2023-11-13 09:33:28 -05:00
|
|
|
# sys-git
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Git operations through Qrexec in Qubes OS.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Table of Contents
|
|
|
|
|
2024-07-04 11:10:11 -04:00
|
|
|
* [Description](#description)
|
|
|
|
* [Alternatives comparison](#alternatives-comparison)
|
|
|
|
* [Security](#security)
|
|
|
|
* [Installation](#installation)
|
|
|
|
* [Access control](#access-control)
|
|
|
|
* [Usage](#usage)
|
|
|
|
* [Initialize the server repository](#initialize-the-server-repository)
|
|
|
|
* [Prepare the client](#prepare-the-client)
|
|
|
|
* [Credits](#credits)
|
2023-11-13 09:33:28 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Description
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Setup a Git server called "sys-git", an offline Git Server that can be
|
|
|
|
accessed from client qubes via Qrexec. Access control via Qrexec policy can
|
|
|
|
restrict access to certain repositories, set of git actions for Fetch, Push
|
|
|
|
and Init. This is an implementation of split-git.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Alternatives comparison
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The following alternatives will be compared against each other and this
|
|
|
|
implementation:
|
|
|
|
|
2024-07-04 11:10:11 -04:00
|
|
|
* [Rudd-O/git-remote-qubes](https://github.com/Rudd-O/git-remote-qubes)
|
|
|
|
* [QubesOS-contrib/qubes-app-split-git](https://github.com/QubesOS-contrib/qubes-app-split-git)
|
|
|
|
* [qubes-os.org/doc/development-workflow/#git-connection-between-vms](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/development-workflow/#git-connection-between-vms)
|
2023-11-13 09:33:28 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| | sys-git | git-remote-qubes | qubes-app-split-git | git-connection-between-vms |
|
|
|
|
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|
|
|
|
| Codebase Size | Small | Large | Large | Small |
|
|
|
|
| Custom Protocol | True | True | True | False |
|
|
|
|
| Path | Repository | Absolute | Repository | Repository |
|
|
|
|
| Repository restriction | True | False | True | True |
|
|
|
|
| No hanging | True | True | True | False |
|
|
|
|
| Fetch | True | True | True (only tags) | True |
|
|
|
|
| Push | True | True | False | True |
|
|
|
|
| Init | True | False | False | False |
|
doc: how to update the repository
As it is not easy to get files to dom0 and we don't want to reimplement
a package manager, crude Git is the solution as of know.
With Git we have the following advantages: native fetch format for
source controlled files, cleaner command-line, automatic signature
verification during merge, the disadvantage is that it is not included
by default in Dom0 and filtering it's stdout chars are not possible.
Note that the remote can report messages to the client via stderr, which
is filtered already, and if it tries to send an escape sequence to
stdout, the operation will fail with 'bad line length character: CHAR'
printed to stderr on the client, unfiltered by qrexec, but filtered to
some extent by the git client. If it is an escape character, the char is
transformed to "?", but UTF-8 multibyte characters are not filtered. Up
to 4 bytes can be displayed.
Tar on the other hand is already installed, but it is much ancient and
it's file parsing caused CVEs in the past relatively more drastic than
Git, it also doesn't only include committed files, it can include any
file that is present in the directory, which by far, increases a lot of
the attack surface unless you reset the state to HEAD, clean .git
directory manually and there are possibly other avenues of attack.
2024-01-18 09:22:35 -05:00
|
|
|
| Validates git communication | False | False | True | False |
|
2023-11-13 09:33:28 -05:00
|
|
|
| Verifies tag signature | False | False | True | False |
|
|
|
|
|
2024-01-18 03:19:40 -05:00
|
|
|
## Security
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
It is not possible to filter Git's stdout from a Qrexec call as it is used by
|
doc: how to update the repository
As it is not easy to get files to dom0 and we don't want to reimplement
a package manager, crude Git is the solution as of know.
With Git we have the following advantages: native fetch format for
source controlled files, cleaner command-line, automatic signature
verification during merge, the disadvantage is that it is not included
by default in Dom0 and filtering it's stdout chars are not possible.
Note that the remote can report messages to the client via stderr, which
is filtered already, and if it tries to send an escape sequence to
stdout, the operation will fail with 'bad line length character: CHAR'
printed to stderr on the client, unfiltered by qrexec, but filtered to
some extent by the git client. If it is an escape character, the char is
transformed to "?", but UTF-8 multibyte characters are not filtered. Up
to 4 bytes can be displayed.
Tar on the other hand is already installed, but it is much ancient and
it's file parsing caused CVEs in the past relatively more drastic than
Git, it also doesn't only include committed files, it can include any
file that is present in the directory, which by far, increases a lot of
the attack surface unless you reset the state to HEAD, clean .git
directory manually and there are possibly other avenues of attack.
