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update upstream
This commit is contained in:
qubedmaiska
commit
bb37d69f56
6 changed files with 316 additions and 406 deletions
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@ -61,95 +61,98 @@ yet documented.
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The API should be implemented as a set of qrexec calls. This is to make it easy
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to set the policy using current mechanism.
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| call | dest | argument | inside | return | note |
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| ------------------------------------- | --------- | --------- | ----------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------- | ---- |
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| `admin.vmclass.List` | `dom0` | - | - | `<class>\n` |
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| `admin.vm.List` | `dom0|<vm>` | - | - | `<name> class=<class> state=<state>\n` |
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| `admin.vm.Create.<class>` | `dom0` | template | `name=<name> label=<label>` | - |
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| `admin.vm.CreateInPool.<class>` | `dom0` | template | `name=<name> label=<label> `<br/>`pool=<pool> pool:<volume>=<pool>` | - | either use `pool=` to put all volumes there, <br/>or `pool:<volume>=` for individual volumes - both forms are not allowed at the same time
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| `admin.vm.CreateDisposable` | template | - | - | name | Create new DisposableVM, `template` is any AppVM with `dispvm_allowed` set to True, or `dom0` to use default defined in `default_dispvm` property of calling VM; VM created with this call will be automatically removed after its shutdown; the main difference from `admin.vm.Create.DispVM` is automatic (random) name generation.
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| `admin.vm.Remove` | vm | - | - | - |
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| `admin.label.List` | `dom0` | - | - | `<property>\n` |
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| `admin.label.Create` | `dom0` | label | `0xRRGGBB` | - |
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| `admin.label.Get` | `dom0` | label | - | `0xRRGGBB` |
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| `admin.label.Index` | `dom0` | label | - | `<label-index>` |
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| `admin.label.Remove` | `dom0` | label | - | - |
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| `admin.property.List` | `dom0` | - | - | `<property>\n` |
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| `admin.property.Get` | `dom0` | property | - | `default={True|False} `<br/>`type={str|int|bool|vm|label|list} <value>` | Type `list` is added in R4.1. Values are of type `str` and each entry is suffixed with newline character.
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| `admin.property.GetAll` | `dom0` | - | - | `<property-name> <full-value-as-in-property.Get>\n` | Get all the properties in one call. Each property is returned on a separate line and use the same value encoding as property.Get method, with an exception that newlines are encoded as literal `\n` and literal `\` are encoded as `\\`.
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| `admin.property.GetDefault` | `dom0` | property | - | `type={str|int|bool|vm|label|list} <value>` | Type `list` is added in R4.1. Values are of type `str` and each entry is suffixed with newline character.
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| `admin.property.Help` | `dom0` | property | - | `help` |
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| `admin.property.HelpRst` | `dom0` | property | - | `help.rst` |
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| `admin.property.Reset` | `dom0` | property | - | - |
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| `admin.property.Set` | `dom0` | property | value | - |
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| `admin.vm.property.List` | vm | - | - | `<property>\n` |
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| `admin.vm.property.Get` | vm | property | - | `default={True|False} `<br/>`type={str|int|bool|vm|label|list} <value>` | Type `list` is added in R4.1. Each list entry is suffixed with a newline character.
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| `admin.vm.property.GetAll` | vm | - | - | `<property-name> <full-value-as-in-property.Get>\n` | Get all the properties in one call. Each property is returned on a separate line and use the same value encoding as property.Get method, with an exception that newlines are encoded as literal `\n` and literal `\` are encoded as `\\`.
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| `admin.vm.property.GetDefault` | vm | property | - | `type={str|int|bool|vm|label|type} <value>` | Type `list` is added in R4.1. Each list entry is suffixed with a newline character.
