mirror of
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-doc.git
synced 2024-12-27 00:09:26 -05:00
Consolidate FAQs into a single page (QubesOS/qubes-issues#2704)
This commit is contained in:
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---
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layout: doc
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title: Users' FAQ
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permalink: /doc/user-faq/
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layout: sidebar
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title: FAQ
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permalink: /faq/
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redirect_from:
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- /doc/user-faq/
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- /en/doc/user-faq/
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- /doc/UserFaq/
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- /wiki/UserFaq/
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- /doc/devel-faq/
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- /en/doc/devel-faq/
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- /doc/DevelFaq/
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- /wiki/DevelFaq/
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---
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Qubes Users' FAQ
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================
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# Frequently Asked Questions
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[General Questions](#general-questions)
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---------------------------------------
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* [Is Qubes just another Linux distribution?](#is-qubes-just-another-linux-distribution)
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* [How is Qubes different from other security solutions?](#how-is-qubes-different-from-other-security-solutions)
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* [Does Qubes use full disk encryption (FDE)?](#does-qubes-use-full-disk-encryption-fde)
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* [What is the main concept behind Qubes?](#what-is-the-main-concept-behind-qubes)
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* [What about other approaches to security?](#what-about-other-approaches-to-security)
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* [What about safe languages and formally verified microkernels?](#what-about-safe-languages-and-formally-verified-microkernels)
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* [Why does Qubes use virtualization?](#why-does-qubes-use-virtualization)
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* [What do all these terms mean?](#what-do-all-these-terms-mean)
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* [Does Qubes run every app in a separate VM?](#does-qubes-run-every-app-in-a-separate-vm)
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* [Why does Qubes use Xen instead of KVM or some other hypervisor?](#why-does-qubes-use-xen-instead-of-kvm-or-some-other-hypervisor)
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* [What about this other/new (micro)kernel/hypervisor?](#what-about-this-othernew-microkernelhypervisor)
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* [What's so special about Qubes' GUI virtualization?](#whats-so-special-about-qubes-gui-virtualization)
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* [Can I watch YouTube videos in qubes?](#can-i-watch-youtube-videos-in-qubes)
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* [Can I run applications, like games, which require 3D support?](#can-i-run-applications-like-games-which-require-3d-support)
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* [Is Qubes a multi-user system?](#is-qubes-a-multi-user-system)
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* [Why passwordless sudo?](#why-passwordless-sudo)
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* [How should I report documentation issues?](#how-should-i-report-documentation-issues)
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* [Will Qubes seek to get certified on the GNU Free System Distribution Guidelines (GNU FSDG)?](#will-qubes-seek-to-get-certified-under-the-gnu-free-system-distribution-guidelines-gnu-fsdg)
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* [Should I trust this website?](#should-i-trust-this-website)
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* [What does it mean to "distrust the infrastructure"?](#what-does-it-mean-to-distrust-the-infrastructure)
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* [Why does this website use Cloudflare?](#why-does-this-website-use-cloudflare)
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* [Why doesn't this website have security feature X?](#why-doesnt-this-website-have-security-feature-x)
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## General & Security Questions
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[Installation & Hardware Compatibility](#installation--hardware-compatibility)
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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* [How much disk space does each qube require?](#how-much-disk-space-does-each-qube-require)
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* [How much memory is recommended for Qubes?](#how-much-memory-is-recommended-for-qubes)
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* [Can I install Qubes on a system without VT-x?](#can-i-install-qubes-on-a-system-without-vt-x)
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* [Can I install Qubes on a system without VT-d?](#can-i-install-qubes-on-a-system-without-vt-d)
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* [What is a DMA attack?](#what-is-a-dma-attack)
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* [Can I use AMD-v instead of VT-x?](#can-i-use-amd-v-instead-of-vt-x)
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* [Can I install Qubes in a virtual machine (e.g., on VMware)?](#can-i-install-qubes-in-a-virtual-machine-eg-on-vmware)
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* [Why does my network adapter not work?](#why-does-my-network-adapter-not-work)
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* [Can I install Qubes OS together with other operating system (dual-boot/multi-boot)?](#can-i-install-qubes-os-together-with-other-operating-system-dual-bootmulti-boot)
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### What is the main concept behind Qubes?
