                                                                            
                                      1780                                  
                                                                            
                      THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS                   
                                                                            
                                by Immanuel Kant                            
                                                                            
                     translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott                  
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                         PREFACE                                            
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  If there exists on any subject a philosophy (that is, a system of         
rational knowledge based on concepts), then there must also be for          
this philosophy a system of pure rational concepts, independent of any      
condition of intuition, in other words, a metaphysic. It may be             
asked whether metaphysical elements are required also for every             
practical philosophy, which is the doctrine of duties, and therefore        
also for Ethics, in order to be able to present it as a true science        
(systematically), not merely as an aggregate of separate doctrines          
(fragmentarily). As regards pure jurisprudence, no one will question        
this requirement; for it concerns only what is formal in the                
elective will, which has to be limited in its external relations            
according to laws of freedom; without regarding any end which is the        
matter of this will. Here, therefore, deontology is a mere                  
scientific doctrine (doctrina scientiae).*                                  
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  *One who is acquainted with practical philosophy is not,                  
therefore, a practical philosopher. The latter is he who makes the          
rational end the principle of his actions, while at the same time he        
joins with this the necessary knowledge which, as it aims at action,        
must not be spun out into the most subtile threads of metaphysic,           
unless a legal duty is in question; in which case meum and tuum must        
be accurately determined in the balance of justice, on the principle        
of equality of action and action, which requires something like             
mathematical proportion, but not in the case of a mere ethical duty.        
For in this case the question is not only to know what it is a duty to      
do (a thing which on account of the ends that all men naturally have        
can be easily decided), but the chief point is the inner principle          
of the will namely that the consciousness of this duty be also the          
spring of action, in order that we may be able to say of the man who        
joins to his knowledge this principle of wisdom that he is a practical      
philosopher.                                                                
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  Now in this philosophy (of ethics) it seems contrary to the idea          
of it that we should go back to metaphysical elements in order to make      
the notion of duty purified from everything empirical (from every           
feeling) a motive of action. For what sort of notion can we form of         
the mighty power and herculean strength which would be sufficient to        
overcome the vice-breeding inclinations, if Virtue is to borrow her         
"arms from the armoury of metaphysics," which is a matter of                
speculation that only few men can handle? Hence all ethical teaching        
in lecture rooms, pulpits, and popular books, when it is decked out         
with fragments of metaphysics, becomes ridiculous. But it is not,           
therefore, useless, much less ridiculous, to trace in metaphysics           
the first principles of ethics; for it is only as a philosopher that        
anyone can reach the first principles of this conception of duty,           
otherwise we could not look for either certainty or purity in the           
ethical teaching. To rely for this reason on a certain feeling              
which, on account of the effect expected from it, is called moral,          
may, perhaps, even satisfy the popular teacher, provided he desires as      
the criterion of a moral duty to consider the problem: "If everyone in      
every case made your maxim the universal law, how could this law be         
consistent with itself?" But if it were merely feeling that made it         
our duty to take this principle as a criterion, then this would not be      
dictated by reason, but only adopted instinctively and therefore            
blindly.                                                                    
  But in fact, whatever men imagine, no moral principle is based on         
any feeling, but such a principle is really nothing else than an            
obscurely conceived metaphysic which inheres in every man's                 
reasoning faculty; as the teacher will easily find who tries to             
catechize his pupils in the Socratic method about the imperative of         
duty and its application to the moral judgement of his actions. The         
mode of stating it need not be always metaphysical, and the language        
need not necessarily be scholastic, unless the pupil is to be               
trained to be a philosopher. But the thought must go back to the            
elements of metaphysics, without which we cannot expect any                 
certainty or purity, or even motive power in ethics.                        
  If we deviate from this principle and begin from pathological, or         
purely sensitive, or even moral feeling (from what is subjectively          
practical instead of what is objective), that is, from the matter of        
the will, the end, not from its form that is the law, in order from         
thence to determine duties; then, certainly, there are no metaphysical      
elements of ethics, for feeling by whatever it may be excited is            
always physical. But then ethical teaching, whether in schools, or          
lecture-rooms, etc., is corrupted in its source. For it is not a            
matter of indifference by what motives or means one is led to a good        
purpose (the obedience to duty). However disgusting, then, metaphysics      
may appear to those pretended philosophers who dogmatize oracularly,        
or even brilliantly, about the doctrine of duty, it is,                     
nevertheless, an indispensable duty for those who oppose it to go back      
to its principles even in ethics, and to begin by going to school on        
its benches.                                                                
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  We may fairly wonder how, after all previous explanations of the          
principles of duty, so far as it is derived from pure reason, it was        
still possible to reduce it again to a doctrine of happiness; in            
such a way, however, that a certain moral happiness not resting on          
empirical causes was ultimately arrived at, a self-contradictory            
nonentity. In fact, when the thinking man has conquered the                 
temptations to vice, and is conscious of having done his (often             
hard) duty, he finds himself in a state of peace and satisfaction           
which may well be called happiness, in which virtue is her own reward.      
Now, says the eudaemonist, this delight, this happiness, is the real        
motive of his acting virtuously. The notion of duty, says be, does not      
immediately determine his will; it is only by means of the happiness        
in prospect that he is moved to his duty. Now, on the other hand,           
since he can promise himself this reward of virtue only from the            
consciousness of having done his duty, it is clear that the latter          
must have preceded: that is, be must feel himself bound to do his duty      
before he thinks, and without thinking, that happiness will be the          
consequence of obedience to duty. He is thus involved in a circle in        
his assignment of cause and effect. He can only hope to be happy if he      
is conscious of his obedience to duty: and he can only be moved to          
obedience to duty if be foresees that he will thereby become happy.         
But in this reasoning there is also a contradiction. For, on the one        
side, he must obey his duty, without asking what effect this will have      
on his happiness, consequently, from a moral principle; on the other        
side, he can only recognize something as his duty when he can reckon        
on happiness which will accrue to him thereby, and consequently on a        
pathological principle, which is the direct opposite of the former.         
  I have in another place (the Berlin Monatsschrift), reduced, as I         
believe, to the simplest expressions the distinction between                
pathological and moral pleasure. The pleasure, namely, which must           
precede the obedience to the law in order that one may act according        
to the law is pathological, and the process follows the physical order      
of nature; that which must be preceded by the law in order that it may      
be felt is in the moral order. If this distinction is not observed; if      
eudaemonism (the principle of happiness) is adopted as the principle        
instead of eleutheronomy (the principle of freedom of the inner             
legislation), the consequence is the euthanasia (quiet death) of all        
morality.                                                                   
  The cause of these mistakes is no other than the following: Those         
who are accustomed only to physiological explanations will not admit        
into their heads the categorical imperative from which these laws           
dictatorially proceed, notwithstanding that they feel themselves            
irresistibly forced by it. Dissatisfied at not being able to explain        
what lies wholly beyond that sphere, namely, freedom of the elective        
will, elevating as is this privilege, that man has of being capable of      
such an idea. They are stirred up by the proud claims of speculative        
reason, which feels its power so strongly in the fields, just as if         
they were allies leagued in defence of the omnipotence of                   
theoretical reason and roused by a general call to arms to resist that      
idea; and thus they are at present, and perhaps for a long time to          
come, though ultimately in vain, to attack the moral concept of             
freedom and if possible render it doubtful.                                 
                                                                            
INTRODUCTION                                                                
      INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS                   
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  Ethics in ancient times signified moral philosophy (philosophia           
moral is) generally, which was also called the doctrine of duties.          
