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Using and Managing USB Devices
Creating and Using a USB qube
Warning: This has the potential to prevent you from connecting a keyboard to Qubes via USB. There are problems with doing this with a encrypted install (LUKS). If you find yourself in this situation, see this issue.
The connection of an untrusted USB device to dom0 is a security risk since dom0, like almost every OS, reads partition tables automatically and since the whole USB stack is put to work to parse the data presented by the USB device in order to determine if it is a USB mass storage device, to read its configuration, etc. This happens even if the drive is then assigned and mounted in another qube.
To avoid this risk, it is possible to prepare and utilize a USB qube.
A USB qube acts as a secure handler for potentially malicious USB devices, preventing them from coming into contact with dom0 (which could otherwise be fatal to the security of the whole system). With a USB qube, every time you connect an untrusted USB drive to a USB port managed by that USB controller, you will have to attach it to the qube in which you wish to use it (if different from the USB qube itself), either by using Qubes VM Manager or the command line (see instructions above). You can create a USB qube using the management stack by performing the following steps as root in dom0:
-
Enable
sys-usb
:qubesctl top.enable qvm.sys-usb
-
Apply the configuration:
qubesctl state.highstate
Alternatively, you can create a USB qube manually as follows:
-
Read the Assigning Devices page to learn how to list and identify your USB controllers. Carefully check whether you have a USB controller that would be appropriate to assign to a USB qube. Note that it should be free of input devices, programmable devices, and any other devices that must be directly available to dom0. If you find a free controller, note its name and proceed to step 2.
-
Create a new qube. Give it an appropriate name and color label (recommended:
sys-usb
, red). If you need to attach a networking device, it might make sense to create a NetVM. If not, an AppVM might make more sense. (The defaultsys-usb
is a NetVM.) -
In the qube's settings, go to the "Devices" tab. Find the USB controller that you identified in step 1 in the "Available" list. Move it to the "Selected" list.
Caution: By assigning a USB controller to a USB qube, it will no longer be available to dom0. This can make your system unusable if, for example, you have only one USB controller, and you are running Qubes off of a USB drive.
-
Click "OK." Restart the qube.
-
Recommended: Check the box on the "Basic" tab which says "Start VM automatically on boot." (This will help to mitigate attacks in which someone forces your system to reboot, then plugs in a malicious USB device.)
If the USB qube will not start, see here.
How to hide all USB controllers from dom0
If you create a USB qube manually, there will be a brief period of time during the boot process during which dom0 will be exposed to your USB controllers (and any attached devices). This is a potential security risk, since even brief exposure to a malicious USB device could result in dom0 being compromised. There are two approaches to this problem:
- Physically disconnect all USB devices whenever you reboot the host.
- Hide (i.e., blacklist) all USB controllers from dom0.
Warning: If you use a USB AEM device, do not use the second option. Using a USB AEM device requires dom0 to have access to the USB controller to which your USB AEM device is attached. If dom0 cannot read your USB AEM device, AEM will hang.
The procedure to hide all USB controllers from dom0 is as follows:
- Open the file
/etc/default/grub
in dom0. - Find the line that begins with
GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX
. - Add
rd.qubes.hide_all_usb
to that line. - Save and close the file.
- Run the command
grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
in dom0. - Reboot.
(Note: Beginning with R3.2, rd.qubes.hide_all_usb
is set automatically if you
opt to create a USB qube during installation. This also occurs automatically if
you choose to create a USB qube using the qubesctl
method, which is the
first pair of steps in the linked section.)
Warning: A USB keyboard cannot be used to type the disk passphrase
if USB controllers were hidden from dom0. Before hiding USB controllers
make sure your laptop keyboard is not internally connected via USB
(by checking output of lsusb
command) or that you have a PS/2 keyboard at hand
(if using a desktop PC). Failure to do so will render your system unusable.
Removing a USB qube
Warning: This procedure will result in your USB controller(s) being attached directly to dom0.
- Shut down the USB qube.
- In Qubes Manager, right-click on the USB qube and select "Remove VM."
- Open the file
/etc/default/grub
in dom0. - Find the line(s) that begins with
GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX
. - If
rd.qubes.hide_all_usb
appears anywhere in those lines, remove it. - Save and close the file.
