dependabot[bot] 4e2c7b2800
Bump flask
Bumps [flask](https://github.com/pallets/flask) from 1.0 to 2.2.5.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/pallets/flask/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/pallets/flask/blob/main/CHANGES.rst)
- [Commits](https://github.com/pallets/flask/compare/1.0...2.2.5)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: flask
  dependency-type: direct:production
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
2023-07-18 18:40:33 +00:00
..
2015-01-03 20:47:39 -05:00
2015-01-03 20:47:39 -05:00
2015-01-03 20:47:39 -05:00
2015-01-03 20:47:39 -05:00
2015-01-03 20:47:39 -05:00
2023-07-18 18:40:33 +00:00
2015-01-03 20:47:39 -05:00

Hash Extension Attack at the Vimeo API

This tutorial is a slight adaptation of Filippo Valsorda's presentation. The example here should not work currently, but it was a vulnerability a couple of years ago.

The problem presented here shows how to exploit a poor choice combination of information in an API hash-function.

TL;DR: given a hash that is composed of a string with an unknown prefix, an attacker can append to the string and produce a new hash that still has the unknown prefix.

MD5

MD5 hashes can't be reversed and are nearly unique (accidental collisions are extremely rare, although possible).

The Vulnerability

  • A signature is created from a hashed string. This string is a composed of:

[ PASSWORD ]["api_key"+ api_key ]["method" + method]

Where password is just the user password and method is the action, for example "vimeo.test.login".

  • This signature is hashed and added as the API signature.

  • Vulnerability 1: if we can see the hash, we can add code to it (extend).

  • Vulnerability 2: the secret is attached to the string that was hashed.

  • Vulnerability 3: all the other components (except the secret) is passed in the plaintext in the request.

The Exploit

  • If an attacker can see a request, she can extend the signature hash with any exploit. For example, she could add the method "vimeo.videos.setFavorite"

  • The API signature is now formed by hashing the entire new request.

HOW TO RUN THIS EXAMPLE

  • In one terminal run $ python server.py

  • Copy the values api_key cdd56f298e71493b9b1015c691e14501 api_sig fdffe59969293f23c197f321ff2f972e

to client.py and then run it.

  • To understand what happen, look inside client.py.