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@ -12,41 +12,42 @@ title: Development workflow
|
|||
|
||||
A workflow for developing Qubes OS+
|
||||
|
||||
To begin, setup [QubesBuilder](/doc/qubes-builder-v2/). This guide
|
||||
assumes you're using qubes-builder v2 to build Qubes.
|
||||
First things first, setup [QubesBuilder](/doc/qubes-builder/). This guide
|
||||
assumes you're using qubes-builder to build Qubes.
|
||||
|
||||
## Repositories and committing Code
|
||||
|
||||
Qubes source code is split into many git repos. These are all contained in the
|
||||
`artifacts/sources` directory under qubes-builder. Subdirectories there are
|
||||
separate components, stored in separate git repositories.
|
||||
Qubes is split into a bunch of git repos. These are all contained in the
|
||||
`qubes-src` directory under qubes-builder. Subdirectories there are separate
|
||||
components, stored in separate git repositories.
|
||||
|
||||
The best way to write and contribute code is to create a git repo somewhere
|
||||
(e.g., GitHub) for the repo you are interested in editing (e.g.,
|
||||
(e.g., github) for the repo you are interested in editing (e.g.,
|
||||
`qubes-manager`, `core-agent-linux`, etc). To integrate your repo with the rest
|
||||
of Qubes, cd to the repo directory and add your repository as a remote in git
|
||||
|
||||
**Example:**
|
||||
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
$ cd qubes-builder/artifacts/sources/qubes-manager
|
||||
$ git remote add abel git@GitHub.com:abeluck/qubes-manager.git
|
||||
$ cd qubes-builder/qubes-src/qubes-manager
|
||||
$ git remote add abel git@github.com:abeluck/qubes-manager.git
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
|
||||
You can then proceed to easily develop in your own branches, pull in new
|
||||
commits from the dev branches, merge them, and eventually push to your own repo.
|
||||
commits from the dev branches, merge them, and eventually push to your own repo
|
||||
on github.
|
||||
|
||||
When you are ready to submit your changes to Qubes to be merged, push your
|
||||
changes, then create a signed git tag (using `git tag -s`). Finally, send a
|
||||
letter to the Qubes listserv describing the changes, and including a link to
|
||||
your repository. If you are using GitHub you can instead create a pull request.
|
||||
Don't forget to include the public PGP key you use to sign your tags.
|
||||
letter to the Qubes listserv describing the changes and including the link to
|
||||
your repository. You can also create pull request on github. Don't forget to
|
||||
include your public PGP key you use to sign your tags.
|
||||
|
||||
### Kernel-specific notes
|
||||
|
||||
#### Prepare fresh version of kernel sources, with Qubes-specific patches applied
|
||||
|
||||
In qubes-builder/artifacts/sources/linux-kernel:
|
||||
In qubes-builder/qubes-src/linux-kernel:
|
||||
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
make prep
|
||||
|
|
@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ drwxr-xr-x 6 user user 4096 Nov 21 20:48 kernel-3.4.18/linux-obj
|
|||
|
||||
#### Go to the kernel tree and update the version
|
||||
|
||||
In qubes-builder/artifacts/sources/linux-kernel:
|
||||
In qubes-builder/qubes-src/linux-kernel:
|
||||
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
cd kernel-3.4.18/linux-3.4.18
|
||||
|
|
@ -116,7 +117,9 @@ vi series.conf
|
|||
|
||||
#### Building RPMs
|
||||
|
||||
Now is a good moment to make sure you have changed the kernel release name in
|
||||
TODO: Is this step generic for all subsystems?
|
||||
|
||||
Now it is a good moment to make sure you have changed kernel release name in
|
||||
rel file. For example, if you change it to '1debug201211116c' the
|
||||
resulting RPMs will be named
|
||||
'kernel-3.4.18-1debug20121116c.pvops.qubes.x86\_64.rpm'. This will help
|
||||
|
|
@ -128,23 +131,34 @@ your changes locally.
|
|||
To actually build RPMs, in qubes-builder:
|
||||
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
./qb -c linux-kernel package fetch prep build
|
||||
make linux-kernel
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
|
||||
RPMs will appear in
|
||||
`artifacts/repository/destination_name/package_name`
|
||||
(for example `artifacts/repository/host-fc37/linux-kernel-6.6.31-1.1/`
|
||||
RPMs will appear in qubes-src/linux-kernel/pkgs/fc20/x86\_64:
|
||||
|
||||
### Useful [QubesBuilder](/doc/qubes-builder-v2/) commands
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
-rw-rw-r-- 1 user user 42996126 Nov 17 04:08 kernel-3.4.18-1debug20121116c.pvops.qubes.x86_64.rpm
|
||||
-rw-rw-r-- 1 user user 43001450 Nov 17 05:36 kernel-3.4.18-1debug20121117a.pvops.qubes.x86_64.rpm
|
||||
-rw-rw-r-- 1 user user 8940138 Nov 17 04:08 kernel-devel-3.4.18-1debug20121116c.pvops.qubes.x86_64.rpm
|
||||
-rw-rw-r-- 1 user user 8937818 Nov 17 05:36 kernel-devel-3.4.18-1debug20121117a.pvops.qubes.x86_64.rpm
|
||||
-rw-rw-r-- 1 user user 54490741 Nov 17 04:08 kernel-qubes-vm-3.4.18-1debug20121116c.pvops.qubes.x86_64.rpm
|
||||
-rw-rw-r-- 1 user user 54502117 Nov 17 05:37 kernel-qubes-vm-3.4.18-1debug20121117a.pvops.qubes.x86_64.rpm
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
|
||||
1. `./qb package diff` - show uncommitted changes
|
||||
2. ` ./qb repository check-release-status-for-component` and
|
||||
`./qb repository check-release-status-for-template`- show version of each
|
||||
component/template (based on git tags)
|
||||
3. `./qb package sign` - sign built packages
|
||||
4. `./qb package publish` and `./qb package upload` - publish signed packages
|
||||
and upload published
|
||||
repository
|
||||
### Useful [QubesBuilder](/doc/qubes-builder/) commands
|
||||
|
||||
1. `make check` - will check if all the code was committed into repository and
|
||||
if all repository are tagged with signed tag.
|
||||
2. `make show-vtags` - show version of each component (based on git tags) -
|
||||
mostly useful just before building ISO. **Note:** this will not show version
|
||||
for components containing changes since last version tag.
|
||||
3. `make push` - push change from **all** repositories to git server. You must
|
||||
set proper remotes (see above) for all repositories first.
|
||||
4. `make prepare-merge` - fetch changes from remote repositories (can be
|
||||
specified on commandline via GIT\_SUBDIR or GIT\_REMOTE vars), (optionally)
|
||||
verify tags and show the changes. This do not merge the changes - there are
|
||||
left for review as FETCH\_HEAD ref. You can merge them using `git merge
|
||||
FETCH_HEAD` (in each repo directory). Or `make do-merge` to merge all of them.
|
||||
|
||||
## Copying Code to dom0
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -283,12 +297,12 @@ if [ "$1" = "tb" ]; then
|
|||
exit $?
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
git remote add $1 git@GitHub.com:$1/qubes-`basename $PWD`
|
||||
git remote add $1 git@github.com:$1/qubes-`basename $PWD`
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
|
||||
It should be executed from component top level directory. This script takes one
|
||||
argument - remote name. If it is `tb`, then it creates qrexec-based git remote
|
||||
to `testbuilder` VM. Otherwise it creates remote pointing at GitHub account of
|
||||
to `testbuilder` VM. Otherwise it creates remote pointing at github account of
|
||||
the same name. In any case it points at repository matching current directory
|
||||
name.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -307,7 +321,7 @@ current and current-testing).
|
|||
|
||||
### RPM packages - yum repo
|
||||
|
||||
In source VM, grab [linux-yum](https://GitHub.com/QubesOS/qubes-linux-yum) repository (below is assumed you've made it in
|
||||
In source VM, grab [linux-yum](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-linux-yum) repository (below is assumed you've made it in
|
||||
`~/repo-yum-upload` directory) and replace `update_repo.sh` script with:
|
||||
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
|
|
@ -323,7 +337,7 @@ find -type f -name '*.rpm' -delete
|
|||
qrexec-client-vm $VMNAME local.UpdateYum
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
|
||||
In target VM, setup actual yum repository (also based on [linux-yum](https://GitHub.com/QubesOS/qubes-linux-yum), this time
|
||||
In target VM, setup actual yum repository (also based on [linux-yum](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-linux-yum), this time
|
||||
without modifications). You will also need to setup some gpg key for signing
|
||||
packages (it is possible to force yum to install unsigned packages, but it
|
||||
isn't possible for `qubes-dom0-update` tool). Fill `~/.rpmmacros` with
|
||||
|
|
@ -403,7 +417,7 @@ Remember to also import gpg public key using `rpm --import`.
|
|||
|
||||
Steps are mostly the same as in the case of yum repo. The only details that differ:
|
||||
|
||||
- use [linux-deb](https://GitHub.com/QubesOS/qubes-linux-deb) instead of [linux-yum](https://GitHub.com/QubesOS/qubes-linux-yum) as a base - both in source and target VM
|
||||
- use [linux-deb](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-linux-deb) instead of [linux-yum](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-linux-yum) as a base - both in source and target VM
|
||||
- use different `update_repo.sh` script in source VM (below)
|
||||
- use `local.UpdateApt` qrexec service in target VM (code below)
|
||||
- in target VM additionally place `update-local-repo.sh` script in repository dir (code below)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,162 +0,0 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
lang: en
|
||||
layout: doc
|
||||
permalink: /doc/qubes-builder-v2/
|
||||
redirect_from:
|
||||
- /en/doc/qubes-builder-v2/
|
||||
- /doc/QubesBuilder2/
|
||||
- /wiki/QubesBuilder2/
|
||||
ref: 311
|
||||
title: Qubes builder v2
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
This is a brief introduction to using Qubes Builder v2 to work with Qubes OS
|
||||
sources. It will walk you through installing and configuring Builder v2, and
|
||||
using it to fetch and build Qubes OS packages.
|
||||
|
||||
For details and customization, use [Qubes OS v2 builder documentation](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-builderv2/).
|
||||
|
||||
# Overview
|
||||
|
||||
In the second generation of Qubes OS builder, container or disposable qube
|
||||
isolation is used to perform every stage of the build and release process.
|
||||
From fetching sources to building, everything is executed inside an isolated
|
||||
*cage* (either a disposable or a container) using an *executor*. For every
|
||||
command that needs to perform an action on sources, like cloning and
|
||||
verifying Git repos, rendering a SPEC file, generating SRPM or Debian
|
||||
source packages, a new cage is used. Only the signing, publishing, and
|
||||
uploading stages are executed locally outside a cage.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Setup
|
||||
|
||||
This is a simple setup using a docker executor. This is a good default choice;
|
||||
if you don't know which executor to use, use docker.
|
||||
|
||||
1. First, decide what qube you are going to use when working with Qubes
|
||||
Builder v2. It can be an AppVM or a Standalone qube, with some steps
|
||||
different between the two.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Installing dependencies
|
||||
|
||||
If you want to use an app qube for developing, install dependencies in the template.
|
||||
If you are using a standalone, install them in the qube itself.
|
||||
Dependencies are specified in `dependencies-*.
|
||||
txt` files in the main builder directory, and you can install them easily
|
||||
in the following ways:
|
||||
1. for Fedora, use:
|
||||
```shell
|
||||
$ sudo dnf install $(cat dependencies-fedora.txt)
|
||||
$ test -f /usr/share/qubes/marker-vm && sudo dnf install qubes-gpg-split
|
||||
```
|
||||
2. for Debian (note: some Debian packages require Debian version 13 or
|
||||
later), use:
|
||||
```shell
|
||||
$ sudo apt install $(cat dependencies-debian.txt)
|
||||
$ test -f /usr/share/qubes/marker-vm && sudo apt install qubes-gpg-split
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
If you have installed dependencies in the template, close it, and
|
||||
(re)start the development qube.
|
||||
|
||||
3. Clone the qubes-builder v2 repository into a location of your choice:
|
||||
```shell
|
||||
git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-builderv2
|
||||
cd qubes-builderv2/
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
4. If you haven't previously used docker in the current qube, you need to set up
|
||||
some permissions. In particular, the user has to be added to the `docker`
|
||||
group:
|
||||
```shell
|
||||
$ sudo usermod -aG docker user
|
||||
```
|
||||
Next, **restart the qube**.
|
||||
|
||||
5. Finally, you need to generate a docker image:
|
||||
```shell
|
||||
$ tools/generate-container-image.sh docker
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
In an app qube, as `/var/lib/docker` is not persistent by default, you also
|
||||
need to use [bind-dirs](/doc/bind-dirs/) to avoid repeating this step after reboot, adding
|
||||
the following to the `/rw/config/qubes-bind-dirs.d/docker.conf` file in
|
||||
this qube:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
binds+=( '/var/lib/docker' )
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
# Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
To use Qubes OS Builder v2, you need to have a `builder.yml` configuration file.
|
||||
You can use one of the sample files from the `example-configs/` directory; for a
|
||||
more readable `builder.yml`, you can also include one of the files from that
|
||||
directory in your `builder.yml`. An example `builder.yml` is:
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
# include configuration relevant for the current release
|
||||
include:
|
||||
- example-configs/qubes-os-r4.2.yml
|
||||
|
||||
# which repository to use to fetch sources
|
||||
use-qubes-repo:
|
||||
version: 4.2
|
||||
testing: true
|
||||
|
||||
# each package built will have local build number appended to package release
|
||||
# number. It makes it easier to update in testing environment
|
||||
increment-devel-versions: true
|
||||
|
||||
# reduce output
|
||||
debug: false
|
||||
|
||||
# this can be set to true if you do not want sources to be automatically
|
||||
# fetched from git
|
||||
skip-git-fetch: false
|
||||
|
||||
# executor configuration
|
||||
executor:
|
||||
type: docker
|
||||
options:
|
||||
image: "qubes-builder-fedora:latest"
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Using Builder v2
|
||||
|
||||
To fetch sources - in this example, for the `core-admin-client` package, you
|
||||
can use the following command:
|
||||
|
||||
```shell
|
||||
$ ./qb -c core-admin-client package fetch
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
This will fetch the sources for the listed package and place them in
|
||||
`artifacts/sources` directory.
|
||||
|
||||
To build a package (from sources in the `artifacts/sources` directory), use:
|
||||
|
||||
```shell
|
||||
$ ./qb -c core-admin-client package fetch prep build
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
or, if you want to build for a specific target (`host-fc37` is a `dom0`
|
||||
using Fedora 37, `vm-fc40` would be a qube using Fedora 40 etc.), use:
|
||||
|
||||
```shell
|
||||
$ ./qb -c core-admin-client -d host-fc37 package fetch prep build
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
If you want to fetch the entire Qubes OS source use the following:
|
||||
|
||||
```shell
|
||||
$ ./qb package fetch
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**caution**: some repositories might have additional requirements. You can
|
||||
disable repositories that are not needed in the `example-configs/*.yml`
|
||||
file you are using by commenting them out. In particular, `python-fido2`,
|
||||
`lvm` and `windows`-related repositories have special requirements.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ Whereas integration tests are mostly stored in the [qubes-core-admin](https://gi
|
|||
To for example run the `qubes-core-admin` unit tests, you currently have to clone at least [qubes-core-admin](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-core-admin) and
|
||||
its dependency [qubes-core-qrexec](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-core-qrexec) repository in the branches that you want to test.
|
||||
|
||||
The below example however will assume that you set up a build environment as described in the [Qubes Builder documentation](/doc/qubes-builder-v2/).
|
||||
The below example however will assume that you set up a build environment as described in the [Qubes Builder documentation](/doc/qubes-builder/).
|
||||
|
||||
Assuming you cloned the `qubes-builder` repository to your home directory inside a fedora VM, you can use the following commands to run the unit tests:
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -205,10 +205,9 @@ pushd ${HOME}/builder >/dev/null
|
|||
|
||||
# the following are needed only if you have sources outside builder
|
||||
#rm -rf qubes-src/core-admin
|
||||
#qb -c core-admin package fetch
|
||||
#make COMPONENTS=core-admin get-sources
|
||||
|
||||
qb -c core-admin -d host-fc41 prep build
|
||||
# update your dom0 fedora distribution as appropriate
|
||||
make core-admin
|
||||
qtb-install qubes-src/core-admin/rpm/x86_64/qubes-core-dom0-*.rpm
|
||||
qtb-runtests
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ You should start learning the components that you plan on working on before the
|
|||
|
||||
Coming up with an interesting idea that you can realistically achieve in the time available to you (one summer) is probably the most difficult part. We strongly recommend getting involved in advance of the beginning of GSoC, and we will look favorably on applications from prospective contributors who have already started to act like free and open source developers.
|
||||
|
||||
Before the summer starts, there are some preparatory tasks which are highly encouraged. First, if you aren't already, definitely start using Qubes as your primary OS as soon as possible! Also, it is encouraged that you become familiar and comfortable with the Qubes development workflow sooner than later. A good way to do this (and also a great way to stand out as an awesome applicant and make us want to accept you!) might be to pick up some issues from [qubes-issues](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues) (our issue-tracking repo) and submit some patches addressing them. Some suitable issues might be those with tags ["help wanted" and "P: minor"](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue%20is%3Aopen%20label%3A%22P%3A%20minor%22%20label%3A%22help%20wanted%22) (although more significant things are also welcome, of course). Doing this will get you some practice with [qubes-builder](/doc/qubes-builder-v2/), our code-signing policies, and some familiarity with our code base in general so you are ready to hit the ground running come summer.
|
||||
Before the summer starts, there are some preparatory tasks which are highly encouraged. First, if you aren't already, definitely start using Qubes as your primary OS as soon as possible! Also, it is encouraged that you become familiar and comfortable with the Qubes development workflow sooner than later. A good way to do this (and also a great way to stand out as an awesome applicant and make us want to accept you!) might be to pick up some issues from [qubes-issues](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues) (our issue-tracking repo) and submit some patches addressing them. Some suitable issues might be those with tags ["help wanted" and "P: minor"](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue%20is%3Aopen%20label%3A%22P%3A%20minor%22%20label%3A%22help%20wanted%22) (although more significant things are also welcome, of course). Doing this will get you some practice with [qubes-builder](/doc/qubes-builder/), our code-signing policies, and some familiarity with our code base in general so you are ready to hit the ground running come summer.
|
||||
|
||||
### Contributor proposal guidelines
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ for more information and qubes-specific background.
|
|||
|
||||
**Difficulty**: medium
|
||||
|
||||
**Knowledge prerequisite**: qubes-builder [[1]](/doc/qubes-builder-v2/) [[2]](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-builderv2), and efficient at introspecting complex systems: comfortable with tracing and debugging tools, ability to quickly identify and locate issues within a large codebase (upstream build tools), etc.
|
||||
**Knowledge prerequisite**: qubes-builder [[1]](/doc/qubes-builder/) [[2]](/doc/qubes-builder-details/) [[3]](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-builder/tree/master/doc), and efficient at introspecting complex systems: comfortable with tracing and debugging tools, ability to quickly identify and locate issues within a large codebase (upstream build tools), etc.