- Run the command
grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
in dom0. - Reboot.
Security Warning about USB Input Devices
Important security warning. Please read this section carefully!
If you connect USB input devices (keyboard and mouse) to a VM, that VM will effectively have control over your system. Because of this, the benefits of using a USB qube are much smaller than using a fully untrusted USB qube. In addition to having control over your system, such VM can also sniff all the input you enter there (for example, passwords in the case of a USB keyboard).
There is no simple way to protect against sniffing, but you can make it harder to exploit control over input devices.
If you have only a USB mouse connected to a USB qube, but the keyboard is connected directly to dom0 (using a PS/2 connector, for example), you simply need to lock the screen when you are away from your computer. You must do this every time you leave your computer unattended, even if there no risk of anyone else having direct physical access to your computer. This is because you are guarding the system not only against anyone with local access, but also against possible actions from a potentially compromised USB qube.
(Note: In the present context, the term "USB drive" denotes any USB mass storage device. In addition to smaller flash memory sticks, this includes things like USB external hard drives.)
Qubes OS supports the ability to attach a USB drive (or just one or more of its partitions) to any qube easily, no matter which qube actually handles the USB controller.
R4.0
USB drive mounting is integrated into the Devices Widget. This is the tool tray
icon with a yellow square located in the top right of your screen by default.
Simply insert
your USB drive and click on the widget. You will see multiple entries for your
USB drive; typically, sys-usb:sda
, sys-usb:sda1
, and sys-usb:2-1
for example.
The simplest (but slightly less secure, see note below about attaching individual
partitions) option is to attach the entire block drive. In our example, this is sda
,
so hover over it.
This will pop up a submenu showing running VMs to which the USB drive can be connected.
Click on one and your USB drive will be attached!
Note that attaching individual partitions can be slightly more secure because it doesn't force the target AppVM to parse the partition table. However, it often means the AppVM won't detect the new partition and you will need to manually mount it inside the AppVM. See below for more detailed steps.
The command-line tool you may use to mount whole USB drives or their partitions
is qvm-block
. This tool can be used to assign a USB drive to a qube as
follows:
-
Insert your USB drive.
-
In a dom0 console (running as a normal user), list all available block devices:
qvm-block
This will list all available block devices connected to any USB controller in your system, no matter which qube hosts the controller. The name of the qube hosting the USB controller is displayed before the colon in the device name. The string after the colon is the name of the device used within the qube, like so:
dom0:sdb1 Cruzer () 4GiB usbVM:sdb1 Disk () 2GiB
Note: If your device is not listed here, you may refresh the list by calling from the qube to which the device is connected (typically
sys-usb
):sudo udevadm trigger --action=change
-
Assuming your USB drive is attached to
sys-usb
and issdb
, we attach the device to a qube with the namepersonal
like so:qvm-block attach personal sys-usb:sdb
This will attach the device to the qube as
/dev/xvdi
if that name is not already taken by another attached device, or/dev/xvdj
, etc.You may also mount one partition at a time by using the same command with the partition number after
sdb
. -
The USB drive is now attached to the qube. If using a default qube, you may open the Nautilus file manager in the qube, and your drive should be visible in the Devices panel on the left. If you've attached a single partition, you may need to manually mount before it becomes visible:
cd ~ mkdir mnt sudo mount /dev/xvdi mnt
-
When you finish using your USB drive, click the eject button or right-click and select Unmount. If you've manually mounted a single partition in the above step, use:
sudo umount mnt
-
In a dom0 console, detach the stick
qvm-block detach <vmname> <device>
-
You may now remove the device.
R3.2
USB drive mounting is integrated into the Qubes VM Manager GUI. Simply insert your USB drive, right-click on the desired qube in the Qubes VM Manager list, click Attach/detach block devices, and select your desired action and device. This, however, only works for the whole device. If you would like to attach individual partitions, you must use the command-line tool.
Note that attaching individual partitions can be slightly more secure because it doesn't force the target AppVM to parse the partition table. However, it often means the AppVM won't detect the new partition and you will need to manually mount it inside the AppVM. See below for more detailed steps.
