Fix some links in the FAQ

Ref QubesOS/qubes-issues#5537
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AJ Jordan 2020-01-21 13:15:18 -05:00
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@ -96,6 +96,12 @@ in a few clicks. Users concerned about privacy will appreciate the
[Tor] securely, while those concerned about physical hardware attacks will [Tor] securely, while those concerned about physical hardware attacks will
benefit from [Anti Evil Maid]. benefit from [Anti Evil Maid].
[disposable qube]: /doc/dispvm/
[Template]: /doc/templates/
[Qubes-Whonix]: /doc/whonix/
[Tor]: https://www.torproject.org/
[Anti Evil Maid]: /doc/anti-evil-maid/
### How does Qubes OS compare to using a "live CD" OS? ### How does Qubes OS compare to using a "live CD" OS?
Booting your computer from a live CD (or DVD) when you need to perform Booting your computer from a live CD (or DVD) when you need to perform
@ -107,6 +113,8 @@ the same OS. This means, once again, that if your session is compromised,
then all the data and activities performed within that same session are also then all the data and activities performed within that same session are also
potentially compromised. potentially compromised.
[Tails]: https://tails.boum.org/
### How does Qubes OS compare to running VMs in a conventional OS? ### How does Qubes OS compare to running VMs in a conventional OS?
Not all virtual machine software is equal when it comes to security. You may Not all virtual machine software is equal when it comes to security. You may
@ -121,17 +129,19 @@ only as secure as the host OS itself. If the host OS is ever compromised,
then any VMs it hosts are also effectively compromised. then any VMs it hosts are also effectively compromised.
By contrast, Qubes uses a "Type 1" or "bare metal" hypervisor called By contrast, Qubes uses a "Type 1" or "bare metal" hypervisor called
[Xen]. Instead of running inside an OS, Type 1 hypervisors run directly on the [Xen]. Instead of running inside an OS, Type 1 hypervisors run directly on
"bare metal" of the hardware. This means that an attacker must be capable of the "bare metal" of the hardware. This means that an attacker must be capable
subverting the hypervisor itself in order to compromise the entire system, of subverting the hypervisor itself in order to compromise the entire system,
which is vastly more difficult. which is vastly more difficult.
Qubes makes it so that multiple VMs running under a Type 1 hypervisor can be Qubes makes it so that multiple VMs running under a Type 1 hypervisor can be
securely used as an integrated OS. For example, it puts all of your application securely used as an integrated OS. For example, it puts all of your application
windows on the same desktop with special colored borders indicating the windows on the same desktop with special colored borders indicating the trust
trust levels of their respective VMs. It also allows for things like secure levels of their respective VMs. It also allows for things like secure copy/paste
copy/paste operations between VMs, securely copying and transferring files operations between VMs, securely copying and transferring files between VMs, and
between VMs, and secure networking between VMs and the Internet. secure networking between VMs and the Internet.
[Xen]: https://www.xenproject.org/
### How does Qubes OS compare to using a separate physical machine? ### How does Qubes OS compare to using a separate physical machine?