|
||||
|
||||
**Size of the project**: 350 hours
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ title: Qubes R4.0 release notes
|
|||
New features since 3.2
|
||||
----------------------
|
||||
|
||||
* Core management scripts rewrite with better structure and extensibility, [API documentation](https://dev.qubes-os.org/projects/core-admin/en/latest/index.html)
|
||||
* Core management scripts rewrite with better structure and extensibility, [API documentation](https://dev.qubes-os.org/projects/qubes-core-admin/en/latest/)
|
||||
* [Admin API](/news/2017/06/27/qubes-admin-api/) allowing strictly controlled managing from non-dom0
|
||||
* All `qvm-*` command-line tools rewritten, some options have changed
|
||||
* Renaming VM directly is prohibited, there is GUI to clone under new name and remove old VM
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -62,98 +62,95 @@ yet documented.
|
|||
The API should be implemented as a set of qrexec calls. This is to make it easy
|
||||
to set the policy using current mechanism.
|
||||
|
||||
| call | dest | argument | inside | return | note |
|
||||
|------------------------------------------------|------------|--------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------| ---- |
|
||||
| `admin.vmclass.List` | `dom0` | - | - | `<class>\n` |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.List` | `dom0 | <vm>` | - | - | `<name> class=<class> state=<state>\n` |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.Create.<class>` | `dom0` | template | `name=<name> label=<label>` | - |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.CreateInPool.<class>` | `dom0` | template | `name=<name> label=<label> `<br/>`pool=<pool> pool:<volume>=<pool>` | - | either use `pool=` to put all volumes there, <br/>or `pool:<volume>=` for individual volumes - both forms are not allowed at the same time
|
||||
| `admin.vm.CreateDisposable` | template | - | - | name | Create new DisposableVM, `template` is any AppVM with `dispvm_allowed` set to True, or `dom0` to use default defined in `default_dispvm` property of calling VM; VM created with this call will be automatically removed after its shutdown; the main difference from `admin.vm.Create.DispVM` is automatic (random) name generation.
|
||||
| `admin.vm.Remove` | vm | - | - | - |
|
||||
| `admin.label.List` | `dom0` | - | - | `<property>\n` |
|
||||
| `admin.label.Create` | `dom0` | label | `0xRRGGBB` | - |
|
||||
| `admin.label.Get` | `dom0` | label | - | `0xRRGGBB` |
|
||||
| `admin.label.Index` | `dom0` | label | - | `<label-index>` |
|
||||
| `admin.label.Remove` | `dom0` | label | - | - |
|
||||
| `admin.property.List` | `dom0` | - | - | `<property>\n` |
|
||||
| `admin.property.Get` | `dom0` | property | - | `default={True |False} `<br/>`type={str|int|bool|vm|label|list} <value>` | Type `list` is added in R4.1. Values are of type `str` and each entry is suffixed with newline character.
|
||||
| `admin.property.GetAll` | `dom0` | - | - | `<property-name> <full-value-as-in-property.Get>\n` | Get all the properties in one call. Each property is returned on a separate line and use the same value encoding as property.Get method, with an exception that newlines are encoded as literal `\n` and literal `\` are encoded as `\\`.
|
||||
| `admin.property.GetDefault` | `dom0` | property | - | `type={str |int|bool|vm|label|list} <value>` | Type `list` is added in R4.1. Values are of type `str` and each entry is suffixed with newline character.
|
||||
| `admin.property.Help` | `dom0` | property | - | `help` |
|
||||
| `admin.property.HelpRst` | `dom0` | property | - | `help.rst` |
|
||||
| `admin.property.Reset` | `dom0` | property | - | - |
|
||||
| `admin.property.Set` | `dom0` | property | value | - |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.property.List` | vm | - | - | `<property>\n` |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.property.Get` | vm | property | - | `default={True |False} `<br/>`type={str|int|bool|vm|label|list} <value>` | Type `list` is added in R4.1. Each list entry is suffixed with a newline character.
|
||||
| `admin.vm.property.GetAll` | vm | - | - | `<property-name> <full-value-as-in-property.Get>\n` | Get all the properties in one call. Each property is returned on a separate line and use the same value encoding as property.Get method, with an exception that newlines are encoded as literal `\n` and literal `\` are encoded as `\\`.
|
||||
| `admin.vm.property.GetDefault` | vm | property | - | `type={str |int|bool|vm|label|type} <value>` | Type `list` is added in R4.1. Each list entry is suffixed with a newline character.
|
||||
| `admin.vm.property.Help` | vm | property | - | `help` |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.property.HelpRst` | vm | property | - | `help.rst` |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.property.Reset` | vm | property | - | - |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.property.Set` | vm | property | value | - |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.feature.List` | vm | - | - | `<feature>\n` |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.feature.Get` | vm | feature | - | value |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.feature.CheckWithTemplate` | vm | feature | - | value |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.feature.CheckWithNetvm` | vm | feature | - | value |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.feature.CheckWithAdminVM` | vm | feature | - | value |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.feature.CheckWithTemplateAndAdminVM` | vm | feature | - | value |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.feature.Remove` | vm | feature | - | - |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.feature.Set` | vm | feature | value | - |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.tag.List` | vm | - | - | `<tag>\n` |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.tag.Get` | vm | tag | - | `0` or `1` | retcode? |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.tag.Remove` | vm | tag | - | - |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.tag.Set` | vm | tag | - | - |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.firewall.Get` | vm | - | - | `<rule>\n` | rules syntax as in [firewall interface](/doc/vm-interface/#firewall-rules-in-4x) with addition of `expire=` and `comment=` options; `comment=` (if present) must be the last option
|
||||
| `admin.vm.firewall.Set` | vm | - | `<rule>\n` | - | set firewall rules, see `admin.vm.firewall.Get` for syntax
|
||||
| `admin.vm.firewall.Reload` | vm | - | - | - | force reload firewall without changing any rule
|
||||
| `admin.vm.device.<class>.Attach` | vm | device | assignment-serialization | - | `device` is in form `<backend-name>+<device-ident>` <br/>optional options given in `key=value` format, separated with spaces; <br/>options can include `persistent=True` to "persistently" attach the device (default is temporary)
|
||||
| `admin.vm.device.<class>.Detach` | vm | device | - | - | `device` is in form `<backend-name>+<device-ident>`.
|
||||
| `admin.vm.device.<class>.Assign` | vm | device | assignment-serialization | - | `device` is in form `<backend-name>+<device-ident>` <br/> `assignment-serialization` is specified in the section Device Serialization.
|
||||
| `admin.vm.device.<class>.Unassign` | vm | device | - | - | `device` is in form `<backend-name>+<device-ident>`.
|
||||
| `admin.vm.device.<class>.Set.required` | vm | device | `True`\|`False` | - | `device` is in form `<backend-name>+<device-ident>`
|
||||
| `admin.vm.deviceclass.List` | `dom0` | - | - | `<deviceclass>\n` |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.device.<class>.Available` | vm | device-ident | - | `<device-ident> <device-serialization>\n` | optional service argument may be used to get info about a single device, <br/> `device-serialization` is specified in the section Device Serialization.
|
||||
| `admin.vm.device.<class>.Assigned` | vm | device-ident | - | `<device-ident> <assignment-serialization>\n` | optional service argument may be used to get info about a single device, <br/> `assignment-serialization` is specified in the section Device Serialization.
|
||||
| `admin.vm.device.<class>.Attached` | vm | device-ident | - | `<device-ident> <assignment-serialization>\n` | optional service argument may be used to get info about a single device, <br/> `assignment-serialization` is specified in the section Device Serialization.
|
||||
| `admin.pool.List` | `dom0` | - | - | `<pool>\n` |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.ListDrivers` | `dom0` | - | - | `<pool-driver> <property> ...\n` | Properties allowed in `admin.pool.Add`
|
||||
| `admin.pool.Info` | `dom0` | pool | - | `<property>=<value>\n` |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.Add` | `dom0` | driver | `<property>=<value>\n` | - |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.Set.revisions_to_keep` | `dom0` | pool | `<value>` | - |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.Remove` | `dom0` | pool | - | - |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.volume.List` | `dom0` | pool | - | volume id |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.volume.Info` | `dom0` | pool | vid | `<property>=<value>\n` |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.volume.Set.revisions_to_keep` | `dom0` | pool | `<vid> <value>` | - |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.volume.ListSnapshots` | `dom0` | pool | vid | `<snapshot>\n` |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.volume.Snapshot` | `dom0` | pool | vid | snapshot |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.volume.Revert` | `dom0` | pool | `<vid> <snapshot>` | - |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.volume.Resize` | `dom0` | pool | `<vid> <size_in_bytes>` | - |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.volume.Import` | `dom0` | pool | `<vid>\n<raw volume data>` | - |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.volume.CloneFrom` | `dom0` | pool | vid | token, to be used in `admin.pool.volume.CloneTo` | obtain a token to copy volume `vid` in `pool`;<br/>the token is one time use only, it's invalidated by `admin.pool.volume.CloneTo`, even if the operation fails |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.volume.CloneTo` | `dom0` | pool | `<vid> <token>` | - | copy volume pointed by a token to volume `vid` in `pool` |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.volume.List` | vm | - | - | `<volume>\n` | `<volume>` is per-VM volume name (`root`, `private`, etc), `<vid>` is pool-unique volume id
|
||||
| `admin.vm.volume.Info` | vm | volume | - | `<property>=<value>\n` |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.volume.Set.revisions_to_keep` | vm | volume | value | - |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.volume.ListSnapshots` | vm | volume | - | snapshot | duplicate of `admin.pool.volume.`, but with other call params |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.volume.Snapshot` | vm | volume | - | snapshot | id. |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.volume.Revert` | vm | volume | snapshot | - | id. |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.volume.Resize` | vm | volume | size_in_bytes | - | id. |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.volume.Import` | vm | volume | raw volume data | - | id. |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.volume.ImportWithSize` | vm | volume | `<size_in_bytes>\n<raw volume data>` | - | new version of `admin.vm.volume.Import`, allows new volume to be different size |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.volume.Clear` | vm | volume | - | - | clear contents of volume |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.volume.CloneFrom` | vm | volume | - | token, to be used in `admin.vm.volume.CloneTo` | obtain a token to copy `volume` of `vm`;<br/>the token is one time use only, it's invalidated by `admin.vm.volume.CloneTo`, even if the operation fails |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.volume.CloneTo` | vm | volume | token, obtained with `admin.vm.volume.CloneFrom` | - | copy volume pointed by a token to `volume` of `vm` |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.CurrentState` | vm | - | - | `<state-property>=<value>\n` | state properties: `power_state`, `mem`, `mem_static_max`, `cputime`
|
||||
| `admin.vm.Start` | vm | - | - | - |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.Shutdown` | vm | - | - | - |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.Pause` | vm | - | - | - |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.Unpause` | vm | - | - | - |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.Kill` | vm | - | - | - |
|
||||
| `admin.backup.Execute` | `dom0` | config id | - | - | config in `/etc/qubes/backup/<id>.conf`, only one backup operation of given `config id` can be running at once |
|
||||
| `admin.backup.Info` | `dom0` | config id | - | backup info | info what would be included in the backup
|
||||
| `admin.backup.Cancel` | `dom0` | config id | - | - | cancel running backup operation
|
||||
| `admin.Events` | `dom0 | vm` | - | - | events |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.Stats` | `dom0 | vm` | - | - | `vm-stats` events, see below | emit VM statistics (CPU, memory usage) in form of events
|
||||
| call | dest | argument | inside | return | note |
|
||||
| ------------------------------------- | --------- | --------- | ----------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------- | ---- |
|
||||
| `admin.vmclass.List` | `dom0` | - | - | `<class>\n` |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.List` | `dom0|<vm>` | - | - | `<name> class=<class> state=<state>\n` |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.Create.<class>` | `dom0` | template | `name=<name> label=<label>` | - |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.CreateInPool.<class>` | `dom0` | template | `name=<name> label=<label> `<br/>`pool=<pool> pool:<volume>=<pool>` | - | either use `pool=` to put all volumes there, <br/>or `pool:<volume>=` for individual volumes - both forms are not allowed at the same time
|
||||
| `admin.vm.CreateDisposable` | template | - | - | name | Create new DisposableVM, `template` is any AppVM with `dispvm_allowed` set to True, or `dom0` to use default defined in `default_dispvm` property of calling VM; VM created with this call will be automatically removed after its shutdown; the main difference from `admin.vm.Create.DispVM` is automatic (random) name generation.
|
||||
| `admin.vm.Remove` | vm | - | - | - |
|
||||
| `admin.label.List` | `dom0` | - | - | `<property>\n` |
|
||||
| `admin.label.Create` | `dom0` | label | `0xRRGGBB` | - |
|
||||
| `admin.label.Get` | `dom0` | label | - | `0xRRGGBB` |
|
||||
| `admin.label.Index` | `dom0` | label | - | `<label-index>` |
|
||||
| `admin.label.Remove` | `dom0` | label | - | - |
|
||||
| `admin.property.List` | `dom0` | - | - | `<property>\n` |
|
||||
| `admin.property.Get` | `dom0` | property | - | `default={True|False} `<br/>`type={str|int|bool|vm|label|list} <value>` | Type `list` is added in R4.1. Values are of type `str` and each entry is suffixed with newline character.
|
||||
| `admin.property.GetAll` | `dom0` | - | - | `<property-name> <full-value-as-in-property.Get>\n` | Get all the properties in one call. Each property is returned on a separate line and use the same value encoding as property.Get method, with an exception that newlines are encoded as literal `\n` and literal `\` are encoded as `\\`.
|
||||
| `admin.property.GetDefault` | `dom0` | property | - | `type={str|int|bool|vm|label|list} <value>` | Type `list` is added in R4.1. Values are of type `str` and each entry is suffixed with newline character.
|
||||
| `admin.property.Help` | `dom0` | property | - | `help` |
|
||||
| `admin.property.HelpRst` | `dom0` | property | - | `help.rst` |
|
||||
| `admin.property.Reset` | `dom0` | property | - | - |
|
||||
| `admin.property.Set` | `dom0` | property | value | - |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.property.List` | vm | - | - | `<property>\n` |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.property.Get` | vm | property | - | `default={True|False} `<br/>`type={str|int|bool|vm|label|list} <value>` | Type `list` is added in R4.1. Each list entry is suffixed with a newline character.
|
||||
| `admin.vm.property.GetAll` | vm | - | - | `<property-name> <full-value-as-in-property.Get>\n` | Get all the properties in one call. Each property is returned on a separate line and use the same value encoding as property.Get method, with an exception that newlines are encoded as literal `\n` and literal `\` are encoded as `\\`.
|
||||
| `admin.vm.property.GetDefault` | vm | property | - | `type={str|int|bool|vm|label|type} <value>` | Type `list` is added in R4.1. Each list entry is suffixed with a newline character.
|
||||
| `admin.vm.property.Help` | vm | property | - | `help` |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.property.HelpRst` | vm | property | - | `help.rst` |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.property.Reset` | vm | property | - | - |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.property.Set` | vm | property | value | - |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.feature.List` | vm | - | - | `<feature>\n` |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.feature.Get` | vm | feature | - | value |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.feature.CheckWithTemplate` | vm | feature | - | value |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.feature.CheckWithNetvm` | vm | feature | - | value |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.feature.CheckWithAdminVM` | vm | feature | - | value |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.feature.CheckWithTemplateAndAdminVM`| vm | feature | - | value |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.feature.Remove` | vm | feature | - | - |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.feature.Set` | vm | feature | value | - |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.tag.List` | vm | - | - | `<tag>\n` |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.tag.Get` | vm | tag | - | `0` or `1` | retcode? |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.tag.Remove` | vm | tag | - | - |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.tag.Set` | vm | tag | - | - |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.firewall.Get` | vm | - | - | `<rule>\n` | rules syntax as in [firewall interface](/doc/vm-interface/#firewall-rules-in-4x) with addition of `expire=` and `comment=` options; `comment=` (if present) must be the last option
|
||||
| `admin.vm.firewall.Set` | vm | - | `<rule>\n` | - | set firewall rules, see `admin.vm.firewall.Get` for syntax
|
||||
| `admin.vm.firewall.Reload` | vm | - | - | - | force reload firewall without changing any rule
|
||||
| `admin.vm.deviceclass.List` | `dom0` | - | - | `<class>\n` |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.device.<class>.Attach` | vm | device | options | - | `device` is in form `<backend-name>+<device-ident>` <br/>optional options given in `key=value` format, separated with spaces; <br/>options can include `persistent=True` to "persistently" attach the device (default is temporary)
|
||||
| `admin.vm.device.<class>.Detach` | vm | device | - | - | `device` is in form `<backend-name>+<device-ident>`
|
||||
| `admin.vm.device.<class>.Set.persistent`| vm | device | `True`\|`False` | - | `device` is in form `<backend-name>+<device-ident>`
|
||||
| `admin.vm.device.<class>.List` | vm | - | - | `<device> <options>\n` | options can include `persistent=True` for "persistently" attached devices (default is temporary)
|
||||
| `admin.vm.device.<class>.Available` | vm | device-ident | - | `<device-ident> <properties> description=<desc>\n` | optional service argument may be used to get info about a single device, <br/>optional (device class specific) properties are in `key=value` form, <br/>`description` must be the last one and is the only one allowed to contain spaces
|
||||
| `admin.pool.List` | `dom0` | - | - | `<pool>\n` |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.ListDrivers` | `dom0` | - | - | `<pool-driver> <property> ...\n` | Properties allowed in `admin.pool.Add`
|
||||
| `admin.pool.Info` | `dom0` | pool | - | `<property>=<value>\n` |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.Add` | `dom0` | driver | `<property>=<value>\n` | - |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.Set.revisions_to_keep` | `dom0` | pool | `<value>` | - |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.Remove` | `dom0` | pool | - | - |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.volume.List` | `dom0` | pool | - | volume id |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.volume.Info` | `dom0` | pool | vid | `<property>=<value>\n` |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.volume.Set.revisions_to_keep`| `dom0` | pool | `<vid> <value>` | - |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.volume.ListSnapshots` | `dom0` | pool | vid | `<snapshot>\n` |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.volume.Snapshot` | `dom0` | pool | vid | snapshot |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.volume.Revert` | `dom0` | pool | `<vid> <snapshot>` | - |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.volume.Resize` | `dom0` | pool | `<vid> <size_in_bytes>` | - |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.volume.Import` | `dom0` | pool | `<vid>\n<raw volume data>` | - |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.volume.CloneFrom` | `dom0` | pool | vid | token, to be used in `admin.pool.volume.CloneTo` | obtain a token to copy volume `vid` in `pool`;<br/>the token is one time use only, it's invalidated by `admin.pool.volume.CloneTo`, even if the operation fails |
|
||||
| `admin.pool.volume.CloneTo` | `dom0` | pool | `<vid> <token>` | - | copy volume pointed by a token to volume `vid` in `pool` |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.volume.List` | vm | - | - | `<volume>\n` | `<volume>` is per-VM volume name (`root`, `private`, etc), `<vid>` is pool-unique volume id
|
||||
| `admin.vm.volume.Info` | vm | volume | - | `<property>=<value>\n` |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.volume.Set.revisions_to_keep`| vm | volume | value | - |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.volume.ListSnapshots` | vm | volume | - | snapshot | duplicate of `admin.pool.volume.`, but with other call params |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.volume.Snapshot` | vm | volume | - | snapshot | id. |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.volume.Revert` | vm | volume | snapshot | - | id. |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.volume.Resize` | vm | volume | size_in_bytes | - | id. |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.volume.Import` | vm | volume | raw volume data | - | id. |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.volume.ImportWithSize` | vm | volume | `<size_in_bytes>\n<raw volume data>` | - | new version of `admin.vm.volume.Import`, allows new volume to be different size |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.volume.Clear` | vm | volume | - | - | clear contents of volume |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.volume.CloneFrom` | vm | volume | - | token, to be used in `admin.vm.volume.CloneTo` | obtain a token to copy `volume` of `vm`;<br/>the token is one time use only, it's invalidated by `admin.vm.volume.CloneTo`, even if the operation fails |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.volume.CloneTo` | vm | volume | token, obtained with `admin.vm.volume.CloneFrom` | - | copy volume pointed by a token to `volume` of `vm` |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.CurrentState` | vm | - | - | `<state-property>=<value>\n` | state properties: `power_state`, `mem`, `mem_static_max`, `cputime`
|
||||
| `admin.vm.Start` | vm | - | - | - |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.Shutdown` | vm | - | - | - |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.Pause` | vm | - | - | - |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.Unpause` | vm | - | - | - |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.Kill` | vm | - | - | - |
|
||||
| `admin.backup.Execute` | `dom0` | config id | - | - | config in `/etc/qubes/backup/<id>.conf`, only one backup operation of given `config id` can be running at once |
|
||||
| `admin.backup.Info` | `dom0` | config id | - | backup info | info what would be included in the backup
|
||||
| `admin.backup.Cancel` | `dom0` | config id | - | - | cancel running backup operation
|
||||
| `admin.Events` | `dom0|vm` | - | - | events |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.Stats` | `dom0|vm` | - | - | `vm-stats` events, see below | emit VM statistics (CPU, memory usage) in form of events
|
||||
|
||||
Volume properties:
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -305,58 +302,6 @@ destination_vm: sys-net
|
|||
destination_path: ncftpput -u my-ftp-username -p my-ftp-pass -c my-ftp-server /directory/for/backups
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Device Serialization
|
||||
|
||||
Both device and assignment serialization is ASCII-encoded and contains
|
||||
space-separated key-value pairs. The format includes an `=` between the key
|
||||
and value, and the value is always enclosed in single quotes (`'`).
