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user/security-in-qubes/split-gpg.md
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@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ Selecting "Yes to All" will add a line in the corresponding [RPC Policy](/doc/rp
## Advanced: Using Split GPG with Subkeys
Users with particularly high security requirements may wish to use Split GPG with [​subkeys](https://wiki.debian.org/Subkeys).
Users with particularly high security requirements may wish to use Split GPG with [subkeys](https://wiki.debian.org/Subkeys).
However, this setup comes at a significant cost: It will be impossible to sign other people's keys with the master secret key without breaking this security model.
Nonetheless, if signing others' keys is not required, then Split GPG with subkeys offers unparalleled security for one's master secret key.
@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ In this example, the following keys are stored in the following locations (see b
### Security Benefits
In the standard Split GPG setup, there are at least two ways in which the `work-gpg` VM might be compromised.
First, an attacker who is capable of exploiting a hypothetical bug in `work-email`'s [​MUA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mail_user_agent) could gain control of the `work-email` VM and send a malformed request which exploits a hypothetical bug in the GPG backend (running in the `work-gpg` VM), giving the attacker control of the `work-gpg` VM.
First, an attacker who is capable of exploiting a hypothetical bug in `work-email`'s [MUA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mail_user_agent) could gain control of the `work-email` VM and send a malformed request which exploits a hypothetical bug in the GPG backend (running in the `work-gpg` VM), giving the attacker control of the `work-gpg` VM.
Second, a malicious public key file which is imported into the `work-gpg` VM might exploit a hypothetical bug in the GPG backend which is running there, again giving the attacker control of the `work-gpg` VM.
In either case, such an attacker might then be able to leak both the master secret key and its passphrase (if any is used, it would regularly be input in the work-gpg VM and therefore easily obtained by an attacker who controls this VM) back to the `work-email` VM or to another VM (e.g., the `netvm`, which is always untrusted by default) via the Split GPG protocol or other [covert channels](/doc/data-leaks).
Once the master secret key is in the `work-email` VM, the attacker could simply email it to himself (or to the world).
@ -378,10 +378,10 @@ Rather, the master secret key remains in the `vault` VM, which is extremely unli
(Note: Although the tutorials below were not written with Qubes Split GPG in mind, they can be adapted with a few commonsense adjustments.
As always, exercise caution and use your good judgment.)
* [​"OpenPGP in Qubes OS" on the qubes-users mailing list](https://groups.google.com/d/topic/qubes-users/Kwfuern-R2U/discussion)
* [​"Creating the Perfect GPG Keypair" by Alex Cabal](https://alexcabal.com/creating-the-perfect-gpg-keypair/)
* [​"GPG Offline Master Key w/ smartcard" maintained by Abel Luck](https://gist.github.com/abeluck/3383449)
* [​"Using GnuPG with QubesOS" by Alex](https://apapadop.wordpress.com/2013/08/21/using-gnupg-with-qubesos/)
* ["OpenPGP in Qubes OS" on the qubes-users mailing list](https://groups.google.com/d/topic/qubes-users/Kwfuern-R2U/discussion)
* ["Creating the Perfect GPG Keypair" by Alex Cabal](https://alexcabal.com/creating-the-perfect-gpg-keypair/)
* ["GPG Offline Master Key w/ smartcard" maintained by Abel Luck](https://gist.github.com/abeluck/3383449)
* ["Using GnuPG with QubesOS" by Alex](https://apapadop.wordpress.com/2013/08/21/using-gnupg-with-qubesos/)
## Current limitations