mirror of
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238 lines
10 KiB
Markdown
238 lines
10 KiB
Markdown
---
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lang: en
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layout: doc
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permalink: /security/pack/
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redirect_from:
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- /doc/security-pack/
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- /en/doc/security-pack/
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- /security-pack/
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- /doc/SecurityPack/
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- /wiki/SecurityPack/
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- /qsp/
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- /sec-pack/
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- /secpack/
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- /doc/qsp/
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- /doc/sec-pack/
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- /doc/secpack/
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ref: 213
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title: Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack)
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---
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The **Qubes Security Pack** (qubes-secpack) is a Git repository that contains:
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- [Qubes security bulletins (QSBs)](/security/qsb/)
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- [Qubes canaries](/security/canary/)
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- [Qubes ISO cryptographic hash values](/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-verify-the-cryptographic-hash-values-of-qubes-isos)
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- [Qubes fund information](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/tree/master/fund)
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- [Qubes PGP keys](https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/)
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- Security-related information and announcements (e.g., key revocations)
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While qubes-secpack itself is independent of any particular host, its current
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official location is:
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<https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack>
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## How to obtain and authenticate
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The following example demonstrates one method of obtaining the qubes-secpack and
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verifying its authenticity. This requires Git and [OpenPGP
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software](/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).
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1. Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
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```shell_session
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$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
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Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
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remote: Counting objects: 195, done.
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remote: Total 195 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0)
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Receiving objects: 100% (195/195), 130.94 KiB | 207.00 KiB/s, done.
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Resolving deltas: 100% (47/47), done.
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Checking connectivity... done.
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```
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2. Import the included PGP keys.
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```shell_session
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$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
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gpg: directory `/home/user/.gnupg' created
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gpg: new configuration file `/home/user/.gnupg/gpg.conf' created
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gpg: WARNING: options in `/home/user/.gnupg/gpg.conf' are not yet active during this run
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gpg: keyring `/home/user/.gnupg/secring.gpg' created
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gpg: keyring `/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.gpg' created
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gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
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gpg: key C37BB66B: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes OS signing key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
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gpg: key 1E30A75D: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes OS signing key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
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gpg: key 74EADABC: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes OS signing key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
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gpg: key 65EF29CA: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes OS Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
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gpg: key 34898310: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes OS Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
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gpg: key B298547C: public key "Marek Marczykowski (Qubes OS signing key) <marmarek@mimuw.edu.pl>" imported
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gpg: key AB5EEF90: public key "Marek Marczykowski (Qubes OS signing key) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
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gpg: key A603BCB6: public key "Marek Marczykowski (Qubes OS signing key) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
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gpg: key 42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
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gpg: key 15CE40BF: public key "Wojciech Zygmunt Porczyk (Qubes OS signing key) <woju@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
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gpg: key 36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
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gpg: key 211093A7: public key "Qubes OS Release 1 Signing Key" imported
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gpg: key 0A40E458: public key "Qubes OS Release 2 Signing Key" imported
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gpg: key 03FA5082: public key "Qubes OS Release 3 Signing Key" imported
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gpg: key 92C7B3DC: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Security Pack Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
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gpg: key 1830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
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gpg: key 3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team <security@qubes-os.org>" imported
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gpg: Total number processed: 17
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gpg: imported: 17 (RSA: 17)
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gpg: no ultimately trusted keys found
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```
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3. [Authenticate and set the trust level of the Qubes Master Signing Key
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(QMSK).](/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key)
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**Note:** Only some keys in the qubes-secpack are signed by the QMSK. Keys
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that are not signed directly by the QMSK are still signed indirectly by
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virtue of being included in the qubes-secpack, which is itself signed (via
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Git tags and/or commits) by keys that are in turn signed by the QMSK.
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4. Verify signed Git tags.
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```shell_session
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$ cd qubes-secpack/
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$ git tag -v `git describe`
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object 2bb7f0b966593d8ed74e140a04d60c68b96b164e
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type commit
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tag joanna_sec_2bb7f0b9
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tagger Joanna Rutkowska <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com> 1468335706 +0000
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Tag for commit 2bb7f0b966593d8ed74e140a04d60c68b96b164e
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gpg: Signature made 2016-07-12T08:01:46 PDT
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gpg: using RSA key 0x4E6829BC92C7B3DC
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gpg: Good signature from "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Security Pack Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" [full]
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```
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The final line of output confirms that the signature is good.
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5. Verify detached PGP signatures.