|
||||
Values may contain spaces or even single quotes, which are escaped with a backslash.
|
||||
If a value is not set (`None`), it is represented as `'unknown'`.
|
||||
For boolean values, `True` is represented as `'yes'`, and `False` as `'no'`.
|
||||
The order of key-value pairs is irrelevant. Keys starting with `_`
|
||||
are considered extra properties and are saved in `data` or `options`
|
||||
for device or assignment respectively.
|
||||
|
||||
Information about the serialization format of specific properties can be found below.
|
||||
|
||||
Format:
|
||||
```
|
||||
<ident> <property_1>='<value_1>' <property_2>='<value_2>' <property_3>='<value_3>'...
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Detailed serialization format for a device:
|
||||
|
||||
- `ident='<ident>'`
|
||||
- `backend_domain='<backend_domain.name>'`
|
||||
- `devclass='<devclass>'`
|
||||
- `vendor='<vendor>'`
|
||||
- `product='<product>'`
|
||||
- `manufacturer='<manufacturer>'`
|
||||
- `name='<name>'`
|
||||
- `serial='<serial>'`
|
||||
- `self_identity='<self_identity>'`
|
||||
- `interfaces='<interface1><interface2>...'`
|
||||
Each device interface is represented with a 7-character length. Each device has at least one interface. Since the length of the interface representation is known, they are serialized as a single string with each interface representation concatenated one after another. The order is irrelevant.
|
||||
- `parent_ident='<parent.ident>' parent_devclass='<parent.devclass>'`
|
||||
- `attachment='<attachment.name>'`
|
||||
- `_<key1>='<value1>' _<key2>='<value2>' ...` (extra parameters)
|
||||
|
||||
Detailed serialization format for an assignment:
|
||||
|
||||
- `ident='<ident>'`
|
||||
- `backend_domain='<backend_domain.name>'`
|
||||
- `devclass='<devclass>'`
|
||||
- `frontend_domain='<frontend_domain.name>'`
|
||||
- `required='<yes/no>'` (default 'no')
|
||||
- `attach_automatically='<yes/no>'` (default 'no')
|
||||
- `_<key1>='<str(value1)>' _<key2>='<str(value2)>' ...` (options)
|
||||
|
||||
Example device serialization:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
1-1.1.1 manufacturer='unknown' self_identity='0000:0000::?******' serial='unknown' ident='1-1.1.1' product='Qubes' vendor='ITL' name='Some untrusted garbage' devclass='bus' backend_domain='vm' interfaces=' ******u03**01' _additional_info='' _date='06.12.23' parent_ident='1-1.1' parent_devclass='None'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## General notes
|
||||
|
||||
- there is no provision for `qvm-run`, but there already exists `qubes.VMShell` call
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -253,4 +253,4 @@ There are two endpoints:
|
|||
- `policy.Ask` - ask the user about whether to execute a given action
|
||||
- `policy.Notify` - notify the user about an action.
|
||||
|
||||
See [qrexec-policy-agent.md](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-core-qrexec/blob/master/doc/qrexec-policy-agent.md) for protocol details.
|
||||
See [qrexec-policy-agent.rst](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-core-qrexec/blob/master/Documentation/qrexec-policy-agent.rst) for protocol details.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -62,12 +62,9 @@ Such configuration can be expressed by enabling `ipv6` feature only on some subs
|
|||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Besides enabling IPv6 forwarding, the standard Qubes firewall can be used to limit what network resources are available to each qube. Currently only the `qvm-firewall` command supports adding IPv6 rules, the GUI firewall editor will have this ability later.
|
||||
|
||||
**Note:** Setting or unsetting the `ipv6` feature only affects qubes-configured networking. It does not affect e.g. external interfaces. If you want to restrict IPv6 on these interfaces change the settings in Network Manager. Alternatively, disable IPv6 support using methods appropriate to the underlying template.
|
||||
Besides enabling IPv6 forwarding, standard Qubes firewall can be used to limit what network resources are available to each qube. Currently only `qvm-firewall` command support adding IPv6 rules, GUI firewall editor will have this ability later.
|
||||
|
||||
### Limitations
|
||||
|
||||
Currently only IPv4 DNS servers are configured, regardless of `ipv6` feature state. It is done this way to avoid reconfiguring all connected qubes whenever IPv6 DNS becomes available or not. Configuring qubes to always use IPv6 DNS and only fallback to IPv4 may result in relatively long timeouts and poor usability.
|
||||
But note that DNS using IPv4 does not prevent to return IPv6 addresses. In practice this is only a problem for IPv6-only networks.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ Any rpm-based, 64-bit environment, the preferred OS being Fedora.
|
|||
|
||||
### How do I build Qubes from sources?
|
||||
|
||||
See [these instructions](/doc/qubes-builder-v2/).
|
||||
See [these instructions](/doc/qubes-builder/).
|
||||
|
||||
### How do I submit a patch?
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -18,13 +18,14 @@ Dive right in to [organizing your qubes](/doc/how-to-organize-your-qubes/).)
|
|||
|
||||
## The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
Qubes OS is an operating system built out of securely-isolated compartments, or [qubes](/doc/glossary/#qube).
|
||||
You can have a work qube, a personal qube, a banking qube, a web browsing qube, a standalone Windows qube and so on.
|
||||
You can have as many qubes as you want! Most of the time, you'll be using an [app
|
||||
qube](/doc/glossary/#app-qube), a qube for running software
|
||||
Qubes OS is an operating system built out of securely-isolated compartments
|
||||
called [qubes](/doc/glossary/#qube). For example, you might have a work qube, a
|
||||
personal qube, a banking qube, a web browsing qube, and so on. You can have as
|
||||
many qubes as you want! Most of the time, you'll be using an [app
|
||||
qube](/doc/glossary/#app-qube), which is a qube intended for running software
|
||||
programs like web browsers, email clients, and word processors. Each app qube
|
||||
is based on another type of qube called a [template](/doc/glossary/#template).
|
||||
The same template can be a base for various qubes. Importantly, a qube
|
||||
More than one qube can be based on the same template. Importantly, a qube
|
||||
cannot modify its template in any way. This means that, if a qube is ever
|
||||
compromised, its template and any other qubes based on that template will
|
||||
remain safe. This is what makes Qubes OS so secure. Even if an attack is
|
||||
|
|
@ -34,8 +35,9 @@ Suppose you want to use your favorite web browser in several different qubes.
|
|||
You'd install the web browser in a template, then every qube based on that
|
||||
template would be able to run the web browser software (while still being
|
||||
forbidden from modifying the template and any other qubes). This way, you only
|
||||
have to install the web browser a single time, and updating the template updates all the qubes based on it.
|
||||
This elegant design saves time and space while enhancing security.
|
||||
have to install the web browser a single time, and updating the template serves
|
||||
to update all the qubes based on it. This elegant design saves time and space
|
||||
while enhancing security.
|
||||
|
||||
There are also some "helper" qubes in your system. Each qube that connects to
|
||||
the Internet does so through a network-providing [service
|
||||
|
|
@ -52,25 +54,27 @@ corresponding version number. There are many ready-to-use
|
|||
many as you like.
|
||||
|
||||
Last but not least, there's a very special [admin
|
||||
qube](/doc/glossary/#admin-qube) used to administer your entire system.
|
||||
There's only one admin qube, and it's called [dom0](/doc/glossary/#dom0).
|
||||
You can think of it as the master qube, holding ultimate power over everything that happens in Qubes OS.
|
||||
Dom0 is the most trusted one of all qubes. If dom0 were ever to be compromised, it would be "game over"- an effective compromise of the entire system.
|
||||
That's why everything in Qubes OS is specifically designed to protect dom0 and ensure that doesn't
|
||||
qube](/doc/glossary/#admin-qube) which, as the name suggests, is used to
|
||||
administer your entire system. There's only one admin qube, and it's called
|
||||
[dom0](/doc/glossary/#dom0). You can think of it as the master qube, holding
|
||||
ultimate power over everything that happens in Qubes OS. Dom0 is more trusted
|
||||
than any other qube. If dom0 were ever compromised, it would be "game over."
|
||||
The entire system would effectively be compromised. That's why everything in
|
||||
Qubes OS is specifically designed to protect dom0 and ensure that doesn't
|
||||
happen. Due to its overarching importance, dom0 has no network connectivity and
|
||||
is used only for running the [desktop
|
||||
environment](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Desktop_environment) and [window
|
||||
manager](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Window_manager). Dom0 should never be
|
||||
used for anything else. In particular, you should never run user applications
|
||||
in dom0. (That's what your app qubes are for!) In short, be very careful when interacting with dom0.
|
||||
in dom0. (That's what your app qubes are for!)
|
||||
|
||||
### Color & Security
|
||||
|
||||
You'll choose a **color** for each of your qubes out of a predefined set of
|
||||
colors. The color of the frame of each window on your desktop will correspond to the color of that qube.
|
||||
These colored frames help you keep track of which qube you're currently using.
|
||||
You may use them to show how trustworthy it is. This is especially helpful
|
||||
when you have the same program running in multiple qubes at the same time. For
|
||||
colors. Each window on your desktop will have its frame colored according to
|
||||
the color of that qube. These colored frames help you keep track of which qube
|
||||
each window belongs to and how trustworthy it is. This is especially helpful
|
||||
when you have the same app running in multiple qubes at the same time. For
|
||||
example, if you're logged in to your bank account in one qube while doing some
|
||||
random web surfing in a different qube, you wouldn't want to accidentally enter
|
||||
your banking password in the latter! The colored frames help to avoid such
|
||||
|
|
@ -79,16 +83,16 @@ mistakes.
|
|||
[](/attachment/doc/r4.1-snapshot_40.png)
|
||||
|
||||
Most Qubes users associate red with what's untrusted and dangerous (like a red
|
||||
stop light signalling danger), green with what's safe and trusted, and yellow and
|
||||
orange with things in-between. This color scheme also includes
|
||||
blue and black, commonly interpreted as indicating progressively more
|
||||
trusted domains than green, with black being ultimately trusted. However, color and
|
||||
associated meanings are entirely up to you. The system itself does
|
||||
not treat the colors differently - they're all equally safe on their own. If you create two identical qubes --- black
|
||||
light: stop! danger!), green with what's safe and trusted, and yellow and
|
||||
orange with things in the middle. This color scheme also extends to include
|
||||
blue and black, which are usually interpreted as indicating progressively more
|
||||
trusted domains than green, with black being ultimately trusted. Color and
|
||||
associated meanings are ultimately up to you, however. The system itself does
|
||||
not treat the colors differently. If you create two identical qubes --- black
|
||||
and red, say --- they'll be the same until you start using them differently.
|
||||
Feel free to use the colors in the way that best meets your needs. For example,
|
||||
Feel free to use the colors in whatever way is most useful to you. For example,
|
||||
you might decide to use three or four qubes for work activities and give them
|
||||
all the same color --- or all different colors depending on the nature of the task they are used for.
|
||||
all the same color --- or all different colors. It's entirely up to you.
|
||||
|
||||
### User Interface
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -100,24 +104,27 @@ the window managers [i3](/doc/i3/) and [AwesomeWM](/doc/awesomewm/).
|
|||
|
||||
[](/attachment/doc/r4.0-taskbar.png)
|
||||
|
||||
The bar at the top of your screen in Qubes 4.2 includes the following XFCE
|
||||
The bar at the top of your screen in Qubes 4.0 includes the following XFCE
|
||||
component areas:
|
||||
|
||||
- The **App Menu**, where you go to open an application within a qube, to open
|
||||
a dom0 terminal, to access administrative UI tools such as the Qube Manager,
|
||||
or to access settings panels for your desktop environment.
|
||||
- The **Task Bar** where buttons for open and hidden windows live.
|
||||
- The **Tray**, where many functional widgets live.
|
||||
- **Spaces**, an interface for [virtual
|
||||
desktops](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_desktop). Virtual desktops do
|
||||
not have any inherent security isolation properties, but some users find them
|
||||
useful for organizing things.
|
||||
- The **Tray**, where many functional widgets live.
|
||||
- The **Task Bar** where buttons for open and hidden windows live.
|
||||
- The **App Menu**, where you go to open an application within a qube, to open
|
||||
a dom0 terminal, to access administrative UI tools such as the Qube Manager,
|
||||
or to access settings panels for your desktop environment.
|
||||
|
||||
To learn more about how to customize your desktop environment, we recommend you
|
||||
spend some time going through [XFCE's documentation](https://docs.xfce.org/).
|
||||
|
||||
There are several tray widgets that are unique to Qubes OS:
|
||||
|
||||
- The **Whonix SDWDate** allows you to control the Tor connection in your
|
||||
[`sys-whonix`](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes) qube.
|
||||
- The **Qubes Clipboard** lets you easily [copy text](https://wwwpreview.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-copy-and-paste-text/) between various qubes and from dom0.
|
||||
- The **Qubes Clipboard** lets you easily copy text from dom0.
|
||||
- The **Qubes Devices** widget allows you to attach and detach devices --- such
|
||||
as USB drives and cameras --- to qubes.
|
||||
- The **Qubes Disk Space** widget shows you how much storage you're using.
|
||||
|
|
@ -129,57 +136,50 @@ There are several tray widgets that are unique to Qubes OS:
|
|||
|
||||
[](/attachment/doc/r4.1-widgets.png)
|
||||
|
||||
To learn more about how to customize your desktop environment, we recommend you
|
||||
go through [XFCE's documentation](https://docs.xfce.org/).
|
||||
|
||||
#### Qube Manager
|
||||
|
||||
To see all of your qubes at the same time, you can use the **Qube Manager**.
|
||||
It displays the states of all the qubes in your system, even the ones that aren’t running.
|
||||
|
||||
To access Qube Manager go to:
|
||||
Qubes Icon (App Menu) → Settings Icon → Qubes Tools → **Qube Manager**
|
||||
To see all of your qubes at the same time, you can use the **Qube Manager** (go
|
||||
to the App Menu → Qubes Tools → Qube Manager), which displays the states of
|
||||
all the qubes in your system, even the ones that aren't running.
|
||||
|
||||
[](/attachment/doc/r4.1-qubes-manager.png)
|
||||
|
||||
#### Command-line interface
|
||||
|
||||
All aspects of Qubes OS can be controlled using command-line tools such as the terminal emulator.
|
||||
The default terminal emulator in Qubes is Xfce Terminal.
|
||||
Opening a terminal emulator in dom0 can be done in several ways:
|
||||
All aspects of Qubes OS can be controlled using command-line tools. Opening a
|
||||
terminal emulator in dom0 can be done in several ways:
|
||||
|
||||
- Go to the App Menu, click on the Settings icon, choose Other from the drop-down menu, and select **Xfce Terminal Emulator** at the bottom.
|
||||
- Go to the App Menu and select **Terminal Emulator** at the top.
|
||||
- Press `Alt`+`F3` and search for `xfce terminal`.
|
||||
- Right-click on the desktop and select **Open Terminal Here**.
|
||||
|
||||
Various command-line tools are described as part of this guide, and the whole reference can be found [here](/doc/tools/).
|
||||
Terminal emulators can also be run in other qubes as normal programs.
|
||||
Terminal emulators can also be run in other qubes as normal programs. Various
|
||||
command-line tools are described as part of this guide, and the whole reference
|
||||
can be found [here](/doc/tools/).
|
||||
|
||||
## First boot
|
||||
|
||||
When you install Qubes OS, a number of qubes are pre-configured for you:
|
||||
|
||||
- **App qubes** such as `work`, `personal`, `untrusted`, and `vault` are your "starter pack" qubes to compartmentalize tasks
|
||||
and types of data to suit most basic needs. (There is nothing special about these pre-configured qubes - they are identical in nature to more specific ones you might wish to create later.)
|
||||
- **Templates:** `fedora-XX`, `debian-XX` (`XX` being the version number)
|
||||
- **Service qubes:** `sys-usb`, `sys-net`, `sys-firewall`, and `sys-whonix`)
|
||||
- **Templates:** `fedora-XX` (`XX` being the version number)
|
||||
- **Admin qube:** `dom0`
|
||||
- **Service qubes:** `sys-usb`, `sys-net`, `sys-firewall`, and `sys-whonix`
|
||||
- **App qubes** configured to prioritize security by compartmentalizing tasks
|
||||
and types of data: `work`, `personal`, `untrusted`, and `vault`. (There is
|
||||
nothing special about these qubes. If you were to create a black qube and
|
||||
name it `vault`, it would be the same as the pre-configured `vault` qube.
|
||||
They're just suggestions to get you started. )
|
||||
|
||||
Other software installed in Qubes OS by default includes open-source applications such as file managers,
|
||||
command-line terminals, printer managers, text editors, and applets for configuring audio and user interface settings.
|
||||
Most of these applications are incorporated within each template.
|
||||
A variety of open-source applications such as file managers, command-line
|
||||
terminals, printer managers, text editors, and "applets" used to configure
|
||||
different things like audio or parts of the user interface are also installed
|
||||
by default—most within the templates. Most are bundled with each template.
|
||||
|
||||
### Adding, removing, and listing qubes
|
||||
|
||||
To create a new qube or remove one, use **Create Qubes VM** option in the App Menu.
|
||||
|
||||
Creating a New Qube:
|
||||
Qubes Icon → Settings → Qubes Tools → Qube Manager → Create Qubes VM → **New Qube**
|
||||
|
||||
Removing a qube:
|
||||
To remove a qube, use the **Delete qube button** as the final step instead.
|
||||
|
||||
You can also add, remove, and list qubes from the
|
||||
You can easily create a new qube with the **Create Qubes VM** option in the App
|
||||
Menu. If you need to add or remove qubes, simply use the Qube Manager's **Add**
|
||||
and **Remove** buttons. You can also add, remove, and list qubes from the
|
||||
command line using the following tools:
|
||||
|
||||
- `qvm-create`
|
||||
|
|
@ -188,8 +188,14 @@ command line using the following tools:
|
|||
|
||||
### How many qubes do I need?
|
||||
|
||||
It's a good idea to start out with the pre-installed app qubes: `work`, `personal`, `untrusted`, and `vault`.
|
||||
If you start to feel that some activity just doesn't fit into any of your existing qubes, or
|
||||
That's a great question, but there's no one-size-fits-all answer. It depends on
|
||||
the structure of your digital life, and this is at least a little different for
|
||||
everyone. If you plan on using your system for work, then it also depends on
|
||||
what kind of job you do.
|
||||
|
||||
It's a good idea to start out with the qubes created automatically by the
|
||||
installer: `work`, `personal`, `untrusted`, and `vault`. If and when you start
|
||||
to feel that some activity just doesn't fit into any of your existing qubes, or
|
||||
you want to partition some part of your life, you can easily create a new qube
|
||||
for it. You'll also be able to easily [copy any
|
||||
files](/doc/how-to-copy-and-move-files) you need to the newly-created qube.
|
||||
|
|
@ -246,5 +252,5 @@ GitHub](https://github.com/QubesOS).
|
|||
|
||||
## Documentation
|
||||
|
||||
Browse our extensive library of [documentation](/doc/) for users and developers
|
||||
Peruse our extensive library of [documentation](/doc/) for users and developers
|
||||
of Qubes OS. You can even [help us improve it](/doc/how-to-edit-the-documentation/)!
