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Merge branch 'mattmccutchen-focus-stealing'
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@ -47,6 +47,15 @@ Therefore, you should always copy clipboard data only from *more trusted* to *le
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See also [this article](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/03/13/partitioning-my-digital-life-into.html) for more information on this topic, and some ideas of how we might solve this problem in some future version of Qubes, as well as [this message](https://groups.google.com/group/qubes-devel/msg/48b4b532cee06e01) from qubes-devel.
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### Focus stealing
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The above discussion assumes that you control which window is focused in dom0 at the time of the paste.
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However, if your dom0 window manager is configured to give focus to newly created windows (which, as of Qubes 4.0, is true in the default install with Xfce), then a malicious qube could "steal the focus" by creating a window just before you press Ctrl+Shift+V, and it would receive the data instead of your intended target.
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(Focus stealing is a risk any time you are typing confidential data, but a Qubes clipboard paste probably presents the greatest risk of leaking an entire password before you have time to react.)
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You may be able to mitigate this risk by changing the window manager configuration.
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For example, with Xfce, you could run `xfwm4-settings` in dom0, go to the "Focus" tab, and un-check "Automatically give focus to newly created windows".
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However, we have not confirmed whether such settings are sufficient to prevent a malicious qube from stealing the focus in all cases.
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Clipboard automatic policy enforcement
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--------------------------------------
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