4.2 KiB
| layout | title | permalink | redirect_from | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| doc | Qubes Networking | /en/doc/qubes-net/ |
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VM network in Qubes
Overall description
In Qubes, the standard Xen networking is used, based on backend driver in the driver domain and frontend drivers in VMs. In order to eliminate layer 2 attacks originating from a compromised VM, routed networking is used instead of the default bridging of vif devices. The default vif-route script had some deficiencies (requires eth0 device to be up, and sets some redundant iptables rules), therefore the custom vif-route-qubes script is used.
The IP address of eth0 interface in AppVM, as well as two IP addresses to be used as nameservers (DNS1 and DNS2), are passed via xenstore to AppVM during its boot (thus, there is no need for DHCP daemon in the network driver domain). DNS1 and DNS2 are private addresses; whenever an interface is brought up in the network driver domain, the /usr/lib/qubes/qubes_setup_dnat_to_ns script sets up the DNAT iptables rules translating DNS1 and DNS2 to the newly learned real dns servers. This way AppVM networking configuration does not need to be changed when configuration in the network driver domain changes (e.g. user switches to a different WLAN). Moreover, in the network driver domain, there is no DNS server either, and consequently there are no ports open to the VMs.
Routing tables examples
VM routing table is simple:
|| |Destination|Gateway|Genmask|Flags|Metric|Ref|Use|Iface| |0.0.0.0|0.0.0.0|0.0.0.0|U|0|0|0|eth0|
Network driver domain routing table is a bit longer:
|| |Destination|Gateway|Genmask|Flags|Metric|Ref|Use|Iface| |10.2.0.16|0.0.0.0|255.255.255.255|UH|0|0|0|vif4.0| |10.2.0.7|0.0.0.0|255.255.255.255|UH|0|0|0|vif10.0| |10.2.0.9|0.0.0.0|255.255.255.255|UH|0|0|0|vif9.0| |10.2.0.8|0.0.0.0|255.255.255.255|UH|0|0|0|vif8.0| |10.2.0.12|0.0.0.0|255.255.255.255|UH|0|0|0|vif3.0| |192.168.0.0|0.0.0.0|255.255.255.0|U|1|0|0|eth0| |0.0.0.0|192.168.0.1|0.0.0.0|UG|0|0|0|eth0|
Location of the network driver domain
Traditionally, the network driver domain is dom0. This design means that a lot of code (networking stack, drivers) running in the all-powerful domain is exposed to potential attack. Although it is supported (one can execute qvm-set-default-netvm dom0), it is strongly discouraged.
Instead, a dedicated domain called netvm should be used. In order to activate it, one needs to install the qubes-servicevm-netvm rpm package, and enable it via command qvm-set-default-netvm netvm. This domain will be assigned all PCI devices that are network cards. One can interact with the Networkmanager daemon running in netvm in the same way as with any other VM GUI application (with one detail that nm-applet requires a system tray, thus one needs to start it via "KDEMenu->Applications->Netvm->Show Tray").
Note that in order to isolate netvm properly, the platform must support VTd and it must be activated. Otherwise, compromised netvm can use DMA to get control over dom0 and even the hypervisor.
When using netvm, there is no network connectivity in dom0. This is the desired configuration - it eliminates all network-bourne attacks. Observe that dom0 is meant to be used for administrative tasks only, and (with one exception) they do not need network. Anything not related to system administration should be done in one of AppVMs.
The above-mentioned exception is the system packages upgrade. Again, one must not install random applications in dom0, but there is a need to e.g. upgrade existing packages. While one may argue that the new packages could be downloaded on a separate machine and copied to dom0 via a pendrive, this solution has its own problems. Therefore, the advised method to temporarily grant network connectivity to dom0 is to use qvm-dom0-network-via-netvm up command. It will pause all running VMs (so that they can do no harm to dom0) and connect dom0 to netvm network just like another AppVM. Having completed package upgrade, execute qvm-dom0-network-via-netvm down to revert to the normal state.
Firewall and Proxy VMs
TODO