Sentence case for titles

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unman 2021-07-09 01:06:41 +00:00
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@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ lang: en
layout: doc
permalink: /doc/audio-virtualization/
ref: 60
title: Audio Virtualization
title: Audio virtualization
---
VMs on Qubes OS have access to virtualized audio through the PulseAudio module.

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@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ redirect_from:
- /doc/GUIdocs/
- /wiki/GUIdocs/
ref: 61
title: GUI Virtualization
title: Gui virtualization
---
qubes_gui and qubes_guid processes

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@ -4,5 +4,5 @@ layout: doc
permalink: /doc/qubes-core-admin-client/
redirect_to: https://dev.qubes-os.org/projects/core-admin-client/en/latest/
ref: 245
title: Qubes Core Admin Client
title: Qubes core admin client
---

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@ -4,5 +4,5 @@ layout: doc
permalink: /doc/qubes-core-admin/
redirect_to: https://dev.qubes-os.org/projects/core-admin/en/latest/
ref: 246
title: Qubes Core Admin
title: Qubes core admin
---

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@ -4,5 +4,5 @@ layout: doc
permalink: /doc/qubes-core-stack/
redirect_to: /news/2017/10/03/core3/
ref: 247
title: Qubes Core Stack
title: Qubes core stack
---

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@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ redirect_from:
- /wiki/SecurityCriticalCode/
- /trac/wiki/SecurityCriticalCode/
ref: 55
title: Security-Critical Code
title: Security-critical code
---
Below is a list of security-critical (i.e., trusted) code components in Qubes OS.

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@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ redirect_from:
- /doc/SecurityGoals/
- /wiki/SecurityGoals/
ref: 210
title: Security Design Goals
title: Security design goals
---
Qubes OS implements a security-by-isolation (or security-by-compartmentalization) approach by providing the ability to easily create many security domains. These domains are implemented as lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) running under the Xen hypervisor. Qubes' main objective is to provide strong isolation between these domains, so that even if an attacker compromises one of the domains, the others are still safe. Qubes, however, does not attempt to provide any security isolation for applications running within the same domain. For example, a buggy web browser running in a Qubes domain could still be compromised just as easily as on a regular Linux distribution. The difference that Qubes makes is that now the attacker doesn't have access to all the software running in the other domains.

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@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ lang: en
layout: doc
permalink: /doc/storage-pools/
ref: 57
title: Storage Pools
title: Storage pools
---
Qubes OS R3.2 introduced the concept of storage drivers and pools. This feature

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@ -9,5 +9,5 @@ redirect_from:
redirect_to:
- /doc/#developer-documentation
ref: 62
title: System Documentation
title: System documentation
---

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@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ redirect_from:
- /doc/TemplateImplementation/
- /wiki/TemplateImplementation/
ref: 58
title: Template Implementation
title: Template implementation
---
Every VM has 4 block devices connected: