From caeb1453552abeb3b93623862b9a2f6c47885155 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Santori Helix <74464484+santorihelix@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2020 20:53:08 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fixed a grammar error in the intro

Changed "...the role of the x plays..." to "...the role of the x is played by..."
---
 user/security-in-qubes/split-gpg.md | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/user/security-in-qubes/split-gpg.md b/user/security-in-qubes/split-gpg.md
index 9a1c1431..b2f20a02 100644
--- a/user/security-in-qubes/split-gpg.md
+++ b/user/security-in-qubes/split-gpg.md
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ redirect_from:
 
 # Qubes Split GPG #
 
-Split GPG implements a concept similar to having a smart card with your private GPG keys, except that the role of the "smart card" plays another Qubes AppVM.
+Split GPG implements a concept similar to having a smart card with your private GPG keys, except that the role of the "smart card" is played by another Qubes AppVM.
 This way one, not-so-trusted domain, e.g. the one where Thunderbird is running, can delegate all crypto operations, such as encryption/decryption and signing to another, more trusted, network-isolated, domain.
 This way the compromise of your domain where Thunderbird or another client app is running -- arguably a not-so-unthinkable scenario -- does not allow the attacker to automatically also steal all your keys.
 (We should make a rather obvious comment here that the so-often-used passphrases on private keys are pretty meaningless because the attacker can easily set up a simple backdoor which would wait until the user enters the passphrase and steal the key then.)