From e26e40cdc5d26285bc788c64add687e412835da5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew David Wong Date: Fri, 18 Jun 2021 03:37:30 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] Replace "TemplateVM" with "template"; fix links QubesOS/qubes-issues#1015 --- introduction/faq.md | 38 +++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/introduction/faq.md b/introduction/faq.md index 4f7fa7e3..6b56ceb2 100644 --- a/introduction/faq.md +++ b/introduction/faq.md @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ For more information about how to use this powerful tool correctly and safely, p ### What about privacy in non-Whonix qubes? Qubes OS does not claim to provide special privacy (as opposed to security) properties in non-[Whonix](/doc/whonix/) qubes. -This includes [DisposableVMs](/doc/disposablevm/). +This includes [disposables](/doc/how-to-use-disposables/). For example, a standard [Fedora](/doc/templates/fedora/) qube is expected to have basically the same privacy properties as that upstream Fedora distribution, enhanced to some degree by the control Qubes provides over that qube. For most users, this level of privacy may be good enough for many common activities. @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ Privacy is far more difficult than is commonly understood. In addition to the [web browser](https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/), there is also [VM fingerprinting](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/VM_Fingerprinting) and [advanced deanonymization attacks](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Advanced_Deanonymization_Attacks) that most users have never considered (and this is just to mention a few examples). The [Whonix Project](https://www.whonix.org/) specializes in [protecting against these risks](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Protocol-Leak-Protection_and_Fingerprinting-Protection). -In order to achieve the same results in non-Whonix qubes (including DisposableVMs), one would have to reinvent Whonix. +In order to achieve the same results in non-Whonix qubes (including disposables), one would have to reinvent Whonix. Such duplication of effort makes no sense when Whonix already exists and is already integrated into Qubes OS. Therefore, when you need privacy, you should use Whonix qubes. @@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ Those won’t fly. We do not provide GPU virtualization for Qubes. This is mostly a security decision, as implementing such a feature would most likely introduce a great deal of complexity into the GUI virtualization infrastructure. However, Qubes does allow for the use of accelerated graphics (e.g. OpenGL) in dom0’s Window Manager, so all the fancy desktop effects should still work. -AppVMs use a software-only (CPU-based) implementation of OpenGL, which may be good enough for basic games and applications. +App qubes use a software-only (CPU-based) implementation of OpenGL, which may be good enough for basic games and applications. For further discussion about the potential for GPU passthrough on Xen/Qubes, please see the following threads: @@ -357,9 +357,9 @@ See [Certified Hardware](/doc/certified-hardware/). ### How much disk space does each qube require? -Each qube is created from a TemplateVM and shares the root filesystem with this TemplateVM (in a read-only manner). +Each qube is created from a template and shares the root filesystem with this template (in a read-only manner). This means that each qube needs only as much disk space as is necessary to store its own private data. -This also means that it is possible to update the software for several qubes simultaneously by running a single update process in the TemplateVM upon which those qubes are based. +This also means that it is possible to update the software for several qubes simultaneously by running a single update process in the template upon which those qubes are based. (These qubes will then have to be restarted in order for the update to take effect in them.) ### How much memory is recommended for Qubes? @@ -424,8 +424,8 @@ See introductions on Wikibooks: [here](https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Fedora_And_ You may have an adapter (wired, wireless), that is not compatible with open-source drivers shipped by Qubes. You may need to install a binary blob, which provides drivers, from the linux-firmware package. -Open a terminal and run `sudo dnf install linux-firmware` in the TemplateVM upon which your NetVM is based. -You have to restart the NetVM after the TemplateVM has been shut down. +Open a terminal and run `sudo dnf install linux-firmware` in the template upon which your NetVM is based. +You have to restart the NetVM after the template has been shut down. ### Can I install Qubes OS together with other operating system (dual-boot/multi-boot)? @@ -437,21 +437,21 @@ It begins with an explanation of the risks with such a setup. See [here](/doc/version-scheme/#check-installed-version). -### My qubes lost internet access after a TemplateVM update. What should I do? +### My qubes lost internet access after a template update. What should I do? -See [Update Troubleshooting](/doc/update-troubleshooting/#lost-internet-access-after-a-templatevm-update). +See [Update Troubleshooting](/doc/update-troubleshooting/#lost-internet-access-after-a-template-update). ### My keyboard layout settings are not behaving correctly. What should I do? See [Hardware Troubleshooting](/doc/hardware-troubleshooting/#keyboard-layout-settings-not-behaving-correctly). -### My dom0 and/or TemplateVM update stalls when attempting to update via the GUI tool. What should I do? +### My dom0 and/or template update stalls when attempting to update via the GUI tool. What should I do? This can usually be fixed by updating via the command line. In dom0, open a terminal and run `sudo qubes-dom0-update`. -In your TemplateVMs, open a terminal and run `sudo dnf upgrade`. +In your templates, open a terminal and run `sudo dnf upgrade`. ### How do I run a Windows HVM in non-seamless mode (i.e., as a single window)? @@ -487,12 +487,12 @@ See also [here](/doc/assigning-devices/). If you're having trouble playing a video file in a qube, you're probably missing the required codecs. The easiest way to resolve this is to install VLC Media Player and use that to play your video files. -You can do this in multiple different TemplateVM distros (Fedora, Debian, etc.). +You can do this in multiple different template distros (Fedora, Debian, etc.). For Debian: -1. (Recommended) Clone an existing Debian TemplateVM -2. Install VLC in that TemplateVM: +1. (Recommended) Clone an existing Debian template +2. Install VLC in that template: ```bash_session $ sudo apt install vlc @@ -502,9 +502,9 @@ For Debian: For Fedora: -1. (Recommended) Clone an existing Fedora TemplateVM -2. [Enable the appropriate RPMFusion repos in the desired Fedora TemplateVM](/doc/how-to-install-software/#rpmfusion-for-fedora-templatevms). -3. Install VLC in that TemplateVM: +1. (Recommended) Clone an existing Fedora template +2. [Enable the appropriate RPMFusion repos in the desired Fedora template](/doc/how-to-install-software/#rpmfusion-for-fedora-templates). +3. Install VLC in that template: ```bash_session $ sudo dnf install vlc @@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ qvm-prefs kernel "" ### When I try to install a template, it says no match is found. -See [VM Troubleshooting](/doc/vm-troubleshooting/#no-match-found-when-trying-to-install-a-templatevm). +See [VM Troubleshooting](/doc/vm-troubleshooting/#no-match-found-when-trying-to-install-a-template). ### I keep getting "Failed to synchronize cache for repo" errors when trying to update my Fedora templates @@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ Specifically: - If PGP signatures are used, the signing key(s) should have well-publicized fingerprint(s) verifiable via multiple independent channels or be accessible to the developers through a web of trust. - If the software is security-sensitive and requires communication with the outside world, a "split" implementation is highly preferred (for examples, see [Split GPG](/doc/split-gpg/) and [Split Bitcoin](/doc/split-bitcoin/)). -- If the software has dependencies, these should be packaged and available in repos for a [current, Qubes-supported version](/doc/supported-versions/#templatevms) of Fedora (preferred) or Debian (unless all the insecure dependencies can run in an untrusted VM in a "split" implementation). +- If the software has dependencies, these should be packaged and available in repos for a [current, Qubes-supported version](/doc/supported-versions/#templates) of Fedora (preferred) or Debian (unless all the insecure dependencies can run in an untrusted VM in a "split" implementation). - If the software must be built from source, the source code and any builders must be signed. (Practically speaking, the more cumbersome and time-consuming it is to build from source, the less likely the developers are to use it.)