The command-line tool you may use to mount whole USB drives or their partitions
is qvm-block
. This tool can be used to assign a USB drive to a qube as
follows:
-
Insert your USB drive.
-
In a dom0 console (running as a normal user), list all available block devices:
qvm-block
This will list all available block devices connected to any USB controller in your system, no matter which qube hosts the controller. The name of the qube hosting the USB controller is displayed before the colon in the device name. The string after the colon is the name of the device used within the qube, like so:
dom0:sdb1 Cruzer () 4GiB usbVM:sdb1 Disk () 2GiB
Note: If your device is not listed here, you may refresh the list by calling from the qube to which the device is connected (typically
sys-usb
):sudo udevadm trigger --action=change
-
Assuming your USB drive is attached to
sys-usb
and issdb
, we attach the device to a qube with the namepersonal
like so:qvm-block -a personal sys-usb:sdb
This will attach the device to the qube as
/dev/xvdi
if that name is not already taken by another attached device, or/dev/xvdj
, etc.You may also mount one partition at a time by using the same command with the partition number after
sdb
. This is slightly more secure because it does not force the target AppVM to parse the partition table.Warning: when working with single partitions, it is possible to assign the same partition to multiple qubes. For example, you could attach
sdb1
to qube1 and thensdb
to qube2. It is up to the user not to make this mistake. The Xen block device framework currently does not provide an easy way around this. Point 2 of this comment on issue 1072 gives details about this. -
The USB drive is now attached to the qube. If using a default qube, you may open the Nautilus file manager in the qube, and your drive should be visible in the Devices panel on the left. If you've attached a single partition, you may need to manually mount before it becomes visible:
cd ~ mkdir mnt sudo mount /dev/xvdi mnt
-
When you finish using your USB drive, click the eject button or right-click and select Unmount. If you've manually mounted a single partition in the above step, use:
sudo umount mnt
-
In a dom0 console, detach the stick
qvm-block -d <device>
or
qvm-block -d <vmname>
-
You may now remove the device.
Warning: Do not remove the device before detaching it from the VM! Otherwise, you will not be able to attach it anywhere later. See issue 1082 for details.
If the device does not appear in Nautilus, you will need to mount it
manually. The device will show up as /dev/xvdi
(or /dev/xvdj
if there is
already one device attached -- if two, /dev/xvdk
, and so on).
What if I removed the device before detaching it from the VM? (R3.2)
Currently (until issue 1082 gets implemented), if you remove the device
before detaching it from the qube, Qubes OS (more precisely, libvirtd
) will
think that the device is still attached to the qube and will not allow attaching
further devices under the same name. The easiest way to recover from such a
situation is to reboot the qube to which the device was attached, but if this
isn't an option, you can manually recover from the situation by following these
steps:
-
Physically connect the device back. You can use any device as long as it will be detected under the same name (for example,
sdb
). -
Attach the device manually to the same VM using the
xl block-attach
command. It is important to use the same "frontend" device name (by default,xvdi
). You can get it from theqvm-block
listing:[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-block sys-usb:sda DataTraveler_2.0 () 246 MiB (attached to 'testvm' as 'xvdi') [user@dom0 ~]$ sudo xl block-attach testvm phy:/dev/sda backend=sys-usb xvdi
In above example, all
xl block-attach
parameters can be deduced from the output ofqvm-block
. In order:testvm
- name of target qube to which device was attached - listed in brackets byqvm-block
commandphy:/dev/sda
- physical path at which device appears in source qube (just after source qube name inqvm-block
output)backend=sys-usb
- name of source qube, can be omitted in the case of dom0xvdi
- "frontend" device name (listed at the end of line inqvm-block
output)
-
Now properly detach the device, either using Qubes VM Manager or the
qvm-block -d
command.
Attaching a single USB device to a qube (USB passthrough)
Starting with Qubes 3.2, it is possible to attach a single USB device to any Qube. While this is a useful feature, it should be used with care, because there are many security implications from using USB devices and USB passthrough will expose your target qube for most of them. If possible, use a method specific for particular device type (for example block devices described above), instead of this generic one.