Subsequently it was found advisable to confine this name to a part          
of moral philosophy, namely, to the doctrine of duties which are not        
subject to external laws (for which in German the name Tugendlehre was      
found suitable). Thus the system of general deontology is divided into      
that of jurisprudence (jurisprudentia), which is capable of external        
laws, and of ethics, which is not thus capable, and we may let this         
division stand.                                                             
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  I. Exposition of the Conception of Ethics                                 
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  The notion of duty is in itself already the notion of a constraint        
of the free elective will by the law; whether this constraint be an         
external one or be self-constraint. The moral imperative, by its            
categorical (the unconditional ought) announces this constraint, which      
therefore does not apply to all rational beings (for there may also be      
holy beings), but applies to men as rational physical beings who are        
unholy enough to be seduced by pleasure to the transgression of the         
moral law, although they themselves recognize its authority; and            
when they do obey it, to obey it unwillingly (with resistance of their      
inclination); and it is in this that the constraint properly                
consists.* Now, as man is a free (moral) being, the notion of duty can      
contain only self-constraint (by the idea of the law itself), when          
we look to the internal determination of the will (the spring), for         
thus only is it possible to combine that constraint (even if it were        
external) with the freedom of the elective will. The notion of duty         
then must be an ethical one.                                                
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  *Man, however, as at the same time a moral being, when he                 
considers himself objectively, which he is qualified to do by his pure      
practical reason, (i.e., according to humanity in his own person).          
finds himself holy enough to transgress the law only unwillingly;           
for there is no man so depraved who in this transgression would not         
feel a resistance and an abhorrence of himself, so that he must put         
a force on himself. It is impossible to explain the phenomenon that at      
this parting of the ways (where the beautiful fable places Hercules         
between virtue and sensuality) man shows more propensity to obey            
inclination than the law. For, we can only explain what happens by          
tracing it to a cause according to physical laws; but then we should        
not be able to conceive the elective will as free. Now this mutually        
opposed self-constraint and the inevitability of it makes us recognize      
the incomprehensible property of freedom.                                   
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  The impulses of nature, then, contain hindrances to the fulfilment        
of duty in the mind of man, and resisting forces, some of them              
powerful; and he must judge himself able to combat these and to             
conquer them by means of reason, not in the future, but in the              
present, simultaneously with the thought; he must judge that he can do      
what the law unconditionally commands that be ought.                        
  Now the power and resolved purpose to resist a strong but unjust          
opponent is called fortitude (fortitudo), and when concerned with           
the opponent of the moral character within us, it is virtue (virtus,        
fortitudo moralis). Accordingly, general deontology, in that part           
which brings not external, but internal, freedom under laws is the          
doctrine of virtue.                                                         
  Jurisprudence had to do only with the formal condition of external        
freedom (the condition of consistency with itself, if its maxim became      
a universal law), that is, with law. Ethics, on the contrary, supplies      
us with a matter (an object of the free elective will), an end of pure      
reason which is at the same time conceived as an objectively necessary      
end, i.e., as duty for all men. For, as the sensible inclinations           
mislead us to ends (which are the matter of the elective will) that         
may contradict duty, the legislating reason cannot otherwise guard          
against their influence than by an opposite moral end, which therefore      
must be given a priori independently on inclination.                        
  An end is an object of the elective will (of a rational being) by         
the idea of which this will is determined to an action for the              
production of this object. Now I may be forced by others to actions         
which are directed to an end as means, but I cannot be forced to            
have an end; I can only make something an end to myself. If,                
however, I am also bound to make something which lies in the notions        
of practical reason an end to myself, and therefore besides the formal      
determining principle of the elective will (as contained in law) to         
have also a material principle, an end which can be opposed to the end      
derived from sensible impulses; then this gives the notion of an end        
which is in itself a duty. The doctrine of this cannot belong to            
jurisprudence, but to ethics, since this alone includes in its              
conception self-constraint according to moral laws.                         
  For this reason, ethics may also be defined as the system of the          
ends of the pure practical reason. The two parts of moral philosophy        
are distinguished as treating respectively of ends and of duties of         
constraint. That ethics contains duties to the observance of which one      
cannot be (physically) forced by others, is merely the consequence          
of this, that it is a doctrine of ends, since to be forced to have          
ends or to set them before one's self is a contradiction.                   
  Now that ethics is a doctrine of virtue (doctrina officiorum              
virtutis) follows from the definition of virtue given above compared        
with the obligation, the peculiarity of which has just been shown.          
There is in fact no other determination of the elective will, except        
that to an end, which in the very notion of it implies that I cannot        
even physically be forced to it by the elective will of others.             
Another may indeed force me to do something which is not my end (but        
only means to the end of another), but he cannot force me to make it        
my own end, and yet I can have no end except of my own making. The          
latter supposition would be a contradiction- an act of freedom which        
yet at the same time would not be free. But there is no                     
contradiction in setting before one's self an end which is also a           
duty: for in this case I constrain myself, and this is quite                
consistent with freedom.* But how is such an end possible? That is now      
the question. For the possibility of the notion of the thing (viz.,         
that it is not self-contradictory) is not enough to prove the               
possibility of the thing itself (the objective reality of the notion).      
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  *The less a man can be physically forced, and the more he can be          
morally forced (by the mere idea of duty), so much the freer he is.         
The man, for example, who is of sufficiently firm resolution and            
strong mind not to give up an enjoyment which he has resolved on,           
however much loss is shown as resulting therefrom, and who yet desists      
from his purpose unhesitatingly, though very reluctantly, when he           
finds that it would cause him to neglect an official duty or a sick         
father; this man proves his freedom in the highest degree by this very      
thing, that he cannot resist the voice of duty.                             
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  II. Exposition of the Notion of an End which is also a Duty               
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  We can conceive the relation of end to duty in two ways; either           
starting from the end to find the maxim of the dutiful actions; or          
conversely, setting out from this to find the end which is also             
duty. jurisprudence proceeds in the former way. It is left to               
everyone's free elective will what end he will choose for his               
action. But its maxim is determined a priori; namely, that the freedom      
of the agent must be consistent with the freedom of every other             
according to a universal law.                                               
  Ethics, however, proceeds in the opposite way. It cannot start            
from the ends which the man may propose to himself, and hence give          
directions as to the maxims he should adopt, that is, as to his             
duty; for that would be to take empirical principles of maxims, and         
these could not give any notion of duty; since this, the categorical        
ought, has its root in pure reason alone. Indeed, if the maxims were        
to be adopted in accordance with those ends (which are all selfish),        
we could not properly speak of the notion of duty at all. Hence in          
ethics the notion of duty must lead to ends, and must on moral              
principles give the foundation of maxims with respect to the ends           
which we ought to propose to ourselves.                                     
  Setting aside the question what sort of end that is which is in           
itself a duty, and how such an end is possible, it is here only             
necessary to show that a duty of this kind is called a duty of virtue,      
and why it is so called.                                                    
  To every duty corresponds a right of action (facultas moral is            
generatim), but all duties do not imply a corresponding right               
(facultas juridica) of another to compel any one, but only the              
duties called legal duties. Similarly to all ethical obligation             
corresponds the notion of virtue, but it does not follow that all           
ethical duties are duties of virtue. Those, in fact, are not so             
which do not concern so much a certain end (matter, object of the           
elective will), but merely that which is formal in the moral                
determination of the will (e.g., that the dutiful action must also          
be done from duty). It is only an end which is also duty that can be        
called a duty of virtue. Hence there are several of the latter kind         
(and thus there are distinct virtues); on the contrary, there is            
only one duty of the former kind, but it is one which is valid for all      
actions (only one virtuous disposition).                                    