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Watch all the talks from Qubes OS Summit 2022, which took place September 9-11,
|
|||
|
||||
## Micah Lee presents "Qubes OS: The Operating System That Can Protect You Even If You Get Hacked"
|
||||
|
||||
[Micah Lee](https://micahflee.com/), a long-time Qubes [advocate](/endorsements/), presented [Qubes OS: The Operating System That Can Protect You Even If You Get Hacked](https://archive.org/details/QubesOSTheOperatingSystemThatCanProtectYouEvenIfYouGetHackedTalkByMicahLee) at the Circle of HOPE conference, which took place July 20-22, 2018 in New York City.
|
||||
[Micah Lee](https://micahflee.com/), a long-time Qubes [advocate](/endorsements/), presented [Qubes OS: The Operating System That Can Protect You Even If You Get Hacked](https://www.hope.net/schedule.html#-qubes-os-the-operating-system-that-can-protect-you-even-if-you-get-hacked-) at the [Circle of HOPE](https://www.hope.net/index.html) conference, which took place July 20-22, 2018 in New York City.
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="video more-bottom">
|
||||
<iframe class="responsive" referrerpolicy="no-referrer" scrolling="no" allowfullscreen src="https://livestream.com/accounts/9197973/events/8286152/videos/178431606/player?autoPlay=false"></iframe>
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ That way, they can be used to customize a single VM instead of all VMs based on
|
|||
The scripts here all run as root.
|
||||
|
||||
- `/rw/config/rc.local` - script runs at VM startup.
|
||||
Good place to change some service settings, replace config files with its copy stored in `/rw/config`, etc. The script need to have the executable permission set to be executed.
|
||||
Good place to change some service settings, replace config files with its copy stored in `/rw/config`, etc.
|
||||
Example usage:
|
||||
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
|
|
@ -32,8 +32,6 @@ The scripts here all run as root.
|
|||
echo '127.0.0.1 example.com' >> /etc/hosts
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
|
||||
- `/rw/config/rc.local.d/*.rc` - scripts run at VM startup just before `/rw/config/rc.local`
|
||||
- `/rw/config/rc.local-early.d/*.rc`, `/rw/config/rc.local-early` - scripts similar to `/rw/config/rc.local`, but running earlier in the system startup sequence - just before `sysinit.target`, and setting up the network.
|
||||
- `/rw/config/qubes-ip-change-hook` - script runs in NetVM after every external IP change and on "hardware" link status change.
|
||||
|
||||
- In ProxyVMs (or app qubes with `qubes-firewall` service enabled), scripts placed in the following directories will be executed in the listed order followed by `qubes-firewall-user-script` at start up.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -120,33 +120,13 @@ A VNC server session is running on `localhost:5900` in `sys-gui-vnc`. In order t
|
|||
> **WARNING**: This setup raises multiple security issues: 1) Anyone who can reach the `VNC` server, can take over the control of the Qubes OS machine, 2) A second client can connect even if a connection is already active and potentially get disconnected, 3) You can get disconnected by some unrelated network issues. Generally, if this `VNC` server is exposed to open network, it must be protected with some other (cryptographic) layer like `VPN`. The setup as is, is useful only for purely testing machine.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### Known issues
|
||||
### Troubleshooting
|
||||
|
||||
#### Application menu lacks qubes entries in a fresh GUI domain
|
||||
|
||||
See [QubesOS/qubes-issues#5804](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/5804)
|
||||
|
||||
#### Cannot update dom0 from sys-gui
|
||||
|
||||
See [QubesOS/qubes-issues#8934](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/8934)
|
||||
|
||||
#### GUI of HVM qubes not visible
|
||||
|
||||
See [QubesOS/qubes-issues#9385](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/9385)
|
||||
|
||||
### Power saving/screensaver issues
|
||||
|
||||
See [QubesOS/qubes-issues#9033](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/9033), [QubesOS/qubes-issues#9384](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/9384), [QubesOS/qubes-issues#7989](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/7989)
|
||||
|
||||
#### Qube startup order (sys-usb and sys-gui)
|
||||
|
||||
See [QubesOS/qubes-issues#7954](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/7954)
|
||||
|
||||
#### Other GUI domain issues
|
||||
|
||||
see existing issues `QubesOS/qubes-issues` under [C: gui-domain](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aopen+is%3Aissue+label%3A%22C%3A+gui-domain%22) label.
|
||||
|
||||
### Reverting sys-gui
|
||||
#### Delete GUI domain
|
||||
|
||||
The following commands have to be run in `dom0`.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -169,3 +149,7 @@ You are now able to delete the GUI domain, for example `sys-gui-gpu`:
|
|||
```bash
|
||||
qvm-remove -f sys-gui-gpu
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
#### General issues
|
||||
|
||||
For any general GUI domain issues, please take a loot at existing issues `QubesOS/qubes-issues` under [C: gui-domain](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aopen+is%3Aissue+label%3A%22C%3A+gui-domain%22) label.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -65,12 +65,10 @@ In theory, you can still use file-based disk images ("file" pool driver), but it
|
|||
Assuming the secondary hard disk is at /dev/sdb (it will be completely erased), you can set it up for encryption by doing in a dom0 terminal (use the same passphrase as the main Qubes disk to avoid a second password prompt at boot):
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
sudo cryptsetup luksFormat --sector-size=512 /dev/sdb
|
||||
sudo cryptsetup luksFormat --hash=sha512 --key-size=512 --cipher=aes-xts-plain64 --verify-passphrase /dev/sdb
|
||||
sudo blkid /dev/sdb
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
(The `--sector-size=512` argument can sometimes work around an incompatibility of storage hardware with LVM thin pools on Qubes. If this does not apply to your hardware, the argument will make no difference.)
|
||||
|
||||
Note the device's UUID (in this example "b209..."), we will use it as its luks name for auto-mounting at boot, by doing:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -50,21 +50,6 @@ is about the virtualization mode. In practice, however, it is most common for
|
|||
standalones to be HVMs and for HVMs to be standalones. Hence, this page covers
|
||||
both topics.
|
||||
|
||||
## Understanding Virtualization Modes
|
||||
|
||||
PVH has both better performance and better security than either PV or HVM:
|
||||
|
||||
PVH has less attack surface than PV, as it relies on Second Level Address Translation (SLAT) hardware. Guests modify their own page tables natively, without hypervisor involvement. Xen does not need to perform complex checks to ensure that a guest cannot obtain write access to its own page tables, as is necessary for PV. Flaws in these checks have been a source of no fewer than four guest ⇒ host escapes: XSA-148, XSA-182, XSA-212, and XSA-213.
|
||||
|
||||
PVH also has less attack surface than HVM, as it does not require QEMU to provide device emulation services. While QEMU is confined in a stubdomain, and again in a seccomp based sandbox, the stubdomain has significant attack surface against the hypervisor. Not only does it have the full attack surface of a PV domain, it also has access to additional hypercalls that allow it to control the guest it is providing emulation services for. XSA-109 was a vulnerability in one of these hypercalls.
|
||||
|
||||
PVH has better performance than HVM, as the stubdomain iin HVM consumes resources (both memory and a small amount of CPU). There is little difference in the I/O path at runtime, as both PVH and HVM guests usually use paravirtualized I/O protocols.
|
||||
|
||||
Surprisingly, PVH often has better performance than PV. This is because PVH does not require hypercalls for page table updates, which are expensive. SLAT does raise the cost of TLB misses, but this is somewhat mitigated by a second-level TLB in recent hardware.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Creating a standalone
|
||||
|
||||
You can create a standalone in the Qube Manager by selecting the "Type" of
|
||||
|
|
@ -191,40 +176,9 @@ seen, e.g., in the Qube Manager in the qube's properties:
|
|||
|
||||
Alternatively, one can use the `qvm-ls -n` command to obtain the same
|
||||
information (IP/netmask/gateway).
|
||||
The Qube Settimgs shows a netmask of 255.255.255.255.
|
||||
This is not suitable for most standalones, and you will need to use a different value.
|
||||
|
||||
In Qubes, the IP address is usually in range 10.137.0.0/16, with disposables in range 10.138.0.0/16, and DNS set to `10.139.1.1` and `10.139.1.2`.
|
||||
The simplest solution is to set the netmask to 255.0.0.0 - standard for a class A network.
|
||||
If you want a more restricted solution you could use 255.252.0.0, or 255.255.255.0
|
||||
|
||||
There is [opt-in support](/doc/networking/#ipv6) for IPv6 forwarding.
|
||||
|
||||
### An example of setting up a network - Network Manager on KDE
|
||||
|
||||
Every guest operating system has its own way of handling networking, and the user is
|
||||
referred to the documentation that comes with that operating system. However,
|
||||
Network Manager is widely used on Linux systems, and so a worked example will
|
||||
prove useful. This example is for an HVM running EndeavourOS.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
In this example, Network Manager on KDE, the network had the following values:
|
||||
|
||||
1. IPv4 networking
|
||||
2. IP address 10.137.0.17
|
||||
3. Netmask - qube settings showed 255.255.255.255, but we decided to use 255.255.255.0
|
||||
4. Gateway 10.138.24.248
|
||||
5. Virtual DNS 10.139.1.1 and 10.139.1.2
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
The network was set up by entering Network Manager, selecting the Wi-Fi & Networking tab, clicking on the Wired Ethernet
|
||||
item, and selecting tab IPv4 (1).
|
||||
The Manual method was selected (2), which revealed areas for data entry.
|
||||
The DNS Servers section takes a comma-separated list, here 10.139.1.1,10.1.139.2 (3).
|
||||
At the bottom of the tab (4), the '+ Add' button was selected, and the IP address of 10.137.0.17 entered in the 'Address' column, the Netmask of 255.255.255.0 entered in the 'Netmask' column, and the Gateway of 10.138.24.248 under 'Gateway'.
|
||||
Selecting the "Apply" button stored these changes
|
||||
The DNS IP addresses are `10.139.1.1` and `10.139.1.2`. There is [opt-in
|
||||
support](/doc/networking/#ipv6) for IPv6 forwarding.
|
||||
|
||||
## Using template-based HVMs
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ It is the responsibility of each distribution to clearly notify its users in adv
|
|||
|
||||
| Qubes OS | Fedora | Debian |
|
||||
| ----------- | ------ | ------ |
|
||||
| Release 4.2 | 41 | 12 |
|
||||
| Release 4.2 | 40, 41 | 12 |
|
||||
|
||||
### Note on Debian support
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ How to test upcoming Qubes OS releases:
|
|||
|
||||
- Test the latest release candidate (RC) on the [downloads](/downloads/) page, if one is currently available. (Or try an older RC from our [FTP server](https://ftp.qubes-os.org/iso/).)
|
||||
- Try the [signed weekly builds](https://qubes.notset.fr/iso/). ([Learn more](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/16929) and [track their status](https://github.com/fepitre/updates-status-iso/issues).)
|
||||
- Use [qubes-builder](/doc/qubes-builder-v2/) to build the latest release yourself.
|
||||
- Use [qubes-builder](/doc/qubes-builder/) to build the latest release yourself.
|
||||
- (No support) Experiment with developer alpha ISOs found from time to time at [Qubes OpenQA](https://openqa.qubes-os.org/).
|
||||
|
||||
Please make sure to [report any bugs you encounter](/doc/issue-tracking/).
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -25,19 +25,19 @@ Qubes-certified computers are certified for a [major release](/doc/version-schem
|
|||
|
||||
The current Qubes-certified models are listed below in reverse chronological order of certification.
|
||||
|
||||
| Brand | Model | Certification details |
|
||||
| -------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| [NovaCustom](https://novacustom.com/) | [V54 Series](https://novacustom.com/product/v54-series/) | [Certification details](/doc/certified-hardware/novacustom-v54-series/) |
|
||||
| [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/) | [NitroPad V56](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop/nitropad-v56-684) | [Certification details](/doc/certified-hardware/nitropad-v56/) |
|
||||
| [NovaCustom](https://novacustom.com/) | [V56 Series](https://novacustom.com/product/v56-series/) | [Certification details](/doc/certified-hardware/novacustom-v56-series/) |
|
||||
| [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/) | [NitroPC Pro 2](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop/nitropc-pro-2-523) | [Certification details](/doc/certified-hardware/nitropc-pro-2/) |
|
||||
| [Star Labs](https://starlabs.systems/) | [StarBook](https://starlabs.systems/pages/starbook) | [Certification details](/doc/certified-hardware/starlabs-starbook/) |
|
||||
| [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/) | [NitroPC Pro](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop/product/nitropc-pro-523) | [Certification details](/doc/certified-hardware/nitropc-pro/) |
|
||||
| [NovaCustom](https://novacustom.com/) | [NV41 Series](https://novacustom.com/product/nv41-series/) | [Certification details](/doc/certified-hardware/novacustom-nv41-series/) |
|
||||
| [3mdeb](https://3mdeb.com/) | [Dasharo FidelisGuard Z690](https://web.archive.org/web/20240917145232/https://shop.3mdeb.com/shop/open-source-hardware/dasharo-fidelisguard-z690-qubes-os-certified/) | [Certification details](/doc/certified-hardware/dasharo-fidelisguard-z690/) |
|
||||
| [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/) | [NitroPad T430](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop/product/nitropad-t430-119) | [Certification details](/doc/certified-hardware/nitropad-t430/) |
|
||||
| [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/) | [NitroPad X230](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop/product/nitropad-x230-67) | [Certification details](/doc/certified-hardware/nitropad-x230/) |
|
||||
| [Insurgo](https://insurgo.ca/) | [PrivacyBeast X230](https://insurgo.ca/produit/qubesos-certified-privacybeast_x230-reasonably-secured-laptop/) | [Certification details](/doc/certified-hardware/insurgo-privacybeast-x230/) |
|
||||
| Brand | Model | Certification details |
|
||||
| -------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| [NovaCustom](https://novacustom.com/) | [V54 Series](https://novacustom.com/product/v54-series/) | [Certification details](/doc/certified-hardware/novacustom-v54-series/) |
|
||||
| [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/) | [NitroPad V56](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop/nitropad-v56-684) | [Certification details](/doc/certified-hardware/nitropad-v56/) |
|
||||
| [NovaCustom](https://novacustom.com/) | [V56 Series](https://novacustom.com/product/v56-series/) | [Certification details](/doc/certified-hardware/novacustom-v56-series/) |
|
||||
| [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/) | [NitroPC Pro 2](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop/nitropc-pro-2-523) | [Certification details](/doc/certified-hardware/nitropc-pro-2/) |
|
||||
| [Star Labs](https://starlabs.systems/) | [StarBook](https://starlabs.systems/pages/starbook) | [Certification details](/doc/certified-hardware/starlabs-starbook/) |
|
||||
| [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/) | [NitroPC Pro](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop/product/nitropc-pro-523) | [Certification details](/doc/certified-hardware/nitropc-pro/) |
|
||||
| [NovaCustom](https://novacustom.com/) | [NV41 Series](https://novacustom.com/product/nv41-series/) | [Certification details](/doc/certified-hardware/novacustom-nv41-series/) |
|
||||
| [3mdeb](https://3mdeb.com/) | [Dasharo FidelisGuard Z690](https://3mdeb.com/shop/open-source-hardware/dasharo-fidelisguard-z690-qubes-os-certified/) | [Certification details](/doc/certified-hardware/dasharo-fidelisguard-z690/) |
|
||||
| [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/) | [NitroPad T430](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop/product/nitropad-t430-119) | [Certification details](/doc/certified-hardware/nitropad-t430/) |
|
||||
| [Nitrokey](https://www.nitrokey.com/) | [NitroPad X230](https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop/product/nitropad-x230-67) | [Certification details](/doc/certified-hardware/nitropad-x230/) |
|
||||
| [Insurgo](https://insurgo.ca/) | [PrivacyBeast X230](https://insurgo.ca/produit/qubesos-certified-privacybeast_x230-reasonably-secured-laptop/) | [Certification details](/doc/certified-hardware/insurgo-privacybeast-x230/) |
|
||||
|
||||
## Become hardware certified
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,11 +6,11 @@ title: Dasharo FidelisGuard Z690
|
|||
image: /attachment/posts/dasharo-fidelisguard-z690_2.jpg
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
The [Dasharo FidelisGuard Z690](https://web.archive.org/web/20240917145232/https://shop.3mdeb.com/shop/open-source-hardware/dasharo-fidelisguard-z690-qubes-os-certified/) is [officially certified](/doc/certified-hardware/) for Qubes OS Release 4.