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| `admin.vm.property.Help` | vm | property | - | `help` |
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| `admin.vm.property.HelpRst` | vm | property | - | `help.rst` |
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| `admin.vm.property.Reset` | vm | property | - | - |
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| `admin.vm.property.Set` | vm | property | value | - |
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| `admin.vm.feature.List` | vm | - | - | `<feature>\n` |
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| `admin.vm.feature.Get` | vm | feature | - | value |
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| `admin.vm.feature.CheckWithTemplate` | vm | feature | - | value |
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| `admin.vm.feature.CheckWithNetvm` | vm | feature | - | value |
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| `admin.vm.feature.CheckWithAdminVM` | vm | feature | - | value |
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| `admin.vm.feature.CheckWithTemplateAndAdminVM`| vm | feature | - | value |
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| `admin.vm.feature.Remove` | vm | feature | - | - |
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| `admin.vm.feature.Set` | vm | feature | value | - |
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| `admin.vm.tag.List` | vm | - | - | `<tag>\n` |
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| `admin.vm.tag.Get` | vm | tag | - | `0` or `1` | retcode? |
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| `admin.vm.tag.Remove` | vm | tag | - | - |
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| `admin.vm.tag.Set` | vm | tag | - | - |
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| `admin.vm.firewall.Get` | vm | - | - | `<rule>\n` | rules syntax as in [firewall interface](/doc/vm-interface/#firewall-rules-in-4x) with addition of `expire=` and `comment=` options; `comment=` (if present) must be the last option
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| `admin.vm.firewall.Set` | vm | - | `<rule>\n` | - | set firewall rules, see `admin.vm.firewall.Get` for syntax
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| `admin.vm.firewall.Reload` | vm | - | - | - | force reload firewall without changing any rule
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| `admin.vm.deviceclass.List` | `dom0` | - | - | `<class>\n` |
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| `admin.vm.device.<class>.Attach` | vm | device | options | - | `device` is in form `<backend-name>+<device-ident>` <br/>optional options given in `key=value` format, separated with spaces; <br/>options can include `persistent=True` to "persistently" attach the device (default is temporary)
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| `admin.vm.device.<class>.Detach` | vm | device | - | - | `device` is in form `<backend-name>+<device-ident>`
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| `admin.vm.device.<class>.Set.persistent`| vm | device | `True`\|`False` | - | `device` is in form `<backend-name>+<device-ident>`
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| `admin.vm.device.<class>.List` | vm | - | - | `<device> <options>\n` | options can include `persistent=True` for "persistently" attached devices (default is temporary)
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| `admin.vm.device.<class>.Available` | vm | device-ident | - | `<device-ident> <properties> description=<desc>\n` | optional service argument may be used to get info about a single device, <br/>optional (device class specific) properties are in `key=value` form, <br/>`description` must be the last one and is the only one allowed to contain spaces
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| `admin.pool.List` | `dom0` | - | - | `<pool>\n` |
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| `admin.pool.ListDrivers` | `dom0` | - | - | `<pool-driver> <property> ...\n` | Properties allowed in `admin.pool.Add`
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| `admin.pool.Info` | `dom0` | pool | - | `<property>=<value>\n` |
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| `admin.pool.Add` | `dom0` | driver | `<property>=<value>\n` | - |
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| `admin.pool.Set.revisions_to_keep` | `dom0` | pool | `<value>` | - |
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| `admin.pool.Remove` | `dom0` | pool | - | - |
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| `admin.pool.volume.List` | `dom0` | pool | - | volume id |
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| `admin.pool.volume.Info` | `dom0` | pool | vid | `<property>=<value>\n` |
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| `admin.pool.volume.Set.revisions_to_keep`| `dom0` | pool | `<vid> <value>` | - |
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| `admin.pool.volume.ListSnapshots` | `dom0` | pool | vid | `<snapshot>\n` |
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| `admin.pool.volume.Snapshot` | `dom0` | pool | vid | snapshot |
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| `admin.pool.volume.Revert` | `dom0` | pool | `<vid> <snapshot>` | - |
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| `admin.pool.volume.Resize` | `dom0` | pool | `<vid> <size_in_bytes>` | - |
