Replace absolute with relative paths for Qubes URLs

about/code-of-conduct.md

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Examples of unacceptable behavior by participants include:
 - Publishing others' private information, such as a physical or electronic address, without explicit permission
 - Other conduct which could reasonably be considered inappropriate in a professional setting
 
-(Please also see our [mailing list discussion guidelines](https://www.qubes-os.org/mailing-lists/#discussion-list-guidelines).)
+(Please also see our [mailing list discussion guidelines](/mailing-lists/#discussion-list-guidelines).)
 
 ## Our Responsibilities
 

about/faq.md

@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ At the same time, due to the smart use of Xen shared memory, our GUI implementat
 
 ### Why passwordless sudo?
 
-Please refer to [this page](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/vm-sudo/).
+Please refer to [this page](/doc/vm-sudo/).
 
 ### How should I report documentation issues?
 
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ Qubes assumes that the user who controls Dom0 controls the whole system.
 It is very difficult to **securely** implement multi-user support. 
 See [here](https://groups.google.com/group/qubes-devel/msg/899f6f3efc4d9a06) for details.
 
-However, in Qubes 4.x we will be implementing management functionality. See [Admin API](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/06/27/qubes-admin-api/) and [Core Stack](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/10/03/core3/) for more details.
+However, in Qubes 4.x we will be implementing management functionality. See [Admin API](/news/2017/06/27/qubes-admin-api/) and [Core Stack](/news/2017/10/03/core3/) for more details.
 
 
 ### What are the system requirements for Qubes OS?
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ Another solution would be to set the pci_strictreset option in dom0:
         qvm-prefs usbVM -s pci_strictreset false
 
 These options allow the VM to ignore the error and the VM will start.
-Please review the note on [this page](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/Dom0Tools/QvmPrefs/) and be aware of the potential risk.
+Please review the note on [this page](/doc/Dom0Tools/QvmPrefs/) and be aware of the potential risk.
 
 ### I assigned a PCI device to a qube, then unassigned it/shut down the qube. Why isn't the device available in dom0?
 

basics_dev/gsoc.md

@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ details in [#2618](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2618).
 
 **Brief explanation**: A long-term goal is to be able to build the entire OS and installation media in a completely bit-wise deterministic manner, but there are many baby steps to be taken along that path. See:
 
-- "[Security challenges for the Qubes build process](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2016/05/30/build-security/)"
+- "[Security challenges for the Qubes build process](/news/2016/05/30/build-security/)"
 - [This mailing list post](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-devel/gq-wb9wTQV8/mdliS4P2BQAJ)
 - and [reproducible-builds.org](https://reproducible-builds.org/)
 
@@ -487,7 +487,7 @@ for more information and qubes-specific background.
 
 **Expected results**: Significant progress towards making the Qubes build process deterministic. This would likely involve cooperation with and hacking on several upstream build tools to eliminate sources of variability.
 
-**Knoledge prerequisite**: qubes-builder [[1]](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qubes-builder/) [[2]](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qubes-builder-details/) [[3]](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-builder/tree/master/doc), and efficient at introspecting complex systems: comfortable with tracing and debugging tools, ability to quickly identify and locate issues within a large codebase (upstream build tools), etc.
+**Knoledge prerequisite**: qubes-builder [[1]](/doc/qubes-builder/) [[2]](/doc/qubes-builder-details/) [[3]](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-builder/tree/master/doc), and efficient at introspecting complex systems: comfortable with tracing and debugging tools, ability to quickly identify and locate issues within a large codebase (upstream build tools), etc.
 
 **Mentor**: [Marek Marczykowski-Górecki](/team/)
 
@@ -513,17 +513,17 @@ We adapted some of the language here about GSoC from the [KDE GSoC page](https:/
 [2017-archive]: https://summerofcode.withgoogle.com/archive/2017/organizations/5074771758809088/
 [gsoc-qubes]: https://summerofcode.withgoogle.com/organizations/6239659689508864/
 [gsoc]: https://summerofcode.withgoogle.com/
-[team]: https://www.qubes-os.org/team/
+[team]: /team/
 [gsoc-faq]: https://developers.google.com/open-source/gsoc/faq
-[contributing]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/contributing/#contributing-code
+[contributing]: /doc/contributing/#contributing-code
-[patches]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/source-code/#how-to-send-patches
+[patches]: /doc/source-code/#how-to-send-patches
-[code-signing]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/code-signing/
+[code-signing]: /doc/code-signing/
-[ml-devel]: https://www.qubes-os.org/mailing-lists/#qubes-devel
+[ml-devel]: /mailing-lists/#qubes-devel
 [gsoc-participate]: https://developers.google.com/open-source/gsoc/
 [gsoc-student]: https://developers.google.com/open-source/gsoc/resources/manual#student_manual
 [how-to-gsoc]: http://teom.org/blog/kde/how-to-write-a-kick-ass-proposal-for-google-summer-of-code/
 [gsoc-submit]: https://summerofcode.withgoogle.com/
-[mailing-lists]: https://www.qubes-os.org/mailing-lists/
+[mailing-lists]: /mailing-lists/
 [qubes-issues]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues
 [qubes-issues-suggested]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue%20is%3Aopen%20label%3A%22P%3A%20minor%22%20label%3A%22help%20wanted%22
-[qubes-builder]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qubes-builder/
+[qubes-builder]: /doc/qubes-builder/