Installation of qubes-usb-proxy
To use this feature, you need to install qubes-usb-proxy
package in the
templates used for the USB qube and qubes you want to connect USB devices to. Note
you cannot pass through devices from dom0 (in other words: USB VM is required).
qubes-usb-proxy
should be installed by default in the template VM.
However, if you receive this error: ERROR: qubes-usb-proxy not installed in the VM
,
you can install the qubes-usb-proxy
with the package manager in the VM
you want to attach the USB device to.
- Fedora:
sudo dnf install qubes-usb-proxy
- Debian/Ubuntu:
sudo apt-get install qubes-usb-proxy
Usage of qubes-usb-proxy (R4.0)
This feature is also available from the Devices Widget. This is the tool tray
icon with a yellow square located in the top right of your screen by default.
Simply insert
your USB device and click on the widget. You will see an entry for your device
such as sys-usb:2-5 - 058f_USB_2.0_Camera
for example.
Hover over it.
This will pop up a submenu showing running VMs to which the USB device can be connected.
Click on one and your device will be attached! You may also use the command line:
Listing available USB devices:
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb
sys-usb:2-4 04ca:300d 04ca_300d
sys-usb:2-5 058f:3822 058f_USB_2.0_Camera
sys-usb:2-1 03f0:0641 PixArt_HP_X1200_USB_Optical_Mouse
Attaching selected USB device:
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb attach conferences sys-usb:2-5
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb
conferences:2-1 058f:3822 058f_USB_2.0_Camera
sys-usb:2-4 04ca:300d 04ca_300d
sys-usb:2-5 058f:3822 058f_USB_2.0_Camera (attached to conferences)
sys-usb:2-1 03f0:0641 PixArt_HP_X1200_USB_Optical_Mouse
Now, you can use your USB device (camera in this case) in the conferences
qube.
If you see the error ERROR: qubes-usb-proxy not installed in the VM
instead,
please refer to the Installation Section.
When you finish, detach the device. This can be done in the GUI by
clicking on the Devices Widget. You will see an entry in bold for your device
such as sys-usb:2-5 - 058f_USB_2.0_Camera
.
Hover over it.
This will pop up a submenu showing running VMs. The one which your device is
connected to will have an Eject button next to it. Click that and your device
will be detached. You may also use the command line:
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb detach conferences sys-usb:2-5
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb
sys-usb:2-4 04ca:300d 04ca_300d
sys-usb:2-5 058f:3822 058f_USB_2.0_Camera
sys-usb:2-1 03f0:0641 PixArt_HP_X1200_USB_Optical_Mouse
Usage of qubes-usb-proxy (R3.2)
Listing available USB devices:
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb
sys-usb:2-4 04ca:300d 04ca_300d
sys-usb:2-5 058f:3822 058f_USB_2.0_Camera
sys-usb:2-1 03f0:0641 PixArt_HP_X1200_USB_Optical_Mouse
Attaching selected USB device:
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb -a conferences sys-usb:2-5
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb
conferences:2-1 058f:3822 058f_USB_2.0_Camera
sys-usb:2-4 04ca:300d 04ca_300d
sys-usb:2-5 058f:3822 058f_USB_2.0_Camera (attached to conferences)
sys-usb:2-1 03f0:0641 PixArt_HP_X1200_USB_Optical_Mouse
Now, you can use your USB device (camera in this case) in the conferences
qube.
If you see the error ERROR: qubes-usb-proxy not installed in the VM
instead,
please refer to the Installation Section.
When you finish, detach the device:
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb -d sys-usb:2-5
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb
sys-usb:2-4 04ca:300d 04ca_300d
sys-usb:2-5 058f:3822 058f_USB_2.0_Camera
sys-usb:2-1 03f0:0641 PixArt_HP_X1200_USB_Optical_Mouse
This feature is not available in Qubes Manager.
Creating and Using a USB qube
Warning: This has the potential to prevent you from connecting a keyboard to Qubes via USB. There are problems with doing this in an encrypted install (LUKS). If you find yourself in this situation, see this issue.