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| `admin.pool.volume.Import` | `dom0` | pool | `<vid>\n<raw volume data>` | - |
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| `admin.pool.volume.CloneFrom` | `dom0` | pool | vid | token, to be used in `admin.pool.volume.CloneTo` | obtain a token to copy volume `vid` in `pool`;<br/>the token is one time use only, it's invalidated by `admin.pool.volume.CloneTo`, even if the operation fails |
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| `admin.pool.volume.CloneTo` | `dom0` | pool | `<vid> <token>` | - | copy volume pointed by a token to volume `vid` in `pool` |
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| `admin.vm.volume.List` | vm | - | - | `<volume>\n` | `<volume>` is per-VM volume name (`root`, `private`, etc), `<vid>` is pool-unique volume id
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| `admin.vm.volume.Info` | vm | volume | - | `<property>=<value>\n` |
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| `admin.vm.volume.Set.revisions_to_keep`| vm | volume | value | - |
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| `admin.vm.volume.ListSnapshots` | vm | volume | - | snapshot | duplicate of `admin.pool.volume.`, but with other call params |
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| `admin.vm.volume.Snapshot` | vm | volume | - | snapshot | id. |
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| `admin.vm.volume.Revert` | vm | volume | snapshot | - | id. |
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| `admin.vm.volume.Resize` | vm | volume | size_in_bytes | - | id. |
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| `admin.vm.volume.Import` | vm | volume | raw volume data | - | id. |
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| `admin.vm.volume.ImportWithSize` | vm | volume | `<size_in_bytes>\n<raw volume data>` | - | new version of `admin.vm.volume.Import`, allows new volume to be different size |
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| `admin.vm.volume.Clear` | vm | volume | - | - | clear contents of volume |
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| `admin.vm.volume.CloneFrom` | vm | volume | - | token, to be used in `admin.vm.volume.CloneTo` | obtain a token to copy `volume` of `vm`;<br/>the token is one time use only, it's invalidated by `admin.vm.volume.CloneTo`, even if the operation fails |
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| `admin.vm.volume.CloneTo` | vm | volume | token, obtained with `admin.vm.volume.CloneFrom` | - | copy volume pointed by a token to `volume` of `vm` |
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| `admin.vm.CurrentState` | vm | - | - | `<state-property>=<value>\n` | state properties: `power_state`, `mem`, `mem_static_max`, `cputime`
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| `admin.vm.Start` | vm | - | - | - |
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| `admin.vm.Shutdown` | vm | - | - | - |
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| `admin.vm.Pause` | vm | - | - | - |
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| `admin.vm.Unpause` | vm | - | - | - |
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| `admin.vm.Kill` | vm | - | - | - |
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| `admin.backup.Execute` | `dom0` | config id | - | - | config in `/etc/qubes/backup/<id>.conf`, only one backup operation of given `config id` can be running at once |
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| `admin.backup.Info` | `dom0` | config id | - | backup info | info what would be included in the backup
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| `admin.backup.Cancel` | `dom0` | config id | - | - | cancel running backup operation
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| `admin.Events` | `dom0|vm` | - | - | events |
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| `admin.vm.Stats` | `dom0|vm` | - | - | `vm-stats` events, see below | emit VM statistics (CPU, memory usage) in form of events
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| call | dest | argument | inside | return | note |
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|------------------------------------------------|------------|--------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------| ---- |
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| `admin.vmclass.List` | `dom0` | - | - | `<class>\n` |
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| `admin.vm.List` | `dom0 | <vm>` | - | - | `<name> class=<class> state=<state>\n` |
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| `admin.vm.Create.<class>` | `dom0` | template | `name=<name> label=<label>` | - |
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| `admin.vm.CreateInPool.<class>` | `dom0` | template | `name=<name> label=<label> `<br/>`pool=<pool> pool:<volume>=<pool>` | - | either use `pool=` to put all volumes there, <br/>or `pool:<volume>=` for individual volumes - both forms are not allowed at the same time
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| `admin.vm.CreateDisposable` | template | - | - | name | Create new DisposableVM, `template` is any AppVM with `dispvm_allowed` set to True, or `dom0` to use default defined in `default_dispvm` property of calling VM; VM created with this call will be automatically removed after its shutdown; the main difference from `admin.vm.Create.DispVM` is automatic (random) name generation.
