Update Verifying Signatures for R3.2

* Update examples using R3.2 ISO
* Note that all .DIGESTS files are now available in qubes-secpack
* Clarify language and procedure
This commit is contained in:
Andrew David Wong 2016-10-01 12:41:37 -07:00
parent cf6a2a3763
commit be74d8ae21
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 8CE137352A019A17

View File

@ -161,10 +161,10 @@ Master Signing Key has no expiration date. This latter key was generated and is
kept only within a dedicated, air-gapped "vault" machine, and the private
portion will (hopefully) never leave this isolated machine.
You can now verify the ISO image (`Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso`) matches its
signature (`Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso.asc`):
You can now verify the ISO image (`Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso`) matches its
signature (`Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso.asc`):
$ gpg -v --verify Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso.asc Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso
$ gpg -v --verify Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso.asc Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso
gpg: armor header: Version: GnuPG v1
gpg: Signature made Tue 08 Mar 2016 07:40:56 PM PST using RSA key ID 03FA5082
gpg: using PGP trust model
@ -186,56 +186,57 @@ Verifying Digests
Each ISO is also accompanied by a plain text file ending in `.DIGESTS`. This
file contains the output of running several different crytographic hash
functions on the ISO in order to obtain alphanumeric outputs known as "digests."
These digests are provided as an alternative verification method to PGP
signatures (though the digests themselves are also PGP-signed -- see below). If
you've already verified the signatures on the ISO directly, then verifying
digests is not necessary.
functions on the ISO in order to obtain alphanumeric outputs known as "digests"
or "hash values." These hash values are provided as an alternative verification
method to PGP signatures (though the `.DIGESTS` file is itself also PGP-signed
--- see below). If you've already verified the signatures on the ISO directly,
then verifying digests is not necessary. You can always find all the `.DIGESTS`
files for every Qubes ISO in the [Qubes Security Pack].
For example, `Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso` is accompanied by
`Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso.DIGESTS` which has the following content:
As an example, `Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso` is accompanied by
`Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso.DIGESTS` which has the following content:
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
f99634b05d15f6bb2ac02ee03e4338a0 *Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso
990b7765ee209b42b3cad78673463daae769c729 *Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso
2d82a684d507ad5789ed83272af4311fd04375e782364d5dd9df4b3d7118cc28 *Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso
083d6cfc3fb5dc97fd91d8f9f70301c154e3674114ff1727b0415c2c663b233c22e0830d0bfc1f7a532549d7e39c6ef5cfde6a90a650343b47ba57d3e8e92ca7 *Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso
3c951138b8b9867d8657f173c1b58b82 *Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso
1fc9508160d7c4cba6cacc3025165b0f996c843f *Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso
6b998045a513dcdd45c1c6e61ace4f1b4e7eff799f381dccb9eb0170c80f678a *Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso
de1eb2e76bdb48559906f6fe344027ece20658d4a7f04ba00d4e40c63723171c62bdcc869375e7a4a4499d7bff484d7a621c3acfe9c2b221baee497d13cd02fe *Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1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=FiJ5
Version: GnuPG v2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=e9oD
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Four digests have been computed for this ISO. The hash functions used, in order
from top to bottom, are MD5, SHA1, SHA256, and SHA512. One way to verify that
the ISO you downloaded matches any of these hash values is by using the
respective `*sum` programs:
$ md5sum -c Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso.DIGESTS
Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso: OK
$ md5sum -c Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso.DIGESTS
Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso: OK
md5sum: WARNING: 23 lines are improperly formatted
$ sha1sum -c Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso.DIGESTS
Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso: OK
$ sha1sum -c Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso.DIGESTS
Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso: OK
sha1sum: WARNING: 23 lines are improperly formatted
$ sha256sum -c Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso.DIGESTS
Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso: OK
$ sha256sum -c Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso.DIGESTS
Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso: OK
sha256sum: WARNING: 23 lines are improperly formatted
$ sha512sum -c Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso.DIGESTS
Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso: OK
$ sha512sum -c Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso.DIGESTS
Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso: OK
sha512sum: WARNING: 23 lines are improperly formatted
The `OK` response tells us that the hash value for that particular hash
@ -249,34 +250,33 @@ read.
Another way is to use `openssl` to compute each hash value, then compare them
to the contents of the `.DIGESTS` file.:
$ openssl dgst -md5 Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso
MD5(Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso)= f99634b05d15f6bb2ac02ee03e4338a0
$ openssl dgst -sha1 Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso
SHA1(Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso)= 990b7765ee209b42b3cad78673463daae769c729
$ openssl dgst -sha256 Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso
SHA256(Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso)= 2d82a684d507ad5789ed83272af4311fd04375e782364d5dd9df4b3d7118cc28
$ openssl dgst -sha512 Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso
SHA512(Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso)=
083d6cfc3fb5dc97fd91d8f9f70301c154e3674114ff1727b0415c2c663b233c22e0830d0bfc1f7a532549d7e39c6ef5cfde6a90a650343b47ba57d3e8e92ca7
$ openssl dgst -md5 Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso
MD5(Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso)= 3c951138b8b9867d8657f173c1b58b82
$ openssl dgst -sha1 Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso
SHA1(Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso)= 1fc9508160d7c4cba6cacc3025165b0f996c843f
$ openssl dgst -sha256 Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso
SHA256(Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso)= 6b998045a513dcdd45c1c6e61ace4f1b4e7eff799f381dccb9eb0170c80f678a
$ openssl dgst -sha512 Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso
SHA512(Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso)= de1eb2e76bdb48559906f6fe344027ece20658d4a7f04ba00d4e40c63723171c62bdcc869375e7a4a4499d7bff484d7a621c3acfe9c2b221baee497d13cd02fe
(Notice that the outputs match the values from the `.DIGESTS` file.)
However, it is possible that an attacker replaced `Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso` with
However, it is possible that an attacker replaced `Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso` with
a malicious ISO, computed the hash values for that ISO, and replaced the values
in `Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso.DIGESTS` with his own set of values. Therefore,
in `Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso.DIGESTS` with his own set of values. Therefore,
ideally, we should also verify the authenticity of the listed hash values.
Since `Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso.DIGESTS` is a clearsigned PGP file, we can use
Since `Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso.DIGESTS` is a clearsigned PGP file, we can use
`gpg` to verify it from the command line:
$ gpg -v --verify Qubes-R3.1-x86_64.iso.DIGESTS
$ gpg -v --verify Qubes-R3.2-x86_64.iso.DIGESTS
gpg: armor header: Hash: SHA256
gpg: armor header: Version: GnuPG v1
gpg: armor header: Version: GnuPG v2
gpg: original file name=''
gpg: Signature made Wed 09 Mar 2016 03:35:48 AM PST using RSA key ID 03FA5082
gpg: Signature made Tue 20 Sep 2016 10:37:03 AM PDT using RSA key ID 03FA5082
gpg: using PGP trust model
gpg: Good signature from "Qubes OS Release 3 Signing Key"
gpg: textmode signature, digest algorithm SHA256
The signature is good. Assuming our copy of the `Qubes OS Release 3 Signing
Key` is also authentic (see above), we can be confident that these hash values
came from the Qubes devs.