  The duty of virtue is essentially distinguished from the duty of          
justice in this respect; that it is morally possible to be                  
externally compelled to the latter, whereas the former rests on free        
self-constraint only. For finite holy beings (which cannot even be          
tempted to the violation of duty) there is no doctrine of virtue,           
but only moral philosophy, the latter being an autonomy of practical        
reason, whereas the former is also an autocracy of it. That is, it          
includes a consciousness- not indeed immediately perceived, but             
rightly concluded, from the moral categorical imperative- of the power      
to become master of one's inclinations which resist the law; so that        
human morality in its highest stage can yet be nothing more than            
virtue; even if it were quite pure (perfectly free from the                 
influence of a spring foreign to duty), a state which is poetically         
personified under the name of the wise man (as an ideal to which one        
should continually approximate).                                            
  Virtue, however, is not to be defined and esteemed merely as              
habit, and (as it is expressed in the prize essay of Cochius) as a          
long custom acquired by practice of morally good actions. For, if this      
is not an effect of well-resolved and firm principles ever more and         
more purified, then, like any other mechanical arrangement brought          
about by technical practical reason, it is neither armed for all            
circumstances nor adequately secured against the change that may be         
wrought by new allurements.                                                 
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                         REMARK                                             
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  To virtue = + a is opposed as its logical contradictory                   
(contradictorie oppositum) the negative lack of virtue (moral               
weakness) = o; but vice = a is its contrary (contrarie s. realiter          
oppositum); and it is not merely a needless question but an                 
offensive one to ask whether great crimes do not perhaps demand more        
strength of mind than great virtues. For by strength of mind we             
understand the strength of purpose of a man, as a being endowed with        
freedom, and consequently so far as he is master of himself (in his         
senses) and therefore in a healthy condition of mind. But great crimes      
are paroxysms, the very sight of which makes the man of healthy mind        
shudder. The question would therefore be something like this:               
whether a man in a fit of madness can have more physical strength than      
if he is in his senses; and we may admit this without on that               
account ascribing to him more strength of mind, if by mind we               
understand the vital principle of man in the free use of his powers.        
For since those crimes have their ground merely in the power of the         
inclinations that weaken reason, which does not prove strength of           
mind, this question would be nearly the same as the question whether a      
man in a fit of illness can show more strength than in a healthy            
condition; and this may be directly denied, since the want of               
health, which consists in the proper balance of all the bodily              
forces of the man, is a weakness in the system of these forces, by          
which system alone we can estimate absolute health.                         
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  III. Of the Reason for conceiving an End which is also a Duty             
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  An end is an object of the free elective will, the idea of which          
determines this will to an action by which the object is produced.          
Accordingly every action has its end, and as no one can have an end         
without himself making the object of his elective will his end,             
hence to have some end of actions is an act of the freedom of the           
agent, not an affect of physical nature. Now, since this act which          
determines an end is a practical principle which commands not the           
means (therefore not conditionally) but the end itself (therefore           
unconditionally), hence it is a categorical imperative of pure              
practical reason and one, therefore, which combines a concept of            
duty with that of an end in general.                                        
  Now there must be such an end and a categorical imperative                
corresponding to it. For since there are free actions, there must also      
be ends to which as an object those actions are directed. Amongst           
these ends there must also be some which are at the same time (that         
is, by their very notion) duties. For if there were none such, then         
since no actions can be without an end, all ends which practical            
reason might have would be valid only as means to other ends, and a         
categorical imperative would be impossible; a supposition which             
destroys all moral philosophy.                                              
  Here, therefore, we treat not of ends which man actually makes to         
himself in accordance with the sensible impulses of his nature, but of      
objects of the free elective will under its own laws- objects which he      
ought to make his end. We may call the former technical                     
(subjective), properly pragmatical, including the rules of prudence in      
the choice of its ends; but the latter we must call the moral               
(objective) doctrine of ends. This distinction is, however,                 
superfluous here, since moral philosophy already by its very notion is      
clearly separated from the doctrine of physical nature (in the present      
instance, anthropology). The latter resting on empirical principles,        
whereas the moral doctrine of ends which treats of duties rests on          
principles given a priori in pure practical reason.                         
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  IV. What are the Ends which are also Duties?                              
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  They are: A. OUR OWN PERFECTION, B. HAPPINESS OF OTHERS.                  
  We cannot invert these and make on one side our own happiness, and        
on the other the perfection of others, ends which should be in              
themselves duties for the same person.                                      
  For one's own happiness is, no doubt, an end that all men have (by        
virtue of the impulse of their nature), but this end cannot without         
contradiction be regarded as a duty. What a man of himself                  
inevitably wills does not come under the notion of duty, for this is a      
constraint to an end reluctantly adopted. It is, therefore, a               
contradiction to say that a man is in duty bound to advance his own         
happiness with all his power.                                               
  It is likewise a contradiction to make the perfection of another          
my end, and to regard myself as in duty bound to promote it. For it is      
just in this that the perfection of another man as a person                 
consists, namely, that he is able of himself to set before him his own      
end according to his own notions of duty; and it is a contradiction to      
require (to make it a duty for me) that I should do something which no      
other but himself can do.                                                   
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  V. Explanation of these two Notions                                       
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                  A. OUR OWN PERFECTION                                     
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  The word perfection is liable to many misconceptions. It is               
sometimes understood as a notion belonging to transcendental                
philosophy; viz., the notion of the totality of the manifold which          
taken together constitutes a thing; sometimes, again, it is understood      
as belonging to teleology, so that it signifies the correspondence          
of the properties of a thing to an end. Perfection in the former sense      
might be called quantitative (material), in the latter qualitative          
(formal) perfection. The former can be one only, for the whole of what      
belongs to the one thing is one. But of the latter there may be             
several in one thing; and it is of the latter property that we here         
treat.                                                                      
  When it is said of the perfection that belongs to man generally           
(properly speaking, to humanity), that it is in itself a duty to            
make this our end, it must be placed in that which may be the effect        
of one's deed, not in that which is merely an endowment for which we        
have to thank nature; for otherwise it would not be duty.                   
Consequently, it can be nothing else than the cultivation of one's          
power (or natural capacity) and also of one's will (moral disposition)      
to satisfy the requirement of duty in general. The supreme element          
in the former (the power) is the understanding, it being the faculty        
of concepts, and, therefore, also of those concepts which refer to          
duty. First it is his duty to labour to raise himself out of the            
rudeness of his nature, out of his animal nature more and more to           
humanity, by which alone he is capable of setting before him ends to        
supply the defects of his ignorance by instruction, and to correct his      
errors; he is not merely counselled to do this by reason as                 
technically practical, with a view to his purposes of other kinds           
(as art), but reason, as morally practical, absolutely commands him to      
do it, and makes this end his duty, in order that he may be worthy          
of the humanity that dwells in him. Secondly, to carry the cultivation      
of his will up to the purest virtuous disposition, that, namely, in         
which the law is also the spring of his dutiful actions, and to obey        
it from duty, for this is internal morally practical perfection.            
This is called the moral sense (as it were a special sense, sensus          
moralis), because it is a feeling of the effect which the                   
legislative will within himself exercises on the faculty of acting          
accordingly. This is, indeed, often misused fanatically, as though          
(like the genius of Socrates) it preceded reason, or even could             
dispense with judgement of reason; but still it is a moral perfection,      
making every special end, which is also a duty, one's own end.              
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                 B. HAPPINESS OF OTHERS                                     
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  It is inevitable for human nature that a should wish and seek for         
happiness, that is, satisfaction with his condition, with certainty of      
the continuance of this satisfaction. But for this very reason it is        
not an end that is also a duty. Some writers still make a                   
distinction between moral and physical happiness (the former                
consisting in satisfaction with one's person and moral behaviour, that      
is, with what one does; the other in satisfaction with that which           
nature confers, consequently with what one enjoys as a foreign              
gift). Without at present censuring the misuse of the word (which even      
involves a contradiction), it must be observed that the feeling of the      
former belongs solely to the preceding head, namely, perfection. For        
he who is to feel himself happy in the mere consciousness of his            
uprightness already possesses that perfection which in the previous         
section was defined as that end which is also duty.                         
