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87 lines
3.4 KiB
Markdown
87 lines
3.4 KiB
Markdown
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# electrum
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Electrum Bitcoin Wallet in Qubes OS.
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## Table of Contents
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* [Description](#description)
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* [Installation](#installation)
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* [Usage](#usage)
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* [Wallet cooperation](#wallet-cooperation)
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* [Cold wallet terminology](#cold-wallet-terminology)
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## Description
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Setup multiple lightweights Electrum Bitcoin Wallets, one offline qube named
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"electrum-cold" and one online qube based on Whonix-Workstation named
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"electrum-hot".
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## Installation
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- Top
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```sh
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qubesctl top.enable electrum
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qubesctl --targets=tpl-electrum,electrum-cold,electrum-hot state.apply
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qubesctl top.disable electrum
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qubesctl state.apply electrum.appmenus
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```
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- State
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<!-- pkg:begin:post-install -->
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```sh
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qubesctl state.apply electrum.create
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qubesctl --skip-dom0 --targets=tpl-electrum state.apply electrum.install
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qubesctl --skip-dom0 --targets=electrum-cold,electrum-hot state.apply electrum.configure
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qubesctl state.apply electrum.appmenus
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```
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<!-- pkg:end:post-install -->
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## Usage
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The qube `electrum-cold` serves as a cold wallet, while the `electrum-hot` is
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networked via tor and you can use it as a watching-only (only pub key present)
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or hot wallet (private key present).
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### Wallet cooperation
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If you plan to create private keys on any wallet, it is recommended to pause
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or shutdown all qubes to reduce the side-channel attack surface.
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As you have both types of wallets, a networked and an offline one, with the
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networked wallet you can broadcast transactions while with the offline one,
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you sign them. Sharing data between the qubes can be done with `qvm-copy` and
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the process of combining a watching-only and a cold wallet is explained in the
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[Electrum wiki](https://electrum.readthedocs.io/en/latest/coldstorage.html).
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### Cold wallet terminology
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I can expect some comments complaining about the term `cold wallet` when
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using Qubes OS with an online system. We use this term to refer to an isolated
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environment (a qube) that has no internet connection.
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You are free to use a non-Qubes physically air-gapped system if you prefer,
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you just have to remove the Audio stack (microphone, speakers), Video stack
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(camera), USB stack (external ports, Bluetooth), Network stack (network
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cards), External reference lights (blinking pattern). If you use a hardware
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wallet, you are dependent on a specific hardware vendor and you will need to
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choose at least an insecure transfer method, scanning QR code where you can
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expose the camera to the data being read, connecting via NFC/USB/SD card
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exposes to the USB stack, transfer via radio exposes all devices nearby to the
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signal being passed, guard against supply-chain attacks. In the end, your
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air-gapped system is not so secure as you thought it to be.
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Yes, a Xen exploit that reaches Dom0 or a CPU exploit that can infer
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[the memory contents of other running VMs](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/11/14/qsb-096/)
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or [the contents of data from a different execution context on the
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same CPU core](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2023/09/27/qsb-094/) can
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compromise private private keys, so it is up to you, the user, to choose your
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strategy.
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Another possibility is a fully offline Qubes OS with this formula installed,
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but then again, transferring the data safely to communicate with a networked
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device for the transactions to be broadcasted is still a hard thing to fix for
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physical air-gapped systems.
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There is no consensus on the best solution, choose the option that you can
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have more security, not the one you "fell" more secure.
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