Connecting an untrusted USB device to dom0 is a security risk since dom0, like almost every OS, reads partition tables automatically. The whole USB stack is put to work to parse the data presented by the USB device in order to determine if it is a USB mass storage device, to read its configuration, etc. This happens even if the drive is then assigned and mounted in another qube.
To avoid this risk, it is possible to prepare and utilize a USB qube.
A USB qube acts as a secure handler for potentially malicious USB devices, preventing them from coming into contact with dom0 (which could otherwise be fatal to the security of the whole system). With a USB qube, every time you connect an untrusted USB drive to a USB port managed by that USB controller, you will have to attach it to the qube in which you wish to use it (if different from the USB qube itself), either by using Qubes VM Manager or the command line (see instructions above). The USB controller may be assigned on the Devices tab of a qube's settings page in Qubes VM Manager or by using the qvm-pci command. For guidance on finding the correct USB controller, see here. You can create a USB qube using the management stack by performing the following as root in dom0:
sudo qubesctl state.sls qvm.sys-usb
Alternatively, you can create a USB qube manually as follows:
-
Read the Assigning Devices page to learn how to list and identify your USB controllers. Carefully check whether you have a USB controller that would be appropriate to assign to a USB qube. Note that it should have no input devices, programmable devices, and any other devices that must be directly available to dom0. If you find a free controller, note its name and proceed to step 2.
-
Create a new qube. Give it an appropriate name and color label (recommended:
sys-usb
, red). If you need to attach a networking device, it might make sense to create a NetVM. If not, an AppVM might make more sense. (The defaultsys-usb
is a NetVM.) -
In the qube's settings, go to the "Devices" tab. Find the USB controller that you identified in step 1 in the "Available" list. Move it to the "Selected" list.
Caution: By assigning a USB controller to a USB qube, it will no longer be available to dom0. This can make your system unusable if, for example, you have only one USB controller, and you are running Qubes off of a USB drive.
-
Click "OK." Restart the qube.
-
Recommended: Check the box on the "Basic" tab which says "Start VM automatically on boot." (This will help to mitigate attacks in which someone forces your system to reboot, then plugs in a malicious USB device.)
If the USB qube will not start, see here.
How to hide all USB controllers from dom0
If you create a USB qube manually, there will be a brief period of time during the boot process during which dom0 will be exposed to your USB controllers (and any attached devices). This is a potential security risk, since even brief exposure to a malicious USB device could result in dom0 being compromised. There are two approaches to this problem:
- Physically disconnect all USB devices whenever you reboot the host.
- Hide (i.e., blacklist) all USB controllers from dom0.
Warning: If you use a USB AEM device, do not use the second option. Using a USB AEM device requires dom0 to have access to the USB controller to which your USB AEM device is attached. If dom0 cannot read your USB AEM device, AEM will hang.
The procedure to hide all USB controllers from dom0 is as follows:
- GRUB2
- Open the file
/etc/default/grub
in dom0. - Find the line that begins with
GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX
. - Add
rd.qubes.hide_all_usb
to that line. - Save and close the file.
- Run the command
grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
in dom0. - Reboot.
- EFI
- Open the file
/boot/efi/EFI/qubes/xen.cfg
in dom0. - Find the lines that begin with
kernel=
. There may be more than one. - Add
rd.qubes.hide_all_usb
to those lines. - Save and close the file.
- Reboot.
(Note: Beginning with R3.2, rd.qubes.hide_all_usb
is set automatically if you
opt to create a USB qube during installation. This also occurs automatically if
you choose to create a USB qube using the qubesctl
method, which is the
first pair of steps in the linked section.)
Warning: A USB keyboard cannot be used to type the disk passphrase
if USB controllers were hidden from dom0. Before hiding USB controllers
make sure your laptop keyboard is not internally connected via USB
(by checking output of lsusb
command) or that you have a PS/2 keyboard at hand
(if using a desktop PC). Failure to do so will render your system unusable.
Removing a USB qube
Warning: This procedure will result in your USB controller(s) being attached directly to dom0.
- GRUB2
- Shut down the USB qube.
- In Qubes Manager, right-click on the USB qube and select "Remove VM."
- Open the file
/etc/default/grub
in dom0. - Find the line(s) that begins with
GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX
. - If
rd.qubes.hide_all_usb
appears anywhere in those lines, remove it. - Save and close the file.
