mirror of
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-doc.git
synced 2024-12-27 00:09:26 -05:00
Replace absolute with relative paths for Qubes URLs
This commit is contained in:
Andrew David Wong
parent
a85afde2d3
commit
bddcd0cad2
@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Examples of unacceptable behavior by participants include:
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- Publishing others' private information, such as a physical or electronic address, without explicit permission
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- Other conduct which could reasonably be considered inappropriate in a professional setting
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(Please also see our [mailing list discussion guidelines](https://www.qubes-os.org/mailing-lists/#discussion-list-guidelines).)
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(Please also see our [mailing list discussion guidelines](/mailing-lists/#discussion-list-guidelines).)
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## Our Responsibilities
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@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ At the same time, due to the smart use of Xen shared memory, our GUI implementat
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### Why passwordless sudo?
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Please refer to [this page](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/vm-sudo/).
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Please refer to [this page](/doc/vm-sudo/).
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### How should I report documentation issues?
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@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ Qubes assumes that the user who controls Dom0 controls the whole system.
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It is very difficult to **securely** implement multi-user support.
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See [here](https://groups.google.com/group/qubes-devel/msg/899f6f3efc4d9a06) for details.
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However, in Qubes 4.x we will be implementing management functionality. See [Admin API](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/06/27/qubes-admin-api/) and [Core Stack](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/10/03/core3/) for more details.
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However, in Qubes 4.x we will be implementing management functionality. See [Admin API](/news/2017/06/27/qubes-admin-api/) and [Core Stack](/news/2017/10/03/core3/) for more details.
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### What are the system requirements for Qubes OS?
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@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ Another solution would be to set the pci_strictreset option in dom0:
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qvm-prefs usbVM -s pci_strictreset false
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These options allow the VM to ignore the error and the VM will start.
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Please review the note on [this page](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/Dom0Tools/QvmPrefs/) and be aware of the potential risk.
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Please review the note on [this page](/doc/Dom0Tools/QvmPrefs/) and be aware of the potential risk.
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### I assigned a PCI device to a qube, then unassigned it/shut down the qube. Why isn't the device available in dom0?
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@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ details in [#2618](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2618).
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**Brief explanation**: A long-term goal is to be able to build the entire OS and installation media in a completely bit-wise deterministic manner, but there are many baby steps to be taken along that path. See:
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- "[Security challenges for the Qubes build process](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2016/05/30/build-security/)"
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- "[Security challenges for the Qubes build process](/news/2016/05/30/build-security/)"
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- [This mailing list post](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-devel/gq-wb9wTQV8/mdliS4P2BQAJ)
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- and [reproducible-builds.org](https://reproducible-builds.org/)
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@ -487,7 +487,7 @@ for more information and qubes-specific background.
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**Expected results**: Significant progress towards making the Qubes build process deterministic. This would likely involve cooperation with and hacking on several upstream build tools to eliminate sources of variability.
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**Knoledge prerequisite**: qubes-builder [[1]](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qubes-builder/) [[2]](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qubes-builder-details/) [[3]](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-builder/tree/master/doc), and efficient at introspecting complex systems: comfortable with tracing and debugging tools, ability to quickly identify and locate issues within a large codebase (upstream build tools), etc.
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**Knoledge prerequisite**: qubes-builder [[1]](/doc/qubes-builder/) [[2]](/doc/qubes-builder-details/) [[3]](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-builder/tree/master/doc), and efficient at introspecting complex systems: comfortable with tracing and debugging tools, ability to quickly identify and locate issues within a large codebase (upstream build tools), etc.
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**Mentor**: [Marek Marczykowski-Górecki](/team/)
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@ -513,17 +513,17 @@ We adapted some of the language here about GSoC from the [KDE GSoC page](https:/
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[2017-archive]: https://summerofcode.withgoogle.com/archive/2017/organizations/5074771758809088/
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[gsoc-qubes]: https://summerofcode.withgoogle.com/organizations/6239659689508864/
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[gsoc]: https://summerofcode.withgoogle.com/
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[team]: https://www.qubes-os.org/team/
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[team]: /team/
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[gsoc-faq]: https://developers.google.com/open-source/gsoc/faq
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[contributing]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/contributing/#contributing-code
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[patches]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/source-code/#how-to-send-patches
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[code-signing]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/code-signing/
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[ml-devel]: https://www.qubes-os.org/mailing-lists/#qubes-devel
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[contributing]: /doc/contributing/#contributing-code
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[patches]: /doc/source-code/#how-to-send-patches
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[code-signing]: /doc/code-signing/
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[ml-devel]: /mailing-lists/#qubes-devel
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[gsoc-participate]: https://developers.google.com/open-source/gsoc/
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[gsoc-student]: https://developers.google.com/open-source/gsoc/resources/manual#student_manual
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[how-to-gsoc]: http://teom.org/blog/kde/how-to-write-a-kick-ass-proposal-for-google-summer-of-code/
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[gsoc-submit]: https://summerofcode.withgoogle.com/
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[mailing-lists]: https://www.qubes-os.org/mailing-lists/
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[mailing-lists]: /mailing-lists/
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[qubes-issues]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues
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[qubes-issues-suggested]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue%20is%3Aopen%20label%3A%22P%3A%20minor%22%20label%3A%22help%20wanted%22
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[qubes-builder]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qubes-builder/
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[qubes-builder]: /doc/qubes-builder/
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@ -75,6 +75,6 @@ be grateful to [receive your patch][patch].
