



**(U) Collaboration, It's the Bomb**

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Run Date: 12/01/2004

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*IC analysts compare notes, swap knowledge to make sense of intelligence (U//FOUO)*

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(S//SI) Have you ever wanted to contact counterparts in the Intelligence Community (IC) to ask questions that would enhance your SIGINT analysis? Questions like:

- Is this image in my traffic a warhead, or a newfangled blender?
- Is this really a beer fermenter, or some sort of dual-use technology?
- Do you have any information that would support our theory that this charitable organization is a front for terrorism?

(S//SI) NSA analysts have long recognized the need to proactively collaborate with Intelligence Community (IC) partners in order to improve intelligence. These same analysts, who have in the past found creative and effective ways to partner, are now meeting the challenge of implementing the Director's Transformation 2.0. With new, easy-to-follow instructions (see [Information Sharing Card](#) --"go infoshare"), partnering through information sharing and analytic collaboration is now becoming the norm, not the exception. We would like to share a few "success stories" with you:

- (S//SI) Analysts from China and Korea Product Line posted information for counterparts at Department of Energy (DOE) in a common analytic space. The traffic only had a non-descript title and a curve. Instead of not reporting the traffic or putting out a report that says, "here's an unidentified curve," the partners, working together, were able to determine that Chinese nuclear warhead designers were building an anechoic\* chamber. The DOE partner further clarified that "the frequency of interest is 8.15 GHz where the attenuation is the strongest. The pyramidal reference indicates the 'pyramids' on the wall of the chamber and the material is some microwave-absorbing material. I have attached a copy of the famous anechoic chamber for your reference."

Just what you were thinking, right?

- (S//SI) A CIA Counterterrorist Center (CTC) analyst was investigating a newly-formed Iraqi company. Her searches of open source and classified databases yielded no information. NSA analysts from Counterterrorism (S2I) and Proliferation and Arms Control (S2G) were aware of "promotional" information about the company. Having the background info was a tremendous time saver for CIA. The NSA and CIA analysts are working together now to determine if the company is supporting terrorism in Iraq; when they come up with an analytic conclusion, they will report.
- (S//SI) Recent HUMINT reporting shed light on an entity mentioned in a transcript from December 2003. Analysts in the Regional Targets Product Line (S2A) thought that the 2003 information could possibly give insight into support to the Taliban from Middle Eastern countries. NSA and CIA analysts now have an open line of communication and are working closely to understand the issues related to this important topic.

(U//FOUO) These are impressive examples and a good beginning. We are striving to make collaboration an integral part of the job for NSA analysts by improving collaborative tools, policy and processes. We invite you to visit our website at

[REDACTED] for to learn more about collaboration and information sharing. On that page you will find a "collaboration record" that you can use to easily document your interaction with your counterparts. As you start working more closely with your IC counterparts, we encourage you to share your experiences with us so

that we can help all NSA analysts see themselves in this new collaborative environment.

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\*(U) Notes:

An anechoic chamber is an "echo free" chamber with walls made of pyramids that absorb microwave and radio signals. It is used to test satellites, antennas, etc.

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DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108