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VerifyingSignatures changed

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Increased verbosity regarding trusting and verifying Qubes Master Signing Key
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Axon 2015-01-14 12:54:39 +00:00
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VerifyingSignatures.md
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@ -57,11 +57,48 @@ uid Qubes Master Signing Key
There should also be a copy of this key at the project's main website, in the [Qubes Security Pack](/wiki/SecurityPack), and in the archives of the project's [​developer](https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/qubes-devel/RqR9WPxICwg/kaQwknZPDHkJ) and [​user](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-users/CLnB5uFu_YQ/ZjObBpz0S9UJ) mailing lists. There should also be a copy of this key at the project's main website, in the [Qubes Security Pack](/wiki/SecurityPack), and in the archives of the project's [​developer](https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/qubes-devel/RqR9WPxICwg/kaQwknZPDHkJ) and [​user](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-users/CLnB5uFu_YQ/ZjObBpz0S9UJ) mailing lists.
Once you have obtained the Qubes Master Signing Key ([​\`0x36879494\`](https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc)), you should verify the fingerprint of this key very carefully. Then set its trust level to "ultimate" (oh, well), so that it can be used to automatically verify all the keys signed by the Qubes Master Signing Key: Once you have obtained the Qubes Master Signing Key ([​\`0x36879494\`](https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc)), you should verify the fingerprint of this key very carefully by obtaining copies of the fingerprint from trustworthy independent sources and comparing them to the downloaded key's fingerprint to ensure they match. Then set its trust level to "ultimate" (oh, well), so that it can be used to automatically verify all the keys signed by the Qubes Master Signing Key:
``` {.wiki} ``` {.wiki}
gpg --edit-key 0x36879494 $ gpg --edit-key 0x36879494
and then: fpr, trust, 5, y, q gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.18; Copyright (C) 2014 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.
pub 4096R/36879494 created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
gpg> fpr
pub 4096R/36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
gpg> trust
pub 4096R/36879494 created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
pub 4096R/36879494 created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: ultimate validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key
Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct
unless you restart the program.
gpg> q
``` ```
Now you can easily download any of the developer or release signing keys that happen to be used to sign particular ISO, RPM, TGZ files or git tags. Now you can easily download any of the developer or release signing keys that happen to be used to sign particular ISO, RPM, TGZ files or git tags.