  If happiness, then, is in question, which it is to be my duty to          
promote as my end, it must be the happiness of other men whose              
(permitted) end I hereby make also mine. It still remains left to           
themselves to decide what they shall reckon as belonging to their           
happiness; only that it is in my power to decline many things which         
they so reckon, but which I do not so regard, supposing that they have      
no right to demand it from me as their own. A plausible objection           
often advanced against the division of duties above adopted consists        
in setting over against that end a supposed obligation to study my own      
(physical) happiness, and thus making this, which is my natural and         
merely subjective end, my duty (and objective end). This requires to        
be cleared up.                                                              
  Adversity, pain, and want are great temptations to transgression          
of one's duty; accordingly it would seem that strength, health, a           
competence, and welfare generally, which are opposed to that                
influence, may also be regarded as ends that are also duties; that is,      
that it is a duty to promote our own happiness not merely to make that      
of others our end. But in that case the end is not happiness but the        
morality of the agent; and happiness is only the means of removing the      
hindrances to morality; permitted means, since no one bas a right to        
demand from me the sacrifice of my not immoral ends. It is not              
directly a duty to seek a competence for one's self; but indirectly it      
may be so; namely, in order to guard against poverty which is a             
great temptation to vice. But then it is not my happiness but my            
morality, to maintain which in its integrity is at once my end and          
my duty.                                                                    
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  VI. Ethics does not supply Laws for Actions (which is done by             
      Jurisprudence), but only for the Maxims of Action                     
-                                                                           
  The notion of duty stands in immediate relation to a law (even            
though I abstract from every end which is the matter of the law); as        
is shown by the formal principle of duty in the categorical                 
imperative: "Act so that the maxims of thy action might become a            
universal law." But in ethics this is conceived as the law of thy           
own will, not of will in general, which might be that of others; for        
in the latter case it would give rise to a judicial duty which does         
not belong to the domain of ethics. In ethics, maxims are regarded          
as those subjective laws which merely have the specific character of        
universal legislation, which is only a negative principle (not to           
contradict a law in general). How, then, can there be further a law         
for the maxims of actions?                                                  
  It is the notion of an end which is also a duty, a notion peculiar        
to ethics, that alone is the foundation of a law for the maxims of          
actions; by making the subjective end (that which every one has)            
subordinate to the objective end (that which every one ought to make        
his own). The imperative: "Thou shalt make this or that thy end (e.         
g., the happiness of others)" applies to the matter of the elective         
will (an object). Now since no free action is possible, without the         
agent having in view in it some end (as matter of his elective              
will), it follows that, if there is an end which is also a duty, the        
maxims of actions which are means to ends must contain only the             
condition of fitness for a possible universal legislation: on the           
other hand, the end which is also a duty can make it a law that we          
should have such a maxim, whilst for the maxim itself the                   
possibility of agreeing with a universal legislation is sufficient.         
  For maxims of actions may be arbitrary, and are only limited by           
the condition of fitness for a universal legislation, which is the          
formal principle of actions. But a law abolishes the arbitrary              
character of actions, and is by this distinguished from recommendation      
(in which one only desires to know the best means to an end).               
-                                                                           
-                                                                           
  VII. Ethical Duties are of indeterminate, Juridical Duties of             
                    strict, Obligation                                      
-                                                                           
  This proposition is a consequence of the foregoing; for if the law        
can only command the maxim of the actions, not the actions themselves,      
this is a sign that it leaves in the observance of it a latitude            
(latitudo) for the elective will; that is, it cannot definitely assign      
how and how much we should do by the action towards the end which is        
also duty. But by an indeterminate duty is not meant a permission to        
make exceptions from the maxim of the actions, but only the permission      
to limit one maxim of duty by another (e. g., the general love of           
our neighbour by the love of parents); and this in fact enlarges the        
field for the practice of virtue. The more indeterminate the duty, and      
the more imperfect accordingly the obligation of the man to the             
action, and the closer he nevertheless brings this maxim of                 
obedience thereto (in his own mind) to the strict duty (of justice),        
so much the more perfect is his virtuous action.                            
  Hence it is only imperfect duties that are duties of virtue. The          
fulfilment of them is merit (meritum) = + a; but their transgression        
is not necessarily demerit (demeritum) = - a, but only moral unworth        
= o, unless the agent made it a principle not to conform to those           
duties. The strength of purpose in the former case is alone properly        
called virtue [Tugend] (virtus); the weakness in the latter case is         
not vice (vitium), but rather only lack of virtue [Untugend], a want        
of moral strength (defectus moralis). (As the word Tugend is derived        
from taugen [to be good for something], Untugend by its etymology           
signifies good for nothing.) Every action contrary to duty is called        
transgression (peccatum). Deliberate transgression which has become         
a principle is what properly constitutes what is called vice (vitium).      
  Although the conformity of actions to justice (i.e., to be an             
upright man) is nothing meritorious, yet the conformity of the maxim        
of such actions regarded as duties, that is, reverence for justice          
is meritorious. For by this the man makes the right of humanity or          
of men his own end, and thereby enlarges his notion of duty beyond          
that of indebtedness (officium debiti), since although another man          
by virtue of his rights can demand that my actions shall conform to         
the law, he cannot demand that the law shall also contain the spring        
of these actions. The same thing is true of the general ethical             
command, "Act dutifully from a sense of duty." To fix this disposition      
firmly in one's mind and to quicken it is, as in the former case,           
meritorious, because it goes beyond the law of duty in actions and          
makes the law in itself the spring.                                         
  But just for or reason, those duties also must be reckoned as of          
indeterminate obligation, in respect of which there exists a                
subjective principle which ethically rewards them; or to bring them as      
near as possible to the notion of a strict obligation, a principle          
of susceptibility of this reward according to the law of virtue;            
namely, a moral pleasure which goes beyond mere satisfaction with           
oneself (which may be merely negative), and of which it is proudly          
said that in this consciousness virtue is its own reward.                   
  When this merit is a merit of the man in respect of other men of          
promoting their natural ends, which are recognized as such by all           
men (making their happiness his own), we might call it the sweet            
merit, the consciousness of which creates a moral enjoyment in which        
men are by sympathy inclined to revel; whereas the bitter merit of          
promoting the true welfare of other men, even though they should not        
recognize it as such (in the case of the unthankful and ungrateful),        
has commonly no such reaction, but only produces a satisfaction with        
one's self, although in the latter case this would be even greater.         
-                                                                           
-                                                                           
  VIII. Exposition of the Duties of Virtue as Intermediate Duties           
-                                                                           
  (1) OUR OWN PERFECTION as an end which is also a duty                     
  (a) Physical perfection; that is, cultivation of all our faculties        
generally for the promotion of the ends set before us by reason.            
That this is a duty, and therefore an end in itself, and that the           
effort to effect this even without regard to the advantage that it          
secures us, is based, not on a conditional (pragmatic), but an              
unconditional (moral) imperative, may be seen from the following            
consideration. The power of proposing to ourselves an end is the            
characteristic of humanity (as distinguished from the brutes). With         
the end of humanity in our own person is therefore combined the             
rational will, and consequently the duty of deserving well of humanity      
by culture generally, by acquiring or advancing the power to carry out      
all sorts of possible ends, so far as this power is to be found in          
man; that is, it is a duty to cultivate the crude capacities of our         
nature, since it is by that cultivation that the animal is raised to        
man, therefore it is a duty in itself.                                      
  This duty, however, is merely ethical, that is, of indeterminate          
obligation. No principle of reason prescribes how far one must go in        
this effort (in enlarging or correcting his faculty of                      
understanding, that is, in acquisition of knowledge or technical            
capacity); and besides the difference in the circumstances into             
which men may come makes the choice of the kind of employment for           
which he should cultivate his talent very arbitrary. Here,                  
therefore, there is no law of reason for actions, but only for the          
maxim of actions, viz.: "Cultivate thy faculties of mind and body so        
as to be effective for all ends that may come in thy way, uncertain         
which of them may become thy own."                                          
  (b) Cultivation of Morality in ourselves. The greatest moral              
perfection of man is to do his duty, and that from duty (that the           
law be not only the rule but also the spring of his actions). Now at        
first sight this seems to be a strict obligation, and as if the             
principle of duty commanded not merely the legality of every action,        
but also the morality, i.e., the mental disposition, with the               
exactness and strictness of a law; but in fact the law commands even        
here only the maxim of the action, namely, that we should seek the          
ground of obligation, not in the sensible impulses (advantage or            
disadvantage), but wholly in the law; so that the action itself is not      
commanded. For it is not possible to man to see so far into the             
depth of his own heart that he could ever be thoroughly certain of the      
purity of his moral purpose and the sincerity of his mind even in           
one single action, although he has no doubt about the legality of           
it. Nay, often the weakness which deters a man from the risk of a           
crime is regarded by him as virtue (which gives the notion of               
strength). And how many there are who may have led a long blameless         
life, who are only fortunate in having escaped so many temptations.         