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| `admin.vm.Remove` | vm | - | - | - |
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| `admin.label.List` | `dom0` | - | - | `<property>\n` |
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| `admin.label.Create` | `dom0` | label | `0xRRGGBB` | - |
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| `admin.label.Get` | `dom0` | label | - | `0xRRGGBB` |
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| `admin.label.Index` | `dom0` | label | - | `<label-index>` |
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| `admin.label.Remove` | `dom0` | label | - | - |
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| `admin.property.List` | `dom0` | - | - | `<property>\n` |
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| `admin.property.Get` | `dom0` | property | - | `default={True |False} `<br/>`type={str|int|bool|vm|label|list} <value>` | Type `list` is added in R4.1. Values are of type `str` and each entry is suffixed with newline character.
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| `admin.property.GetAll` | `dom0` | - | - | `<property-name> <full-value-as-in-property.Get>\n` | Get all the properties in one call. Each property is returned on a separate line and use the same value encoding as property.Get method, with an exception that newlines are encoded as literal `\n` and literal `\` are encoded as `\\`.
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| `admin.property.GetDefault` | `dom0` | property | - | `type={str |int|bool|vm|label|list} <value>` | Type `list` is added in R4.1. Values are of type `str` and each entry is suffixed with newline character.
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| `admin.property.Help` | `dom0` | property | - | `help` |
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| `admin.property.HelpRst` | `dom0` | property | - | `help.rst` |
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| `admin.property.Reset` | `dom0` | property | - | - |
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| `admin.property.Set` | `dom0` | property | value | - |
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| `admin.vm.property.List` | vm | - | - | `<property>\n` |
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| `admin.vm.property.Get` | vm | property | - | `default={True |False} `<br/>`type={str|int|bool|vm|label|list} <value>` | Type `list` is added in R4.1. Each list entry is suffixed with a newline character.
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| `admin.vm.property.GetAll` | vm | - | - | `<property-name> <full-value-as-in-property.Get>\n` | Get all the properties in one call. Each property is returned on a separate line and use the same value encoding as property.Get method, with an exception that newlines are encoded as literal `\n` and literal `\` are encoded as `\\`.
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| `admin.vm.property.GetDefault` | vm | property | - | `type={str |int|bool|vm|label|type} <value>` | Type `list` is added in R4.1. Each list entry is suffixed with a newline character.
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| `admin.vm.property.Help` | vm | property | - | `help` |
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| `admin.vm.property.HelpRst` | vm | property | - | `help.rst` |
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| `admin.vm.property.Reset` | vm | property | - | - |
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| `admin.vm.property.Set` | vm | property | value | - |
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| `admin.vm.feature.List` | vm | - | - | `<feature>\n` |
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| `admin.vm.feature.Get` | vm | feature | - | value |
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| `admin.vm.feature.CheckWithTemplate` | vm | feature | - | value |
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| `admin.vm.feature.CheckWithNetvm` | vm | feature | - | value |
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| `admin.vm.feature.CheckWithAdminVM` | vm | feature | - | value |
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| `admin.vm.feature.CheckWithTemplateAndAdminVM` | vm | feature | - | value |
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| `admin.vm.feature.Remove` | vm | feature | - | - |
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| `admin.vm.feature.Set` | vm | feature | value | - |
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| `admin.vm.tag.List` | vm | - | - | `<tag>\n` |
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| `admin.vm.tag.Get` | vm | tag | - | `0` or `1` | retcode? |
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| `admin.vm.tag.Remove` | vm | tag | - | - |
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| `admin.vm.tag.Set` | vm | tag | - | - |
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| `admin.vm.firewall.Get` | vm | - | - | `<rule>\n` | rules syntax as in [firewall interface](/doc/vm-interface/#firewall-rules-in-4x) with addition of `expire=` and `comment=` options; `comment=` (if present) must be the last option
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| `admin.vm.firewall.Set` | vm | - | `<rule>\n` | - | set firewall rules, see `admin.vm.firewall.Get` for syntax
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| `admin.vm.firewall.Reload` | vm | - | - | - | force reload firewall without changing any rule
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| `admin.vm.device.<class>.Attach` | vm | device | assignment-serialization | - | `device` is in form `<backend-name>+<device-ident>` <br/>optional options given in `key=value` format, separated with spaces; <br/>options can include `persistent=True` to "persistently" attach the device (default is temporary)
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| `admin.vm.device.<class>.Detach` | vm | device | - | - | `device` is in form `<backend-name>+<device-ident>`.
