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Remove misinterpretation-prone paragraph

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See comments on QubesOS/qubes-issues#7864
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Andrew David Wong 2022-11-06 21:48:59 -08:00
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introduction/faq.md
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@ -94,10 +94,6 @@ The main way Qubes OS [provides privacy](#how-does-qubes-os-provide-privacy) is
Qubes OS does not claim to provide special privacy (as opposed to security) properties in non-Whonix qubes.
This includes [disposables](/doc/how-to-use-disposables/).
For example, a standard [Fedora](/doc/templates/fedora/) qube is expected to have basically the same privacy properties as that upstream Fedora distribution, enhanced to some degree by the control Qubes provides over that qube.
For most users, this level of privacy may be good enough for many common activities.
However, users seeking more advanced privacy features should use Whonix qubes.
Privacy is far more difficult than is commonly understood.
In addition to the [web browser](https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/), there is also [VM fingerprinting](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/VM_Fingerprinting) and [advanced deanonymization attacks](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Advanced_Deanonymization_Attacks) that most users have never considered (and this is just to mention a few examples).
The [Whonix Project](https://www.whonix.org/) specializes in [protecting against these risks](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Protocol-Leak-Protection_and_Fingerprinting-Protection).