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[Facebook]: https://www.facebook.com/QubesOS
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[GitHub issues]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues
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[qubes-devel]: /mailing-lists/#qubes-devel
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[Community-Developed Feature Tracker]: https://www.qubes-os.org/qubes-issues/
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[Community-Developed Feature Tracker]: /qubes-issues/
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[Qubes download mirror]: /downloads/mirrors/
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@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ redirect_from:
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gpg --keyserver pgp.mit.edu --recv-keys 0xDDFA1A3E36879494
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* Verify its fingerprint, set as 'trusted'. [This is described here](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/VerifyingSignatures).
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* Verify its fingerprint, set as 'trusted'. [This is described here](/doc/VerifyingSignatures).
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* Download the Qubes developers' keys.
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@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ redirect_from:
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- /wiki/QubesBuilder/
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---
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**Note: The build system has been improved since this how-to was last updated. The [Archlinux template building instructions](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/building-archlinux-template/) contain more up-to-date and detailed information on how to use the build system.**
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**Note: The build system has been improved since this how-to was last updated. The [Archlinux template building instructions](/doc/building-archlinux-template/) contain more up-to-date and detailed information on how to use the build system.**
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Building Qubes from scratch
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===========================
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@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Thus if an AppVM uses sys-net as its NetVM, any DispVM launched from this AppVM
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You can change this behaviour for individual VMs: in Qubes VM Manager open VM Settings for the VM in question and go to the "Advanced" tab.
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Here you can edit the "NetVM for DispVM" setting to change the NetVM of any DispVM launched from that VM.
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A Disposable VM launched from the Start Menu inherits the NetVM of the [DVM Template](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/glossary/#dvm-template).
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A Disposable VM launched from the Start Menu inherits the NetVM of the [DVM Template](/doc/glossary/#dvm-template).
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By default the DVM template is called `fedora-XX-dvm` (where `XX` is the Fedora version of the default TemplateVM).
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As an "internal" VM it is hidden in Qubes VM Manager, but can be shown by selecting "Show/Hide internal VMs".
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Note that changing the "NetVM for DispVM" setting for the DVM Template does *not* affect the NetVM of DispVMs launched from the Start Menu; only changing the DVM Template's own NetVM does.
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@ -133,4 +133,4 @@ You will see that there is unallocated free space at the end of your primary dis
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You can use standard linux tools like fdisk and mkfs to make this space available.
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[resizing the root disk image]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/resize-root-disk-image/
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[resizing the root disk image]: /doc/resize-root-disk-image/
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@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Known Issues
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dom0.) Do not attempt to detach these disks. (They will automatically be
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detached when you shut down the AppVM.) [[2]]
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[Qubes Backup]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/BackupRestore/
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[TemplateVM]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/Templates/
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[Qubes Backup]: /doc/BackupRestore/
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[TemplateVM]: /doc/Templates/
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[1]: https://groups.google.com/d/topic/qubes-users/EITd1kBHD30/discussion
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[2]: https://groups.google.com/d/topic/qubes-users/nDrOM7dzLNE/discussion
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@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Installation
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------------
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Prior to R3.2, KDE was the default desktop environment in Qubes. Beginning with
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R3.2, however, [XFCE is the new default desktop environment](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/3.2/release-notes/). Nonetheless, it is
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R3.2, however, [XFCE is the new default desktop environment](/doc/releases/3.2/release-notes/). Nonetheless, it is
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still possible to install KDE by issuing this command in dom0:
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$ sudo qubes-dom0-update @kde-desktop-qubes
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@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ XFCE installation in dom0
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**Disclaimer: The article is obsolete for Qubes OS 3.2 and later.**
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Prior to R3.2, KDE was the default desktop environment in Qubes. Beginning with
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R3.2 [XFCE is the new default desktop environment](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/3.2/release-notes/) and does not require manual installation.
