mirror of
https://github.com/Kicksecure/security-misc.git
synced 2024-12-20 22:44:22 -05:00
200 lines
8.7 KiB
INI
200 lines
8.7 KiB
INI
## Copyright (C) 2019 - 2024 ENCRYPTED SUPPORT LP <adrelanos@whonix.org>
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## See the file COPYING for copying conditions.
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kpkg="linux-image-$(dpkg --print-architecture)" || true
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kver="$(dpkg-query --show --showformat='${Version}' "$kpkg")" 2>/dev/null || true
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#echo "## kver: $kver"
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## This configuration file is split into 3 sections:
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## 1. Kernel Space
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## 2. Direct Memory Access
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## 3. Entropy
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## 4. Networking
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## See the documentation below for details on the majority of the selected commands.
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.html
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## https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Kernel_parameters#GRUB
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## 1. Kernel Space:
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##
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## https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#boot-parameters
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## Disable merging of slabs with similar size.
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## Reduces the risk of triggering heap overflows.
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## Prevents overwriting objects from merged caches and limits influencing slab cache layout.
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##
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## https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/06/19/33
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## https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/06/20/10
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX slab_nomerge"
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## Zero memory at allocation time and free time.
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## Fills newly allocated pages, freed pages, and heap objects with zeros.
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## Mitigates use-after-free exploits by erasing sensitive information in memory.
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##
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## https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=6471384af2a6530696fc0203bafe4de41a23c9ef
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX init_on_alloc=1"
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX init_on_free=1"
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## Enable the kernel page allocator to randomise free lists.
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## During early boot the page allocator has predictable FIFO behaviour for physical pages.
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## Limits some data exfiltration and ROP attacks that rely on inferring sensitive data location.
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## Also improves performance by optimising memory-side cache utilisation.
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##
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## https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=e900a918b0984ec8f2eb150b8477a47b75d17692
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## https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Return-oriented_programming#Attacks
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX page_alloc.shuffle=1"
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## Enable kernel page table isolation to harden against kernel ASLR (KASLR) bypasses.
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## Mitigates the Meltdown CPU vulnerability.
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##
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## https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kernel_page-table_isolation
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX pti=on"
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## Enable randomisation of the kernel stack offset on syscall entries.
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## Hardens against memory corruption attacks due to increased entropy.
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## Limits attacks relying on deterministic stack addresses or cross-syscall address exposure.
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##
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## https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/3/18/246
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## https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2020/02/15/CVE-2019-18683.html
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX randomize_kstack_offset=on"
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## Disable vsyscalls to reduce attack surface as they have been replaced by vDSO.
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## Vulnerable to ROP attacks as vsyscalls are located at fixed addresses in memory.
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##
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## https://lwn.net/Articles/446528/
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## https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VDSO
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX vsyscall=none"
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## Restrict access to debugfs by not registering the file system.
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## Deactivated since the file system can contain sensitive information.
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##
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## https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/7/16/122
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX debugfs=off"
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## Force the kernel to panic on "oopses".
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## Can sometimes potentially indicate and thwart certain kernel exploitation attempts.
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## Also cause panics on machine check exceptions.
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## Panics may be due to false-positives such as bad drivers.
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##
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## https://forums.whonix.org/t/set-oops-panic-kernel-parameter-or-kernel-panic-on-oops-1-sysctl-for-better-security/7713
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##
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## See /usr/libexec/security-misc/panic-on-oops for implementation.
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##
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#GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX oops=panic"
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## Modify machine check exception handler.
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## Can decide whether the system should panic or not based on the occurrence of an exception.
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/arch/x86/x86_64/machinecheck.html
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/arch/x86/x86_64/boot-options.html#machine-check
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## https://forums.whonix.org/t/kernel-hardening/7296/494
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##
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## The default kernel setting will be utilised until provided sufficient evidence to modify.
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##
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#GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX mce=0"
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## Prevent sensitive kernel information leaks in the console during boot.