How much of the element of pure morality in their mental disposition        
may have belonged to each deed remains hidden even from themselves.         
  Accordingly, this duty to estimate the worth of one's actions not         
merely by their legality, but also by their morality (mental                
disposition), is only of indeterminate obligation; the law does not         
command this internal action in the human mind itself, but only the         
maxim of the action, namely, that we should strive with all our             
power that for all dutiful actions the thought of duty should be of         
itself an adequate spring.                                                  
  (2) HAPPINESS OF OTHERS as an end which is also a duty                    
  (a) Physical Welfare. Benevolent wishes may be unlimited, for they        
do not imply doing anything. But the case is more difficult with            
benevolent action, especially when this is to be done, not from             
friendly inclination (love) to others, but from duty, at the expense        
of the sacrifice and mortification of many of our appetites. That this      
beneficence is a duty results from this: that since our self-love           
cannot be separated from the need to be loved by others (to obtain          
help from them in case of necessity), we therefore make ourselves an        
end for others; and this maxim can never be obligatory except by            
having the specific character of a universal law, and consequently          
by means of a will that we should also make others our ends. Hence the      
happiness of others is an end that is also a duty.                          
  I am only bound then to sacrifice to others a part of my welfare          
without hope of recompense: because it is my duty, and it is                
impossible to assign definite limits how far that may go. Much depends      
on what would be the true want of each according to his own                 
feelings, and it must be left to each to determine this for himself.        
For that one should sacrifice his own happiness, his true wants, in         
order to promote that of others, would be a self-contradictory maxim        
if made a universal law. This duty, therefore, is only                      
indeterminate; it has a certain latitude within which one may do            
more or less without our being able to assign its limits definitely.        
The law holds only for the maxims, not for definite actions.                
  (b) Moral well-being of others (salus moral is) also belongs to           
the happiness of others, which it is our duty to promote, but only a        
negative duty. The pain that a man feels from remorse of conscience,        
although its origin is moral, is yet in its operation physical, like        
grief, fear, and every other diseased condition. To take care that          
he should not be deservedly smitten by this inward reproach is not          
indeed my duty but his business; nevertheless, it is my duty to do          
nothing which by the nature of man might seduce him to that for             
which his conscience may hereafter torment him, that is, it is my duty      
not to give him occasion of stumbling. But there are no definite            
limits within which this care for the moral satisfaction of others          
must be kept; therefore it involves only an indeterminate obligation.       
-                                                                           
-                                                                           
  IX. What is a Duty of Virtue?                                             
-                                                                           
  Virtue is the strength of the man's maxim in his obedience to             
duty. All strength is known only by the obstacles that it can               
overcome; and in the case of virtue the obstacles are the natural           
inclinations which may come into conflict with the moral purpose;           
and as it is the man who himself puts these obstacles in the way of         
his maxims, hence virtue is not merely a self-constraint (for that          
might be an effort of one inclination to constrain another), but is         
also a constraint according to a principle of inward freedom, and           
therefore by the mere idea of duty, according to its formal law.            
  All duties involve a notion of necessitation by the law, and ethical      
duties involve a necessitation for which only an internal                   
legislation is possible; juridical duties, on the other hand, one           
for which external legislation also is possible. Both, therefore,           
include the notion of constraint, either self-constraint or constraint      
by others. The moral power of the former is virtue, and the action          
springing from such a disposition (from reverence for the law) may          
be called a virtuous action (ethical), although the law expresses a         
juridical duty. For it is the doctrine of virtue that commands us to        
regard the rights of men as holy.                                           
  But it does not follow that everything the doing of which is virtue,      
is, properly speaking, a duty of virtue. The former may concern merely      
the form of the maxims; the latter applies to the matter of them,           
namely, to an end which is also conceived as duty. Now, as the ethical      
obligation to ends, of which there may be many, is only indeterminate,      
because it contains only a law for the maxim of actions, and the end        
is the matter (object) of elective will; hence there are many               
duties, differing according to the difference of lawful ends, which         
may be called duties of virtue (officia honestatis), just because they      
are subject only to free self-constraint, not to the constraint of          
other men, and determine the end which is also a duty.                      
  Virtue, being a coincidence of the rational will, with every duty         
firmly settled in the character, is, like everything formal, only           
one and the same. But, as regards the end of actions, which is also         
duty, that is, as regards the matter which one ought to make an end,        
there may be several virtues; and as the obligation to its maxim is         
called a duty of virtue, it follows that there are also several duties      
of virtue.                                                                  
  The supreme principle of ethics (the doctrine of virtue) is: "Act on      
a maxim, the ends of which are such as it might be a universal law for      
everyone to have." On this principle a man is an end to himself as          
well as others, and it is not enough that he is not permitted to use        
either himself or others merely as means (which would imply that be         
might be indifferent to them), but it is in itself a duty of every man      
to make mankind in general his end.                                         
  The principle of ethics being a categorical imperative does not           
admit of proof, but it admits of a justification from principles of         
pure practical reason. Whatever in relation to mankind, to oneself,         
and others, can be an end, that is an end for pure practical reason:        
for this is a faculty of assigning ends in general; and to be               
indifferent to them, that is, to take no interest in them, is a             
contradiction; since in that case it would not determine the maxims of      
actions (which always involve an end), and consequently would cease to      
be practical reasons. Pure reason, however, cannot command any ends         
a priori, except so far as it declares the same to be also a duty,          
which duty is then cared a duty of virtue.                                  
-                                                                           
-                                                                           
  X. The Supreme Principle of Jurisprudence was Analytical; that of         
                     Ethics is Synthetical                                  
-                                                                           
  That external constraint, so far as it withstands that which hinders      
the external freedom that agrees with general laws (as an obstacle          
of the obstacle thereto), can be consistent with ends generally, is         
clear on the principle of contradiction, and I need not go beyond           
the notion of freedom in order to see it, let the end which each may        
be what he will. Accordingly, the supreme principle of jurisprudence        
is an analytical principle. On the contrary the principle of ethics         
goes beyond the notion of external freedom and, by general laws,            
connects further with it an end which it makes a duty. This principle,      
therefore, is synthetic. The possibility of it is contained in the          
deduction (SS ix).                                                          
  This enlargement of the notion of duty beyond that of external            
freedom and of its limitation by the merely formal condition of its         
constant harmony; this, I say, in which, instead of constraint from         
without, there is set up freedom within, the power of self-constraint,      
and that not by the help of other inclinations, but by pure                 
practical reason (which scorns all such help), consists in this             
fact, which raises it above juridical duty; that by it ends are             
proposed from which jurisprudence altogether abstracts. In the case of      
the moral imperative, and the supposition of freedom which it               
necessarily involves, the law, the power (to fulfil it) and the             
rational will that determines the maxim, constitute all the elements        
that form the notion of juridical duty. But in the imperative, which        
commands the duty of virtue, there is added, besides the notion of          
self-constraint, that of an end; not one that we have, but that we          
ought to have, which, therefore, pure practical reason has in               
itself, whose highest, unconditional end (which, however, continues to      
be duty) consists in this: that virtue is its own end and, by               
deserving well of men, is also its own reward. Herein it shines so          
brightly as an ideal to human perceptions, it seems to cast in the          
shade even holiness itself, which is never tempted to                       
transgression.* This, however, is an illusion arising from the fact         
that as we have no measure for the degree of strength, except the           
greatness of the obstacles which might have been overcome (which in         
our case are the inclinations), we are led to mistake the subjective        
conditions of estimation of a magnitude for the objective conditions        
of the magnitude itself. But when compared with human ends, all of          
which have their obstacles to be overcome, it is true that the worth        
of virtue itself, which is its own end, far outweighs the worth of all      
the utility and all the empirical ends and advantages which it may          
have as consequences.                                                       
-                                                                           
  *So that one might very two well-known lines of Haller thus:              
    With all his failings, man is still                                     
    Better than angels void of will.                                        
-                                                                           
  We may, indeed, say that man is obliged to virtue (as a moral             
strength). For although the power (facultas) to overcome all                
imposing sensible impulses by virtue of his freedom can and must be         
presupposed, yet this power regarded as strength (robur) is                 
something that must be acquired by the moral spring (the idea of the        
law) being elevated by contemplation of the dignity of the pure law of      
reason in us, and at the same time also by exercise.                        