basics_user/contributing.md

@@ -75,6 +75,6 @@ be grateful to [receive your patch][patch].
 [Facebook]: https://www.facebook.com/QubesOS
 [GitHub issues]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues
 [qubes-devel]: /mailing-lists/#qubes-devel
-[Community-Developed Feature Tracker]: https://www.qubes-os.org/qubes-issues/
+[Community-Developed Feature Tracker]: /qubes-issues/
 [Qubes download mirror]: /downloads/mirrors/
 

building/building-archlinux-template.md

@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ redirect_from:
 
       gpg --keyserver pgp.mit.edu --recv-keys 0xDDFA1A3E36879494
 
-* Verify its fingerprint, set as 'trusted'. [This is described here](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/VerifyingSignatures).
+* Verify its fingerprint, set as 'trusted'. [This is described here](/doc/VerifyingSignatures).
 
 * Download the Qubes developers' keys.
 

building/qubes-builder.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ redirect_from:
 - /wiki/QubesBuilder/
 ---
 
-**Note: The build system has been improved since this how-to was last updated. The [Archlinux template building instructions](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/building-archlinux-template/) contain more up-to-date and detailed information on how to use the build system.**
+**Note: The build system has been improved since this how-to was last updated. The [Archlinux template building instructions](/doc/building-archlinux-template/) contain more up-to-date and detailed information on how to use the build system.**
 
 Building Qubes from scratch
 ===========================

common-tasks/dispvm.md

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Thus if an AppVM uses sys-net as its NetVM, any DispVM launched from this AppVM
 You can change this behaviour for individual VMs: in Qubes VM Manager open VM Settings for the VM in question and go to the "Advanced" tab. 
 Here you can edit the "NetVM for DispVM" setting to change the NetVM of any DispVM launched from that VM.
 
-A Disposable VM launched from the Start Menu inherits the NetVM of the [DVM Template](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/glossary/#dvm-template). 
+A Disposable VM launched from the Start Menu inherits the NetVM of the [DVM Template](/doc/glossary/#dvm-template). 
 By default the DVM template is called `fedora-XX-dvm` (where `XX` is the Fedora version of the default TemplateVM). 
 As an "internal" VM it is hidden in Qubes VM Manager, but can be shown by selecting "Show/Hide internal VMs". 
 Note that changing the "NetVM for DispVM" setting for the DVM Template does *not* affect the NetVM of DispVMs launched from the Start Menu; only changing the DVM Template's own NetVM does.

configuration/resize-disk-image.md

@@ -133,4 +133,4 @@ You will see that there is unallocated free space at the end of your primary dis
 You can use standard linux tools like fdisk and mkfs to make this space available.
 
 
-[resizing the root disk image]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/resize-root-disk-image/
+[resizing the root disk image]: /doc/resize-root-disk-image/

configuration/secondary-storage.md

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Known Issues
    dom0.) Do not attempt to detach these disks. (They will automatically be
    detached when you shut down the AppVM.) [[2]]
 
-[Qubes Backup]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/BackupRestore/
+[Qubes Backup]: /doc/BackupRestore/
-[TemplateVM]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/Templates/
+[TemplateVM]: /doc/Templates/
 [1]: https://groups.google.com/d/topic/qubes-users/EITd1kBHD30/discussion
 [2]: https://groups.google.com/d/topic/qubes-users/nDrOM7dzLNE/discussion

customization/kde.md

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Installation
 ------------
 
 Prior to R3.2, KDE was the default desktop environment in Qubes. Beginning with
-R3.2, however, [XFCE is the new default desktop environment](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/3.2/release-notes/). Nonetheless, it is
+R3.2, however, [XFCE is the new default desktop environment](/doc/releases/3.2/release-notes/). Nonetheless, it is
 still possible to install KDE by issuing this command in dom0:
 
     $ sudo qubes-dom0-update @kde-desktop-qubes

customization/xfce.md

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ XFCE installation in dom0
 **Disclaimer: The article is obsolete for Qubes OS 3.2 and later.**
 
 Prior to R3.2, KDE was the default desktop environment in Qubes. Beginning with
-R3.2 [XFCE is the new default desktop environment](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/3.2/release-notes/) and does not require manual installation.
+R3.2 [XFCE is the new default desktop environment](/doc/releases/3.2/release-notes/) and does not require manual installation.
 