|
||||
The [Dasharo FidelisGuard Z690](https://3mdeb.com/shop/open-source-hardware/dasharo-fidelisguard-z690-qubes-os-certified/) is [officially certified](/doc/certified-hardware/) for Qubes OS Release 4.
|
||||
|
||||
[](https://web.archive.org/web/20240917145232/https://shop.3mdeb.com/shop/open-source-hardware/dasharo-fidelisguard-z690-qubes-os-certified/)
|
||||
[](https://3mdeb.com/shop/open-source-hardware/dasharo-fidelisguard-z690-qubes-os-certified/)
|
||||
|
||||
The [Dasharo FidelisGuard Z690](https://web.archive.org/web/20240917145232/https://shop.3mdeb.com/shop/open-source-hardware/dasharo-fidelisguard-z690-qubes-os-certified/) is a full desktop PC build that brings the [Dasharo](https://dasharo.com/) open-source firmware distribution to the MSI PRO Z690-A DDR4 motherboard with Qubes OS preinstalled. The full configuration includes:
|
||||
The [Dasharo FidelisGuard Z690](https://3mdeb.com/shop/open-source-hardware/dasharo-fidelisguard-z690-qubes-os-certified/) is a full desktop PC build that brings the [Dasharo](https://dasharo.com/) open-source firmware distribution to the MSI PRO Z690-A DDR4 motherboard with Qubes OS preinstalled. The full configuration includes:
|
||||
|
||||
| Part | Model Name |
|
||||
|------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
|
|
@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ The [Dasharo FidelisGuard Z690](https://web.archive.org/web/20240917145232/https
|
|||
| Storage | SSD Intel 670p 512 GB M.2 2280 PCI-E x4 Gen3 NVMe |
|
||||
| Enclosure | SilentiumPC Armis AR1 |
|
||||
|
||||
[](https://web.archive.org/web/20240917145232/https://shop.3mdeb.com/shop/open-source-hardware/dasharo-fidelisguard-z690-qubes-os-certified/)
|
||||
[](https://3mdeb.com/shop/open-source-hardware/dasharo-fidelisguard-z690-qubes-os-certified/)
|
||||
|
||||
This computer comes with a "Dasharo Supporters Entrance Subscription," which includes the following:
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ This computer comes with a "Dasharo Supporters Entrance Subscription," which inc
|
|||
- Dasharo Premier Support through an invite-only Matrix channel
|
||||
- Influence on the Dasharo feature roadmap
|
||||
|
||||
[](https://web.archive.org/web/20240917145232/https://shop.3mdeb.com/shop/open-source-hardware/dasharo-fidelisguard-z690-qubes-os-certified/)
|
||||
[](https://3mdeb.com/shop/open-source-hardware/dasharo-fidelisguard-z690-qubes-os-certified/)
|
||||
|
||||
For further details, please see the [Dasharo FidelisGuard Z690](https://web.archive.org/web/20240917145232/https://shop.3mdeb.com/shop/open-source-hardware/dasharo-fidelisguard-z690-qubes-os-certified/) product page.
|
||||
For further details, please see the [Dasharo FidelisGuard Z690](https://3mdeb.com/shop/open-source-hardware/dasharo-fidelisguard-z690-qubes-os-certified/) product page.
|
||||
|
||||
[](https://web.archive.org/web/20240917145232/https://shop.3mdeb.com/shop/open-source-hardware/dasharo-fidelisguard-z690-qubes-os-certified/)
|
||||
[](https://3mdeb.com/shop/open-source-hardware/dasharo-fidelisguard-z690-qubes-os-certified/)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ The [Insurgo PrivacyBeast X230](https://insurgo.ca/produit/qubesos-certified-pri
|
|||
|
||||
- [coreboot](https://www.coreboot.org/) initialization for the x230 is binary-blob-free, including native graphic initialization. Built with the [Heads](https://github.com/osresearch/heads/) payload, it delivers an [Anti Evil Maid (AEM)](/doc/anti-evil-maid/)-like solution built into the firmware. (Even though our [requirements](/doc/certified-hardware/#hardware-certification-requirements) provide an exception for CPU-vendor-provided blobs for silicon and memory initialization, Insurgo exceeds our requirements by insisting that these be absent from its machines.)
|
||||
|
||||
- [Intel ME](https://libreboot.org/faq.html#intelme) is neutered through the AltMeDisable bit, while all modules other than ROMP and BUP, which are required to initialize main CPU, have been [deleted](https://github.com/linuxboot/heads-wiki/blob/master/Installing-and-Configuring/Flashing-Guides/Clean-the-ME-firmware.md#how-to-disabledeactive-most-of-it).
|
||||
- [Intel ME](https://libreboot.org/faq.html#intelme) is neutered through the AltMeDisable bit, while all modules other than ROMP and BUP, which are required to initialize main CPU, have been [deleted](https://github.com/osresearch/heads-wiki/blob/master/Clean-the-ME-firmware.md#how-to-disabledeactive-most-of-it).
|
||||
|
||||
- A re-ownership process that allows it to ship pre-installed with Qubes OS, including full-disk encryption already in place, but where the final disk encryption key is regenerated only when the machine is first powered on by the user, so that the OEM doesn't know it.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -114,16 +114,16 @@ We recommend consulting these resources when selecting hardware for Qubes OS:
|
|||
other security updates directly to users. By contrast, on AMD client (as
|
||||
opposed to server) platforms, microcode updates are typically shipped only as
|
||||
part of system firmware and generally cannot be loaded from the operating
|
||||
system [^1]. This means that AMD users typically must wait for:
|
||||
|
||||
system. This means that AMD users typically must wait for:
|
||||
|
||||
1. AMD to distribute microcode updates to original equipment manufacturers
|
||||
(OEMs), original design manufacturers (ODMs), and motherboard manufacturers
|
||||
(MB); and
|
||||
2. The user's OEM, ODM, or MB to provide a suitable BIOS or (U)EFI update for
|
||||
the user's system.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Historically, AMD has often been slow to complete step (1), at least for its
|
||||
client (as opposed to server) platforms [^2]. In some cases, AMD has made fixes
|
||||
client (as opposed to server) platforms. In some cases, AMD has made fixes
|
||||
available for its server platforms very shortly after a security embargo was
|
||||
lifted, but it did not make fixes available for client platforms facing the
|
||||
same vulnerability until weeks or months later. (A "security embargo" is the
|
||||
|
|
@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ We recommend consulting these resources when selecting hardware for Qubes OS:
|
|||
|
||||
Step (2) varies by vendor. Many vendors fail to complete step (2) at all,
|
||||
while some others take a very long time to complete it.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
The bottom line is that Qubes OS **can** run on AMD systems, and the Qubes and
|
||||
Xen security teams do their best to provide security support for AMD systems.
|
||||
However, without the ability to ship microcode updates, there is only so much
|
||||
|
|
@ -163,17 +163,3 @@ We recommend consulting these resources when selecting hardware for Qubes OS:
|
|||
|
||||
- You can check whether an Intel processor has VT-x and VT-d on
|
||||
[ark.intel.com](https://ark.intel.com/content/www/us/en/ark.html#@Processors).
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: There is an `amd-ucode-firmware` package, but it only contains
|
||||
microcode for servers and outdated microcode for Chromebooks. Also,
|
||||
the [AMD security website](https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security.html)
|
||||
only lists microcode as a mitigation for data center CPUs.
|
||||
|
||||
[^2]: As shown on [the AMD page for Speculative Return Stack Overflow](https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-7005.html),
|
||||
updated AGESA™ firmware for AMD Ryzen™ Threadripper™ 5000WX Processors
|
||||
was not available until 2024-01-11, even though the vulnerability became
|
||||
public on 2023-08-08. AMD did not provide updated firmware for other client
|
||||
processors until a date between 2023-08-22 to 2023-08-25.
|
||||
|
||||
For Zenbleed, firmware was not available until 2024 for most client parts,
|
||||
even though server parts got microcode on 2023-06-06.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -12,17 +12,13 @@ title: Emergency backup recovery (v4)
|
|||
This page describes how to perform an emergency restore of a backup created on
|
||||
Qubes R4.X (which uses backup format version 4).
|
||||
|
||||
The Qubes backup system is designed with emergency disaster recovery in mind. No
|
||||
special Qubes-specific tools are required to access data backed up by Qubes. In
|
||||
the event a Qubes system is unavailable, you can access your data on any
|
||||
GNU/Linux system by following the instructions on this page.
|
||||
The Qubes backup system has been designed with emergency disaster recovery in
|
||||
mind. No special Qubes-specific tools are required to access data backed up by
|
||||
Qubes. In the event a Qubes system is unavailable, you can access your data on
|
||||
any GNU/Linux system with the following procedure.
|
||||
|
||||
**Important:** You may wish to store a copy of these instructions with your
|
||||
Qubes backups. All Qubes documentation, including this page, is available in
|
||||
plain text format in the [qubes-doc](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-doc) Git
|
||||
repository.
|
||||
|
||||
## Required `scrypt` utility
|
||||
Required `scrypt` Utility
|
||||
-------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
In Qubes 4.X, backups are encrypted and integrity-protected with
|
||||
[scrypt](https://www.tarsnap.com/scrypt.html). You will need a copy of this
|
||||
|
|
@ -38,8 +34,8 @@ easier scripting, which means you'll need to enter the passphrase for each file
|
|||
separately, instead of using `echo ... | scrypt`.
|
||||
|
||||
Here are instructions for obtaining a compiled `scrypt` binary. This example
|
||||
uses an RPM-based system (Fedora), but the same general procedure should work on
|
||||
any GNU/Linux system.
|
||||
uses an RPM-based system (Fedora), but the same general procedure should work
|
||||
on any GNU/Linux system.
|
||||
|
||||
1. If you're not on Qubes 4.X, [import and authenticate the Release 4 Signing
|
||||
Key](/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-release-signing-keys).
|
||||
|
|
@ -50,7 +46,7 @@ any GNU/Linux system.
|
|||
|
||||
[user@restore ~]$ dnf download scrypt
|
||||
|
||||
Or, if that doesn't work:
|
||||
or, if that doesn't work:
|
||||
|
||||
[user@restore ~]$ curl -O https://yum.qubes-os.org/r4.0/current/vm/fc28/rpm/scrypt-1.2.1-1.fc28.x86_64.rpm
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -66,35 +62,60 @@ any GNU/Linux system.
|
|||
|
||||
[user@restore ~]$ sudo dnf install rpmdevtools
|
||||
|
||||
5. Extract the `scrypt` binary from the RPM and make it conveniently
|
||||
available.
|
||||
5. Extract the `scrypt` binary from the RPM.
|
||||
|
||||
[user@restore ~]$ rpmdev-extract scrypt-*.rpm
|
||||
[user@restore ~]$ alias scrypt="$PWD/scrypt-*/usr/bin/scrypt"
|
||||
|
||||
## Emergency recovery instructions
|
||||
6. (Optional) Create an alias for the new binary.
|
||||
|
||||
[user@restore ~]$ alias scrypt="scrypt-*/usr/bin/scrypt"
|
||||
|
||||
Emergency Recovery Instructions
|
||||
-------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
**Note:** In the following example, the backup file is both *encrypted* and
|
||||
*compressed*.
|
||||
|
||||
1. Untar the backup metadata from the main backup file.
|
||||
1. Untar the main backup file.
|
||||
|
||||
[user@restore ~]$ tar -i -xvf qubes-backup-2023-04-05T123456 \
|
||||
backup-header backup-header.hmac qubes.xml.000.enc
|
||||
[user@restore ~]$ tar -i -xvf qubes-backup-2015-06-05T123456
|
||||
backup-header
|
||||
backup-header.hmac
|
||||
qubes.xml.000.enc
|
||||
vm1/private.img.000.enc
|
||||
vm1/private.img.001.enc
|
||||
vm1/private.img.002.enc
|
||||
vm1/icon.png.000.enc
|
||||
vm1/firewall.xml.000.enc
|
||||
vm1/whitelisted-appmenus.list.000.enc
|
||||
dom0-home/dom0user.000.enc
|
||||
|
||||
**To extract only specific VMs:** Each VM in the backup file has its path
|
||||
listed in `qubes.xml.000.enc`. Decrypt it. (In this example, the password is
|
||||
`password`.)
|
||||
|
||||
[user@restore ~]$ cat backup-header | grep backup-id
|
||||
backup-id=20190128T123456-1234
|
||||
[user@restore ~]$ scrypt dec -P qubes.xml.000.enc qubes.xml.000
|
||||
Please enter passphrase: 20190128T123456-1234!qubes.xml.000!password
|
||||
[user@restore ~]$ tar -i -xvf qubes.xml.000
|
||||
|
||||
Now that you have the decrypted `qubes.xml.000` file, search for the
|
||||
`backup-path` property inside of it. With the `backup-path`, extract only
|
||||
the files necessary for your VM (`vmX`).
|
||||
|
||||
[user@restore ~]$ tar -i -xvf qubes-backup-2015-06-05T123456 \
|
||||
backup-header backup-header.hmac vmX/
|
||||
|
||||
2. Set the backup passphrase environment variable. While this isn't strictly
|
||||
required, it will be handy later and will avoid saving the passphrase in the
|
||||
shell's history.
|
||||
required, it will be handy later and will avoid saving the passphrase in
|
||||
the shell's history.
|
||||
|
||||
[user@restore ~]$ read -r backup_pass
|
||||
|
||||
Type in your passphrase (it will be visible on screen!) and press Enter.
|
||||
|
||||
3. Verify the integrity of `backup-header` using `backup-header.hmac` (an
|
||||
encrypted *and integrity protected* version of `backup-header`).
|
||||
3. Verify the integrity of `backup-header`. For compatibility reasons,
|
||||
`backup-header.hmac` is an encrypted *and integrity protected*
|
||||
version of `backup-header`.
|
||||
|
||||
[user@restore ~]$ set +H
|
||||
[user@restore ~]$ echo "backup-header!$backup_pass" |\
|
||||
|
|
@ -102,34 +123,34 @@ any GNU/Linux system.
|
|||
diff -qs backup-header backup-header.verified
|
||||
Files backup-header and backup-header.verified are identical
|
||||
|
||||
**Note:** If this command fails, it may be that the backup was tampered with
|
||||
or is in a different format. In the latter case, look inside `backup-header`
|
||||
at the `version` field. If it contains a value other than `version=4`, go to
|
||||
the instructions for that format version:
|
||||
**Note:** If this command fails, it may be that the backup was tampered
|
||||
with or is in a different format. In the latter case, look inside
|
||||
`backup-header` at the `version` field. If it contains a value other than
|
||||
`version=4`, go to the instructions for that format version:
|
||||
- [Emergency Backup Recovery without Qubes (v2)](/doc/backup-emergency-restore-v2/)
|
||||
- [Emergency Backup Recovery without Qubes (v3)](/doc/backup-emergency-restore-v3/)
|
||||
|
||||
4. Read `backup-header`.
|
||||
4. Read `backup-header`:
|
||||
|
||||
[user@restore ~]$ cat backup-header
|
||||
version=4
|
||||
encrypted=True
|
||||
compressed=True
|
||||
compression-filter=gzip
|
||||
hmac-algorithm=scrypt
|
||||
backup-id=20230405T123455-1234
|
||||
backup_id=20161020T123455-1234
|
||||
|
||||
5. Set `backup_id` to the value in the last line of `backup-header`. (Note that
|
||||
there is a hyphen in `backup-id` in the file, whereas there is an underscore
|
||||
in `backup_id` in the variable you're setting.)
|
||||
5. Set `backup_id` to the value in the last line of `backup-header`:
|
||||
|
||||
[user@restore ~]$ backup_id=20230405T123455-1234
|
||||
[user@restore ~]$ backup_id=20161020T123455-1234
|
||||
|
||||
6. Verify and decrypt, decompress, and extract the `qubes.xml` file.
|
||||
6. Verify the integrity of your data, decrypt, decompress, and extract
|
||||
`private.img`:
|
||||
|
||||
[user@restore ~]$ echo "$backup_id!qubes.xml.000!$backup_pass" |\
|
||||
scrypt dec -P qubes.xml.000.enc | gzip -d | tar -xv
|
||||
qubes.xml
|
||||
[user@restore ~]$ find vm1 -name 'private.img.*.enc' | sort -V | while read f_enc; do \
|
||||
f_dec=${f_enc%.enc}; \
|
||||
echo "$backup_id!$f_dec!$backup_pass" | scrypt dec -P $f_enc || break; \
|
||||
done | gzip -d | tar -xv
|
||||
vm1/private.img
|
||||
|
||||
If this pipeline fails, it is likely that the backup is corrupted or has
|
||||
been tampered with.
|
||||
|
|
@ -137,66 +158,23 @@ any GNU/Linux system.
|
|||
**Note:** If your backup was compressed with a program other than `gzip`,
|
||||
you must substitute the correct compression program in the command above.
|
||||
This information is contained in `backup-header` (see step 4). For example,
|
||||
if your backup is compressed with `bzip2`, use `bzip2 -d` instead of `gzip
|
||||
-d` in the command above. You might need to install a package of the same
|
||||
name (in this example, `bzip2`) through your distribution's package manager.
|
||||
if your backup is compressed with `bzip2`, use `bzip2 -d` instead in the
|
||||
command above.
|
||||
|
||||
7. Search inside of the `qubes.xml` file for the `backup-path` of the qube
|
||||
whose data you wish to restore. If you install the `xmlstarlet` package, the
|
||||
following command will convert `qubes.xml` to a friendlier listing for this
|
||||
purpose:
|
||||
7. Mount `private.img` and access your data.
|
||||
|
||||
[user@restore ~]$ xmlstarlet sel -T -t -m //domain \
|
||||
-v 'concat(.//property[@name="name"], " ", .//feature[@name="backup-path"])' \
|
||||
-n qubes.xml
|
||||
|
||||
anon-whonix
|
||||
debian-11
|
||||
default-mgmt-dvm
|
||||
disp2345
|
||||
fedora-37
|
||||
fedora-37-dvm
|
||||
personal vm123/
|
||||
sys-firewall
|
||||
sys-net
|
||||
sys-usb
|
||||
sys-whonix
|
||||
untrusted
|
||||
vault vm321/
|
||||
whonix-gw-16
|
||||
whonix-ws-16
|
||||
whonix-ws-16-dvm
|
||||
work
|
||||
[user@restore vm1]$ sudo mkdir /mnt/img
|
||||
[user@restore vm1]$ sudo mount -o loop vm1/private.img /mnt/img/
|
||||
[user@restore vm1]$ cat /mnt/img/home/user/your_data.txt
|
||||
This data has been successfully recovered!
|
||||
|
||||
The example output above shows that the backup file includes a qube named
|
||||
`personal` and a qube named `vault`, with `backup-path` values of `vm123/`
|
||||
and `vm321/` respectively. (Every other listed qube was not selected to be
|
||||
included in the backup file.) Use the corresponding value to untar the
|
||||
necessary data files of the qube:
|
||||
8. Success! If you wish to recover data from more than one VM in your backup,
|
||||
simply repeat steps 6 and 7 for each additional VM.