-                                                                           
-                                                                           
  XI. According to the preceding Principles, the Scheme of Duties of        
                  Virtue may be thus exhibited                              
-                                                                           
       The Material Element of the Duty of Virtue                           
-                                                                           
-                                                                           
               1                              2                             
    Internal Duty of Virtue       External Virtue of Duty                   
-                                                                           
        My Own End,                  The End of Others,                     
        which is also my             the promotion of                       
        Duty                         which is also my                       
                                     Duty                                   
-                                                                           
        (My own                      (The Happiness                         
        Perfection)                  of Others)                             
-                                                                           
               3                              4                             
        The Law which is             The End which is                       
        also Spring                  also Spring                            
-                                                                           
        On which the                 On which the                           
        Morality                     Legality                               
-                                                                           
         of every free determination of will rests                          
-                                                                           
-                                                                           
    The Formal Element of the Duty of Virtue.                               
-                                                                           
-                                                                           
  XII. Preliminary Notions of the Susceptibility of the Mind for            
                 Notions of Duty generally                                  
-                                                                           
  These are such moral qualities as, when a man does not possess them,      
he is not bound to acquire them. They are: the moral feeling,               
conscience, love of one's neighbour, and respect for ourselves              
(self-esteem). There is no obligation to have these, since they are         
subjective conditions of susceptibility for the notion of duty, not         
objective conditions of morality. They are all sensitive and                
antecedent, but natural capacities of mind (praedispositio) to be           
affected by notions of duty; capacities which it cannot be regarded as      
a duty to have, but which every man has, and by virtue of which he can      
be brought under obligation. The consciousness of them is not of            
empirical origin, but can only follow on that of a moral law, as an         
effect of the same on the mind.                                             
-                                                                           
                    A. THE MORAL FEELING                                    
-                                                                           
  This is the susceptibility for pleasure or displeasure, merely            
from the consciousness of the agreement or disagreement of our              
action with the law of duty. Now, every determination of the                
elective will proceeds from the idea of the possible action through         
the feeling of pleasure or displeasure in taking an interest in it          
or its effect to the deed; and here the sensitive state (the affection      
of the internal sense) is either a pathological or a moral feeling.         
The former is the feeling that precedes the idea of the law, the            
latter that which may follow it.                                            
  Now it cannot be a duty to have a moral feeling, or to acquire it;        
for all consciousness of obligation supposes this feeling in order          
that one may become conscious of the necessitation that lies in the         
notion of duty; but every man (as a moral being) has it originally          
in himself; the obligation, then, can only extend to the cultivation        
of it and the strengthening of it even by admiration of its                 
inscrutable origin; and this is effected by showing how it is just, by      
the mere conception of reason, that it is excited most strongly, in         
its own purity and apart from every pathological stimulus; and it is        
improper to call this feeling a moral sense; for the word sense             
generally means a theoretical power of perception directed to an            
object; whereas the moral feeling (like pleasure and displeasure in         
general) is something merely subjective, which supplies no                  
knowledge. No man is wholly destitute of moral feeling, for if he were      
totally unsusceptible of this sensation he would be morally dead; and,      
to speak in the language of physicians, if the moral vital force could      
no longer produce any effect on this feeling, then his humanity             
would be dissolved (as it were by chemical laws) into mere animality        
and be irrevocably confounded with the mass of other physical               
beings. But we have no special sense for (moral) good and evil any          
more than for truth, although such expressions are often used; but          
we have a susceptibility of the free elective will for being moved          
by pure practical reason and its law; and it is this that we call           
the moral feeling.                                                          
-                                                                           
                    B. OF CONSCIENCE                                        
-                                                                           
  Similarly, conscience is not a thing to be acquired, and it is not a      
duty to acquire it; but every man, as a moral being, has it originally      
within him. To be bound to have a conscience would be as much as to         
say to be under a duty to recognize duties. For conscience is               
practical reason which, in every case of law, holds before a man his        
duty for acquittal or condemnation; consequently it does not refer          
to an object, but only to the subject (affecting the moral feeling          
by its own act); so that it is an inevitable fact, not an obligation        
and duty. When, therefore, it is said, "This man has no conscience,"        
what is meant is that he pays no heed to its dictates. For if he            
really had none, he would not take credit to himself for anything done      
according to duty, nor reproach himself with violation of duty, and         
therefore he would be unable even to conceive the duty of having a          
conscience.                                                                 
  I pass by the manifold subdivisions of conscience, and only               
observe what follows from what has just been said, namely, that             
there is no such thing as an erring conscience. No doubt it is              
possible sometimes to err in the objective judgement whether something      
is a duty or not; but I cannot err in the subjective whether I have         
compared it with my practical (here judicially acting) reason for           
the purpose of that judgement: for if I erred I would not have              
exercised practical judgement at all, and in that case there is             
neither truth nor error. Unconscientiousness is not want of                 
conscience, but the propensity not to heed its judgement. But when a        
man is conscious of having acted according to his conscience, then, as      
far as regards guilt or innocence, nothing more can be required of          
him, only he is bound to enlighten his understanding as to what is          
duty or not; but when it comes or has come to action, then                  
conscience speaks involuntarily and inevitably. To act conscientiously      
can, therefore, not be a duty, since otherwise it would be necessary        
to have a second conscience, in order to be conscious of the act of         
the first.                                                                  
  The duty here is only to cultivate our con. science, to quicken           
our attention to the voice of the internal judge, and to use all means      
to secure obedience to it, and is thus our indirect duty.                   