 
 Installation:

installing/live-usb.md

@@ -121,5 +121,5 @@ Downloading and burning
    and `of` or specify an incorrect device, you could accidentally overwrite
    your primary system drive. Please be careful!
 
-[project-page]: https://www.qubes-os.org/gsoc/
+[project-page]: /gsoc/
 [gsoc-page]: https://summerofcode.withgoogle.com/organizations/6239659689508864/

managing-os/hvm.md

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ to learn why it took so long for Qubes OS to support HVM domains
 (Qubes 1 only supported Linux based PV domains). As of
 Qubes 4, every VM is PVH by default, except those with attached PCI devices which are HVM.
 [See here](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2017/07/31/qubes-40-rc1.html) for a discussion
-of the switch to HVM from R3.2's PV, and [here](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2018/01/11/qsb-37/)
+of the switch to HVM from R3.2's PV, and [here](/news/2018/01/11/qsb-37/)
 for changing the default to PVH.
 
 Creating an HVM domain

managing-os/templates/debian.md

@@ -114,5 +114,5 @@ More information
 * [Debian wiki](https://wiki.debian.org/Qubes)
 
 
-[stretch]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/template/debian/upgrade-8-to-9/ 
+[stretch]: /doc/template/debian/upgrade-8-to-9/ 
 

privacy/anonymizing-your-mac-address.md

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ privacy](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/design/MAC_address/#index1h1). Curren
 
 Newer versions of Network Manager have a robust set of options for randomizing MAC addresses, and can handle the entire process across reboots, sleep/wake cycles and different connection states. In particular, versions 1.4.2 and later should be well suited for Qubes.
 
-Network Manager 1.4.2 or later is available from the Fedora 25 repository as well as the Debian 9 repository, which you can install by [upgrading a Debian 8 template to version 9.](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/debian-template-upgrade-8/) 
+Network Manager 1.4.2 or later is available from the Fedora 25 repository as well as the Debian 9 repository, which you can install by [upgrading a Debian 8 template to version 9.](/doc/debian-template-upgrade-8/) 
 
 In the Debian 9 or Fedora 25 template you intend to use as a NetVM, check that Network Manager version is now at least 1.4.2:
 

privacy/tails.md

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Despite this, in case that method becomes cumbersome, Tails can be used inside v
 
 To run Tails under Qubes:
 
-1.  Read about [creating and using HVM qubes](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/hvm/)
+1.  Read about [creating and using HVM qubes](/doc/hvm/)
 
 2.  Download and verify Tails from [https://tails.boum.org](https://tails.boum.org) in a qube, (saved as `/home/user/Downloads/tails.iso` on qube "isoVM" for purposes of this guide).
 
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ The Tails qube will not shut down cleanly.
 Kill it from the GUI Manager or ```qvm-kill Tails``` in Konsole.
 
 ### Security
-You will probably want to implement [MAC spoofing](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/anonymizing-your-mac-address/).
+You will probably want to implement [MAC spoofing](/doc/anonymizing-your-mac-address/).
 
 There are added security concerns for Tails users when running it in a virtual machine.
 If you intend to do this, you should read [the warnings](https://tails.boum.org/doc/advanced_topics/virtualization/) from the Tails team about it.

privacy/torvm.md

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Qubes TorVM (qubes-tor)
 
 Qubes TorVM is a deprecated ProxyVM service that provides torified networking to
 all its clients. **If you are interested in TorVM, you will find the
-[Whonix implementation in Qubes](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/privacy/whonix/) a
+[Whonix implementation in Qubes](/doc/privacy/whonix/) a
 more usable and robust solution for creating a torifying traffic proxy.**
 
 By default, any AppVM using the TorVM as its NetVM will be fully torified, so
@@ -273,9 +273,9 @@ transparent torified solutions. Notably the following:
 [stream-isolation]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/proposals/171-separate-streams.txt
 [stream-isolation-explained]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html
 [tor-threats]: https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#adversary
-[qubes-net]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/QubesNet/
+[qubes-net]: /doc/QubesNet/
 [dns]: https://tails.boum.org/todo/support_arbitrary_dns_queries/
 [tor-browser]: https://www.torproject.org/download/download-easy.html
 [tor-verify-sig]: https://www.torproject.org/docs/verifying-signatures.html
-[dispvm]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/DisposableVms/
+[dispvm]: /doc/DisposableVms/
-[dispvm-customization]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/UserDoc/DispVMCustomization/
+[dispvm-customization]: /doc/UserDoc/DispVMCustomization/

releases/3.2/release-notes.md

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ You can get detailed description in [completed github issues][github-release-not
 Known issues
 ------------
 
-* [Fedora 23 reached EOL in December 2016](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/End_of_life). There is a [manual procedure to upgrade your VMs](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2016/11/15/fedora-24-template-available/).
+* [Fedora 23 reached EOL in December 2016](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/End_of_life). There is a [manual procedure to upgrade your VMs](/news/2016/11/15/fedora-24-template-available/).
 
