING CLASSIC
|
|||
|
|
COMMUNIST EFFORT TAKEOVER GOVERNMENT...DECISIVE PERIOD NOT
|
|||
|
|
FAR OFF. WHETHER OR NOT LUMUMBA ACTUALLY COMMIE OR JUST
|
|||
|
|
PLAYING COMMIE GAME TO ASSIST HIS SOLIDIFYING POWER, ANTI-
|
|||
|
|
WEST FORCES RAPIDLY INCREASING POWER CONGO AND THERE MAY BE
|
|||
|
|
LITTLE TIME LEFT IN WHICH TO TAKE ACTION TO AVOID ANOTHER
|
|||
|
|
CUBA.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
August 26. Headquarters to Leopoldville:
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
IN HIGH QUARTERS HERE IT IS THE CLEAR-CUT CONCLUSION THAT IF
|
|||
|
|
[LUMUMBA] CONTUNUES TO HOLD HIGH OFFICE, THE INEVITABLE
|
|||
|
|
RESULT WILL...AT WORST PAVE THE WAY TO COMMUNIST
|
|||
|
|
TAKEOVER...WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES..FOR THE INTERESTS OF
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
*This excerpt appeared in Harper's Magazine in October 1984.
|
|||
|
|
THE FREE WORLD GENERALLY. CONSEQUENTLY WE CONCLUDE THAT HIS
|
|||
|
|
REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE...OF OUR COVERT
|
|||
|
|
ACTION...TO THE EXTENT THAT AMBASSADOR MAY DESIRE TO BE
|
|||
|
|
CONSULTED, YOU SHOULD SEEK HIS CONCURRENCE. IF IN ANY
|
|||
|
|
PARTICULAR CASE, HE DOES NOT WISH TO BE CONSULTED YOU CAN ACT
|
|||
|
|
ON YOUR AUTHORITY...
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
September 19. Headquarters to Leopoldville, announcing the
|
|||
|
|
arrival of the poison:
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
["JOE"] SHOULD ARRIVE APPROX. 27 SEPT...WILL ANNOUNCE HIMSELF
|
|||
|
|
AS "JOE FROM PARIS"...URGENT YOU SHOULD SEE ["JOE"]
|
|||
|
|
SOONEST...HE WILL FULLY IDENTIFY HIMSELF AMD EXPLAIN HIS
|
|||
|
|
ASSIGNMENT TO YOU. ALL CABLE TRAFFIC THIS OP...HOLD ENTIRELY
|
|||
|
|
TO YOURSELF.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
October 7. Leopoldville to headquarters:
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
[JOE] LEFT CERTAIN ITEMS OF CONTINUING USEFULNESS. [STATION
|
|||
|
|
OFFICER] PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT OP.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
October 15. Headquarters to Leopoldville:
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
POSSIBLE USE COMMANDO TYPE GROUP FOR ABDUCTIOM
|
|||
|
|
[LUMUMBA]...VIA ASSAULT ON HOUSE...
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
October 17. Leopoldville to headquarters:
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
NOT BEEN ABLE PENETRATE ENTOURAGE...RECOMMEND HQS POUCH
|
|||
|
|
SOONEST HIGH POWERED FOREIGN MAKE RIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC SCOPE
|
|||
|
|
AND SILENCER. HUNTING GOOD HERE WHEN LIGHT IS RIGHT.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
November 14. Leopoldville to headquarters:
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
TARGET HAS NOT LEFT BUILDING IN SEVERAL WEEKS. HOUSE GUARDED
|
|||
|
|
DAY AND NIGHT...TARGET HAS DISMISSED MOST OF SERVANTS SO
|
|||
|
|
ENTRY THIS MEANS SEEMS REMOTE.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
January 13. Fearing that Lumumba, who had been imprisoned by
|
|||
|
|
Mobutu's forces in December, would soon be freed by his
|
|||
|
|
supporters and seize power, Leopoldville cables headquarters:
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
THE COMBINATION OF [LUMUMBA'S] POWERS AS DEMAGOGUE, HIS ABLE
|
|||
|
|
USE OF OF GOON SQUADS AND PROPAGANDA AND SPIRIT OF DEFEAT
|
|||
|
|
WITHIN [GOVERNMENT]...WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY INSURE [LUMUMBA]
|
|||
|
|
VICTORY IN PARLIAMENT...REFUSAL TAKE DRASTIC STEPS AT THIS
|
|||
|
|
TIME WILL LEAD TO DEFEAT OF [UNITED STATES] POLICY IN CONGO.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
January 17. Mobutu and his ally Joseph Kasavubu send Lumumba
|
|||
|
|
to his enemies in Katanga province, the forces of local
|
|||
|
|
leader Moise Tshombe. Two days later, the CIA base chief in
|
|||
|
|
Elizabethville cables headquarters:
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
THANKS FOR PATRICE. IF WE HAD KNOWN HE WAS COMING WE WOULD
|
|||
|
|
HAVE BAKED A SNAKE.
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
A U.N. inquiry later concluded Lumumba was killed by his
|
|||
|
|
enemies on or shortly after his arrival in Katanga. The
|
|||
|
|
Church Committee investigation found that "the toxic
|
|||
|
|
substances were never used. But there is, however, no
|
|||
|
|
suggestion of a connection between the assassination plot and
|
|||
|
|
the events which actually led to Lumumba's death".
|