|
||||
|
||||
[user@restore ~]$ tar -i -xvf qubes-backup-2023-04-05T123456 vm123/
|
||||
**Note:** You may wish to store a copy of these instructions with your
|
||||
Qubes backups in the event that you fail to recall the above procedure
|
||||
while this web page is inaccessible. All Qubes documentation, including
|
||||
this page, is available in plain text format in the following Git
|
||||
repository:
|
||||
|
||||
8. Verify and decrypt the backed up data, decompress it, and extract it.
|
||||
|
||||
[user@restore ~]$ find vm123/ -name 'private.img.*.enc' | sort -V | while read f_enc; do \
|
||||
f_dec=${f_enc%.enc}; \
|
||||
echo "$backup_id!$f_dec!$backup_pass" | scrypt dec -P $f_enc || break; \
|
||||
done | gzip -d | tar -xv
|
||||
vm123/private.img
|
||||
|
||||
If this pipeline fails, it is likely that the backup is corrupted or has
|
||||
been tampered with.
|
||||
|
||||
Also see the note in step 6 about substituting a different compression
|
||||
program for `gzip`.
|
||||
|
||||
9. Mount `private.img` and access your data.
|
||||
|
||||
[user@restore ~]$ sudo mkdir /mnt/img
|
||||
[user@restore ~]$ sudo mount -o loop vm123/private.img /mnt/img/
|
||||
[user@restore ~]$ ls /mnt/img/home/user/
|
||||
example_data_file.txt
|
||||
...
|
||||
|
||||
Success! If you wish to recover data from more than one qube in your backup,
|
||||
simply repeat steps 7, 8, and 9 for each additional qube.
|
||||
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-doc.git
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -68,39 +68,18 @@ will appear in the Applications Menu. (If you encounter problems, see
|
|||
|
||||
## Installing software from other sources
|
||||
|
||||
Some software is not available from the default repositories and must be
|
||||
downloaded and installed from another source. Depending on the installation method,
|
||||
you may either use the updates proxy or direct networking.
|
||||
|
||||
### Using the updates proxy
|
||||
|
||||
If you are still using the distribution package manager, updates will likely still
|
||||
work over the updates proxy without needing to give the TemplateVM direct network access.
|
||||
|
||||
If you are using another installation method fetching remote resources, you might still
|
||||
be able to use the updates proxy by making the tools aware of the proxy. For many tools,
|
||||
it is enough to export the following environment variables in your shell session before
|
||||
proceeding:
|
||||
|
||||
```sh
|
||||
$ export HTTP_PROXY=http://127.0.0.1:8082 http_proxy=$HTTP_PROXY \
|
||||
HTTPS_PROXY=$HTTP_PROXY https_proxy=$HTTPS_PROXY \
|
||||
ALL_PROXY=$HTTP_PROXY all_proxy=$ALL_PROXY \
|
||||
NO_PROXY=127.0.0.1 no_proxy=$NO_PROXY
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Using direct networking
|
||||
|
||||
**Warning:** This method gives your template direct network access, which is
|
||||
[risky](#why-dont-templates-have-normal-network-access). This method is **not**
|
||||
[risky](#why-dont-templates-have-network-access). This method is **not**
|
||||
recommended for trusted templates. Moreover, depending on how you install this
|
||||
software, it may not get updated automatically when you [update Qubes
|
||||
normally](/doc/how-to-update/), which means you may have to update it manually
|
||||
yourself.
|
||||
|
||||
This method assumes that you are trying to follow instructions to install some piece
|
||||
of software in a normal operating system, except *that* operating system is running as a
|
||||
template in Qubes OS.
|
||||
Some software is not available from the default repositories and must be
|
||||
downloaded and installed from another source. This method assumes that you're
|
||||
trying to follow the instructions to install some piece of software in a normal
|
||||
operating system, except that operating system is running as a template in
|
||||
Qubes OS.
|
||||
|
||||
1. (Recommended) Clone the desired template (since this new template will
|
||||
probably be less trusted than the original).
|
||||
|
|
@ -161,25 +140,25 @@ If things are still not working as expected:
|
|||
Please see [How to Update](/doc/how-to-update/).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Why don't templates have normal network access?
|
||||
## Why don't templates have network access?
|
||||
|
||||
In order to protect you from performing risky activities in templates, they do
|
||||
not have normal network access by default. Instead, templates use an [updates
|
||||
proxy](#updates-proxy) which allows you to install and update software using
|
||||
the distribution's package manager over the proxy connection.
|
||||
**The updates proxy is already set up to work automatically out-of-the-box and
|
||||
requires no special action from you.**
|
||||
Most users should simply follow the normal instructions for [installing software
|
||||
from default repositories](#installing-software-from-default-repositories)
|
||||
and [updating](/doc/how-to-update/) software. If your software is not available
|
||||
in the default repositories, see [installing software from other
|
||||
proxy](#updates-proxy) that allows you to install and update software using
|
||||
the distribution package manager without giving the template direct network
|
||||
access.**The updates proxy is already setup to work automatically
|
||||
out-of-the-box and requires no special action from you.** Most users should
|
||||
simply follow the normal instructions for [installing software from default
|
||||
repositories](#installing-software-from-default-repositories) and
|
||||
[updating](/doc/how-to-update/) software. If your software is not available in
|
||||
the default repositories, see [installing software from other
|
||||
sources](#installing-software-from-other-sources).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Advanced
|
||||
|
||||
The following sections cover advanced topics pertaining to installing and
|
||||
updating software in qubes.
|
||||
updating software in domUs.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### Testing repositories
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ the other. Alice's setup looks like this:
|
|||
[bind-dirs](/doc/bind-dirs/) to make those changes persistent, but sometimes
|
||||
she doesn't want to get bogged down doing with all that and figures it
|
||||
wouldn't be worth it just for this one qube. She's secretly glad that Qubes
|
||||
OS doesn't judge her for this and just gives her the freedom to do things however
|
||||
OS doesn't judge her this and just gives her the freedom to do things however
|
||||
she likes while keeping everything securely compartmentalized. At times like
|
||||
these, she takes comfort in knowing that things can be messy and disorganized
|
||||
*within* a qube while her overall digital life remains well-organized.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ Fully updating your Qubes OS system means updating:
|
|||
- [dom0](/doc/glossary/#dom0)
|
||||
- [templates](/doc/glossary/#template)
|
||||
- [standalones](/doc/glossary/#standalone) (if you have any)
|
||||
- [firmware](/doc/glossary/#firmware)
|
||||
|
||||
## Security updates
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -33,7 +32,7 @@ However, you can also start the tool manually by selecting it in the Application
|
|||
|
||||
<div class="alert alert-info" role="alert">
|
||||
<i class="fa fa-question-circle"></i>
|
||||
For information about how templates download updates, please see <a href="/doc/how-to-install-software/#why-dont-templates-have-normal-network-access">Why don't templates have normal network access?</a> and the <a href="/doc/how-to-install-software/#updates-proxy">Updates proxy</a>.
|
||||
For information about how templates download updates, please see <a href="/doc/how-to-install-software/#why-dont-templates-have-network-access">Why don't templates have network access?</a> and the <a href="/doc/how-to-install-software/#updates-proxy">Updates proxy</a>.
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
By default, most qubes that are connected to the internet will periodically check for updates for their parent templates. You can check the date of the last update check in the "last checked" column. If updates are available for any qube, you will receive a notification as described above, and in the "Updates available" column you will see "YES" for that qube(s). If the update check did not find any new updates, "NO" will appear in the column. Respectively, for qubes that are no longer supported, "OBSOLETE" will be displayed. However, if you have any templates that do *not* have any online child qubes, you will *not* receive update notifications for them. By default, after a week, if updates for a given qube have not been checked, the value in the "Updates available" column will be set to "MAYBE".
|
||||
|
|
@ -66,19 +65,10 @@ If you use [Anti Evil Maid (AEM)](/doc/anti-evil-maid/), you'll have to "reseal"
|
|||
|
||||
<div class="alert alert-danger" role="alert">
|
||||
<i class="fa fa-exclamation-triangle"></i>
|
||||
<b>Warning:</b> Updating with direct commands such as <code>dnf update</code> and <code>apt update</code> is <b>not</b> recommended, since these bypass built-in Qubes OS update security measures. Instead, we strongly recommend using the <b>Qubes Update</b> tool or its command-line equivalents, as described below. (By contrast, <a href="/doc/how-to-install-software/">installing</a> packages using direct package manager commands is fine.)
|
||||
<b>Warning:</b> Updating with direct commands such as <code>dnf update</code>, and <code>apt update</code> is <b>not</b> recommended, since these bypass built-in Qubes OS update security measures. Instead, we strongly recommend using the <b>Qubes Update</b> tool or its command-line equivalents, as described below. (By contrast, <a href="/doc/how-to-install-software/">installing</a> packages using direct package manager commands is fine.)
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Advanced users may wish to perform updates via the command-line interface. There are two ways to do this:
|
||||
|
||||
- If you are using Salt, one can use the following two Salt states.
|
||||
|
||||
- [update.qubes-dom0](/doc/salt/#updatequbes-dom0)
|
||||
- [update.qubes-vm](/doc/salt/#updatequbes-vm)
|
||||
|
||||
- Alternatively, use `qubes-dom0-update` to update dom0, and use `qubes-vm-update` to update domUs.
|
||||
|
||||
Using either of these methods has the same effect as updating via the Qubes Update tool.
|
||||
Advanced users may wish to perform updates via the command-line interface. To update templates and standalones non-interactively, use the command `qubes-vm-update`, and to update dom0, use `qubes-dom0-update`. If you want to perform an update with more advanced user-configurable options (e.g., custom pre- or post-update scripts, custom workarounds), see: [update.qubes-dom0](/doc/salt/#updatequbes-dom0) and [update.qubes-vm](/doc/salt/#updatequbes-vm).
|
||||
|
||||
Advanced users may also be interested in learning [how to enable the testing repos](/doc/testing/).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -93,114 +83,3 @@ In the case of Qubes OS itself, we will make an [announcement](/news/categories/
|
|||
Periodic upgrades are also important for templates. For example, you might be using a [Fedora template](/doc/templates/fedora/). The [Fedora Project](https://getfedora.org/) is independent of the Qubes OS Project. They set their own [schedule](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_Release_Life_Cycle#Maintenance_Schedule) for when each Fedora release reaches EOL. You can always find out when an OS reaches EOL from the upstream project that maintains it. We also pass along any EOL notices we receive for official template OSes as a convenience to Qubes users (see the [supported template releases](/doc/supported-releases/#templates)).
|
||||
|
||||
The one exception to all this is the specific release used for dom0 (not to be confused with Qubes OS as a whole), which [doesn't have to be upgraded](/doc/supported-releases/#note-on-dom0-and-eol).
|
||||
|
||||
## Microcode Updates
|
||||
|
||||
x86\_64 CPUs contain special low-level software called **microcode**, which
|
||||
is used to implement certain instructions and runs on various processors that
|
||||
are outside of Qubes OS's control. Most microcode is in an on-CPU ROM, but
|
||||
CPU vendors provide patches that modify small parts of this microcode. These
|
||||
patches can be loaded from the BIOS or by the OS.
|
||||
|
||||
The fixes for some QSBs require a microcode update to work. Furthermore,
|
||||
microcode updates will sometimes fix vulnerabilities "silently". This means
|
||||
that the vulnerability impacts the security of Qubes OS, but the Qubes OS
|
||||
Security Team is not informed that a vulnerability exists, so no QSB is ever
|
||||
issued. Therefore, it is critical to update microcode.
|
||||
|
||||
Intel provides microcode updates for all of their CPUs in a public Git
|
||||
repository, and allows OS vendors (such as Qubes OS) to distribute the updates
|
||||
free of charge. AMD, however, only provides microcode for server CPUs.
|
||||
AMD client CPUs can only receive microcode updates via a system firmware
|
||||
update. Worse, there is often a significant delay between when a vulnerability
|
||||
becomes public and when firmware that includes updated microcode is available
|
||||
to Qubes OS users. This is why Qubes OS recommends Intel CPUs instead of
|
||||
AMD CPUs.
|
||||
|
||||
## Firmware updates
|
||||
|
||||
Modern computers have many processors other than those that run Qubes OS.
|
||||
Furthermore, the main processor cores also run firmware, which is used to
|
||||
boot the system and often provides some services at runtime. Both kinds
|
||||
of firmware can have bugs and vulnerabilities, so it is critical to keep
|
||||
them updated.
|
||||
|
||||
Some firmware is loaded by the OS at runtime.
|
||||
Such firmware is provided by the `linux-firmware` package and can be updated the usual way.
|
||||
Other devices have persistent firmware that must be updated manually.
|
||||
|
||||
Qubes OS supports updating system firmware in three different ways.
|
||||
Which one to use depends on the device whose firmware is being updated.
|
||||
|
||||
- If a device is attached to a domU, it should be updated using **fwupd**.
|
||||
fwupd is included in both Debian and Fedora repositories.
|
||||
It requires Internet access to use, but you can use the updates proxy if you
|
||||
need to update firmware from an offline VM. You can use either the
|
||||
command-line `fwupdmgr` tool or any of the graphical interfaces to fwupd.
|
||||
|
||||
- If a device is attached to dom0, use the `qubes-fwupdmgr` command-line tool.
|
||||
This tool uses fwupd internally, but it fetches firmware and metadata over
|
||||
qrexec from the dom0 UpdateVM, rather than fetching them from the Internet.
|
||||
Unfortunately, their is no graphical interface for this tool yet.
|
||||
|
||||
- System76 systems use a special update tool which is simpler than fwupd.
|
||||
Support for this tool is currently in progress. Once it is finished,
|
||||
users will be able to use the **system76-firmware-cli** command-line
|
||||
tool to update the firmware.
|
||||
|
||||
Firmware updates are important on all systems, but they are especially
|
||||
important on AMD client systems. These do not support loading microcode from
|
||||
the OS, so firmware updates are the **only** way to obtain microcode updates.
|
||||
|
||||
## Firmware update methods
|
||||
|
||||
As of Qubes 4.2, firmware updates can be performed from within Qubes for [fwupd-supported computers](https://fwupd.org/).
|
||||
|
||||
### In dom0
|
||||
|
||||
First, ensure that your [UpdateVM](/doc/Software/UpdateVM/)
|
||||
contains the `fwupd-qubes-vm` package. This package is installed
|
||||
by default for qubes with `qubes-vm-recommended` packages.
|
||||
|
||||
In a dom0 terminal, install the `fwupd-qubes-dom0` package:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update fwupd-qubes-dom0
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Once the package is installed:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
$ sudo qubes-fwupdmgr get-devices
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Examine the terminal output for warnings or errors.
|
||||
You may see the following warning:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
WARNING: UEFI capsule updates not available or enabled
|
||||
```
|
||||
If so, [adjust your BIOS settings](https://github.com/fwupd/fwupd/wiki/PluginFlag:capsules-unsupported) to enable UEFI updates. This setting is sometimes named "Windows UEFI Firmware Update."
|
||||
|
||||
Once resolved, in a dom0 terminal:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
$ sudo qubes-fwupdmgr get-devices
|
||||
$ sudo qubes-fwupdmgr refresh
|
||||
$ sudo qubes-fwupdmgr update
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
A numbered list of devices with available updates will be presented. Ensure your computer is plugged in to a stable power source, then type the list number of the device you wish to update. If a reboot is required, you will be prompted at the console to confirm.
|
||||
|
||||
Repeat the update process for any additional devices on your computer.
|
||||
|
||||
### In other qubes
|
||||
|
||||
Devices that are attached to non-dom0 qubes can be updated via a graphical tool for `fwupd`, or via the `fwupdmgr` commandline tool.
|
||||
|
||||
To update the firmware of offline qubes, use the [Updates
|
||||
proxy](/doc/how-to/install/software/#updates-proxy).
|
||||
|
||||
### Computers without fwupd support
|
||||
|
||||
For computers that do not have firmware update support via `fwupd`, follow the firmware update instructions on the manufacturer's website. Verify the authenticity of any firmware updates you apply.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ title: How to use USB devices
|
|||
|
||||
If you are looking to handle USB *storage* devices (thumbdrives or USB-drives), please have a look at the [block device](/doc/how-to-use-block-storage-devices/) page.
|
||||
|
||||
**Note:** Attaching USB devices to qubes requires a [USB qube](/doc/usb-qubes/).
|
||||
**Note:** Attaching USB devices to VMs requires a [USB qube](/doc/usb-qubes/).
|
||||
|
||||
**Important security warning:** USB passthrough comes with many security implications.
|
||||
Please make sure you carefully read and understand the **[security considerations](/doc/device-handling-security/#usb-security)**.
|
||||
|
|
@ -28,15 +28,15 @@ Examples of valid cases for USB-passthrough:
|
|||
(If you are thinking to use a two-factor-authentication device, [there is an app for that](/doc/ctap-proxy/).
|
||||
But it has some [issues](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4661).)
|
||||
|
||||
## Attaching and detaching a USB device
|
||||
## Attaching And Detaching a USB Device
|
||||
|
||||
### With Qubes device manager
|
||||
### With Qubes Device Manager
|
||||
|
||||
Click the device-manager-icon: 
|
||||
A list of available devices appears.
|
||||
USB-devices have a USB-icon to their right: 
|
||||
|
||||
Hover on one device to display a list of qubes you may attach it to.
|
||||
Hover on one device to display a list of VMs you may attach it to.
|
||||
|
||||
Click one of those.
|
||||
The USB device will be attached to it.
|
||||
|
|
@ -44,11 +44,11 @@ You're done.
|
|||
|
||||
After you finished using the USB-device, you can detach it the same way by clicking on the Devices Widget.
|
||||
You will see an entry in bold for your device such as **`sys-usb:2-5 - 058f_USB_2.0_Camera`**.
|
||||
Hover on the attached device to display a list of running qubes
|
||||
Hover on the attached device to display a list of running VMs.
|
||||
The one to which your device is connected will have an eject button  next to it.
|
||||
Click that and your device will be detached.
|
||||
|
||||
### With the command line tool
|
||||
### With The Command Line Tool
|
||||
|
||||
In dom0, you can use `qvm-usb` from the commandline to attach and detach devices.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ sys-usb:2-1 03f0:0641 PixArt_Optical_Mouse
|
|||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Now, you can use your USB device (camera in this case) in the `work` qube.
|
||||
If you see the error `ERROR: qubes-usb-proxy not installed in the qube` instead, please refer to the [Installation Section](#installation-of-qubes-usb-proxy).
|
||||
If you see the error `ERROR: qubes-usb-proxy not installed in the VM` instead, please refer to the [Installation Section](#installation-of-qubes-usb-proxy).
|
||||
|
||||
When you finish, detach the device.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -87,20 +87,20 @@ sys-usb:2-5 058f:3822 058f_USB_2.0_Camera
|
|||
sys-usb:2-1 03f0:0641 PixArt_Optical_Mouse
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Maintenance and customisation
|
||||
## Maintenance And Customisation
|
||||
|
||||
### Creating and using a USB qube
|
||||
### Creating And Using a USB qube
|
||||
|
||||
If you've selected to install a usb-qube during system installation, everything is already set up for you in `sys-usb`.