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```shell_session
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$ cd canaries/
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$ gpg --verify canary-001-2015.txt.sig.joanna canary-001-2015.txt
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gpg: Signature made Mon Jan 5 20:21:40 2015 UTC using RSA key ID 92C7B3DC
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gpg: Good signature from "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Security Pack Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>"
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$ gpg --verify canary-001-2015.txt.sig.marmarek canary-001-2015.txt
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gpg: Signature made Mon Jan 5 20:13:37 2015 UTC using RSA key ID 1830E06A
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gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>"
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```
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The fourth and final lines of output confirm that the two signatures are
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good.
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The same procedures can be applied to any directory or file in the
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qubes-secpack. Two methods of verification (signed Git tags and detached PGP
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signatures) are provided to ensure that the system is robust (e.g., against a
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potential failure in Git tag-based verification) and to give users more options
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to verify the files.
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## PGP key inclusion criteria
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The qubes-secpack generally includes only those PGP keys used to sign some kind
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of official project asset, such as Qubes release ISOs (release signing keys),
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Git tags and commits (code signing, doc signing, and security team keys), and
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the qubes-secpack's own files and Git tags (security team keys again). This
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means that email keys are generally not included, even for official project
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email addresses. There is one exception to this rule: the official [Qubes
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security team](/security/#qubes-security-team) email address, which is used to
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report security vulnerabilities in Qubes OS to our security team.
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## History and rationale
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On 2013-01-05, Joanna Rutkowska announced the qubes-secpack and explained its
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rationale in an
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[email](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-devel/twkOEaMLtNI/lZyGx6_jFCEJ)
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to the Qubes mailing lists:
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```
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Hello,
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A new Qubes Security Bulletin has been just released and is available here:
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https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-013-2015.txt
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As per the previous discussions about recent problems with verifying
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digital signatures on messages sent to Google Groups (thanks to
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automatic footer addition by Google), we have decided to change the way
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we publish Qubes Security Bulletins, as well as other security-related
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info pertinent to the Qubes Project.
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Starting today, we will be maintain a Git repository -- "Qubes Security
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Pack" -- which will contain all the QSBs released so far, all the keys,
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warrant canaries [1], and potentially some additional info or
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announcements (e.g. key revocations). The whole repo can be found here:
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https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack
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Note that all the keys distributed there should be signed by Qubes
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Master Key. The Master Key is also attached in the repo, but should
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really be obtained/verified using a different channel.
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Additionally, most of the files are signed by core Qubes
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developers (currently by Marek and myself) via detached signatures as
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well as git tag signatures.
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The are several advantages of using Git to distribute all these information:
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1) Git repo is a collection of files, some of which can be detached GPG
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signatures for other files and we can ensure all these files are
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distributed together.
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2) Git makes it easy for people to clone and redistribute these
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collection of files, as well as to easily host them and view on the Web.
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3) Git provides for signed tags mechanisms which is another mean we
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utilize to ensure integrity of the distributed files.
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A few words about the Warrant Canary which we've just introduced today,
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and which can be seen here:
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https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-001-2015.txt
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Even though we're not providing any kind of services (such as e.g. email
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hosting), that could be searched or tapped by authorities, there are
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other possibilities that worry us [2], in the light of various recent
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law "developments", such as those that might be coercing people to hand
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over their private keys to authorities.
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Until we fully decentralize the root of trust for Qubes, something that
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requires the move to deterministic builds [3], and so won't happen
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very soon, the possibility of having to disclose any of the Qubes
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signing keys to anybody might have pretty serious consequences for those
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who decided to entrust Qubes with anything serious. And we would like to
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somehow minimize these consequences with this canary thing.
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Additionally the canary is a nice way of ensuring "freshness" of our
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messaging to the community.
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Of course the canary doesn't solve all the problems. E.g. if my signing
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keys were somehow stolen without our knowledge, it wouldn't help.
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Neither it could help in case me being or becoming a miscreant. And
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probably it doesn't address many other potential problems, which could
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only be solved one day with a multi-signature scheme. But anyway, until
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that time, this is the best we can do, I think.
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And congrats to Jann for the very interesting clipboard attack (even
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though mostly theoretical, still very cool)!
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Thanks,
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joanna.
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--
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The Qubes Security Team
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https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/SecurityPage
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[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary
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[2] Especially myself, because I'm currently the Root Of Trust for all
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Qubes binaries :/
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[3] Deterministic builds are required because it's the only way we can
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implement multiple signature scheme for distributed binaries.
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```
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