2024-01-18 09:22:35 -05:00
|
|
|
the local running git process, we rely on Git's parsing and filtering for
|
|
|
|
remote operations. A remote can send up to 4 bytes of UTF-8 character to it's
|
|
|
|
stdout as packet information during the initial server client negotiation, the
|
|
|
|
client will display the characters on stderr with an error message containing
|
|
|
|
the character. Git only filters for control characters but other characters
|
|
|
|
that are valid UTF-8 such as multibyte are not filtered. The same characters
|
2024-01-18 13:49:15 -05:00
|
|
|
can be present in the git log. In reality, there are many other ways the
|
|
|
|
remote can make the client display a refname with attacker controlled data
|
|
|
|
with a much larger byte size, this cannot be solved while the remote helper
|
|
|
|
does not verify each received reference.
|
doc: how to update the repository
As it is not easy to get files to dom0 and we don't want to reimplement
a package manager, crude Git is the solution as of know.
With Git we have the following advantages: native fetch format for
source controlled files, cleaner command-line, automatic signature
verification during merge, the disadvantage is that it is not included
by default in Dom0 and filtering it's stdout chars are not possible.
Note that the remote can report messages to the client via stderr, which
is filtered already, and if it tries to send an escape sequence to
stdout, the operation will fail with 'bad line length character: CHAR'
printed to stderr on the client, unfiltered by qrexec, but filtered to
some extent by the git client. If it is an escape character, the char is
transformed to "?", but UTF-8 multibyte characters are not filtered. Up
to 4 bytes can be displayed.
Tar on the other hand is already installed, but it is much ancient and
it's file parsing caused CVEs in the past relatively more drastic than
Git, it also doesn't only include committed files, it can include any
file that is present in the directory, which by far, increases a lot of
the attack surface unless you reset the state to HEAD, clean .git
directory manually and there are possibly other avenues of attack.
2024-01-18 09:22:35 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A remote helper that validates the data received can increase the security
|
|
|
|
by not printing untrusted data, which is the case with
|
|
|
|
[qubes-app-split-git](https://github.com/QubesOS-contrib/qubes-app-split-git/commits/master/),
|
|
|
|
but unfortunately it demands signed tags and doesn't work for normal git
|
|
|
|
operations with signed commits and branches, as the later can't be signed.
|
|
|
|
A fork of the aforementioned project might be the future of this helper.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Even if the transport is secure, the tool that renders the information of your
|
|
|
|
recently acquired repository
|
|
|
|
[can](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-23521)
|
|
|
|
[contain](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-41902)
|
|
|
|
[bugs](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-46663)
|
|
|
|
[that](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-25652)
|
|
|
|
[result](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-29007)
|
|
|
|
in local code execution and remote code execution. In the end, if you don't
|
|
|
|
trust the origin, don't use it.
|
2024-01-18 03:19:40 -05:00
|
|
|
|
2023-11-13 09:33:28 -05:00
|
|
|
## Installation
|
|
|
|
|
2024-07-04 11:10:11 -04:00
|
|
|
* Top:
|
|
|
|
|
2023-11-13 09:33:28 -05:00
|
|
|
```sh
|
2024-02-23 10:54:35 -05:00
|
|
|
sudo qubesctl top.enable sys-git
|
|
|
|
sudo qubesctl --targets=tpl-sys-git,sys-git state.apply
|
|
|
|
sudo qubesctl top.disable sys-git
|
2023-11-13 09:33:28 -05:00
|
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
|
2024-07-04 11:10:11 -04:00
|
|
|
* State:
|
|
|
|
|
2023-11-13 09:33:28 -05:00
|
|
|
<!-- pkg:begin:post-install -->
|
2024-07-04 11:10:11 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2023-11-13 09:33:28 -05:00
|
|
|
```sh
|
2024-02-23 10:54:35 -05:00
|
|
|
sudo qubesctl state.apply sys-git.create
|
|
|
|
sudo qubesctl --skip-dom0 --targets=tpl-sys-git state.apply sys-git.install
|
|
|
|
sudo qubesctl --skip-dom0 --targets=sys-git state.apply sys-git.configure
|
2023-11-13 09:33:28 -05:00
|
|
|
```
|
2024-07-04 11:10:11 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2023-11-13 09:33:28 -05:00
|
|
|
<!-- pkg:end:post-install -->
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Installation on the client template:
|
2024-07-04 11:10:11 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2023-11-13 09:33:28 -05:00
|
|
|
```sh
|
2024-02-23 10:54:35 -05:00
|
|
|
sudo qubesctl --skip-dom0 --targets=tpl-dev state.apply sys-git.install-client
|
2023-11-13 09:33:28 -05:00
|
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Access control
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
_Default policy_: `any qube` can `ask` via the `@default` target if you allow
|
|
|
|
it to `Fetch` from, `Push` to and `Init` on `sys-git`.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
__Recommended usage__:
|
|
|
|
|
2024-07-04 11:10:11 -04:00
|
|
|
* __Init__: Argument useful when allowing a qube to always create a
|
|
|
|
* repository on the server.