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R3.2 [XFCE is the new default desktop environment](/doc/releases/3.2/release-notes/) and does not require manual installation.
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Installation:
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@ -121,5 +121,5 @@ Downloading and burning
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and `of` or specify an incorrect device, you could accidentally overwrite
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your primary system drive. Please be careful!
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[project-page]: https://www.qubes-os.org/gsoc/
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[project-page]: /gsoc/
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[gsoc-page]: https://summerofcode.withgoogle.com/organizations/6239659689508864/
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@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ to learn why it took so long for Qubes OS to support HVM domains
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(Qubes 1 only supported Linux based PV domains). As of
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Qubes 4, every VM is PVH by default, except those with attached PCI devices which are HVM.
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[See here](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2017/07/31/qubes-40-rc1.html) for a discussion
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of the switch to HVM from R3.2's PV, and [here](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2018/01/11/qsb-37/)
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of the switch to HVM from R3.2's PV, and [here](/news/2018/01/11/qsb-37/)
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for changing the default to PVH.
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Creating an HVM domain
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@ -114,5 +114,5 @@ More information
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* [Debian wiki](https://wiki.debian.org/Qubes)
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[stretch]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/template/debian/upgrade-8-to-9/
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[stretch]: /doc/template/debian/upgrade-8-to-9/
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@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ privacy](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/design/MAC_address/#index1h1). Curren
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Newer versions of Network Manager have a robust set of options for randomizing MAC addresses, and can handle the entire process across reboots, sleep/wake cycles and different connection states. In particular, versions 1.4.2 and later should be well suited for Qubes.
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Network Manager 1.4.2 or later is available from the Fedora 25 repository as well as the Debian 9 repository, which you can install by [upgrading a Debian 8 template to version 9.](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/debian-template-upgrade-8/)
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Network Manager 1.4.2 or later is available from the Fedora 25 repository as well as the Debian 9 repository, which you can install by [upgrading a Debian 8 template to version 9.](/doc/debian-template-upgrade-8/)
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In the Debian 9 or Fedora 25 template you intend to use as a NetVM, check that Network Manager version is now at least 1.4.2:
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@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Despite this, in case that method becomes cumbersome, Tails can be used inside v
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To run Tails under Qubes:
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1. Read about [creating and using HVM qubes](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/hvm/)
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1. Read about [creating and using HVM qubes](/doc/hvm/)
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2. Download and verify Tails from [https://tails.boum.org](https://tails.boum.org) in a qube, (saved as `/home/user/Downloads/tails.iso` on qube "isoVM" for purposes of this guide).
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@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ The Tails qube will not shut down cleanly.
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Kill it from the GUI Manager or ```qvm-kill Tails``` in Konsole.
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### Security
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You will probably want to implement [MAC spoofing](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/anonymizing-your-mac-address/).
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You will probably want to implement [MAC spoofing](/doc/anonymizing-your-mac-address/).
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There are added security concerns for Tails users when running it in a virtual machine.
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If you intend to do this, you should read [the warnings](https://tails.boum.org/doc/advanced_topics/virtualization/) from the Tails team about it.
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@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Qubes TorVM (qubes-tor)
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Qubes TorVM is a deprecated ProxyVM service that provides torified networking to
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all its clients. **If you are interested in TorVM, you will find the
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[Whonix implementation in Qubes](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/privacy/whonix/) a
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[Whonix implementation in Qubes](/doc/privacy/whonix/) a
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more usable and robust solution for creating a torifying traffic proxy.**
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By default, any AppVM using the TorVM as its NetVM will be fully torified, so
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@ -273,9 +273,9 @@ transparent torified solutions. Notably the following:
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[stream-isolation]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/proposals/171-separate-streams.txt
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[stream-isolation-explained]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html
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[tor-threats]: https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#adversary
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[qubes-net]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/QubesNet/
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[qubes-net]: /doc/QubesNet/
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[dns]: https://tails.boum.org/todo/support_arbitrary_dns_queries/
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[tor-browser]: https://www.torproject.org/download/download-easy.html
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[tor-verify-sig]: https://www.torproject.org/docs/verifying-signatures.html
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[dispvm]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/DisposableVms/
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[dispvm-customization]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/UserDoc/DispVMCustomization/
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[dispvm]: /doc/DisposableVms/
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[dispvm-customization]: /doc/UserDoc/DispVMCustomization/
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@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ You can get detailed description in [completed github issues][github-release-not
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Known issues
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------------
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* [Fedora 23 reached EOL in December 2016](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/End_of_life). There is a [manual procedure to upgrade your VMs](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2016/11/15/fedora-24-template-available/).