-                                                                           
                    C. OF LOVE TO MEN                                       
-                                                                           
  Love is a matter of feeling, not of will or volition, and I cannot        
love because I will to do so, still less because I ought (I cannot          
be necessitated to love); hence there is no such thing as a duty to         
love. Benevolence, however (amor benevolentiae), as a mode of               
action, may be subject to a law of duty. Disinterested benevolence          
is often called (though very improperly) love; even where the               
happiness of the other is not concerned, but the complete and free          
surrender of all one's own ends to the ends of another (even a              
superhuman) being, love is spoken of as being also our duty. But all        
duty is necessitation or constraint, although it may be                     
self-constraint according to a law. But what is done from constraint        
is not done from love.                                                      
  It is a duty to do good to other men according to our power, whether      
we love them or not, and this duty loses nothing of its weight,             
although we must make the sad remark that our species, alas! is not         
such as to be found particularly worthy of love when we know it more        
closely. Hatred of men, however, is always hateful: even though             
without any active hostility it consists only in complete aversion          
from mankind (the solitary misanthropy). For benevolence still remains      
a duty even towards the manhater, whom one cannot love, but to whom we      
can show kindness.                                                          
  To hate vice in men is neither duty nor against duty, but a mere          
feeling of horror of vice, the will having no influence on the feeling      
nor the feeling on the will. Beneficence is a duty. He who often            
practises this, and sees his beneficent purpose succeed, comes at last      
really to love him whom he has benefited. When, therefore, it is said:      
"Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," this does not mean,             
"Thou shalt first of all love, and by means of this love (in the            
next place) do him good"; but: "Do good to thy neighbour, and this          
beneficence will produce in thee the love of men (as a settled habit        
of inclination to beneficence)."                                            
  The love of complacency (amor complacentiae,) would therefore             
alone be direct. This is a pleasure immediately connected with the          
idea of the existence of an object, and to have a duty to this, that        
is, to be necessitated to find pleasure in a thing, is a                    
contradiction.                                                              
-                                                                           
                     D. OF RESPECT                                          
-                                                                           
  Respect (reverentia) is likewise something merely subjective; a           
feeling of a peculiar kind not a judgement about an object which it         
would be a duty to effect or to advance. For if considered as duty          
it could only be conceived as such by means of the respect which we         
have for it. To have a duty to this, therefore, would be as much as to      
say to be bound in duty to have a duty. When, therefore, it is said:        
"Man has a duty of self-esteem," this is improperly stated, and we          
ought rather to say: "The law within him inevitably forces from him         
respect for his own being, and this feeling (which is of a peculiar         
kind) is a basis of certain duties, that is, of certain actions             
which may be consistent with his duty to himself." But we cannot say        
that he has a duty of respect for himself; for he must have respect         
for the law within himself, in order to be able to conceive duty at         
all.                                                                        
-                                                                           
-                                                                           
  XIII. General Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals in the              
               treatment of Pure Ethics                                     
-                                                                           
  First. A duty can have only a single ground of obligation; and if         
two or more proof of it are adduced, this is a certain mark that            
either no valid proof has yet been given, or that there are several         
distinct duties which have been regarded as one.                            
  For all moral proofs, being philosophical, can only be drawn by           
means of rational knowledge from concepts, not like mathematics,            
through the construction of concepts. The latter science admits a           
variety of proofs of one and the same theorem; because in intuition         
a priori there may be several properties of an object, all of which         
lead back to the very same principle. If, for instance, to prove the        
duty of veracity, an argument is drawn first from the harm that a           
lie causes to other men; another from the worthlessness of a liar           
and the violation of his own self-respect, what is proved in the            
former argument is a duty of benevolence, not of veracity, that is          
to say, not the duty which required to be proved, but a different one.      
Now, if, in giving a variety of proof for one and the same theorem, we      
flatter ourselves that the multitude of reasons will compensate the         
lack of weight in each taken separately, this is a very                     
unphilosophical resource, since it betrays trickery and dishonesty;         
for several insufficient proofs placed beside one another do not            
produce certainty, nor even probability. They should advance as reason      
and consequence in a series, up to the sufficient reason, and it is         
only in this way that they can have the force of proof. Yet the former      
is the usual device of the rhetorician.                                     
  Secondly. The difference between virtue and vice cannot be sought in      
the degree in which certain maxims are followed, but only in the            
specific quality of the maxims (their relation to the law). In other        
words, the vaunted principle of Aristotle, that virtue is the mean          
between two vices, is false.* For instance, suppose that good               
management is given as the mean between two vices, prodigality and          
avarice; then its origin as a virtue can neither be defined as the          
gradual diminution of the former vice (by saving), nor as the increase      
of the expenses of the miserly. These vices, in fact, cannot be viewed      
as if they, proceeding as it were in opposite directions, met together      
in good management; but each of them has its own maxim, which               
necessarily contradicts that of the other.                                  
-                                                                           
  *The common classical formulae of ethics- medio tutissimus ibis;          
omne mimium vertitur in vitium; est modus in rebus, etc., medium            
tenuere beati; virtus est medium vitiorum et utrinque reductum-             
["You will go most safely in the middle" (Virgil); "Every excess            
develops into a vice"; "There is a mean in all things, etc." (Horace);      
"Happy they who steadily pursue a middle course"; "Virtue is the            
mean between two vices and equally removed from either" (Horace).]-         
contain a poor sort of wisdom, which has no definite principles; for        
this mean between two extremes, who will assign it for me? Avarice (as      
a vice) is not distinguished from frugality (as a virtue) by merely         
being the lat pushed too far; but has a quite different principle;          
(maxim), namely placing the end of economy not in the enjoyment of          
one's means, but in the mere possession of them, renouncing enjoyment;      
just as the vice of prodigality is not to be sought in the excessive        
enjoyment of one's means, but in the bad maxim which makes the use          
of them, without regard to their maintenance, the sole end.                 
-                                                                           
  For the same reason, no vice can be defined as an excess in the           
practice of certain actions beyond what is proper (e.g.,                    
Prodigalitas est excessus in consumendis opibus); or, as a less             
exercise of them than is fitting (Avaritia est defectus, etc.). For         
since in this way the degree is left quite undefined, and the question      
whether conduct accords with duty or not, turns wholly on this, such        
an account is of no use as a definition.                                    
  Thirdly. Ethical virtue must not be estimated by the power we             
attribute to man of fulfilling the law; but, conversely, the moral          
power must be estimated by the law, which commands categorically; not,      
therefore, by the empirical knowledge that we have of men as they are,      
but by the rational knowledge how, according to the ideas of humanity,      
they ought to be. These three maxims of the scientific treatment of         
ethics are opposed to the older apophthegms:                                
  1. There is only one virtue and only one vice.                            
  2. Virtue is the observance of the mean path between two opposite         
vices.                                                                      
  3. Virtue (like prudence) must be learned from experience.                
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  XIV. Of Virtue in General                                                 
-                                                                           
  Virtue signifies a moral strength of will. But this does not exhaust      
the notion; for such strength might also belong to a holy (superhuman)      
being, in whom no opposing impulse counteracts the law of his rational      
will; who therefore willingly does everything in accordance with the        
law. Virtue then is the moral strength of a man's will in his               
obedience to duty; and this is a moral necessitation by his own law         
giving reason, inasmuch as this constitutes itself a power executing        
the law. It is not itself a duty, nor is it a duty to possess it            
(otherwise we should be in duty bound to have a duty), but it               
commands, and accompanies its command with a moral constraint (one          
possible by laws of internal freedom). But since this should be             
irresistible, strength is requisite, and the degree of this strength        
can be estimated only by the magnitude of the hindrances which man          
creates for himself, by his inclinations. Vices, the brood of unlawful      
dispositions, are the monsters that he has to combat; wherefore this        
moral strength as fortitude (fortitudo moral is) constitutes the            
greatest and only true martial glory of man; it is also called the          
true wisdom, namely, the practical, because it makes the ultimate           
end of the existence of man on earth its own end. Its possession alone      
makes man free, healthy, rich, a king, etc., nor either chance or fate      
deprive him of this, since he possesses himself, and the virtuous           
cannot lose his virtue.                                                     
  All the encomiums bestowed on the ideal of humanity in its moral          
perfection can lose nothing of their practical reality by the examples      
of what men now are, have been, or will probably be hereafter;              
anthropology which proceeds from mere empirical knowledge cannot            
impair anthroponomy which is erected by the unconditionally                 
legislating reason; and although virtue may now and then be called          
meritorious (in relation to men, not to the law), and be worthy of          
reward, yet in itself, as it is its own end, so also it must be             
regarded as its own reward.                                                 
  Virtue considered in its complete perfection is, therefore, regarded      
not as if man possessed virtue, but as if virtue possessed the man,         
since in the former case it would appear as though he had still had         
the choice (for which he would then require another virtue, in order        
to select virtue from all other wares offered to him). To conceive a        
plurality of virtues (as we unavoidably must) is nothing else but to        
conceive various moral objects to which the (rational) will is led          
by the single principle of virtue; and it is the same with the              
opposite vices. The expression which personifies both is a contrivance      
for affecting the sensibility, pointing, however, to a moral sense.         