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| `admin.vm.device.<class>.Assign` | vm | device | assignment-serialization | - | `device` is in form `<backend-name>+<device-ident>` <br/> `assignment-serialization` is specified in the section Device Serialization.
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| `admin.vm.device.<class>.Unassign` | vm | device | - | - | `device` is in form `<backend-name>+<device-ident>`.
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| `admin.vm.device.<class>.Set.required` | vm | device | `True`\|`False` | - | `device` is in form `<backend-name>+<device-ident>`
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| `admin.vm.deviceclass.List` | `dom0` | - | - | `<deviceclass>\n` |
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| `admin.vm.device.<class>.Available` | vm | device-ident | - | `<device-ident> <device-serialization>\n` | optional service argument may be used to get info about a single device, <br/> `device-serialization` is specified in the section Device Serialization.
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| `admin.vm.device.<class>.Assigned` | vm | device-ident | - | `<device-ident> <assignment-serialization>\n` | optional service argument may be used to get info about a single device, <br/> `assignment-serialization` is specified in the section Device Serialization.
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| `admin.vm.device.<class>.Attached` | vm | device-ident | - | `<device-ident> <assignment-serialization>\n` | optional service argument may be used to get info about a single device, <br/> `assignment-serialization` is specified in the section Device Serialization.
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| `admin.pool.List` | `dom0` | - | - | `<pool>\n` |
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| `admin.pool.ListDrivers` | `dom0` | - | - | `<pool-driver> <property> ...\n` | Properties allowed in `admin.pool.Add`
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| `admin.pool.Info` | `dom0` | pool | - | `<property>=<value>\n` |
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| `admin.pool.Add` | `dom0` | driver | `<property>=<value>\n` | - |
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| `admin.pool.Set.revisions_to_keep` | `dom0` | pool | `<value>` | - |
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| `admin.pool.Remove` | `dom0` | pool | - | - |
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| `admin.pool.volume.List` | `dom0` | pool | - | volume id |
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| `admin.pool.volume.Info` | `dom0` | pool | vid | `<property>=<value>\n` |
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| `admin.pool.volume.Set.revisions_to_keep` | `dom0` | pool | `<vid> <value>` | - |
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| `admin.pool.volume.ListSnapshots` | `dom0` | pool | vid | `<snapshot>\n` |
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| `admin.pool.volume.Snapshot` | `dom0` | pool | vid | snapshot |
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| `admin.pool.volume.Revert` | `dom0` | pool | `<vid> <snapshot>` | - |
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| `admin.pool.volume.Resize` | `dom0` | pool | `<vid> <size_in_bytes>` | - |
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| `admin.pool.volume.Import` | `dom0` | pool | `<vid>\n<raw volume data>` | - |
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| `admin.pool.volume.CloneFrom` | `dom0` | pool | vid | token, to be used in `admin.pool.volume.CloneTo` | obtain a token to copy volume `vid` in `pool`;<br/>the token is one time use only, it's invalidated by `admin.pool.volume.CloneTo`, even if the operation fails |
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| `admin.pool.volume.CloneTo` | `dom0` | pool | `<vid> <token>` | - | copy volume pointed by a token to volume `vid` in `pool` |
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| `admin.vm.volume.List` | vm | - | - | `<volume>\n` | `<volume>` is per-VM volume name (`root`, `private`, etc), `<vid>` is pool-unique volume id
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| `admin.vm.volume.Info` | vm | volume | - | `<property>=<value>\n` |
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| `admin.vm.volume.Set.revisions_to_keep` | vm | volume | value | - |
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| `admin.vm.volume.ListSnapshots` | vm | volume | - | snapshot | duplicate of `admin.pool.volume.`, but with other call params |