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[Common Problems](#common-problems)
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-----------------------------------
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* [Which version of Qubes am I running?](#which-version-of-qubes-am-i-running)
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* [My qubes lost Internet access after a TemplateVM update. What should I do?](#my-qubes-lost-internet-access-after-a-templatevm-update-what-should-i-do)
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* [My keyboard layout settings are not behaving correctly. What should I do?](#my-keyboard-layout-settings-are-not-behaving-correctly-what-should-i-do)
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* [My dom0 and/or TemplateVM update stalls when attempting to update via …](#my-dom0-andor-templatevm-update-stalls-when-attempting-to-update-via-the-gui-tool-what-should-i-do)
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* [How do I run a Windows HVM in non-seamless mode (i.e., as a single window)?](#how-do-i-run-a-windows-hvm-in-non-seamless-mode-ie-as-a-single-window)
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* [I created a usbVM and assigned usb controllers to it. Now the usbVM wont boot.](#i-created-a-usbvm-and-assigned-usb-controllers-to-it-now-the-usbvm-wont-boot)
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* [I assigned a PCI device to a qube, then unassigned it/shut down the …](#i-assigned-a-pci-device-to-a-qube-then-unassigned-itshut-down-the-qube-why-isnt-the-device-available-in-dom0)
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* [How do I install Flash in a Debian qube?](#how-do-i-install-flash-in-a-debian-qube)
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* [How do I play video files?](#how-do-i-play-video-files)
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* [How do I access my external drive?](#how-do-i-access-my-external-drive)
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* [My encrypted drive doesn't appear in Debian qube?](#my-encrypted-drive-doesnt-appear-in-debian-qube)
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* [Windows Update is stuck.](#windows-update-is-stuck)
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* [Fullscreen Firefox is frozen.](#fullscreen-firefox-is-frozen)
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* [I have weird graphics glitches like the screen turning partially black.](#i-have-weird-graphics-glitches-like-the-screen-turning-partially-black)
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-----------------
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To build security on the "Security by Compartmentalization (or Isolation)" principle.
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### What about other approaches to security?
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General Questions
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-----------------
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The other two popular [approaches](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2008/09/02/three-approaches-to-computer-security.html) are “Security by Correctness” and “Security by Obscurity.”
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We don't believe either of these approaches are capable of providing reasonable security today, nor do we believe that they will be capable of doing so in the foreseeable future.
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### How is Qubes different from other security solutions?
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Please see [this article](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2012/09/12/how-is-qubes-os-different-from.html) for a thorough discussion.
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### Is Qubes just another Linux distribution?
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@ -77,26 +36,6 @@ If you really want to call it a distribution, then it's more of a "Xen distribut
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But Qubes is much more than just Xen packaging.
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It has its own VM management infrastructure, with support for template VMs, centralized VM updating, etc. It also has a very unique GUI virtualization infrastructure.
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### How is Qubes different from other security solutions?
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Please see [this article](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2012/09/12/how-is-qubes-os-different-from.html) for a thorough discussion.
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### Does Qubes use full disk encryption (FDE)?
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Yes, of course!
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Full disk encryption is enabled by default.
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Specifically, we use [`LUKS`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux_Unified_Key_Setup)/[`dm-crypt`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dm-crypt).
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You can even [manually configure your encryption parameters](/doc/encryption-config/), if you like!
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### What is the main concept behind Qubes?
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To build security on the “Security by Compartmentalization (or Isolation)” principle.
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### What about other approaches to security?
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The other two popular [approaches](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2008/09/02/three-approaches-to-computer-security.html) are “Security by Correctness” and “Security by Obscurity.”