|
||||
If you've later decided to create a usb-qube, please follow [this guide](/doc/usb-qubes/).
|
||||
|
||||
### Installation of `qubes-usb-proxy`
|
||||
### Installation Of `qubes-usb-proxy`
|
||||
|
||||
To use this feature, the `qubes-usb-proxy` package needs to be installed in the templates used for the USB qube and qubes you want to connect USB devices to.
|
||||
This section exists for reference or in case something broke and you need to reinstall `qubes-usb-proxy`.
|
||||
Under normal conditions, `qubes-usb-proxy` should already be installed and good to go.
|
||||
|
||||
If you receive this error: `ERROR: qubes-usb-proxy not installed in the qube`, you can install the `qubes-usb-proxy` with the package manager in the qube you want to attach the USB device to.
|
||||
If you receive this error: `ERROR: qubes-usb-proxy not installed in the VM`, you can install the `qubes-usb-proxy` with the package manager in the VM you want to attach the USB device to.
|
||||
|
||||
- Fedora:
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
|
@ -111,19 +111,18 @@ If you receive this error: `ERROR: qubes-usb-proxy not installed in the qube`, y
|
|||
sudo apt-get install qubes-usb-proxy
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Using USB keyboards and other input devices
|
||||
### Using USB Keyboards And Other Input Devices
|
||||
|
||||
**Warning:** especially keyboards need to be accepted by default when using them to login! Please make sure you carefully read and understood the **[security considerations](/doc/device-handling-security/#usb-security)** before continuing!
|
||||
|
||||
Mouse and keyboard setup are part of [setting up a USB qube](/doc/usb-qubes/).
|
||||
|
||||
### Finding the right USB controller
|
||||
### Finding The Right USB Controller
|
||||
|
||||
Some USB devices are not compatible with the USB pass-through method Qubes employs.
|
||||
In situations like these, you can try to pass through the entire USB controller to a qube as PCI device.
|
||||
However, with this approach you cannot attach single *USB devices* but have to attach the whole *USB controller* with whatever USB devices are connected to it.
|
||||
However, with this approach one cannot attach single USB devices but has to attach the whole USB controller with whatever USB devices are connected to it.
|
||||
|
||||
You can find your controller and its BDF address using the method described below, using the command-line tools `lsusb` and `readlink`.
|
||||
If you have multiple USB controllers, you must first figure out which PCI device is the right controller.
|
||||
|
||||
First, find out which USB bus the device is connected to (note that these steps need to be run from a terminal inside your USB qube):
|
||||
|
|
@ -142,7 +141,7 @@ Bus 003 Device 003: ID 413c:818d Dell Computer Corp.
|
|||
(In this case, the device isn't fully identified)
|
||||
|
||||
The device is connected to USB bus \#3.
|
||||
Check which other devices are connected to the same bus, since *all* of them will be attached to the target qube.
|
||||
Check which other devices are connected to the same bus, since *all* of them will be attach to the same VM.
|
||||
|
||||
To find the right controller, follow the usb bus:
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -155,29 +154,11 @@ This should output something like:
|
|||
```
|
||||
../../../devices/pci-0/pci0000:00/0000:00:1a.0/usb3
|
||||
```
|
||||
Now you see the path: the text between `/pci0000:00/0000:` and `/usb3` i.e. `00:1a.0` is the BDF address. Strip the address and pass it to the [`qvm-pci` tool](/doc/how-to-use-pci-devices/) to attach the controller to the target qube, like this:
|
||||
|
||||
Now you see the path and the text between `/pci0000:00/0000:` and `/usb3` i.e. `00:1a.0` is the BDF address. Strip the address and pass it to the [`qvm-pci` tool](/doc/how-to-use-pci-devices/) to attach the controller to the targetVM.
|
||||
|
||||
For example, On R 4.0 the command would look something like
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
qvm-pci attach --persistent personal dom0:00_1a.0
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
It is possible that on some system configurations the readlink method produces output which is different from the example above,
|
||||
For example, you might see output like this:
|
||||
```
|
||||
../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1c.0/0000:01:00.0/usb1
|
||||
```
|
||||
In this case, there is a PCI bridge, and the BDF address of the controller is the *last* item, 01:00.0
|
||||
|
||||
If the output format does not match this example, or you are unsure if it contains the correct BDF address, you can try finding the address using using the Qube Manager instead.
|
||||
|
||||
### Identifying controllers using the Qube Manager
|
||||
Using Qube Manager you can quickly determine the controllers on your system and their BDF addresses, but not which controller a particular device is attached to.
|
||||
|
||||
Open the Qube Manager, then right click on one of the qubes and open the settings. Go to the tab "Devices".
|
||||
Here you should see your available devices along with their BDF addresses. Look for the lines containing "USB controller".
|
||||
They should look something like: `01:00.0 USB controller: Name of manufacturer`
|
||||
|
||||
The first part is the BDF address, in this example: `01:00.0`
|
||||
|
||||
If, for example, you have 2 USB controllers in your system because you added one you should see 2 such lines and you can probably guess which controller is the one on the mainboard and which one you added. For example, if you have a mainboard with an Intel chipset, it is possible that all of the mainboard devices show as "Intel Corporation", while the added controller shows another manufacturer's name.
|
||||
|
||||
Now you should be able to tell which is the BDF address of the mainboard USB controller or the added USB controller.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -88,13 +88,6 @@ domUs lack direct hardware access.
|
|||
* Sometimes the term [VM](#vm) is used as a synonym for domU. This is
|
||||
technically inaccurate, as [dom0](#dom0) is also a VM in Xen.
|
||||
|
||||
## firmware
|
||||
|
||||
Software that runs outside the control of the operating system.
|
||||
Some firmware executes on the same CPU cores as Qubes OS does, but
|
||||
all computers have many additional processors that the operating system
|
||||
does not run on, and these computers also run firmware.
|
||||
|
||||
## HVM
|
||||
|
||||
Hardware-assisted Virtual Machine. Any fully virtualized, or hardware-assisted,
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -269,8 +269,7 @@ As an example we can take the use case of qube QubeDest running a web server lis
|
|||
|
||||
**1. Identify the IP addresses you will need to use for sys-net, sys-firewall and the destination qube.**
|
||||
|
||||
You can get this information using various methods.
|
||||
Only the first method can be used for `sys-net` to find the external IP:
|
||||
You can get this information using various methods, but only the first one can be used for `sys-net` outside world IP:
|
||||
|
||||
- by running this command in each qube: `ip -4 -br a | grep UP`
|
||||
- using `qvm-ls -n`
|
||||
|
|
@ -285,12 +284,7 @@ Note the IP addresses you will need, they will be required in the next steps.
|
|||
|
||||
For the following example, we assume that the physical interface ens6 in sys-net is on the local network 192.168.x.y with the IP 192.168.x.n, and that the IP address of sys-firewall is 10.137.1.z.
|
||||
|
||||
When writing rules in sys-net, you can use `iif` or `iifname`.
|
||||
`iif` is faster, but can change where interfaces are dynamically created and destroyed, eg. ppp0.
|
||||
In that case use `iifname`, like this `iifname ens6`.
|
||||
`iifname` can also match wildcards - `iifname "eth*"`
|
||||
|
||||
In the sys-net VM's Terminal, the first step is to define an nftables chain that will receive DNAT rules to relay the network traffic on a given port to the qube NetVM, we recommend to define a new chain for each destination qube to ease rules management:
|
||||
In the sys-net VM's Terminal, the first step is to define an ntables chain that will receive DNAT rules to relay the network traffic on a given port to the qube NetVM, we recommend to define a new chain for each destination qube to ease rules management:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
nft add chain qubes custom-dnat-qubeDEST '{ type nat hook prerouting priority filter +1 ; policy accept; }'
|
||||
|
|
@ -298,24 +292,25 @@ nft add chain qubes custom-dnat-qubeDEST '{ type nat hook prerouting priority fi
|
|||
|
||||
> Note: the name `custom-dnat-qubeDST` is arbitrary
|
||||
|
||||
> Note: while we use a DNAT chain for a single qube, it's possible to have a single DNAT chain for multiple qubes
|
||||
> Note: while we use a DNAT chain for a single qube, it's totally possible to have a single DNAT chain for multiple qubes
|
||||
|
||||
Second step, code a natting firewall rule to route traffic on the outside interface for the service to the sys-firewall VM
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
nft add rule qubes custom-dnat-qubeDEST iifname ens6 ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24 tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter dnat 10.137.1.z
|
||||
nft add rule qubes custom-dnat-qubeDEST iif == "ens6" ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24 tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter dnat 10.137.1.z
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Third step, code the appropriate new filtering firewall rule to allow new connections for the service
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
nft add rule qubes custom-forward iifname ens6 ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24 ip daddr 10.137.1.z tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter accept
|
||||
nft add rule qubes custom-forward iif == "ens6" ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24 ip daddr 10.137.1.z tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter accept
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
> Note: If you do not wish to limit the IP addresses connecting to the service, remove `ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24` from the rules
|
||||
> If you want to expose the service on multiple interfaces, repeat steps 2 and 3 above, for each interface. Alternatively, you can leave out the interface completely.
|
||||
|
||||
Verify the rules on the sys-net firewall correctly match the packets you want by looking at the counters: check for the counter lines in the chains `custom-forward` and `custom-dnat-qubeDEST`:
|
||||
> If you want to expose the service on multiple interfaces, repeat the steps 2 and 3 described above, for each interface. Alternatively, you can leave out the interface completely.
|
||||
|
||||
Verify the rules on sys-net firewall correctly match the packets you want by looking at its counters, check for the counter lines in the chains `custom-forward` and `custom-dnat-qubeDEST`:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
nft list table ip qubes
|
||||
|
|
@ -325,12 +320,12 @@ In this example, we can see 7 packets in the forward rule, and 3 packets in the
|
|||
|
||||
```
|
||||
chain custom-forward {
|
||||
iifname ens6 ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24 ip daddr 10.137.1.z tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter packets 7 bytes 448 accept
|
||||
iif "ens6" ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24 ip daddr 10.137.1.z tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter packets 7 bytes 448 accept
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
chain custom-dnat-qubeDEST {
|
||||
type nat hook prerouting priority filter + 1; policy accept;
|
||||
iifname ens6 ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24 tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter packets 3 bytes 192 dnat to 10.138.33.59
|
||||
iif "ens6" ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24 tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter packets 3 bytes 192 dnat to 10.138.33.59
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -356,20 +351,18 @@ Content of `/rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script` in `sys-net`:
|
|||
if nft add chain qubes custom-dnat-qubeDEST '{ type nat hook prerouting priority filter +1 ; policy accept; }'
|
||||
then
|
||||
# create the dnat rule
|
||||
nft add rule qubes custom-dnat-qubeDEST iifname ens6 saddr 192.168.x.y/24 tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter dnat 10.137.1.z
|
||||
nft add rule qubes custom-dnat-qubeDEST iif == "ens6" saddr 192.168.x.y/24 tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter dnat 10.137.1.z
|
||||
|
||||
# allow forwarded traffic
|
||||
nft add rule qubes custom-forward iifname ens6 ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24 ip daddr 10.137.1.z tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter accept
|
||||
nft add rule qubes custom-forward iif == "ens6" ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24 ip daddr 10.137.1.z tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter accept
|
||||
fi
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
|
||||
**3. Route packets from the FirewallVM to the VM**
|
||||
|
||||
For the following example, we use the fact that the interface of sys-firewall facing sys-net, is eth0.
|
||||
This is allocated to iifgroup 1.
|
||||
Furthermore, we assume that the IP address of sys-firewall is 10.137.1.z, and the target VM running the web server has the IP address 10.137.0.xx.
|
||||
For the following example, we use the fact that the physical interface of sys-firewall, facing sys-net, is eth0. Furthermore, we assume that the target VM running the web server has the IP address 10.137.0.xx and that the IP address of sys-firewall is 10.137.1.z.
|
||||
|
||||
In the sys-firewall Terminal, add a DNAT chain that will contain routing rules:
|
||||
In the sys-firewall VM's Terminal, add a DNAT chain that will contain routing rules:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
nft add chain qubes custom-dnat-qubeDEST '{ type nat hook prerouting priority filter +1 ; policy accept; }'
|
||||
|
|
@ -378,13 +371,13 @@ nft add chain qubes custom-dnat-qubeDEST '{ type nat hook prerouting priority fi
|
|||
Second step, code a natting firewall rule to route traffic on the outside interface for the service to the destination qube
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
nft add rule qubes custom-dnat-qubeDEST iifgroup 1 ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24 tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter dnat 10.137.0.xx
|
||||
nft add rule qubes custom-dnat-qubeDEST iif == "eth0" ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24 tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter dnat 10.137.0.xx
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Third step, code the appropriate new filtering firewall rule to allow new connections for the service
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
nft add rule qubes custom-forward iifgroup 1 ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24 ip daddr 10.137.0.xx tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter accept
|
||||
nft add rule qubes custom-forward iif == "eth0" ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24 ip daddr 10.137.0.xx tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter accept
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
> Note: If you do not wish to limit the IP addresses connecting to the service, remove `ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24` from the rules
|
||||
|
|
@ -405,10 +398,10 @@ Content of `/rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script` in `sys-firewall`:
|
|||
if nft add chain qubes custom-dnat-qubeDEST '{ type nat hook prerouting priority filter +1 ; policy accept; }'
|
||||
then
|
||||
# create the dnat rule
|
||||
nft add rule qubes custom-dnat-qubeDEST iifgroup 1 tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter dnat 10.137.0.xx
|
||||
nft add rule qubes custom-dnat-qubeDEST iif == "eth0" tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter dnat 10.137.0.xx
|
||||
|
||||
# allow forwarded traffic
|
||||
nft add rule qubes custom-forward iifgroup 1 ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24 ip daddr 10.137.0.xx tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter accept
|
||||
nft add rule qubes custom-forward iif == "eth0" ip saddr 192.168.x.y/24 ip daddr 10.137.0.xx tcp dport 443 ct state new,established,related counter accept
|
||||
fi
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ Now we are going to add the authenticator as a login requirement:
|
|||
|
||||
1. `sudo authselect create-profile mfa --base-on sssd`
|
||||
|
||||
2. Edit the custom system authentication template in `/etc/authselect/custom/mfa/system-auth`.
|
||||
2. Edit the custom system authentication template with `sudo nanois encouraged /etc/authselect/custom/mfa/system-auth`.
|
||||
|
||||
Add the following line right after `auth required pam_faildelay.so delay=2000000`:
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
lang: en
|
||||
layout: doc
|
||||
permalink: /doc/split-gpg-2/
|
||||
redirect_from:
|
||||
- /en/doc/split-gpg-2/
|
||||
- /doc/SplitGpg-2/
|
||||
- /doc/UserDoc/SplitGpg-2/
|
||||
- /doc/open-pgp-2/
|
||||
- /en/doc/open-pgp-2/
|
||||
- /doc/OpenPGP-2/
|
||||
- /doc/UserDoc/OpenPGP-2/
|
||||
ref: 568
|
||||
title: Split GPG-2
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Split GPG implements a concept similar to having a smart card with your private GPG keys, except that the role of the "smart card" is played by another Qubes app qube.
|
||||
This way one not-so-trusted domain, e.g. the one where Thunderbird is running, can delegate all crypto operations -- such as encryption/decryption and signing -- to another, more trusted, network-isolated domain.
|
||||
This way the compromise of your domain where Thunderbird or another client app is running -- arguably a not-so-unthinkable scenario -- does not allow the attacker to automatically also steal all your keys.
|
||||
(We should make a rather obvious comment here that the so-often-used passphrases on private keys are pretty meaningless because the attacker can easily set up a simple backdoor which would wait until the user enters the passphrase and steal the key then.)
|
||||
|
||||
[](/attachment/doc/split-gpg-diagram.png)
|
||||
|
||||
This diagram presents an overview of the Split GPG architecture.
|
||||
|
||||
## Advantages of Split GPG vs. traditional GPG with a smart card
|
||||
|
||||
It is often thought that the use of smart cards for private key storage guarantees ultimate safety.
|
||||
While this might be true (unless the attacker can find a usually-very-expensive-and-requiring-physical-presence way to extract the key from the smart card) but only with regards to the safety of the private key itself.
|
||||
However, there is usually nothing that could stop the attacker from requesting the smart card to perform decryption of all the user documents the attacker has found or need to decrypt.
|
||||
In other words, while protecting the user's private key is an important task, we should not forget that ultimately it is the user data that are to be protected and that the smart card chip has no way of knowing the requests to decrypt documents are now coming from the attacker's script and not from the user sitting in front of the monitor.
|
||||
(Similarly the smart card doesn't make the process of digitally signing a document or a transaction in any way more secure -- the user cannot know what the chip is really signing.
|
||||
Unfortunately this problem of signing reliability is not solvable by Split GPG.)
|
||||
|
||||
With Qubes Split GPG this problem is drastically minimized, because each time the key is to be used the user is asked for consent (with a definable time out, 5 minutes by default), plus is always notified each time the key is used via a tray notification from the domain where GPG backend is running.
|
||||
This way it would be easy to spot unexpected requests to decrypt documents.
|
||||
|
||||
## Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
Create/Edit `/etc/qubes/policy.d/30-user-gpg2.policy` in dom0, and add a line like this:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
qubes.Gpg2 + gpg-client-vm @default allow target=gpg-server-vm
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Import/Generate your secret keys in the server domain.
|
||||
For example:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
gpg-server-vm$ gpg --import /path/to/my/secret-keys-export
|
||||
gpg-server-vm$ gpg --import-ownertrust /path/to/my/ownertrust-export
|
||||
```
|
||||
or
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
gpg-server-vm$ gpg --gen-key
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
In dom0 enable the `split-gpg2-client` service in the client domain, for example via the command-line:
|
||||
|
||||
```shell
|
||||
dom0$ qvm-service <SPLIT_GPG2_CLIENT_DOMAIN_NAME> split-gpg2-client on
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
To verify if this was done correctly:
|
||||
|
||||
```shell
|
||||
dom0$ qvm-service <SPLIT_GPG2_CLIENT_DOMAIN_NAME>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Output should be:
|
||||
|
||||
```shell
|
||||
split-gpg2-client on
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Restart the client domain.
|
||||
|
||||
Export the **public** part of your keys and import them in the client domain.
|
||||
Also import/set proper "ownertrust" values.
|
||||
For example:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
gpg-server-vm$ gpg --export > public-keys-export
|
||||
gpg-server-vm$ gpg --export-ownertrust > ownertrust-export
|
||||
gpg-server-vm$ qvm-copy public-keys-export ownertrust-export
|
||||
|
||||
gpg-client-vm$ gpg --import ~/QubesIncoming/gpg-server-vm/public-keys-export
|
||||
gpg-client-vm$ gpg --import-ownertrust ~/QubesIncoming/gpg-server-vm/ownertrust-export
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
This should be enough to have it running:
|
||||
```
|
||||
gpg-client-vm$ gpg -K
|
||||
/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx
|
||||
-----------------------------
|
||||
sec# rsa2048 2019-12-18 [SC] [expires: 2021-12-17]
|
||||
50C2035AF57B98CD6E4010F1B808E4BB07BA9EFB
|
||||
uid [ultimate] test
|
||||
ssb# rsa2048 2019-12-18 [E]
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
If you want change some server option copy `/usr/share/doc/split-gpg2/examples/qubes-split-gpg2.conf.example` to `~/.config/qubes-split-gpg2/qubes-split-gpg2.conf` and change it as desired, it will take precedence over other loaded files, such as the drop-in configuration files with the suffix `.conf` in `~/.config/qubes-split-gpg2/conf.d/`.
