mirror of
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-doc.git
synced 2024-12-22 05:55:05 -05:00
247 lines
11 KiB
ReStructuredText
247 lines
11 KiB
ReStructuredText
===================================
|
||
Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack)
|
||
===================================
|
||
|
||
|
||
The **Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack)** is a Git repository that
|
||
contains:
|
||
|
||
- `Qubes security bulletins (QSBs) <https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/>`__
|
||
|
||
- `Qubes canaries <https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canary/>`__
|
||
|
||
- :ref:`Qubes ISO cryptographic hash values <project-security/verifying-signatures:how to verify the cryptographic hash values of qubes isos>`
|
||
|
||
- `Qubes fund information <https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/tree/master/fund>`__
|
||
|
||
- `Qubes PGP keys <https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/>`__
|
||
|
||
- Security-related information and announcements (e.g., key
|
||
revocations)
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
While qubes-secpack itself is independent of any particular host, its
|
||
current official location is:
|
||
|
||
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack
|
||
|
||
How to obtain and authenticate
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
|
||
The following example demonstrates one method of obtaining the
|
||
qubes-secpack and verifying its authenticity. This requires Git and
|
||
:ref:`OpenPGP software <project-security/verifying-signatures:openpgp software>`.
|
||
|
||
1. Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo.
|
||
|
||
.. code:: bash
|
||
|
||
$ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git
|
||
Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'...
|
||
remote: Counting objects: 195, done.
|
||
remote: Total 195 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0)
|
||
Receiving objects: 100% (195/195), 130.94 KiB | 207.00 KiB/s, done.
|
||
Resolving deltas: 100% (47/47), done.
|
||
Checking connectivity... done.
|
||
|
||
|
||
2. Import the included PGP keys. See our `PGP key policies <#pgp-key-policies>`__ for important information about these
|
||
keys.
|
||
|
||
.. code:: bash
|
||
|
||
$ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/*
|
||
gpg: directory `/home/user/.gnupg' created
|
||
gpg: new configuration file `/home/user/.gnupg/gpg.conf' created
|
||
gpg: WARNING: options in `/home/user/.gnupg/gpg.conf' are not yet active during this run
|
||
gpg: keyring `/home/user/.gnupg/secring.gpg' created
|
||
gpg: keyring `/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.gpg' created
|
||
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
|
||
gpg: key C37BB66B: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes OS signing key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
|
||
gpg: key 1E30A75D: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes OS signing key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
|
||
gpg: key 74EADABC: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes OS signing key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
|
||
gpg: key 65EF29CA: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes OS Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
|
||
gpg: key 34898310: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes OS Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
|
||
gpg: key B298547C: public key "Marek Marczykowski (Qubes OS signing key) <marmarek@mimuw.edu.pl>" imported
|
||
gpg: key AB5EEF90: public key "Marek Marczykowski (Qubes OS signing key) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
|
||
gpg: key A603BCB6: public key "Marek Marczykowski (Qubes OS signing key) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
|
||
gpg: key 42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
|
||
gpg: key 15CE40BF: public key "Wojciech Zygmunt Porczyk (Qubes OS signing key) <woju@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
|
||
gpg: key 36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
|
||
gpg: key 211093A7: public key "Qubes OS Release 1 Signing Key" imported
|
||
gpg: key 0A40E458: public key "Qubes OS Release 2 Signing Key" imported
|
||
gpg: key 03FA5082: public key "Qubes OS Release 3 Signing Key" imported
|
||
gpg: key 92C7B3DC: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Security Pack Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
|
||
gpg: key 1830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>" imported
|
||
gpg: key 3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team <security@qubes-os.org>" imported
|
||
gpg: Total number processed: 17
|
||
gpg: imported: 17 (RSA: 17)
|
||
gpg: no ultimately trusted keys found
|
||
|
||
|
||
3. :ref:`Authenticate and set the trust level of the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK). <project-security/verifying-signatures:how to import and authenticate the qubes master signing key>`
|
||
|
||
4. Verify signed Git tags.
|
||
|
||
.. code:: bash
|
||
|
||
$ cd qubes-secpack/
|
||
$ git tag -v `git describe`
|
||
object 2bb7f0b966593d8ed74e140a04d60c68b96b164e
|
||
type commit
|
||
tag joanna_sec_2bb7f0b9
|
||
tagger Joanna Rutkowska <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com> 1468335706 +0000
|
||
|
||
Tag for commit 2bb7f0b966593d8ed74e140a04d60c68b96b164e
|
||
gpg: Signature made 2016-07-12T08:01:46 PDT
|
||
gpg: using RSA key 0x4E6829BC92C7B3DC
|
||
gpg: Good signature from "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Security Pack Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>" [full]
|
||
|
||
The final line of output confirms that the signature is good.
|
||
|
||
5. Verify detached PGP signatures.
|
||
|
||
.. code:: bash
|
||
|
||
$ cd canaries/
|
||
$ gpg --verify canary-001-2015.txt.sig.joanna canary-001-2015.txt
|
||
gpg: Signature made Mon Jan 5 20:21:40 2015 UTC using RSA key ID 92C7B3DC
|
||
gpg: Good signature from "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Security Pack Signing Key) <joanna@invisiblethingslab.com>"
|
||
$ gpg --verify canary-001-2015.txt.sig.marmarek canary-001-2015.txt
|
||
gpg: Signature made Mon Jan 5 20:13:37 2015 UTC using RSA key ID 1830E06A
|
||
gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack) <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>"
|
||
|
||
The fourth and final lines of output confirm that the two signatures
|
||
are good.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
The same procedures can be applied to any directory or file in the
|
||
qubes-secpack. Two methods of verification (signed Git tags and detached
|
||
PGP signatures) are provided to ensure that the system is robust (e.g.,
|
||
against a potential failure in Git tag-based verification) and to give
|
||
users more options to verify the files.