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## Must be used in combination with the kernel.printk sysctl.
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## See /usr/lib/sysctl.d/30_silent-kernel-printk.conf for implementation.
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/core-api/printk-basics.html
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## https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/silent_boot
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##
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## See /etc/default/grub.d/41_quiet_boot.cfg for implementation.
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##
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#GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX loglevel=0"
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#GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX quiet"
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## Disable support for x86 processes and syscalls.
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## Unconditionally disables IA32 emulation to substantially reduce attack surface.
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##
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## https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230623111409.3047467-7-nik.borisov@suse.com/
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##
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## Applicable when using Linux kernel >= 6.7 (retained here for future-proofing and completeness).
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##
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#ia32_emulation=0
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## 2. Direct Memory Access:
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##
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## https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#dma-attacks
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## Enable CPU manufacturer-specific IOMMU drivers to protect against DMA attacks.
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX amd_iommu=force_isolation"
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX intel_iommu=on"
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## Enable and force use of IOMMU translation to protect against DMA attacks.
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## Strictly force DMA unmap operations to synchronously invalidate IOMMU hardware TLBs.
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## Ensures devices will never be able to access stale data contents.
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##
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## https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Input%E2%80%93output_memory_management_unit
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## https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DMA_attack
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## https://lenovopress.lenovo.com/lp1467.pdf
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX iommu=force"
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX iommu.passthrough=0"
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX iommu.strict=1"
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## Disable the busmaster bit on all PCI bridges during the early boot process.
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## Patches weak-point in some existing IOMMU implementations.
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## May lead to issues such as complete system boot failure on certain devices.
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##
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## https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=4444f8541dad16fefd9b8807ad1451e806ef1d94
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## https://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/54433.html
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX efi=disable_early_pci_dma"
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## 3. Entropy:
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##
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## https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#rdrand
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## Do not credit the CPU or bootloader seeds as entropy sources at boot.
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## The RDRAND CPU (RNG) instructions are proprietary and closed-source.
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## Numerous implementations of RDRAND have a long history of being defective.
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## The RNG seed passed by the bootloader could also potentially be tampered.
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## Maximising the entropy pool at boot is desirable for all cryptographic operations.
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## These settings ensure additional entropy is obtained from other sources to initialise the RNG.
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## Note that distrusting these (relatively fast) sources of entropy will increase boot time.
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##
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## https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDRAND#Reception
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## https://systemd.io/RANDOM_SEEDS/
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## https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2019/10/how-a-months-old-amd-microcode-bug-destroyed-my-weekend/
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## https://x.com/pid_eins/status/1149649806056280069
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## https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-reveal-nsa-campaign-against-encryption.html
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## https://forums.whonix.org/t/entropy-config-random-trust-cpu-yes-or-no-rng-core-default-quality/8566
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## https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/pull/165355
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## https://lkml.org/lkml/2022/6/5/271
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX random.trust_bootloader=off"
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX random.trust_cpu=off"
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## Obtain more entropy during boot as the runtime memory allocator is being initialised.
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## Entropy will be extracted from up to the first 4GB of RAM.
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## Requires the linux-hardened kernel patch.
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##
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## https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Hardened-kernel#linux-hardened
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## https://github.com/anthraxx/linux-hardened/commit/c3e7df1dba1eb8105d6d5143079a6a0ad9e9ebc7
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## https://github.com/anthraxx/linux-hardened/commit/a04458f97fe1f7e95888c77c0165b646375db9c4
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##
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GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX extra_latent_entropy"
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## 4. Networking
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##
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## https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#kasr-boot-parameters
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## Disable the entire IPv6 stack functionality.
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## Removes attack surface associated with the IPv6 module.
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##
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## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/networking/ipv6.html
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## https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/IPv6#Disable_IPv6
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##
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## Enabling makes redundant many network hardening sysctl's in usr/lib/sysctl.d/990-security-misc.conf.
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##
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#ipv6.disable=1 |