|
|
|
|
* __Fetch__: Fetch can be allowed by less trusted qubes.
|
|
|
|
* __Push__: Push should only be made by trusted qubes.
|
2023-11-13 09:33:28 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Allow qube `dev` to `Fetch` from `sys-git`, but ask to `Push` and `Init`:
|
2024-07-04 11:10:11 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2023-11-13 09:33:28 -05:00
|
|
|
```qrexecpolicy
|
|
|
|
qusal.GitFetch * dev @default allow target=sys-git
|
|
|
|
qusal.GitPush * dev @default ask target=sys-git default_target=sys-git
|
|
|
|
qusal.GitInit * dev @default ask target=sys-git default_target=sys-git
|
|
|
|
qusal.GitFetch * dev @anyvm deny
|
|
|
|
qusal.GitPush * dev @anyvm deny
|
|
|
|
qusal.GitInit * dev @anyvm deny
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Allow qube `untrusted` to `Fetch` `repo` if using target name `sys-git` but
|
|
|
|
deny `Push` and `Init` to any other qube:
|
2024-07-04 11:10:11 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2023-11-13 09:33:28 -05:00
|
|
|
```qrexecpolicy
|
|
|
|
qusal.GitFetch +repo untrusted sys-git ask target=sys-git default_target=sys-git
|
|
|
|
qusal.GitFetch * untrusted @anyvm deny
|
|
|
|
qusal.GitPush * untrusted @anyvm deny
|
|
|
|
qusal.GitInit * untrusted @anyvm deny
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Deny `Fetch`, `Push` and `Init` from any qube to any other qube:
|
2024-07-04 11:10:11 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2023-11-13 09:33:28 -05:00
|
|
|
```qrexecpolicy
|
|
|
|
qusal.GitFetch * @anyvm @anyvm deny
|
|
|
|
qusal.GitPush * @anyvm @anyvm deny
|
|
|
|
qusal.GitInit * @anyvm @anyvm deny
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Usage
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
### Initialize the server repository
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
There are a few constraints regarding repositories:
|
|
|
|
|
2024-07-04 11:10:11 -04:00
|
|
|
* Must be created under `/home/user/src` in `sys-git`;
|
|
|
|
* Names must have only letters, numbers, hyphen, underscore and dot. Must
|
|
|
|
not begin or end with dot, hyphen and underscore.
|
2023-11-13 09:33:28 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In `sys-git`, create bare repositories under `/home/user/src`.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
From the `server`:
|
2024-07-04 11:10:11 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2023-11-13 09:33:28 -05:00
|
|
|
```sh
|
|
|
|
git init --bare ~/src/X.git
|
|
|
|
```
|
2024-07-04 11:10:11 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2023-11-13 09:33:28 -05:00
|
|
|
You must use the `.git` prefix to indicate a bare repository.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Or from the `client`, if the `qusal.GitInit` policy allows:
|
2024-07-04 11:10:11 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2023-11-13 09:33:28 -05:00
|
|
|
```sh
|
|
|
|
cd ~/path/to/repo
|
|
|
|
git init-qrexec
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
### Prepare the client
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Qrexec protocol is supported with the following URL format:
|
|
|
|
`qrexec://<QUBE>/<REPO>`, where the `<QUBE>` field can be a literal name or
|
|
|
|
token and the `<REPO>` field is the name of the repository that exists on
|
|
|
|
`sys-git` under `/home/user/src`.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Clone an existing repository:
|
2024-07-04 11:10:11 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2023-11-13 09:33:28 -05:00
|
|
|
```sh
|
|
|
|
git clone qrexec://@default/qubes-doc
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Or Initialize a new repository:
|
2024-07-04 11:10:11 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2023-11-13 09:33:28 -05:00
|
|
|
```sh
|
|
|
|
git init qubes-doc
|
|
|
|
cd qubes-doc
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Add a remote using the Qrexec protocol:
|
2024-07-04 11:10:11 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2023-11-13 09:33:28 -05:00
|
|
|
```sh
|
|
|
|
git remote add sg qrexec://@default/qubes-doc
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Test fetching from the newly added remote:
|
2024-07-04 11:10:11 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2023-11-13 09:33:28 -05:00
|
|
|
```sh
|
|
|
|
git fetch sg
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Make changes to the git repository as you normally would on any system.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Push to the server and set it as the default upstream:
|
2024-07-04 11:10:11 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2023-11-13 09:33:28 -05:00
|
|
|
```sh
|
|
|
|
git push -u sg main
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Following pushes will be simpler:
|
2024-07-04 11:10:11 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2023-11-13 09:33:28 -05:00
|
|
|
```sh
|
|
|
|
git push
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Credits
|
|
|
|
|
2024-07-04 11:10:11 -04:00
|
|
|
* [Unman](https://github.com/unman/shaker/tree/main/git)
|