 * Windows Tools: `qvm-block` does not work
 
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Installation instructions
 -------------------------
 
 See [Installation Guide](/doc/installation-guide/).
-After installation, [manually upgrade to Fedora 24](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2016/11/15/fedora-24-template-available/).
+After installation, [manually upgrade to Fedora 24](/news/2016/11/15/fedora-24-template-available/).
 
 Upgrading
 ---------

releases/4.0/release-notes.md

@@ -78,4 +78,4 @@ We also provide [detailed instruction][upgrade-to-r4.0] for this procedure.
 [qsb-24]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-024-2016.txt
 [backup-format]: /doc/backup-emergency-restore-v4/
 [api-doc]: https://dev.qubes-os.org/projects/qubes-core-admin/en/latest/
-[upgrade-to-r4.0]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade-to-r4.0/
+[upgrade-to-r4.0]: /doc/upgrade-to-r4.0/

security/security-guidelines.md

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ While your connection to the Qubes website and download mirrors is encrypted, me
 Signature verification allows us to validate for ourselves that these files were the ones authored and signed by their creators (in this case the Qubes development team). 
 
 Because it's so easy for a hacker who manages to tamper with the downloaded iso files this way to patch in malware, it is of the utmost importance that you **verify the signature of the Qubes iso** you use to install Qubes. 
-See the page on [Verifying Signatures](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/) for more information and a tutorial on how to accomplish this.
+See the page on [Verifying Signatures](/security/verifying-signatures/) for more information and a tutorial on how to accomplish this.
 
 Once you have Qubes installed, the standard program installation command for Fedora and Qubes repositories
 
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ qubes-hcl-report <userVM>
 
 where \<userVM\> is the name of the VM within which the report will be written (but the report will also be displayed in the Dom0 terminal). If it displays that VT-d is active, you should be able to assign **PCIe devices to an HVM** and **enjoy DMA protection** for your driver domains, so you successfully passed this step.
 
-If VT-d is not active, attempt to activate it by selecting the **VT-d flag** within the BIOS settings. If your processor/BIOS does not allow VT-d activation you still enjoy much better security than alternative systems, but you may be vulnerable to **DMA attacks**. Next time you buy a computer consult our **[HCL (Hardware Compatibility List)](https://www.qubes-os.org/hcl/)** and possibly contribute to it.
+If VT-d is not active, attempt to activate it by selecting the **VT-d flag** within the BIOS settings. If your processor/BIOS does not allow VT-d activation you still enjoy much better security than alternative systems, but you may be vulnerable to **DMA attacks**. Next time you buy a computer consult our **[HCL (Hardware Compatibility List)](/hcl/)** and possibly contribute to it.
 
 Updating Software
 -----------------

security/yubi-key.md

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ Using YubiKey to Qubes authentication
 =====================================
 
 You can use YubiKey to enhance Qubes user authentication, for example to mitigate
-risk of snooping the password. This can also slightly improve security when you have [USB keyboard](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/usb/#security-warning-about-usb-input-devices).
+risk of snooping the password. This can also slightly improve security when you have [USB keyboard](/doc/usb/#security-warning-about-usb-input-devices).
 
 There (at least) two possible configurations: using OTP mode and using challenge-response mode.
 

troubleshooting/install-nvidia-driver.md

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ Support for newer cards is limited until AMDGPU support in the 4.5+ kernel, whic
 Built in Intel graphics, Radeon graphics (between that 4000-9000 range), and perhaps some prebaked NVIDIA card support that i don't know about. Those are your best bet for great Qubes support.
 
 If you do happen to get proprietary drivers working on your Qubes system (via installing them). Please take the time to go to the 
-[Hardware Compatibility List (HCL)](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/hcl/#generating-and-submitting-new-reports )
+[Hardware Compatibility List (HCL)](/doc/hcl/#generating-and-submitting-new-reports )
 Add your computer, graphics card, and installation steps you did to get everything working.
 
 ## RpmFusion packages

troubleshooting/macbook-troubleshooting.md

@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ Please see [this thread o the qubes-devel mailing list][macbook-air-2012-5-1].
 
 [1]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/794
 [2]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1261
-[3]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/assigning-devices/
+[3]: /doc/assigning-devices/
 [bluetooth-replacement]: https://www.ifixit.com/Guide/MacBook+Air+13-Inch+Mid+2011+AirPort-Bluetooth+Card+Replacement/6360
 [macbook-air-2012-5-1]: https://groups.google.com/d/topic/qubes-devel/uLDYGdKk_Dk/discussion