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Merge branch 'Kicksecure:master' into docs
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commit
f2c3eba4f0
9 changed files with 136 additions and 14 deletions
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@ -241,8 +241,8 @@ kernel.io_uring_disabled=2
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##
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## https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#sysctl-userspace
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## Restrict usage of the ptrace() system call to only processes with CAP_SYS_PTRACE.
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## Limit ptrace() as it enables programs to inspect and modify other active processes.
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## Disable the usage of the ptrace() system call by all processes.
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## Restrict ptrace() as it enables programs to inspect and modify other active processes.
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## Prevents native code debugging which some programs use as a method to detect tampering.
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## May cause breakages in 'anti-cheat' software and programs running under Proton/WINE.
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##
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@ -252,13 +252,12 @@ kernel.io_uring_disabled=2
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## https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues/651#issuecomment-917599928
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## https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/issues/2860
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##
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## KSPP=partial
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## KSPP sets the stricter sysctl kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=3.
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## KSPP=yes
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## KSPP sets the sysctl.
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##
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## It is possible to harden further by disabling ptrace() for all users, see documentation.
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## https://github.com/Kicksecure/security-misc/pull/242
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## See /usr/lib/sysctl.d/30_security-misc_ptrace-disable.conf for implementation.
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##
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kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=2
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#kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=3
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## Maximize bits of entropy for improved effectiveness of mmap ASLR.
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## The maximum number of bits depends on CPU architecture (the ones shown below are for x86).
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@ -529,7 +528,15 @@ net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses=1
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net.ipv4.conf.*.accept_source_route=0
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net.ipv6.conf.*.accept_source_route=0
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## Do not accept IPv6 router advertisements and solicitations.
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## Do not accept IPv6 router advertisements (RAs) and solicitations.
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## RAs are unsecured and unauthenticated and any device on the local link can send and accept them without verification.
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## Malicious RAs can activate IPv6 connectivity on dormant hosts leading to unauthorized access.
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## Flooding the network with malicious RAs can lead to denial of service attacks.
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## Rogue RAs can lead to interception of all network traffic by setting the attacker's system as the default gateway.
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##
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## https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6104
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## https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6105
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## https://archive.conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2012kul/materials/D1T2%20-%20Marc%20Heuse%20-%20IPv6%20Insecurity%20Revolutions.pdf
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##
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net.ipv6.conf.*.accept_ra=0
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