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Provide evidence that AMD is slow to ship client microcode
The claims in the documentation are corrrect, but no sources were provided. Add links to sources. Fixes: QubesOS/qubes-issues#9485
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@ -114,16 +114,16 @@ We recommend consulting these resources when selecting hardware for Qubes OS:
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other security updates directly to users. By contrast, on AMD client (as
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opposed to server) platforms, microcode updates are typically shipped only as
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part of system firmware and generally cannot be loaded from the operating
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system. This means that AMD users typically must wait for:
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system [^1]. This means that AMD users typically must wait for:
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1. AMD to distribute microcode updates to original equipment manufacturers
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(OEMs), original design manufacturers (ODMs), and motherboard manufacturers
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(MB); and
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2. The user's OEM, ODM, or MB to provide a suitable BIOS or (U)EFI update for
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the user's system.
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Historically, AMD has often been slow to complete step (1), at least for its
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client (as opposed to server) platforms. In some cases, AMD has made fixes
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client (as opposed to server) platforms [^2]. In some cases, AMD has made fixes
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available for its server platforms very shortly after a security embargo was
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lifted, but it did not make fixes available for client platforms facing the
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same vulnerability until weeks or months later. (A "security embargo" is the
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@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ We recommend consulting these resources when selecting hardware for Qubes OS:
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Step (2) varies by vendor. Many vendors fail to complete step (2) at all,
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while some others take a very long time to complete it.
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The bottom line is that Qubes OS **can** run on AMD systems, and the Qubes and
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Xen security teams do their best to provide security support for AMD systems.
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However, without the ability to ship microcode updates, there is only so much
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@ -163,3 +163,17 @@ We recommend consulting these resources when selecting hardware for Qubes OS:
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- You can check whether an Intel processor has VT-x and VT-d on
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[ark.intel.com](https://ark.intel.com/content/www/us/en/ark.html#@Processors).
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[^1]: There is an `amd-ucode-firmware` package, but it only contains
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microcode for servers and outdated microcode for Chromebooks. Also,
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the [AMD security website](https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security.html)
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only lists microcode as a mitigation for data center CPUs.
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[^2]: As shown on [the AMD page for Speculative Return Stack Overflow](https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-7005.html),
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updated AGESA™ firmware for AMD Ryzen™ Threadripper™ 5000WX Processors
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was not available until 2024-01-11, even though the vulnerability became
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public on 2023-08-08. AMD did not provide updated firmware for other client
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processors until a date between 2023-08-22 to 2023-08-25.
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For Zenbleed, firmware was not available until 2024 for most client parts,
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even though server parts got microcode on 2023-06-06.
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