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We don't believe either of these approaches are capable of providing reasonable security today, nor do we believe that they will be capable of doing so in the foreseeable future.
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### What about safe languages and formally verified microkernels?
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In short: these are non-realistic solutions today. We discuss this in further depth in our [Architecture Specification document](/attachment/wiki/QubesArchitecture/arch-spec-0.3.pdf).
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@ -105,6 +44,13 @@ In short: these are non-realistic solutions today. We discuss this in further de
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We believe that this is currently the only practically viable approach to implementing strong isolation while simultaneously providing compatibility with existing applications and drivers.
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### Does Qubes use full disk encryption (FDE)?
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Yes, of course!
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Full disk encryption is enabled by default.
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Specifically, we use [`LUKS`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux_Unified_Key_Setup)/[`dm-crypt`](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dm-crypt).
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You can even [manually configure your encryption parameters](/doc/encryption-config/), if you like!
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### What do all these terms mean?
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All Qubes-specific terms are defined in the [glossary](/doc/glossary/).
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@ -149,30 +95,6 @@ We have designed the GUI virtualization subsystem with two primary goals: securi
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Our GUI infrastructure introduces only about 2,500 lines of C code (LOC) into the privileged domain (Dom0), which is very little, and thus leaves little space for bugs and potential attacks.
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At the same time, due to the smart use of Xen shared memory, our GUI implementation is very efficient, so most virtualized applications really feel as if they were executed natively.
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### Can I watch YouTube videos in qubes?
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Absolutely.
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### Can I run applications, like games, which require 3D support?
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Those won’t fly.
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We do not provide OpenGL virtualization for Qubes.
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This is mostly a security decision, as implementing such a feature would most likely introduce a great deal of complexity into the GUI virtualization infrastructure.
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However, Qubes does allow for the use of accelerated graphics (OpenGL) in Dom0’s Window Manager, so all the fancy desktop effects should still work.
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For further discussion about the potential for GPU passthrough on Xen/Qubes, please see the following threads:
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- [GPU passing to HVM](https://groups.google.com/group/qubes-devel/browse_frm/thread/31f1f2da39978573?scoring=d&q=GPU&)
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- [Clarifications on GPU security](https://groups.google.com/group/qubes-devel/browse_frm/thread/31e2d8a47c8b4474?scoring=d&q=GPU&)
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### Is Qubes a multi-user system?
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No.
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Qubes does not pretend to be a multi-user system.
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Qubes assumes that the user who controls Dom0 controls the whole system.
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It would be very difficult to **securely** implement multi-user support.
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See [here](https://groups.google.com/group/qubes-devel/msg/899f6f3efc4d9a06) for details.
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### Why passwordless sudo?
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Please refer to [this page](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/vm-sudo/).
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@ -227,11 +149,45 @@ So, if feature X isn't enabled, it's most likely for one of three reasons:
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3. Our platform supports it, but we're not aware that we can enable it or have forgotten to do so.
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(If it seems like this is the case, let us know!)
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----------
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Installation & Hardware Compatibility
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-------------------------------------
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## Users
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(See also: [System Requirements](/doc/system-requirements/), [Hardware Compatibility List](/hcl/), and [Certified Laptops](/doc/certified-laptops/).)
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### Can I watch YouTube videos in qubes?
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Absolutely.
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### Can I run applications, like games, which require 3D support?
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Those won’t fly.
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We do not provide OpenGL virtualization for Qubes.
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This is mostly a security decision, as implementing such a feature would most likely introduce a great deal of complexity into the GUI virtualization infrastructure.
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However, Qubes does allow for the use of accelerated graphics (OpenGL) in Dom0’s Window Manager, so all the fancy desktop effects should still work.
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For further discussion about the potential for GPU passthrough on Xen/Qubes, please see the following threads:
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- [GPU passing to HVM](https://groups.google.com/group/qubes-devel/browse_frm/thread/31f1f2da39978573?scoring=d&q=GPU&)
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- [Clarifications on GPU security](https://groups.google.com/group/qubes-devel/browse_frm/thread/31e2d8a47c8b4474?scoring=d&q=GPU&)
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### Is Qubes a multi-user system?