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| `admin.vm.volume.Snapshot` | vm | volume | - | snapshot | id. |
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| `admin.vm.volume.Revert` | vm | volume | snapshot | - | id. |
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| `admin.vm.volume.Resize` | vm | volume | size_in_bytes | - | id. |
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| `admin.vm.volume.Import` | vm | volume | raw volume data | - | id. |
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| `admin.vm.volume.ImportWithSize` | vm | volume | `<size_in_bytes>\n<raw volume data>` | - | new version of `admin.vm.volume.Import`, allows new volume to be different size |
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| `admin.vm.volume.Clear` | vm | volume | - | - | clear contents of volume |
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| `admin.vm.volume.CloneFrom` | vm | volume | - | token, to be used in `admin.vm.volume.CloneTo` | obtain a token to copy `volume` of `vm`;<br/>the token is one time use only, it's invalidated by `admin.vm.volume.CloneTo`, even if the operation fails |
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| `admin.vm.volume.CloneTo` | vm | volume | token, obtained with `admin.vm.volume.CloneFrom` | - | copy volume pointed by a token to `volume` of `vm` |
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| `admin.vm.CurrentState` | vm | - | - | `<state-property>=<value>\n` | state properties: `power_state`, `mem`, `mem_static_max`, `cputime`
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| `admin.vm.Start` | vm | - | - | - |
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| `admin.vm.Shutdown` | vm | - | - | - |
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| `admin.vm.Pause` | vm | - | - | - |
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| `admin.vm.Unpause` | vm | - | - | - |
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| `admin.vm.Kill` | vm | - | - | - |
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| `admin.backup.Execute` | `dom0` | config id | - | - | config in `/etc/qubes/backup/<id>.conf`, only one backup operation of given `config id` can be running at once |
|
||||
| `admin.backup.Info` | `dom0` | config id | - | backup info | info what would be included in the backup
|
||||
| `admin.backup.Cancel` | `dom0` | config id | - | - | cancel running backup operation
|
||||
| `admin.Events` | `dom0 | vm` | - | - | events |
|
||||
| `admin.vm.Stats` | `dom0 | vm` | - | - | `vm-stats` events, see below | emit VM statistics (CPU, memory usage) in form of events
|
||||
|
||||
Volume properties:
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -301,6 +304,58 @@ destination_vm: sys-net
|
|||
destination_path: ncftpput -u my-ftp-username -p my-ftp-pass -c my-ftp-server /directory/for/backups
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Device Serialization
|
||||
|
||||
Both device and assignment serialization is ASCII-encoded and contains
|
||||
space-separated key-value pairs. The format includes an `=` between the key
|
||||
and value, and the value is always enclosed in single quotes (`'`).
|
||||
Values may contain spaces or even single quotes, which are escaped with a backslash.
|
||||
If a value is not set (`None`), it is represented as `'unknown'`.
|
||||
For boolean values, `True` is represented as `'yes'`, and `False` as `'no'`.
|
||||
The order of key-value pairs is irrelevant. Keys starting with `_`
|
||||
are considered extra properties and are saved in `data` or `options`
|
||||
for device or assignment respectively.
|
||||
|
||||
Information about the serialization format of specific properties can be found below.
|
||||
|
||||
Format:
|
||||
```
|
||||
<ident> <property_1>='<value_1>' <property_2>='<value_2>' <property_3>='<value_3>'...
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Detailed serialization format for a device:
|
||||
|
||||
- `ident='<ident>'`
|
||||
- `backend_domain='<backend_domain.name>'`
|
||||
- `devclass='<devclass>'`
|
||||
- `vendor='<vendor>'`
|
||||
- `product='<product>'`
|
||||
- `manufacturer='<manufacturer>'`
|
||||
- `name='<name>'`
|
||||
- `serial='<serial>'`
|
||||
- `self_identity='<self_identity>'`
|
||||
- `interfaces='<interface1><interface2>...'`
|
||||
Each device interface is represented with a 7-character length. Each device has at least one interface. Since the length of the interface representation is known, they are serialized as a single string with each interface representation concatenated one after another. The order is irrelevant.