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* [Fedora 23 reached EOL in December 2016](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/End_of_life). There is a [manual procedure to upgrade your VMs](/news/2016/11/15/fedora-24-template-available/).
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* Windows Tools: `qvm-block` does not work
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@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Installation instructions
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-------------------------
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See [Installation Guide](/doc/installation-guide/).
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After installation, [manually upgrade to Fedora 24](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2016/11/15/fedora-24-template-available/).
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After installation, [manually upgrade to Fedora 24](/news/2016/11/15/fedora-24-template-available/).
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Upgrading
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---------
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@ -78,4 +78,4 @@ We also provide [detailed instruction][upgrade-to-r4.0] for this procedure.
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[qsb-24]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-024-2016.txt
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[backup-format]: /doc/backup-emergency-restore-v4/
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[api-doc]: https://dev.qubes-os.org/projects/qubes-core-admin/en/latest/
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[upgrade-to-r4.0]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade-to-r4.0/
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[upgrade-to-r4.0]: /doc/upgrade-to-r4.0/
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@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ While your connection to the Qubes website and download mirrors is encrypted, me
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Signature verification allows us to validate for ourselves that these files were the ones authored and signed by their creators (in this case the Qubes development team).
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Because it's so easy for a hacker who manages to tamper with the downloaded iso files this way to patch in malware, it is of the utmost importance that you **verify the signature of the Qubes iso** you use to install Qubes.
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See the page on [Verifying Signatures](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/) for more information and a tutorial on how to accomplish this.
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See the page on [Verifying Signatures](/security/verifying-signatures/) for more information and a tutorial on how to accomplish this.
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Once you have Qubes installed, the standard program installation command for Fedora and Qubes repositories
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@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ qubes-hcl-report <userVM>
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where \<userVM\> is the name of the VM within which the report will be written (but the report will also be displayed in the Dom0 terminal). If it displays that VT-d is active, you should be able to assign **PCIe devices to an HVM** and **enjoy DMA protection** for your driver domains, so you successfully passed this step.
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If VT-d is not active, attempt to activate it by selecting the **VT-d flag** within the BIOS settings. If your processor/BIOS does not allow VT-d activation you still enjoy much better security than alternative systems, but you may be vulnerable to **DMA attacks**. Next time you buy a computer consult our **[HCL (Hardware Compatibility List)](https://www.qubes-os.org/hcl/)** and possibly contribute to it.
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If VT-d is not active, attempt to activate it by selecting the **VT-d flag** within the BIOS settings. If your processor/BIOS does not allow VT-d activation you still enjoy much better security than alternative systems, but you may be vulnerable to **DMA attacks**. Next time you buy a computer consult our **[HCL (Hardware Compatibility List)](/hcl/)** and possibly contribute to it.
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Updating Software
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-----------------
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@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ Using YubiKey to Qubes authentication
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=====================================
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You can use YubiKey to enhance Qubes user authentication, for example to mitigate
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risk of snooping the password. This can also slightly improve security when you have [USB keyboard](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/usb/#security-warning-about-usb-input-devices).
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risk of snooping the password. This can also slightly improve security when you have [USB keyboard](/doc/usb/#security-warning-about-usb-input-devices).
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There (at least) two possible configurations: using OTP mode and using challenge-response mode.
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@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ Support for newer cards is limited until AMDGPU support in the 4.5+ kernel, whic
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Built in Intel graphics, Radeon graphics (between that 4000-9000 range), and perhaps some prebaked NVIDIA card support that i don't know about. Those are your best bet for great Qubes support.
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If you do happen to get proprietary drivers working on your Qubes system (via installing them). Please take the time to go to the
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[Hardware Compatibility List (HCL)](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/hcl/#generating-and-submitting-new-reports )
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[Hardware Compatibility List (HCL)](/doc/hcl/#generating-and-submitting-new-reports )
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Add your computer, graphics card, and installation steps you did to get everything working.
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## RpmFusion packages
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@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ Please see [this thread o the qubes-devel mailing list][macbook-air-2012-5-1].
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||||
|
||||
[1]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/794
|
||||
[2]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1261
|
||||
[3]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/assigning-devices/
|
||||
[3]: /doc/assigning-devices/
|
||||
[bluetooth-replacement]: https://www.ifixit.com/Guide/MacBook+Air+13-Inch+Mid+2011+AirPort-Bluetooth+Card+Replacement/6360
|
||||
[macbook-air-2012-5-1]: https://groups.google.com/d/topic/qubes-devel/uLDYGdKk_Dk/discussion
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user