Hence it follows that an aesthetic of morals is not a part, but a           
subjective exposition of the Metaphysic of Morals; in which the             
emotions that accompany the force of the moral law make the that force      
to be felt; for example: disgust, horror, etc., which gives a sensible      
moral aversion in order to gain the precedence from the merely              
sensible incitement.                                                        
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  XV. Of the Principle on which Ethics is separated from                    
                     Jurisprudence                                          
-                                                                           
  This separation on which the subdivision of moral philosophy in           
general rests, is founded on this: that the notion of freedom, which        
is common to both, makes it necessary to divide duties into those of        
external and those of internal freedom; the latter of which alone           
are ethical. Hence this internal freedom which is the condition of all      
ethical duty must be discussed as a preliminary (discursus                  
praeliminaris), just as above the doctrine of conscience was discussed      
as the condition of all duty.                                               
-                                                                           
                         REMARKS                                            
-                                                                           
  Of the Doctrine of Virtue on the Principle Of Internal Freedom.           
-                                                                           
  Habit (habitus) is a facility of action and a subjective                  
perfection of the elective will. But not every such facility is a free      
habit (habitus libertatis); for if it is custom (assuetudo), that           
is, a uniformity of action which, by frequent repetition, has become a      
necessity, then it is not a habit proceeding from freedom, and              
therefore not a moral habit. Virtue therefore cannot be defined as a        
habit of free law-abiding actions, unless indeed we add "determining        
itself in its action by the idea of the law"; and then this habit is        
not a property of the elective will, but of the rational will, which        
is a faculty that in adopting a rule also declares it to be a               
universal law, and it is only such a habit that can be reckoned as          
virtue. Two things are required for internal freedom: to be master          
of oneself in a given case (animus sui compos) and to have command          
over oneself (imperium in semetipsum), that is to subdue his                
emotions and to govern his passions. With these conditions, the             
character (indoles) is noble (erecta); in the opposite case, it is          
ignoble (indoles abjecta serva).                                            
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  XVI. Virtue requires, first of all, Command over Oneself                  
-                                                                           
  Emotions and passions are essentially distinct; the former belong to      
feeling in so far as this coming before reflection makes it more            
difficult or even impossible. Hence emotion is called hasty (animus         
praeceps). And reason declares through the notion of virtue that a man      
should collect himself; but this weakness in the life of one's              
understanding, joined with the strength of a mental excitement, is          
only a lack of virtue (Untugend), and as it were a weak and childish        
thing, which may very well consist with the best will, and has further      
this one good thing in it, that this storm soon subsides. A propensity      
to emotion (e.g., resentment) is therefore not so closely related to        
vice as passion is. Passion, on the other hand, is the sensible             
appetite grown into a permanent inclination (e. g., hatred in contrast      
to resentment). The calmness with which one indulges it leaves room         
for reflection and allows the mind to frame principles thereon for          
itself; and thus when the inclination falls upon what contradicts           
the law, to brood on it, to allow it to root itself deeply, and             
thereby to take up evil (as of set purpose) into one's maxim; and this      
is then specifically evil, that is, it is a true vice.                      
  Virtue, therefore, in so far as it is based on internal freedom,          
contains a positive command for man, namely, that he should bring           
all his powers and inclinations under his rule (that of reason); and        
this is a positive precept of command over himself which is additional      
to the prohibition, namely, that he should not allow himself to be          
governed by his feelings and inclinations (the duty of apathy); since,      
unless reason takes the reins of government into its own hands, the         
feelings and inclinations play the master over the man.                     
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  XVII. Virtue necessarily presupposes Apathy (considered as                
                          Strength)                                         
-                                                                           
  This word (apathy) has come into bad repute, just as if it meant          
want of feeling, and therefore subjective indifference with respect to      
the objects of the elective will; it is supposed to be a weakness.          
This misconception may be avoided by giving the name moral apathy to        
that want of emotion which is to be distinguished from indifference.        
In the former, the feelings arising from sensible impressions lose          
their influence on the moral feeling only because the respect for           
the law is more powerful than all of them together. It is only the          
apparent strength of a fever patient that makes even the lively             
sympathy with good rise to an emotion, or rather degenerate into it.        
Such an emotion is called enthusiasm, and it is with reference to this      
that we are to explain the moderation which is usually recommended          
in virtuous practices:                                                      
-                                                                           
          Insani sapiens nomen ferat, aequus uniqui                         
          Ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat ipsam.*                    
-                                                                           
  *Horace. ["Let the wise man bear the name of fool, and the just of        
unjust, if he pursue virtue herself beyond the proper bounds."]             
-                                                                           
  For otherwise it is absurd to imagine that one could be too wise          
or too virtuous. The emotion always belongs to the sensibility, no          
matter by what sort of object it may be excited. The true strength          
of virtue is the mind at rest, with a firm, deliberate resolution to        
bring its law into practice. That is the state of health in the             
moral life; on the contrary, the emotion, even when it is excited by        
the idea of the good, is a momentary glitter which leaves exhaustion        
after it. We may apply the term fantastically virtuous to the man           
who will admit nothing to be indifferent in respect of morality             
(adiaphora), and who strews all his steps with duties, as with              
traps, and will not allow it to be indifferent whether a man eats fish      
or flesh, drink beer or wine, when both agree with him; a micrology         
which, if adopted into the doctrine of virtue, would make its rule a        
tyranny.                                                                    
-                                                                           
                         REMARK                                             
-                                                                           
  Virtue is always in progress, and yet always begins from the              
beginning. The former follows from the fact that, objectively               
considered, it is an ideal and unattainable, and yet it is a duty           
constantly to approximate to it. The second is founded subjectively on      
the nature of man which is affected by inclinations, under the              
influence of which virtue, with its maxims adopted once for all, can        
never settle in a position of rest; but, if it is not rising,               
inevitably falls; because moral maxims cannot, like technical, be           
based on custom (for this belongs to the physical character of the          
determination of will); but even if the practice of them become a           
custom, the agent would thereby lose the freedom in the choice of           
his maxims, which freedom is the character of an action done from           
duty.                                                                       
                                                                            
ON_CONSCIENCE                                                               
                     ON CONSCIENCE                                          
-                                                                           
  The consciousness of an internal tribunal in man (before which            
"his thoughts accuse or excuse one another") is CONSCIENCE.                 
  Every man has a conscience, and finds himself observed by an              
inward judge which threatens and keeps him in awe (reverence                
combined with fear); and this power which watches over the laws within      
him is not something which he himself (arbitrarily) makes, but it is        
incorporated in his being. It follows him like his shadow, when he          
thinks to escape. He may indeed stupefy himself with pleasures and          
distractions, but cannot avoid now and then coming to himself or            
awaking, and then he at once perceives its awful voice. In his              
utmost depravity, he may, indeed, pay no attention to it, but he            
cannot avoid hearing it.                                                    
  Now this original intellectual and (as a conception of duty) moral        
capacity, called conscience, has this peculiarity in it, that although      
its business is a business of man with himself, yet he finds himself        
compelled by his reason to transact it as if at the command of another      
person. For the transaction here is the conduct of a trial (causa)          
before a tribunal. But that he who is accused by his conscience should      
be conceived as one and the same person with the judge is an absurd         
conception of a judicial court; for then the complainant would              
always lose his case. Therefore, in all duties the conscience of the        
man must regard another than himself as the judge of his actions, if        
it is to avoid self-contradiction. Now this other may be an actual          
or a merely ideal person which reason frames to itself. Such an             
idealized person (the authorized judge of conscience) must be one           
who knows the heart; for the tribunal is set up in the inward part          
of man; at the same time he must also be all-obliging, that is, must        
be or be conceived as a person in respect of whom all duties are to be      
regarded as his commands; since conscience is the inward judge of           
all free actions. Now, since such a moral being must at the same            
time possess all power (in heaven and earth), since otherwise he could      
not give his commands their proper effect (which the office of judge        
necessarily requires), and since such a moral being possessing power        
over all is called GOD, hence conscience must be conceived as the           
subjective principle of a responsibility for one's deeds before God;        
nay, this latter concept is contained (though it be only obscurely) in      
every moral self-consciousness.                                             
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                            -THE END-                                       
