From df507b7f8ce475e84263ae300bb287555bb84f47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: resulin <94526516+resulin@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2023 17:14:27 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Update faq.md: Upgrade to HTTPS

---
 introduction/faq.md | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/introduction/faq.md b/introduction/faq.md
index 6674a4eb..6a0a204e 100644
--- a/introduction/faq.md
+++ b/introduction/faq.md
@@ -784,7 +784,7 @@ UEFI Secure Boot is not supported out of the box as UEFI support in Xen is very
 Arguably secure boot reliance on UEFI integrity is not the best design.
 The relevant binaries (shim.efi, xen.efi, kernel / initramfs) are not signed by the Qubes Team and secure boot has not been tested.
 Intel TXT (used in [Anti Evil Maid](/doc/anti-evil-maid/)) at least tries to avoid or limit trust in BIOS.
-See the Heads project [[1]](https://trmm.net/Heads) [[2]](http://osresearch.net/) for a better-designed non-UEFI-based secure boot scheme with very good support for Qubes.
+See the Heads project [[1]](https://trmm.net/Heads) [[2]](https://osresearch.net/) for a better-designed non-UEFI-based secure boot scheme with very good support for Qubes.
 
 ### What is the canonical way to detect Qubes VM?