Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/pr/71'

Conflicts:
	privacy/install-whonix.md
This commit is contained in:
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 2015-12-09 20:37:06 +01:00
commit bd937d1211
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@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Security considerations for network printers and drivers
Some printers require 3rd party drivers, typically downloadable from the vendor's website. Such drivers are typically distributed in a form of ready to install RPM packages. However, they are often unsigned, and additionally the downloads are available via HTTP connections only. As a result, installation of such 3rd party RPMs in a default template VM exposes a risk of compromise of this template VM, which, in turn, leads automatically to compromise of all the AppVMs based on the template. (Again, it's not buggy or malicious drivers that we fear here, but rather malicious installation scripts for those drivers).
In order to mitigate this risk, one might consider creating a custom template (i.e. clone the original template) and then install the 3rd party, unverified drivers there. Such template might then be made the default template for [Disposable VM creation](/en/doc/disposable-vms/), which should allow one to print any document by right-clicking on it, choosing "Open in Disposable VM" and print from there. This would allow to print documents from more trusted AppVMs (based on a trusted default template, that is not poisoned by 3rd party printer drivers).
In order to mitigate this risk, one might consider creating a custom template (i.e. clone the original template) and then install the 3rd party, unverified drivers there. Such template might then be made the default template for [Disposable VM creation](/doc/disposable-vms/), which should allow one to print any document by right-clicking on it, choosing "Open in Disposable VM" and print from there. This would allow to print documents from more trusted AppVMs (based on a trusted default template, that is not poisoned by 3rd party printer drivers).
However, one should be aware that most (all?) network printing protocols are insecure, unencrypted protocols. This means, that an attacker who is able to sniff the local network, or who is controlling the (normally untrusted) Qubes NetVM, will likely to be able to see the documents being printed. This is a limitation of today's printers and printing protocols, something that cannot be solved by Qubes or any other OS.

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@ -55,4 +55,4 @@ To start an application in the **Whonix-Workstation AppVM** that you created, la
### Advanced Information
You can learn more about [customizing Whonix here](doc/privacy/customizing-whonix/)
You can learn more about [customizing Whonix here](/doc/privacy/customizing-whonix/)

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@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ Ign http://deb.torproject.org jessie/main Translation-en
Reading package lists... Done
~~~
However, if what you see is different or you see the word `WARNING:` you should look at our troubleshooting documentation for [Debian and Whonix](/en/doc/troubleshooting/debian-and-whonix/).
However, if what you see is different or you see the word `WARNING:` you should look at our troubleshooting documentation for [Debian and Whonix](/doc/troubleshooting/debian-and-whonix/).
### Restart Services after Upgrading

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@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ permalink: /doc/privacy/whonix/
Whonix for Privacy & Anonymity
==============================
To improve your privacy & anonymity on the internet, you can install the [Whonix Template](/en/doc/templates/whonix/) on your Qubes machine.
To improve your privacy & anonymity on the internet, you can install the [Whonix Template](/doc/templates/whonix/) on your Qubes machine.
[Whonix](https://www.whonix.org) is based on [Debian](https://www.debian.org) and [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) and utilizes two VMs, a **"gateway"** and a **"workstation"**. Qubes security architecture makes use of Whonix's isolation by using the gateway as a ProxyVM to route all network traffic through Tor, while the workstation is used for making AppVMs.
@ -15,13 +15,13 @@ To improve your privacy & anonymity on the internet, you can install the [Whonix
To install Whonix, you must have a working Qubes machine already.
* [Install Whonix in Qubes](/en/doc/privacy/install-whonix/)
* [Updating Whonix in Qubes](/en/doc/privacy/updating-whonix/)
* [Install Whonix in Qubes](/doc/privacy/install-whonix/)
* [Updating Whonix in Qubes](/doc/privacy/updating-whonix/)
### Customizing & Uninstalling Whonix
* [Customizing Whonix](/en/doc/privacy/customizing-whonix/)
* [Uninstall Whonix from Qubes](/en/doc/privacy/uninstall-whonix/)
* [Customizing Whonix](/doc/privacy/customizing-whonix/)
* [Uninstall Whonix from Qubes](/doc/privacy/uninstall-whonix/)
*The following links are on Whonix's website and are technical.*
@ -36,4 +36,4 @@ To install Whonix, you must have a working Qubes machine already.
* [Whonix Support](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Support) - General Whonix, Debian, Tor, etc... related issues
* [Whonix Qubes Forum](https://www.whonix.org/forum/Qubes) - Whonix specific issues
You can also use [Qubes support](/en/help/), but not all Qubes users run Whonix.
You can also use [Qubes support](/help/), but not all Qubes users run Whonix.

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@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ permalink: /doc/troubleshooting/updating-debian-and-whonix/
Updating Debian and Whonix
==========================
Despite Qubes shipping with [Debian Templates](/en/doc/templates/debian/), most of Qubes core components run on Fedora and thus our documentation has better coverage for Fedora. However, Qubes has been working closely with the [Whonix](https://whonix.org) project which is based on Debian.
Despite Qubes shipping with [Debian Templates](/doc/templates/debian/), most of Qubes core components run on Fedora and thus our documentation has better coverage for Fedora. However, Qubes has been working closely with the [Whonix](https://whonix.org) project which is based on Debian.
This troubleshooting guide is collection of tips about updating Whonix that also pertain to updating the normal Debian package manager. If you plan to use Debian heavily, **we highly recommend you install the Whonix templates and use them to update your normal Debian TemplateVM.**