diff --git a/etc/default/grub.d/40_kernel_hardening.cfg b/etc/default/grub.d/40_kernel_hardening.cfg
index 946f2a4..b69dfe0 100644
--- a/etc/default/grub.d/40_kernel_hardening.cfg
+++ b/etc/default/grub.d/40_kernel_hardening.cfg
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ kver="$(dpkg-query --show --showformat='${Version}' "$kpkg")" 2>/dev/null || tru
 ## 3. Entropy
 ## 4. Networking
 
-## See the documentation below for details on the majority of the selected commands.
+## See the documentation below for details on the majority of the selected commands:
 ## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.html
 ## https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Kernel_parameters#GRUB
 
@@ -37,10 +37,10 @@ GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX slab_nomerge"
 GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX init_on_alloc=1"
 GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX init_on_free=1"
 
-## Enable the kernel page allocator to randomise free lists.
-## During early boot the page allocator has predictable FIFO behaviour for physical pages.
+## Enable the kernel page allocator to randomize free lists.
+## During early boot, the page allocator has predictable FIFO behavior for physical pages.
 ## Limits some data exfiltration and ROP attacks that rely on inferring sensitive data location.
-## Also improves performance by optimising memory-side cache utilisation.
+## Also improves performance by optimizing memory-side cache utilization.
 ##
 ## https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=e900a918b0984ec8f2eb150b8477a47b75d17692
 ## https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Return-oriented_programming#Attacks
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX page_alloc.shuffle=1"
 ##
 GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX pti=on"
 
-## Enable randomisation of the kernel stack offset on syscall entries.
+## Enable randomization of the kernel stack offset on syscall entries.
 ## Hardens against memory corruption attacks due to increased entropy.
 ## Limits attacks relying on deterministic stack addresses or cross-syscall address exposure.
 ##
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX debugfs=off"
 ## https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/arch/x86/x86_64/boot-options.html#machine-check
 ## https://forums.whonix.org/t/kernel-hardening/7296/494
 ##
-## The default kernel setting will be utilised until provided sufficient evidence to modify.
+## The default kernel setting will be utilized until provided sufficient evidence to modify.
 ##
 #GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX mce=0"
 
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX iommu.passthrough=0"
 GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX iommu.strict=1"
 
 ## Disable the busmaster bit on all PCI bridges during the early boot process.
-## Patches weak-point in some existing IOMMU implementations.
+## Patches weak points in some existing IOMMU implementations.
 ## May lead to issues such as complete system boot failure on certain devices.
 ##
 ## https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=4444f8541dad16fefd9b8807ad1451e806ef1d94
@@ -159,8 +159,8 @@ GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX efi=disable_early_pci_dma"
 ## The RDRAND CPU (RNG) instructions are proprietary and closed-source.
 ## Numerous implementations of RDRAND have a long history of being defective.
 ## The RNG seed passed by the bootloader could also potentially be tampered.
-## Maximising the entropy pool at boot is desirable for all cryptographic operations.
-## These settings ensure additional entropy is obtained from other sources to initialise the RNG.
+## Maximizing the entropy pool at boot is desirable for all cryptographic operations.
+## These settings ensure additional entropy is obtained from other sources to initialize the RNG.
 ## Note that distrusting these (relatively fast) sources of entropy will increase boot time.
 ##
 ## https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDRAND#Reception
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX efi=disable_early_pci_dma"
 GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX random.trust_bootloader=off"
 GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX random.trust_cpu=off"
 
-## Obtain more entropy during boot as the runtime memory allocator is being initialised.
+## Obtain more entropy during boot as the runtime memory allocator is being initialized.
 ## Entropy will be extracted from up to the first 4GB of RAM.
 ## Requires the linux-hardened kernel patch.
 ##