- Run the command
grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
in dom0. - Reboot.
- EFI
- Shut down the USB qube.
- In Qubes Manager, right-click on the USB qube and select "Remove VM."
- Open the file
/boot/efi/EFI/qubes/xen.cfg
in dom0. - Find the line(s) that begins with
kernel=
. - If
rd.qubes.hide_all_usb
appears anywhere in those lines, remove it. - Save and close the file.
- Reboot.
Security Warning about USB Input Devices
Important security warning. Please read this section carefully!
If you connect USB input devices (keyboard and mouse) to a VM, that VM will effectively have control over your system. Because of this, the benefits of using a USB qube are much smaller than using a fully untrusted USB qube. In addition to having control over your system, such VM can also sniff all the input you enter there (for example, passwords in the case of a USB keyboard).
There is no simple way to protect against sniffing, but you can make it harder to exploit control over input devices.
If you have only a USB mouse connected to a USB qube, but the keyboard is connected directly to dom0 (using a PS/2 connector, for example), you simply need to lock the screen when you are away from your computer. You must do this every time you leave your computer unattended, even if there no risk of anyone else having direct physical access to your computer. This is because you are guarding the system not only against anyone with local access, but also against possible actions from a potentially compromised USB qube.
If your keyboard is also connected to a USB qube, things are much harder. Locking the screen (with a traditional password) does not solve the problem, because the USB qube can simply sniff this password and later easily unlock the screen. One possibility is to set up the screen locker to require an additional step to unlock (i.e., two-factor authentication). One way to achieve this is to use a YubiKey, or some other hardware token, or even to manually enter a one-time password.
How to use a USB keyboard
Caution: Please carefully read the Security Warning about USB Input Devices before proceeding.
If you use USB keyboard, automatic USB qube creation during installation is disabled. Additional steps are required to avoid locking you out from the system. Those steps are not performed by default, because of risk explained in Security Warning about USB Input Devices.
R4.0, using salt
To allow USB keyboard usage (including early boot for LUKS passphrase), make sure you have the latest qubes-mgmt-salt-dom0-virtual-machines
package (simply install dom0 updates) and execute in dom0:
sudo qubesctl state.sls qvm.usb-keyboard
The above command will take care of all required configuration, including creating USB qube if not present. Note that it will expose dom0 to USB devices while entering LUKS passphrase. Users are advised to physically disconnect other devices from the system for that time, to minimize the risk.
If you wish to perform only subset of this configuration (for example do not enable USB keyboard during boot), see manual instructions below.
R3.2, manual
In order to use a USB keyboard, you must first attach it to a USB qube, then give that qube permission to pass keyboard input to dom0.
Edit the qubes.InputKeyboard
policy file in dom0, which is located here:
/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.InputKeyboard
Add a line like this one to the top of the file:
sys-usb dom0 allow,user=root
(Change sys-usb
to your desired USB qube.)
You can now use your USB keyboard.
For a confirmation dialog each time the USB keyboard is connected, change this line to:
sys-usb dom0 ask,default_target=dom0
Additionally, if you want to use USB keyboard to enter LUKS passphrase, it is incompatible with hiding USB controllers from dom0.
You need to revert that procedure (remove rd.qubes.hide_all_usb
option from files mentioned there) and employ alternative protection during system boot - disconnect other devices during startup.
How to use a USB mouse
Caution: Please carefully read the Security Warning about USB Input Devices before proceeding.
In order to use a USB mouse, you must first attach it to a USB qube, then give that
qube permission to pass mouse input to dom0.
The following steps are already done by default if you created the sys-usb qube with
qubesctl state.sls qvm.sys-usb
above, or let Qubes create it for you on first boot. However,
if you've created the USB qube manually:
Edit the qubes.InputMouse
policy file in dom0, which is located here:
/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.InputMouse
Add a line like this to the top of the file:
sys-usb dom0 allow,user=root
(Change sys-usb
to your desired USB qube.)
You can now use your USB mouse.
For a confirmation dialog each time the USB mouse is connected, change this line to:
sys-usb dom0 ask,default_target=dom0