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No.
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Qubes does not pretend to be a multi-user system.
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Qubes assumes that the user who controls Dom0 controls the whole system.
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It would be very difficult to **securely** implement multi-user support.
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See [here](https://groups.google.com/group/qubes-devel/msg/899f6f3efc4d9a06) for details.
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### What are the system requirements for Qubes OS?
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See the [System Requirements](/doc/system-requirements/).
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### Is there a list of hardware that is compatible with Qubes OS?
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See the [Hardware Compatibility List](/hcl/).
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### Is there any certified hardware for Qubes OS?
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See [Certified Hardware](/doc/certified-hardware/).
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### How much disk space does each qube require?
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@ -296,9 +252,6 @@ You shouldn't do that, because it poses a security risk for your Qubes OS instal
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But if you understand the risk and accept it, read [documentation on multibooting](/doc/multiboot/),
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it begins with an explanation of the risks with such a setup.
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Common Problems
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---------------
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### Which version of Qubes am I running?
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See [here](/doc/version-scheme/#check-installed-version).
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@ -338,10 +291,8 @@ In your TemplateVMs, open a terminal and run `sudo yum upgrade`.
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Enable "debug mode" in the qube's settings, either by checking the box labeled "Run in debug mode" in the Qubes VM Manager qube settings menu or by running the [qvm-prefs command](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-prefs/).)
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### I created a usbVM and assigned usb controllers to it. Now the usbVM wont boot.
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This is probably because one of the controllers does not support reset.
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In Qubes R2 any such errors were ignored but in Qubes R3.0 they are not.
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A device that does not support reset is not safe and generally should not be assigned to a VM.
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@ -385,8 +336,7 @@ or
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MODALIAS=`cat /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:<BDF>/modalias`
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MOD=`modprobe -R $MODALIAS | head -n 1`
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echo 0000:<BDF> > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/$MOD/bind
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### How do I install Flash in a Debian qube?
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The Debian way is to install the flashplugin-nonfree package.
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@ -472,3 +422,52 @@ If it seems like the issue described in [this thread](https://github.com/QubesOS
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- Q → System Tools → Window Manager Tweaks → Compositor → uncheck "Enable display compositing"
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Please report (via the mailing lists) if you experience this issue, and whether disabling the compositor fixes it for you or not.
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----------
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## Developers
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### Why does dom0 need to be 64-bit?
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Since 2013 [Xen has not supported 32-bit x86 architecture](https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Release_Features) and Intel VT-d, which Qubes uses to isolate devices and drivers, is available on Intel 64-bit processors only.
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In addition, with features like improved ASLR, it is often more difficult to exploit a bug on x64 Linux than x86 Linux.
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While we designed Qubes from the beginning to limit potential attack vectors, we still realize that some of the code running in Dom0, e.g. our GUI daemon or xen-store daemon, however simple, might contain some bugs.
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Plus since we haven't implemented a separate storage domain, the disk backends are in Dom0 and are "reachable" from the VMs, which adds up to the potential attack surface.
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So, having faced a choice between 32-bit and 64-bit OS for Dom0, it was almost a no-brainer.
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The 64-bit option provides some (little perhaps, but some) more protection against some classes of attacks, and at the same time does not have any disadvantages except the extra requirement of a 64 bit processor.
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And even though Qubes now "needs" a 64 bit processor, it didn't make sense to run Qubes on a system without 3-4GB of memory, and those have 64-bit CPUs anyway.
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### What is the recommended build environment for Qubes OS?
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Any rpm-based, 64-bit environment, the preferred OS being Fedora.
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### How do I build Qubes from sources?
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See [these instructions](/doc/qubes-builder/).
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### How do I submit a patch?
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See the [Qubes Source Code Repositories](/doc/source-code/) article.
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### What is Qubes' attitude toward changing guest distros?
