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Fix some links in the FAQ

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Ref QubesOS/qubes-issues#5537
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AJ Jordan 2020-01-21 13:15:18 -05:00
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introduction/faq.md
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@ -96,6 +96,12 @@ in a few clicks. Users concerned about privacy will appreciate the
[Tor] securely, while those concerned about physical hardware attacks will
benefit from [Anti Evil Maid].
[disposable qube]: /doc/dispvm/
[Template]: /doc/templates/
[Qubes-Whonix]: /doc/whonix/
[Tor]: https://www.torproject.org/
[Anti Evil Maid]: /doc/anti-evil-maid/
### How does Qubes OS compare to using a "live CD" OS?
Booting your computer from a live CD (or DVD) when you need to perform
@ -107,6 +113,8 @@ the same OS. This means, once again, that if your session is compromised,
then all the data and activities performed within that same session are also
potentially compromised.
[Tails]: https://tails.boum.org/
### How does Qubes OS compare to running VMs in a conventional OS?
Not all virtual machine software is equal when it comes to security. You may
@ -121,17 +129,19 @@ only as secure as the host OS itself. If the host OS is ever compromised,
then any VMs it hosts are also effectively compromised.
By contrast, Qubes uses a "Type 1" or "bare metal" hypervisor called
[Xen]. Instead of running inside an OS, Type 1 hypervisors run directly on the
"bare metal" of the hardware. This means that an attacker must be capable of
subverting the hypervisor itself in order to compromise the entire system,
[Xen]. Instead of running inside an OS, Type 1 hypervisors run directly on
the "bare metal" of the hardware. This means that an attacker must be capable
of subverting the hypervisor itself in order to compromise the entire system,
which is vastly more difficult.
Qubes makes it so that multiple VMs running under a Type 1 hypervisor can be
securely used as an integrated OS. For example, it puts all of your application
windows on the same desktop with special colored borders indicating the
trust levels of their respective VMs. It also allows for things like secure
copy/paste operations between VMs, securely copying and transferring files
between VMs, and secure networking between VMs and the Internet.
windows on the same desktop with special colored borders indicating the trust
levels of their respective VMs. It also allows for things like secure copy/paste
operations between VMs, securely copying and transferring files between VMs, and
secure networking between VMs and the Internet.
[Xen]: https://www.xenproject.org/
### How does Qubes OS compare to using a separate physical machine?