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Improve qubes-secpack page
- Swap section order - Normalize heading capitalization and syntax - Add redirect
This commit is contained in:
Andrew David Wong
parent
6043c6e51d
commit
c6beef25f5
@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ permalink: /security/pack/
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redirect_from:
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- /doc/security-pack/
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- /en/doc/security-pack/
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- /security-pack/
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- /doc/SecurityPack/
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- /wiki/SecurityPack/
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- /qsp/
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@ -33,105 +34,8 @@ official location is:
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<https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack>
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History and Rationale
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---------------------
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On 2013-01-05, Joanna Rutkowska announced the `qubes-secpack` and explained its
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rationale in an
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[email](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-devel/twkOEaMLtNI/lZyGx6_jFCEJ)
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to the Qubes mailing lists:
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```
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Hello,
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A new Qubes Security Bulletin has been just released and is available here:
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https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-013-2015.txt
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As per the previous discussions about recent problems with verifying
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digital signatures on messages sent to Google Groups (thanks to
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automatic footer addition by Google), we have decided to change the way
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we publish Qubes Security Bulletins, as well as other security-related
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info pertinent to the Qubes Project.
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Starting today, we will be maintain a Git repository -- "Qubes Security
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Pack" -- which will contain all the QSBs released so far, all the keys,
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warrant canaries [1], and potentially some additional info or
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announcements (e.g. key revocations). The whole repo can be found here:
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https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack
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Note that all the keys distributed there should be signed by Qubes
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Master Key. The Master Key is also attached in the repo, but should
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really be obtained/verified using a different channel.
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Additionally, most of the files are signed by core Qubes
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developers (currently by Marek and myself) via detached signatures as
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well as git tag signatures.
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The are several advantages of using Git to distribute all these information:
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1) Git repo is a collection of files, some of which can be detached GPG
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signatures for other files and we can ensure all these files are
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distributed together.
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2) Git makes it easy for people to clone and redistribute these
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collection of files, as well as to easily host them and view on the Web.
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3) Git provides for signed tags mechanisms which is another mean we
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utilize to ensure integrity of the distributed files.
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A few words about the Warrant Canary which we've just introduced today,
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and which can be seen here:
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https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-001-2015.txt
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Even though we're not providing any kind of services (such as e.g. email
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hosting), that could be searched or tapped by authorities, there are
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other possibilities that worry us [2], in the light of various recent
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law "developments", such as those that might be coercing people to hand
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over their private keys to authorities.
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Until we fully decentralize the root of trust for Qubes, something that
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requires the move to deterministic builds [3], and so won't happen
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very soon, the possibility of having to disclose any of the Qubes
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signing keys to anybody might have pretty serious consequences for those
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who decided to entrust Qubes with anything serious. And we would like to
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somehow minimize these consequences with this canary thing.
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Additionally the canary is a nice way of ensuring "freshness" of our
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messaging to the community.
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Of course the canary doesn't solve all the problems. E.g. if my signing
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keys were somehow stolen without our knowledge, it wouldn't help.
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Neither it could help in case me being or becoming a miscreant. And
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probably it doesn't address many other potential problems, which could
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only be solved one day with a multi-signature scheme. But anyway, until
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that time, this is the best we can do, I think.
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And congrats to Jann for the very interesting clipboard attack (even
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though mostly theoretical, still very cool)!
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Thanks,
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joanna.
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--
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The Qubes Security Team
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https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/SecurityPage
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[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary
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[2] Especially myself, because I'm currently the Root Of Trust for all
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Qubes binaries :/
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[3] Deterministic builds are required because it's the only way we can
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implement multiple signature scheme for distributed binaries.
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```
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How to Obtain, Verify, and Read
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-------------------------------
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## How to obtain, verify, and read
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The following example demonstrates one method of obtaining the `qubes-secpack`,
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verifying its contents, and reading them.
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@ -271,3 +175,101 @@ The same procedures can be applied to any directory or file in the
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signatures) are provided to ensure that the system is robust (e.g., against a
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potential failure in Git tag-based verification) and to give users more options
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to verify the files.
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## History and rationale
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On 2013-01-05, Joanna Rutkowska announced the `qubes-secpack` and explained its
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rationale in an
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[email](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-devel/twkOEaMLtNI/lZyGx6_jFCEJ)
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to the Qubes mailing lists:
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```
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Hello,
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A new Qubes Security Bulletin has been just released and is available here:
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|
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https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-013-2015.txt
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As per the previous discussions about recent problems with verifying
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digital signatures on messages sent to Google Groups (thanks to
|
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automatic footer addition by Google), we have decided to change the way
|
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we publish Qubes Security Bulletins, as well as other security-related
|
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info pertinent to the Qubes Project.
|
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|
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Starting today, we will be maintain a Git repository -- "Qubes Security
|
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Pack" -- which will contain all the QSBs released so far, all the keys,
|
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warrant canaries [1], and potentially some additional info or
|
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announcements (e.g. key revocations). The whole repo can be found here:
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|
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https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack
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Note that all the keys distributed there should be signed by Qubes
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Master Key. The Master Key is also attached in the repo, but should
|
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really be obtained/verified using a different channel.
|
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|
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Additionally, most of the files are signed by core Qubes
|
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developers (currently by Marek and myself) via detached signatures as
|
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well as git tag signatures.
|
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|
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The are several advantages of using Git to distribute all these information:
|
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|
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1) Git repo is a collection of files, some of which can be detached GPG
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signatures for other files and we can ensure all these files are
|
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distributed together.
|
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|
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2) Git makes it easy for people to clone and redistribute these
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collection of files, as well as to easily host them and view on the Web.
|
||||
|
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3) Git provides for signed tags mechanisms which is another mean we
|
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utilize to ensure integrity of the distributed files.
|
||||
|
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A few words about the Warrant Canary which we've just introduced today,
|
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and which can be seen here:
|
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|
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https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-001-2015.txt
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Even though we're not providing any kind of services (such as e.g. email
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hosting), that could be searched or tapped by authorities, there are
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other possibilities that worry us [2], in the light of various recent
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law "developments", such as those that might be coercing people to hand
|
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over their private keys to authorities.
|
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|
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Until we fully decentralize the root of trust for Qubes, something that
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requires the move to deterministic builds [3], and so won't happen
|
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very soon, the possibility of having to disclose any of the Qubes
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signing keys to anybody might have pretty serious consequences for those
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who decided to entrust Qubes with anything serious. And we would like to
|
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somehow minimize these consequences with this canary thing.
|
||||
|
||||
Additionally the canary is a nice way of ensuring "freshness" of our
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messaging to the community.
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|
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Of course the canary doesn't solve all the problems. E.g. if my signing
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keys were somehow stolen without our knowledge, it wouldn't help.
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Neither it could help in case me being or becoming a miscreant. And
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probably it doesn't address many other potential problems, which could
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only be solved one day with a multi-signature scheme. But anyway, until
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that time, this is the best we can do, I think.
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And congrats to Jann for the very interesting clipboard attack (even
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though mostly theoretical, still very cool)!
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Thanks,
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joanna.
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--
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The Qubes Security Team
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https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/SecurityPage
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[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary
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[2] Especially myself, because I'm currently the Root Of Trust for all
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Qubes binaries :/
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[3] Deterministic builds are required because it's the only way we can
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implement multiple signature scheme for distributed binaries.
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```
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