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62 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
62 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
---
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lang: en
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layout: doc
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permalink: /doc/anti-evil-maid/
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redirect_from:
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- /en/doc/anti-evil-maid/
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- /doc/AntiEvilMaid/
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- /wiki/AntiEvilMaid/
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ref: 164
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title: Anti evil maid (AEM)
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---
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Background
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----------
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Please read [this blog article](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/09/07/anti-evil-maid.html).
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Requirements
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----------
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The current package requires a TPM 1.2 interface and a working Intel TXT engine.
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If you cleaned your Intel Management Engine with e.g. [me_cleaner](https://github.com/corna/me_cleaner)
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while installing [CoreBoot](https://www.coreboot.org/) then you are out of luck.
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For now you have to choose between cleaning your BIOS and deploying Anti Evil Maid.
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[Discussion](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-users/sEmZfOZqYXM/j5rHeex1BAAJ)
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Installing
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----------
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In Dom0 install `anti-evil-maid`:
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~~~
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sudo qubes-dom0-update anti-evil-maid
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~~~
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For more information, see the [qubes-antievilmaid](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-antievilmaid) repository, which includes a `README`.
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Security Considerations
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-----------------------
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[Qubes security guidelines](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/security/security-guidelines.md) dictate that USB devices should never be attached directly to dom0, since this can result in the entire system being compromised.
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However, in its default configuration, installing and using AEM requires attaching a USB drive (i.e., [mass storage device](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USB_mass_storage_device_class)) directly to dom0.
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(The other option is to install AEM to an internal disk.
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However, this carries significant security implications, as explained [here](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/09/07/anti-evil-maid.html).) This presents us with a classic security trade-off: each Qubes user must make a choice between protecting dom0 from a potentially malicious USB drive, on the one hand, and protecting the system from Evil Maid attacks, on the other hand.
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Given the practical feasibility of attacks like [BadUSB](https://srlabs.de/badusb/) and revelations regarding pervasive government hardware backdoors, this is no longer a straightforward decision.
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New, factory-sealed USB drives cannot simply be assumed to be "clean" (e.g., to have non-malicious microcontroller firmware).
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Therefore, it is up to each individual Qubes user to evaluate the relative risk of each attack vector against his or her security model.
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For example, a user who frequently travels with a Qubes laptop holding sensitive data may be at a much higher risk of Evil Maid attacks than a home user with a stationary Qubes desktop.
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If the frequent traveler judges her risk of an Evil Maid attack to be higher than the risk of a malicious USB device, she might reasonably opt to install and use AEM.
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On the other hand, the home user might deem the probability of an Evil Maid attack occurring in her own home to be so low that there is a higher probability that any USB drive she purchases is already compromised, in which case she might reasonably opt never to attach any USB devices directly to dom0.
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(In either case, users can--and should--secure dom0 against further USB-related attacks through the use of a [USB VM](https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/security/security-guidelines.md#creating-and-using-a-usbvm).)
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For more information, please see [this discussion thread](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-devel/EBc4to5IBdg/n1hfsHSfbqsJ).
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Known issues
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------------
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- USB 3.0 isn't supported yet
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- [AEM is not compatible with having an SSD cache](https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/70021590-fb3a-4f95-9ce5-4b340530ddbf%40petaramesh.org)
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