|
||||
- `parent_ident='<parent.ident>' parent_devclass='<parent.devclass>'`
|
||||
- `attachment='<attachment.name>'`
|
||||
- `_<key1>='<value1>' _<key2>='<value2>' ...` (extra parameters)
|
||||
|
||||
Detailed serialization format for an assignment:
|
||||
|
||||
- `ident='<ident>'`
|
||||
- `backend_domain='<backend_domain.name>'`
|
||||
- `devclass='<devclass>'`
|
||||
- `frontend_domain='<frontend_domain.name>'`
|
||||
- `required='<yes/no>'` (default 'no')
|
||||
- `attach_automatically='<yes/no>'` (default 'no')
|
||||
- `_<key1>='<str(value1)>' _<key2>='<str(value2)>' ...` (options)
|
||||
|
||||
Example device serialization:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
1-1.1.1 manufacturer='unknown' self_identity='0000:0000::?******' serial='unknown' ident='1-1.1.1' product='Qubes' vendor='ITL' name='Some untrusted garbage' devclass='bus' backend_domain='vm' interfaces=' ******u03**01' _additional_info='' _date='06.12.23' parent_ident='1-1.1' parent_devclass='None'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## General notes
|
||||
|
||||
- there is no provision for `qvm-run`, but there already exists `qubes.VMShell` call
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -62,9 +62,12 @@ Such configuration can be expressed by enabling `ipv6` feature only on some subs
|
|||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Besides enabling IPv6 forwarding, standard Qubes firewall can be used to limit what network resources are available to each qube. Currently only `qvm-firewall` command support adding IPv6 rules, GUI firewall editor will have this ability later.
|
||||
Besides enabling IPv6 forwarding, the standard Qubes firewall can be used to limit what network resources are available to each qube. Currently only the `qvm-firewall` command supports adding IPv6 rules, the GUI firewall editor will have this ability later.
|
||||
|
||||
**Note:** Setting or unsetting the `ipv6` feature only affects qubes-configured networking. It does not affect e.g. external interfaces. If you want to restrict IPv6 on these interfaces change the settings in Network Manager. Alternatively, disable IPv6 support using methods appropriate to the underlying template.
|
||||
|
||||
### Limitations
|
||||
|
||||
Currently only IPv4 DNS servers are configured, regardless of `ipv6` feature state. It is done this way to avoid reconfiguring all connected qubes whenever IPv6 DNS becomes available or not. Configuring qubes to always use IPv6 DNS and only fallback to IPv4 may result in relatively long timeouts and poor usability.
|
||||
But note that DNS using IPv4 does not prevent to return IPv6 addresses. In practice this is only a problem for IPv6-only networks.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -114,16 +114,16 @@ We recommend consulting these resources when selecting hardware for Qubes OS:
|
|||
other security updates directly to users. By contrast, on AMD client (as
|
||||
opposed to server) platforms, microcode updates are typically shipped only as
|
||||
part of system firmware and generally cannot be loaded from the operating
|
||||
system. This means that AMD users typically must wait for:
|
||||
|
||||
system [^1]. This means that AMD users typically must wait for:
|
||||
|
||||
1. AMD to distribute microcode updates to original equipment manufacturers
|
||||
(OEMs), original design manufacturers (ODMs), and motherboard manufacturers
|
||||
(MB); and
|
||||
2. The user's OEM, ODM, or MB to provide a suitable BIOS or (U)EFI update for
|
||||
the user's system.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
- Historically, AMD has often been slow to complete step (1), at least for its
|
||||
client (as opposed to server) platforms. In some cases, AMD has made fixes
|
||||
client (as opposed to server) platforms [^2]. In some cases, AMD has made fixes
|
||||
available for its server platforms very shortly after a security embargo was
|
||||
lifted, but it did not make fixes available for client platforms facing the
|
||||
same vulnerability until weeks or months later. (A "security embargo" is the
|
||||
|
|
@ -131,10 +131,8 @@ We recommend consulting these resources when selecting hardware for Qubes OS:
|
|||
designated date.) By contrast, Intel has consistently made fixes available for
|
||||
new CPU vulnerabilities across its supported platforms very shortly after
|
||||
security embargoes have been lifted.
|
||||
|
||||
- Step (2) varies by vendor. Many vendors fail to complete step (2) at all,
|
||||
while some others take a very long time to complete it.
|
||||
|
||||
- The bottom line is that Qubes OS **can** run on AMD systems, and the Qubes and
|
||||
Xen security teams do their best to provide security support for AMD systems.
|
||||
However, without the ability to ship microcode updates, there is only so much
|
||||
|
|
@ -163,3 +161,17 @@ We recommend consulting these resources when selecting hardware for Qubes OS:
|
|||
|
||||
- You can check whether an Intel processor has VT-x and VT-d on
|
||||
[ark.intel.com](https://ark.intel.com/content/www/us/en/ark.html#@Processors).