|
||||
|
||||
If you have a passphrase on your keys and `gpg-agent` only shows the "keygrip" (something like the fingerprint of the private key) when asking for the passphrase, then make sure that you have imported the public key part in the server domain.
|
||||
|
||||
## Subkeys vs primary keys
|
||||
|
||||
split-gpg2 only knows a hash of the data being signed.
|
||||
Therefore, it cannot differentiate between e.g. signatures of a piece of data or signatures of another key.
|
||||
This means that a client can use split-gpg2 to sign other keys, which split-gpg1 did not allow.
|
||||
|
||||
To prevent this, split-gpg2 creates a new GnuPG home directory and imports the secret subkeys (**not** the primary key!) to it.
|
||||
Clients will be able to use the secret parts of the subkeys, but not of the primary key.
|
||||
If your primary key is able to sign data and certify other keys, and your only subkey can only perform encryption, this means that all signing will fail.
|
||||
To make signing work again, generate a subkey that is capable of signing but **not** certification.
|
||||
split-gpg2 does not generate this key for you, so you need to generate it yourself.
|
||||
If you want to generate a key in software, use the `addkey` command of `gpg2 --edit-key`.
|
||||
If you want to generate a key on a smartcard or other hardware token, use `addcardkey` instead.
|
||||
|
||||
## Advanced usage
|
||||
|
||||
There are a few option not described in this README.
|
||||
See the comments in the example (config and the source code)[https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-app-linux-split-gpg2/blob/main/qubes-split-gpg2.conf.example].
|
||||
|
||||
Similar to a smartcard, split-gpg2 only tries to protect the private key.
|
||||
For advanced usages, consider if a specialized RPC service would be better.
|
||||
It could do things like checking what data is singed, detailed logging, exposing the encrypted content only to a VM without network, etc.
|
||||
|
||||
Using split-gpg2 as the "backend" for split-gpg1 is known to work.
|
||||
|
||||
## Allow key generation
|
||||
|
||||
By setting `allow_keygen = yes` in `qubes-split-gpg2.conf` you can allow the client to generate new keys.
|
||||
Normal usage should not need this.
|
||||
|
||||
**Warning**: This feature is new and not much tested.
|
||||
Therefore it's not security supported!
|
||||
|
||||
## Copyright
|
||||
|
||||
Copyright (C) 2014 HW42 <hw42@ipsumj.de>\
|
||||
Copyright (C) 2019 Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
|
||||
|
||||
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
|
||||
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
|
||||
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
|
||||
(at your option) any later version.
|
||||
|
||||
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
|
||||
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
|
||||
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
|
||||
GNU General Public License for more details.
|
||||
|
||||
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
|
||||
with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
|
||||
51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
|
||||
|
|
@ -16,12 +16,6 @@ ref: 168
|
|||
title: Split GPG
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="alert alert-warning" role="alert">
|
||||
<i class="fa fa-exclamation-circle"></i>
|
||||
<b>Note:</b> This information concerns split-gpg.
|
||||
The implementation has been updated to provide more features in split-gpg-2. Some incomplete information on split-gpg-2 is available <a href="https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/split-gpg-2/">here</a>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Split GPG implements a concept similar to having a smart card with your private GPG keys, except that the role of the "smart card" is played by another Qubes app qube.
|
||||
This way one not-so-trusted domain, e.g. the one where Thunderbird is running, can delegate all crypto operations -- such as encryption/decryption and signing -- to another, more trusted, network-isolated domain.
|
||||
This way the compromise of your domain where Thunderbird or another client app is running -- arguably a not-so-unthinkable scenario -- does not allow the attacker to automatically also steal all your keys.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -60,9 +60,7 @@ This section contains notes about specific Debian releases.
|
|||
|
||||
### Debian 12
|
||||
|
||||
The Debian-12 templates that ship with release 4.2.4 cannot be used for salting Fedora templates. You must change the template used by `default-mgmt-dvm` to a Fedora template. You can do this in the Qubes Template Switcher tool, or at the command line using `qvm-prefs default-mgmt-dvm template`.
|
||||
|
||||
If you have a Debian template from an earlier release that you want to use for salting Qubes, you **must** stop the salt-common and salt-ssh packages from being upgraded.
|
||||
If you want to use a Debian 12 template for salting Qubes, you **must** stop the salt-common and salt-ssh packages from being upgraded.
|
||||
Do this by marking these packages on hold *before* updating the template.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ After installing a fresh template, we recommend performing the following steps:
|
|||
|
||||
For information about how templates access the network, please see [Why don’t
|
||||
templates have network
|
||||
access?](/doc/how-to-install-software/#why-dont-templates-have-normal-network-access)
|
||||
access?](/doc/how-to-install-software/#why-dont-templates-have-network-access)
|
||||
and the [Updates proxy](/doc/how-to-install-software/#updates-proxy).
|
||||
|
||||
## Updating
|
||||
|
|
@ -158,21 +158,68 @@ Please see [How to Install Software](/doc/how-to-install-software).
|
|||
|
||||
## Uninstalling
|
||||
|
||||
To remove a template, the graphical `Qube Manager` (Qubes Menu > Qubes Tools > Qube Manager) may be used. Right-click the template to be uninstalled and click "Delete qube" to begin removal. If no issues are found, a dialog box will request the template's name be typed as a final confirmation. Upon completion, the template will be deleted.
|
||||
If you want to remove a template you must make sure that it is not being used.
|
||||
You should check that the template is not being used by any qubes,
|
||||
and also that it is not set as the default template.
|
||||
|
||||
The procedure for uninstalling a template depends on how it was created.
|
||||
|
||||
If the template was originaly created by cloning another template, then you can
|
||||
delete it the same way as you would any other qube. In the Qube Manager,
|
||||
right-click on the template and select **Delete qube**. (If you're not sure,
|
||||
you can safely try this method first to see if it works.)
|
||||
|
||||
If, on the other hand, the template came pre-installed or was installed by
|
||||
installing a template package in dom0, per the instructions
|
||||
[above](#installing), then you must execute the following type of command in
|
||||
dom0 in order to uninstall it:
|
||||
|
||||
Alternatively, to remove a template via the command line in dom0:
|
||||
```
|
||||
$ qvm-template remove <TEMPLATE_NAME>
|
||||
$ qvm-template remove qubes-template-<DISTRO_NAME>-<RELEASE_NUMBER>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
\<TEMPLATE_NAME> is the first column from the output of:
|
||||
`qubes-template-<DISTRO_NAME>-<RELEASE_NUMBER>` is the name of the desired
|
||||
template package.
|
||||
|
||||
You may see warning messages like the following:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
$ qvm-template list --installed
|
||||
warning: file /var/lib/qubes/vm-templates/fedora-XX/whitelisted-appmenus.list: remove failed: No such file or directory
|
||||
warning: file /var/lib/qubes/vm-templates/fedora-XX/vm-whitelisted-appmenus.list: remove failed: No such file or directory
|
||||
warning: file /var/lib/qubes/vm-templates/fedora-XX/root.img.part.04: remove failed: No such file or directory
|
||||
warning: file /var/lib/qubes/vm-templates/fedora-XX/root.img.part.03: remove failed: No such file or directory
|
||||
warning: file /var/lib/qubes/vm-templates/fedora-XX/root.img.part.02: remove failed: No such file or directory
|
||||
warning: file /var/lib/qubes/vm-templates/fedora-XX/root.img.part.01: remove failed: No such file or directory
|
||||
warning: file /var/lib/qubes/vm-templates/fedora-XX/root.img.part.00: remove failed: No such file or directory
|
||||
warning: file /var/lib/qubes/vm-templates/fedora-XX/netvm-whitelisted-appmenus.list: remove failed: No such file or directory
|
||||
warning: file /var/lib/qubes/vm-templates/fedora-XX/icon.png: remove failed: No such file or directory
|
||||
warning: file /var/lib/qubes/vm-templates/fedora-XX/clean-volatile.img.tar: remove failed: No such file or directory
|
||||
warning: file /var/lib/qubes/vm-templates/fedora-XX/apps.templates: remove failed: No such file or directory
|
||||
warning: file /var/lib/qubes/vm-templates/fedora-XX/apps.tempicons: remove failed: No such file or directory
|
||||
warning: file /var/lib/qubes/vm-templates/fedora-XX/apps: remove failed: No such file or directory
|
||||
warning: file /var/lib/qubes/vm-templates/fedora-XX: remove failed: No such file or directory
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
In either case, issues with template removal may be raised. If an issue is raised, the template will remain installed and a list of concerns displayed. "Global property default_template" requires [switching](#switching) the default_template property to another template. "Template for" can be resolved by [switching](#switching) the dependent qubes' template. Once the issues are addressed, attempt the removal again.
|
||||
These are normal and expected. Nothing is wrong, and no action is required to
|
||||
address these warnings.
|
||||
|
||||
If the template's entry in the Qubes Menu is not removed with its uninstallation, consult the [troubleshooting page](/doc/app-menu-shortcut-troubleshooting/#fixing-shortcuts).
|
||||
If the uninstallation command doesn't work, pay close attention to
|
||||
any error message: it may tell you what qube is using the template,
|
||||
or if the template is default. In other cases, please see [VM Troubleshooting](/doc/vm-troubleshooting/).
|
||||
|
||||
If the Applications Menu entry doesn't go away after you uninstall a template,
|
||||
execute the following type of command in dom0:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
$ rm ~/.local/share/applications/<TEMPLATE_NAME>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Applications Menu entries for backups of removed qubes can also be found in
|
||||
`/usr/local/share/applications/` of dom0.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
$ rm /usr/local/share/applications/<TEMPLATE_NAME>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Reinstalling
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -387,9 +434,8 @@ this context: the same as their template filesystem, of course.
|
|||
|
||||
* Some templates are available in ready-to-use binary form, but some of them
|
||||
are available only as source code, which can be built using the [Qubes
|
||||
Builder](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-builderv2/). In particular, some
|
||||
template "flavors" are available in source code form only. For the
|
||||
technical details of the template
|
||||
Builder](/doc/qubes-builder/). In particular, some template "flavors" are
|
||||
available in source code form only. For the technical details of the template
|
||||
system, please see [Template Implementation](/doc/template-implementation/).
|
||||
Take a look at the [Qubes Builder](/doc/qubes-builder-v2/) documentation for
|
||||
Take a look at the [Qubes Builder](/doc/qubes-builder/) documentation for
|
||||
instructions on how to compile them.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -146,17 +146,18 @@ These parameters are set for the following reasons:
|
|||
- Install on first disk.
|
||||
- **For Windows 11 only**: Windows 11 requires TPM 2.0, which currently is not supported from Xen. In Order to install Windows 11 under Qubes, the check for TPM in the Windows installer has to be disabled:
|
||||
|
||||
- When the window allowing you to select a Windows version is displayed, **do not select a version and close this window**, but instead type Shift-F10 to open a console window.
|
||||
- When you start setup without having a TPM, you get an error message like *This PC does not fulfil the minimum requirements for Windows 11*.
|
||||
- Typing Shift-F10 then opens a console window.
|
||||
- Here you type `regedit` to start the registry editor.
|
||||
- There you position to the key `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\Setup`.
|
||||
- Now create the key `LabConfig`.
|
||||
- Position to this key and create 3 DWORD values called `BypassTPMCheck`, `BypassSecureBootCheck` and `BypassRAMCheck` and set each value to `1`.
|
||||
- Close the registry editor and console windows.
|
||||
- You will then return to the setup, which will continue normally and install Windows 11 without TPM 2.0.
|
||||
- In the setup window, hit the left arrow in the left upper corner. You will then return into the setup, which will continue normally and install Windows 11 without TPM 2.0.
|
||||
|
||||
:warning: **Caution:** This temporary patch may cease to work if it so pleases Microsoft sometime. With version 24H2 it is still working.
|
||||
:warning: **Caution:** This temporary patch may cease to work if it so pleases Microsoft some time.
|
||||
|
||||
The installation of Windows 11 may require an internet connection to grab a Microsoft ID. Previously, this was true only for the home edition, but since version 24H2, it extends to the Pro edition, too. A workaround to bypass the internet connection requirements of the Windows 11 setup has been published that works for version 21H2 but may be blocked for newer versions:
|
||||
The installation of Windows 11 may require an internet connection to grab a Microsoft ID. This is currently true only for the home addition, but will probably extend to the Pro edition, too. A workaround to bypass the internet connection requirements of the Windows 11 setup has been published that currently works for version 21H2 but may be blocked some time in the future by Microsoft:
|
||||
|
||||
- When you reach the “Let’s Connect You To A Network” page, type Shift-F10 to open a console window.
|
||||
- Here you type `taskmgr` to start the Task Manager window so you can see all running processes.
|
||||
|
|
@ -171,17 +172,6 @@ These parameters are set for the following reasons:
|
|||
- Click `Next`. A screen appears saying "Who's going to use this device?" This is the local account creation screen.
|
||||
- Enter the username you want to use and click `Next`.
|
||||
- Enter a password and click `Next`. You can leave the field blank but it's not recommended.
|
||||
|
||||
For Windows 11 version 24H2, the following sequence of actions to use a local account instead of a Microsoft account has been proved working:
|
||||
|
||||
For version 24H2, the following actions allow you to install Windows 11 with a local account, if the VM is defined, at least temporarily, without a netVM:
|
||||
- After some reboots, the VM will show a window allowing the selection of an installation country. In this window, type Shift-F10 to open a console window.
|
||||
- In this window, type `oobe\bypassnro`. The VM will then reboot and return to the country selection window. The network connection window will now show an option "I don't have internet", allowing you to define a local account.
|
||||
|
||||
In new preview builds of Windows (26120 and beyond, and eventually the next release version), the `oobe\bypassnro` command has been erased and no longer works. Instead, there's a new command called start `ms-chx:localonly` that does something similar. In this case, proceed as follows:
|
||||
- Follow the Windows 11 install process until you get to the Sign in screen. Here, type Shift-F10 to open a console window.
|
||||
- Enter start `ms-cxh:localonly` at the command prompt.
|
||||
- A "Create a user for this PC" dialog window appears, allowing you to define a local account.
|
||||
|
||||
- On systems shipped with a Windows license, the product key may be read from flash via root in dom0:
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -241,16 +231,7 @@ For additional information on configuring a Windows qube, see the [Customizing W
|
|||
|
||||
## Windows as a template
|
||||
|
||||
As described above Windows 7, 8.1, 10, and 11 can be installed as TemplateVM. To have the user data stored in AppVMs depending on this template, the user data have to be stored on a private disk named `Q:`. If there is already a disk for user data, possibly called `D:`, it has to be renamed to `Q:`. Otherwise, this disk has to be created via the Windows `diskpart` utility, or the Disk Management administrative function by formatting the qube's private volume and associating the letter `Q:` with it. The volume name is of no importance.
|
||||
|
||||
Moving the user data is not directly possible under Windows, because the directory `C:\Users` is permanently open and thus locked. Qubes Windows Tools provides a function to move these data on Windows reboot when the directory is not yet locked. To use this function, a working version of QWT has to be used (see the documentation on QWT installation). For Qubes R4.2, this is currently the version 4.1.69. There are two possibilities to move the user data to this volume `Q:`.
|
||||
|
||||
- If Qubes Windows Tools is installed, the option `Move User Profiles` has to be selected on the installation. In this case, the user files are moved to the new disk during the reboot at the end of the installation.
|
||||
|
||||
- This can also be accomplished without QWT installation, avoiding the installation of the Xen PV drivers, if the risk of a compromised version of these drivers according to QSB-091 is considered too severe. In this case, the file `relocate_dir.exe` has to be extracted from the QWT installer kit `qubes-tools-x64.msi`, which will be shown as the content of the CDROM made available by starting the Windows qube with the additional option `--install-windows-tools` (see the QWT installation documentation). The installer kit is a specially formatted archive, from which the file `relocate_dir.exe` can be extracted using a utility like 7-Zip. The file has then to be copied to `%windir%\system32`, i.e. usually `C:\Windows\system32`. Furthermore, locate the registry key `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager`, and add the text `relocate_dir.exe C:\Users Q:\Users` as a new line to the `REG_MULTI_SZ` value `\BootExecute` in this key. On rebooting the Windows qube, the user files will be moved to the disk `Q:`, and the additional registry entry will be removed, such that this action occurs only once.
|
||||
|
||||
If the user data have been moved to `Q:`, be sure not to user the option `Move User Profeiles`on subsequent installations of Qubes Windows tools.
|
||||
|
||||
As described above Windows 7, 8.1, 10 and 11 can be installed as TemplateVM. To have the user data stored in AppVMs depending on this template, the option `Move User Profiles` has to be selected on installation of Qubes Windows Tools. For Windows 7, before installing QWT, the private disk `D:` has to be renamed to `Q:`, see the QWT installation documentation in [Qubes Windows Tools](/doc/templates/windows/qubes-windows-tools-4-1).
|
||||
|
||||
AppVMs based on these templates can be created the normal way by using the Qube Manager or by specifying
|
||||
~~~
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -30,21 +30,4 @@ After suspend/resume, OpenVPN may not automatically reconnect. In order to get i
|
|||
|
||||
After setting up OpenVPN and restarting the VM, you may be repeatedly getting the popup "Ready to start link", but the VPN isn't connected.
|
||||
|
||||
To figure out the root of the problem, check the VPN logs in `/var/log/syslog` or use `journalctl`. The logs may reveal issues like missing OpenVPN libraries, which you can then install.
|
||||
|
||||
## `notify-send` induced failure
|
||||
[Some VPN guides](https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/configuring-a-proxyvm-vpn-gateway/19061) use complex scripts that include a call to `notify-send`, yet some images may not contain this tool or may not have it working properly.
|
||||
For instance calling `notify-send` on a `fedora-36` template VM gives:
|
||||
```
|
||||
Failed to execute child process “dbus-launch” (No such file or directory)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
To check this tool is working properly run:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
sudo notify-send "$(hostname): Test notify-send OK" --icon=network-idle
|
||||
```
|
||||
You should see the `info` message appear on the top of your screen.
|
||||
If that is the case then `notify-send` is not the issue.
|
||||
If it is not, and you have an error of some sort you can:
|
||||
1. Remove all calls to `notify-send` from scripts you are using to start VPN
|
||||
2. Use another template qube that has a working `notify-send` or find proper guide and make your current template run `notify-send` work properly.
|
||||
To figure out the root of the problem, check the VPN logs in `/var/logs/syslog`. The log may reveal issues like missing OpenVPN libraries, which you can then install.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue