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renamed: etc/sysctl.d/30_security-misc.conf -> usr/lib/sysctl.d/30_security-misc.conf

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renamed:    etc/sysctl.d/30_security-misc_kexec-disable.conf -> usr/lib/sysctl.d/30_security-misc_kexec-disable.conf
renamed:    etc/sysctl.d/30_silent-kernel-printk.conf -> usr/lib/sysctl.d/30_silent-kernel-printk.conf
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Patrick Schleizer 2023-10-25 17:28:43 -04:00
parent 3317332cb4
commit b7c52800f4
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usr/lib/sysctl.d/30_security-misc.conf Normal file
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## Copyright (C) 2019 - 2023 ENCRYPTED SUPPORT LP <adrelanos@whonix.org>
## See the file COPYING for copying conditions.
## Disables coredumps. This setting may be overwritten by systemd so this may not be useful.
## security-misc also disables coredumps in other ways.
kernel.core_pattern=|/bin/false
## Restricts the kernel log to root only.
kernel.dmesg_restrict=1
## Don't allow writes to files that we don't own
## in world writable sticky directories, unless
## they are owned by the owner of the directory.
fs.protected_fifos=2
fs.protected_regular=2
## Only allow symlinks to be followed when outside of
## a world-writable sticky directory, or when the owner
## of the symlink and follower match, or when the directory
## owner matches the symlink's owner.
##
## Prevent hardlinks from being created by users that do not
## have read/write access to the source file.
##
## These prevent many TOCTOU races.
fs.protected_symlinks=1
fs.protected_hardlinks=1
## Hardens the BPF JIT compiler and restricts it to root.
kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled=1
net.core.bpf_jit_harden=2
## Hides kernel addresses in various files in /proc.
## Kernel addresses can be very useful in certain exploits.
##
## https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Bug_Classes/Kernel_pointer_leak
kernel.kptr_restrict=2
## Improves ASLR effectiveness for mmap.
## Both explicit sysctl are made redundant due to automation
## https://forums.whonix.org/t/automate-mmap-randomisation-to-fix-ppc64el/16514
## Do NOT enable either - displaying only for clarity
##
#vm.mmap_rnd_bits=32
#vm.mmap_rnd_compat_bits=16
## Restricts the use of ptrace to root. This might break some programs running under WINE.
## A workaround for WINE would be to give the wineserver and wine-preloader ptrace capabilities. This can be done by running:
##
## sudo apt-get install libcap2-bin
## sudo setcap cap_sys_ptrace=eip /usr/bin/wineserver
## sudo setcap cap_sys_ptrace=eip /usr/bin/wine-preloader
kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=2
## Prevent setuid processes from creating coredumps.
fs.suid_dumpable=0
## Randomize the addresses for mmap base, heap, stack, and VDSO pages
kernel.randomize_va_space=2
#### meta start
#### project Kicksecure
#### category networking and security
#### description
## TCP/IP stack hardening
## Protects against time-wait assassination.
## It drops RST packets for sockets in the time-wait state.
net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337=1
## Disables ICMP redirect acceptance.
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects=0
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects=0
net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects=0
net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects=0
net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects=0
net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects=0
## Disables ICMP redirect sending.
net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects=0
net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects=0
## Ignores ICMP requests.
net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_all=1
net.ipv6.icmp.echo_ignore_all=1
## Ignores bogus ICMP error responses
net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses=1
## Enables TCP syncookies.
net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=1
## Disable source routing.
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route=0
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route=0
net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route=0
net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route=0
## Enable reverse path filtering to prevent IP spoofing and
## mitigate vulnerabilities such as CVE-2019-14899.
## https://forums.whonix.org/t/enable-reverse-path-filtering/8594
net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter=1
net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter=1
#### meta end
## Previously disabled SACK, DSACK, and FACK.
## https://forums.whonix.org/t/disabling-tcp-sack-dsack-fack/8109
#net.ipv4.tcp_sack=0
#net.ipv4.tcp_dsack=0
#net.ipv4.tcp_fack=0
#### meta start
#### project Kicksecure
#### category networking and security
#### description
## disable IPv4 TCP Timestamps
net.ipv4.tcp_timestamps=0
#### meta end
## Only allow the SysRq key to be used for shutdowns and the
## Secure Attention Key (SAK).
##
## https://forums.whonix.org/t/sysrq-magic-sysrq-key/8079/
kernel.sysrq=132
## Restrict loading TTY line disciplines to CAP_SYS_MODULE to prevent
## unprivileged attackers from loading vulnerable line disciplines
## with the TIOCSETD ioctl which has been used in exploits before
## such as https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2017/03/24/CVE-2017-2636.html
##
## https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/4/15/890
dev.tty.ldisc_autoload=0
## Restrict the userfaultfd() syscall to root as it can make heap sprays
## easier.
##
## https://duasynt.com/blog/linux-kernel-heap-spray
vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd=0
## Let the kernel only swap if it is absolutely necessary.
## Better not be set to zero:
## - https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-US/Red_Hat_Enterprise_Linux/6/html/Performance_Tuning_Guide/s-memory-tunables.html
## - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swappiness
vm.swappiness=1
## Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
## https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
kernel.perf_event_paranoid=3
# Do not accept router advertisments
net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra=0
net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra=0

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## Copyright (C) 2019 - 2023 ENCRYPTED SUPPORT LP <adrelanos@whonix.org>
## See the file COPYING for copying conditions.
## Quote https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.html
##
## kexec_load_disabled:
##
## A toggle indicating if the kexec_load syscall has been disabled. This value defaults to 0 (false: kexec_load enabled), but can be set to 1 (true: kexec_load disabled). Once true, kexec can no longer be used, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. This allows a kexec image to be loaded before disabling the syscall, allowing a system to set up (and later use) an image without it being altered. Generally used together with the "modules_disabled" sysctl.
## Disables kexec which can be used to replace the running kernel.
kernel.kexec_load_disabled=1
## Why is this in a dedicated config file?
## Package ram-wipe requires kexec. However, ram-wipe could not ship a config
## file /etc/sysctl.d/40_ram-wipe.conf which sets 'kernel.kexec_load_disabled=0'.
## This is because once systemd-sysctl.service has set 'kernel.kexec_load_disabled=1'
## it cannot be undone without reboot. This is a upstream Linux security feature.

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## Copyright (C) 2019 - 2023 ENCRYPTED SUPPORT LP <adrelanos@whonix.org>
## See the file COPYING for copying conditions.
## Prevent kernel info leaks in console during boot.
## https://phabricator.whonix.org/T950
kernel.printk = 3 3 3 3
## NOTE:
## For higher verbosity, the user might also want to delete file
## /etc/default/grub.d/41_quiet.cfg
## (or out-comment its settings).
##
## Alternatively, the user could consider to install the debug-misc package,
## which will undo the settings found here.