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Avoid repeating the prereqs in the 'How to verify the [...] hash values' section...

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...also make other minor improvements.
This commit is contained in:
Dave Smith 2021-07-25 23:41:00 -05:00
parent 0c048c58a0
commit f403800b6f
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 9D496637D81484A6
1 changed files with 23 additions and 27 deletions
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50
project-security/verifying-signatures.md
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@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ decision of whether to trust any given party is beyond the scope of digital
signatures. It's more of a social and political decision.
Once we make the decision to trust certain parties, digital signatures are
useful, because they make it possible for us to limit our trust only to those
useful, because they make it possible for us to limit our trust to only those
few parties we choose and not to worry about all the bad things that can happen
between us and them, e.g., server compromises (qubes-os.org will surely be
compromised one day, so [don't blindly trust the live version of this
@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ However, for digital signatures to make any sense, we must ensure that the
public keys we use for signature verification are indeed the original ones.
Anybody can generate a cryptographic key that purports to belong to "The Qubes
OS Project," but of course only the keys that we (the real Qubes developers)
generate are the genuine ones. The next rest of this page explains how to
generate are the genuine ones. The rest of this page explains how to
verify the authenticity of the various keys used in the project and how to use
those keys to verify certain important assets.
@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ do, but here are some examples for popular operating systems:
**Linux:** [GnuPG](https://gnupg.org/download/index.html)
([documentation](https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/)). Open a terminal and
use the `gpg2` command. If you don't already have GnuPG installed, install it
via your distro's package manager or from the website.
via your distro's package manager or from the GnuPG website.
**Mac:** [GPG Suite](https://gpgtools.org/)
([documentation](https://gpgtools.tenderapp.com/kb)). Open a terminal to enter
@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ in turn signed by the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK).
Before we proceed, you must first complete the following prerequisite steps:
1. [Install OpenPGP software.](#openpgp-software)
2. [Import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key.](#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key)
2. [Import and authenticate the QMSK.](#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key)
The first step is to obtain the correct RSK. The filename of the RSK for your
Qubes OS release is usually `qubes-release-X-signing-key.asc`, where `X` is the
@ -339,8 +339,8 @@ gpg: 2 good signatures
```
This is just an example, so the output you receive will not look exactly the
same. What matters is the line that shows that this key is signed by the Qubes
Master Signing Key with a `sig!` prefix. This verifies the authenticity of the
same. What matters is the line that shows that this key is signed by the QMSK
with a `sig!` prefix. This verifies the authenticity of the
RSK. Note that the `!` flag after the `sig` tag is important because it means
that the key signature is valid. A `sig-` prefix would indicate a bad signature
and `sig%` would mean that gpg encountered an error while verifying the
@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ contained in a plain text file ending in `.DIGESTS`, which can find on the
[downloads](/downloads/) page alongside the ISO. This file contains the output
of running several different cryptographic hash functions on the ISO (a process
known as "hashing") in order to obtain alphanumeric outputs known as "hash
values or "digests."
values" or "digests."
One convenient property of hash values is that they can be generated on any
computer. This means, for example, that you can download a Qubes ISO on one
@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ are lines for the PGP signature that the `*sum` programs do not know how to
read. Therefore, it is safe to ignore these warning lines.
Another way is to use `openssl` to compute each hash value, then compare them
to the contents of the digest file.:
to the contents of the digest file:
```shell_session
$ openssl dgst -md5 Qubes-RX-x86_64.iso
@ -480,22 +480,18 @@ malicious ISO, computed the hash values for that malicious ISO, and replaced
the values in `Qubes-RX-x86_64.iso.DIGESTS` with his own set of values.
Therefore, we should also verify the authenticity of the listed hash values.
Since `Qubes-RX-x86_64.iso.DIGESTS` is a clearsigned PGP file, we can use GPG
to verify it from the command line:
to verify the signature in the digest file:
1. [Import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key.](#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key)
2. [Import and authenticate your release signing key.](#how-to-import-and-authenticate-release-signing-keys)
3. Verify the signature in the digest file:
```shell_session
$ gpg2 -v --verify Qubes-RX-x86_64.iso.DIGESTS
gpg: armor header: Hash: SHA256
gpg: armor header: Version: GnuPG v2
gpg: original file name=''
gpg: Signature made Tue 20 Sep 2016 10:37:03 AM PDT using RSA key ID 03FA5082
gpg: using PGP trust model
gpg: Good signature from "Qubes OS Release X Signing Key"
gpg: textmode signature, digest algorithm SHA256
```
```shell_session
$ gpg2 -v --verify Qubes-RX-x86_64.iso.DIGESTS
gpg: armor header: Hash: SHA256
gpg: armor header: Version: GnuPG v2
gpg: original file name=''
gpg: Signature made Tue 20 Sep 2016 10:37:03 AM PDT using RSA key ID 03FA5082
gpg: using PGP trust model
gpg: Good signature from "Qubes OS Release X Signing Key"
gpg: textmode signature, digest algorithm SHA256
```
This is just an example, so the output you receive will not look exactly the
same. What matters is the line that says `Good signature from "Qubes OS Release
@ -660,11 +656,11 @@ the arguments to `gpg2`. (The signature file goes first.)
There are several possibilities:
- You don't have the [Qubes Master Signing
Key](#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
- [You have not set the Qubes Master Signing Key's trust level
Key (QMSK)](#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).
- You have [not set the QMSK's trust level
correctly.](#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key)
- [In the case of a key that is not directly signed by the Qubes Master Signing
Key, you have not set that key's trust level
- In the case of a key that is not directly signed by the QMSK,
you have [not set that key's trust level
correctly.](#how-to-verify-signatures-on-git-repository-tags-and-commits)
### Why am I getting "X signature not checked due to a missing key"?