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We try to respect each distro's culture, where possible.
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See the discussion on issue [#1014](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1014) for an example.
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The policy is there mostly to ease maintenance, on several levels:
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* Less modifications means easier migration to new upstream distribution
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releases.
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* The upstream documentation matches the distribution running in the Qubes VM.
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* We're less likely to introduce Qubes-specific issues.
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* Each officially supported distribution (ideally) should offer the same set of
|
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Qubes-specific features - a change in one supported distribution should be
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followed also in others, including new future distributions.
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### Is I/O emulation component (QEMU) part of the Trusted Computing Base (TCB)?
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No. Unlike many other virtualization systems, Qubes takes special effort to keep QEMU _outside_ of the TCB.
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This has been achieved thanks to the careful use of Xen's stub domain feature.
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For more details about how we improved on Xen's native stub domain use, see [here](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2012/03/03/windows-support-coming-to-qubes.html).
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@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
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---
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layout: doc
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||||
title: Developers' FAQ
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permalink: /doc/devel-faq/
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redirect_from:
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- /en/doc/devel-faq/
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- /doc/DevelFaq/
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- /wiki/DevelFaq/
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---
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Qubes Developers' FAQ
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=====================
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Why does dom0 need to be 64-bit?
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--------------------------------
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Since 2013 [Xen has not supported 32-bit x86 architecture](https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Release_Features) and Intel VT-d, which Qubes uses to isolate devices and drivers, is available on Intel 64-bit processors only.
|
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|
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In addition, with features like improved ASLR, it is often more difficult to exploit a bug on x64 Linux than x86 Linux.
|
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While we designed Qubes from the beginning to limit potential attack vectors, we still realize that some of the code running in Dom0, e.g. our GUI daemon or xen-store daemon, however simple, might contain some bugs.
|
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Plus since we haven't implemented a separate storage domain, the disk backends are in Dom0 and are "reachable" from the VMs, which adds up to the potential attack surface.
|
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So, having faced a choice between 32-bit and 64-bit OS for Dom0, it was almost a no-brainer.
|
||||
The 64-bit option provides some (little perhaps, but some) more protection against some classes of attacks, and at the same time does not have any disadvantages except the extra requirement of a 64 bit processor.
|
||||
And even though Qubes now "needs" a 64 bit processor, it didn't make sense to run Qubes on a system without 3-4GB of memory, and those have 64-bit CPUs anyway.
|
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|
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What is the recommended build environment for Qubes OS?
|
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------------------------------------------
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Any rpm-based, 64-bit environment, the preferred OS being Fedora.
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How do I build Qubes from sources?
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--------------------------------
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See [these instructions](/doc/qubes-builder/).
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How do I submit a patch?
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------------------------
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See the [Qubes Source Code Repositories](/doc/source-code/) article.
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What is Qubes' attitude toward changing guest distros?
|
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------------------------------------------------------
|
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We try to respect each distro's culture, where possible.
|
||||
See the discussion on issue [#1014](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1014) for an example.
|
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|
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The policy is there mostly to ease maintenance, on several levels:
|
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|
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* Less modifications means easier migration to new upstream distribution
|
||||
releases.
|
||||
* The upstream documentation matches the distribution running in the Qubes VM.
|
||||
* We're less likely to introduce Qubes-specific issues.
|
||||
* Each officially supported distribution (ideally) should offer the same set of
|
||||
Qubes-specific features - a change in one supported distribution should be
|
||||
followed also in others, including new future distributions.
|
||||
|
||||
Is I/O emulation component (QEMU) part of the Trusted Computing Base (TCB)?
|
||||
------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
No. Unlike many other virtualization systems, Qubes takes special effort to keep QEMU _outside_ of the TCB.
|
||||
This has been achieved thanks to the careful use of Xen's stub domain feature.
|
||||
For more details about how we improved on Xen's native stub domain use, see [here](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2012/03/03/windows-support-coming-to-qubes.html).
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user