Update docs on entropy

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@ -287,19 +287,17 @@ GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX efi=disable_early_pci_dma"
## https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#rdrand
## Do not credit the CPU or bootloader seeds as entropy sources at boot.
## The RDRAND CPU (RNG) instructions are proprietary and closed-source.
## Numerous implementations of RDRAND have a long history of being defective.
## The RDRAND and RDSEED CPU (RNG) instructions are proprietary and closed-source.
## Numerous implementations of RDRAND and RDSEED have a long history of being defective.
## The RNG seed passed by the bootloader could also potentially be tampered.
## Maximizing the entropy pool at boot is desirable for all cryptographic operations.
## These settings ensure additional entropy is obtained from other sources to initialize the RNG.
## RDSEED instructions also rely on periodic reseeds from the same underlying entropy sources.
## These settings ensure additional entropy is obtained from other sources to initialize the Linux CRNG.
## Note that distrusting these (relatively fast) sources of entropy will increase boot time.
##
## https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDRAND#Reception
## https://systemd.io/RANDOM_SEEDS/
## https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Dev/Entropy#RDRAND
## https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2019/10/how-a-months-old-amd-microcode-bug-destroyed-my-weekend/
## https://x.com/pid_eins/status/1149649806056280069
## https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-reveal-nsa-campaign-against-encryption.html
## https://forums.whonix.org/t/entropy-config-random-trust-cpu-yes-or-no-rng-core-default-quality/8566
## https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/pull/165355