|
||
|
||
PGP key policies
|
||
----------------
|
||
|
||
|
||
- **Inclusion criteria.** The qubes-secpack generally includes only
|
||
those PGP keys used to sign some kind of official project asset, such
|
||
as Qubes release ISOs (release signing keys), Git tags and commits
|
||
(code signing, doc signing, and security team keys), and the
|
||
qubes-secpack’s own files and Git tags (security team keys again).
|
||
This means that email keys are generally not included, even for
|
||
official project email addresses. There is one exception to this
|
||
rule: the official :ref:`Qubes security team <project-security/security:qubes security team>` email address, which is used
|
||
to report security vulnerabilities in Qubes OS to our security team.
|
||
|
||
- **Key signing (certification).** Only some keys in the qubes-secpack
|
||
are signed by the QMSK. Keys that are not signed directly by the QMSK
|
||
are still signed indirectly by virtue of being included in the
|
||
qubes-secpack, which is itself signed (via Git tags and/or commits)
|
||
by keys that are in turn signed by the QMSK.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
History and rationale
|
||
---------------------
|
||
|
||
|
||
On 2013-01-05, Joanna Rutkowska announced the qubes-secpack and
|
||
explained its rationale in an
|
||
`email <https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-devel/twkOEaMLtNI/lZyGx6_jFCEJ>`__
|
||
to the Qubes mailing lists:
|
||
|
||
.. code:: bash
|
||
|
||
Hello,
|
||
|
||
A new Qubes Security Bulletin has been just released and is available here:
|
||
|
||
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-013-2015.txt
|
||
|
||
As per the previous discussions about recent problems with verifying
|
||
digital signatures on messages sent to Google Groups (thanks to
|
||
automatic footer addition by Google), we have decided to change the way
|
||
we publish Qubes Security Bulletins, as well as other security-related
|
||
info pertinent to the Qubes Project.
|
||
|
||
Starting today, we will be maintain a Git repository -- "Qubes Security
|
||
Pack" -- which will contain all the QSBs released so far, all the keys,
|
||
warrant canaries [1], and potentially some additional info or
|
||
announcements (e.g. key revocations). The whole repo can be found here:
|
||
|
||
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack
|
||
|
||
Note that all the keys distributed there should be signed by Qubes
|
||
Master Key. The Master Key is also attached in the repo, but should
|
||
really be obtained/verified using a different channel.
|
||
|
||
Additionally, most of the files are signed by core Qubes
|
||
developers (currently by Marek and myself) via detached signatures as
|
||
well as git tag signatures.
|
||
|
||
The are several advantages of using Git to distribute all these information:
|
||
|
||
1) Git repo is a collection of files, some of which can be detached GPG
|
||
signatures for other files and we can ensure all these files are
|
||
distributed together.
|
||
|
||
2) Git makes it easy for people to clone and redistribute these
|
||
collection of files, as well as to easily host them and view on the Web.
|
||
|
||
3) Git provides for signed tags mechanisms which is another mean we
|
||
utilize to ensure integrity of the distributed files.
|
||
|
||
A few words about the Warrant Canary which we've just introduced today,
|
||
and which can be seen here:
|
||
|
||
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-001-2015.txt
|
||
|
||
Even though we're not providing any kind of services (such as e.g. email
|
||
hosting), that could be searched or tapped by authorities, there are
|
||
other possibilities that worry us [2], in the light of various recent
|
||
law "developments", such as those that might be coercing people to hand
|
||
over their private keys to authorities.
|
||
|
||
Until we fully decentralize the root of trust for Qubes, something that
|
||
requires the move to deterministic builds [3], and so won't happen
|
||
very soon, the possibility of having to disclose any of the Qubes
|
||
signing keys to anybody might have pretty serious consequences for those
|
||
who decided to entrust Qubes with anything serious. And we would like to
|
||
somehow minimize these consequences with this canary thing.
|
||
|
||
Additionally the canary is a nice way of ensuring "freshness" of our
|
||
messaging to the community.
|
||
|
||
Of course the canary doesn't solve all the problems. E.g. if my signing
|
||
keys were somehow stolen without our knowledge, it wouldn't help.
|
||
Neither it could help in case me being or becoming a miscreant. And
|
||
probably it doesn't address many other potential problems, which could
|
||
only be solved one day with a multi-signature scheme. But anyway, until
|
||
that time, this is the best we can do, I think.
|
||
|
||
And congrats to Jann for the very interesting clipboard attack (even
|
||
though mostly theoretical, still very cool)!
|
||
|
||
Thanks,
|
||
joanna.
|
||
|
||
--
|
||
The Qubes Security Team
|
||
https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/SecurityPage
|
||
|
||
|
||
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary
|
||
|
||
[2] Especially myself, because I'm currently the Root Of Trust for all
|
||
Qubes binaries :/
|
||
|
||
[3] Deterministic builds are required because it's the only way we can
|
||
implement multiple signature scheme for distributed binaries.
|
||
|
||
|