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: There is an `amd-ucode-firmware` package, but it only contains
|
||||
microcode for servers and outdated microcode for Chromebooks. Also,
|
||||
the [AMD security website](https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security.html)
|
||||
only lists microcode as a mitigation for data center CPUs.
|
||||
|
||||
[^2]: As shown on [the AMD page for Speculative Return Stack Overflow](https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-7005.html),
|
||||
updated AGESA™ firmware for AMD Ryzen™ Threadripper™ 5000WX Processors
|
||||
was not available until 2024-01-11, even though the vulnerability became
|
||||
public on 2023-08-08. AMD did not provide updated firmware for other client
|
||||
processors until a date between 2023-08-22 to 2023-08-25.
|
||||
|
||||
For Zenbleed, firmware was not available until 2024 for most client parts,
|
||||
even though server parts got microcode on 2023-06-06.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ Fully updating your Qubes OS system means updating:
|
|||
- [dom0](/doc/glossary/#dom0)
|
||||
- [templates](/doc/glossary/#template)
|
||||
- [standalones](/doc/glossary/#standalone) (if you have any)
|
||||
- [firmware](/doc/glossary/#firmware)
|
||||
|
||||
## Security updates
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -65,10 +66,19 @@ If you use [Anti Evil Maid (AEM)](/doc/anti-evil-maid/), you'll have to "reseal"
|
|||
|
||||
<div class="alert alert-danger" role="alert">
|
||||
<i class="fa fa-exclamation-triangle"></i>
|
||||
<b>Warning:</b> Updating with direct commands such as <code>dnf update</code>, and <code>apt update</code> is <b>not</b> recommended, since these bypass built-in Qubes OS update security measures. Instead, we strongly recommend using the <b>Qubes Update</b> tool or its command-line equivalents, as described below. (By contrast, <a href="/doc/how-to-install-software/">installing</a> packages using direct package manager commands is fine.)
|
||||
<b>Warning:</b> Updating with direct commands such as <code>dnf update</code> and <code>apt update</code> is <b>not</b> recommended, since these bypass built-in Qubes OS update security measures. Instead, we strongly recommend using the <b>Qubes Update</b> tool or its command-line equivalents, as described below. (By contrast, <a href="/doc/how-to-install-software/">installing</a> packages using direct package manager commands is fine.)
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
Advanced users may wish to perform updates via the command-line interface. To update templates and standalones non-interactively, use the command `qubes-vm-update`, and to update dom0, use `qubes-dom0-update`. If you want to perform an update with more advanced user-configurable options (e.g., custom pre- or post-update scripts, custom workarounds), see: [update.qubes-dom0](/doc/salt/#updatequbes-dom0) and [update.qubes-vm](/doc/salt/#updatequbes-vm).
|
||||
Advanced users may wish to perform updates via the command-line interface. There are two ways to do this:
|
||||
|
||||
- If you are using Salt, one can use the following two Salt states.
|
||||
|
||||
- [update.qubes-dom0](/doc/salt/#updatequbes-dom0)
|
||||
- [update.qubes-vm](/doc/salt/#updatequbes-vm)
|
||||
|
||||
- Alternatively, use `qubes-dom0-update` to update dom0, and use `qubes-vm-update` to update domUs.
|
||||
|
||||
Using either of these methods has the same effect as updating via the Qubes Update tool.
|
||||
|
||||
Advanced users may also be interested in learning [how to enable the testing repos](/doc/testing/).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -83,3 +93,61 @@ In the case of Qubes OS itself, we will make an [announcement](/news/categories/
|
|||
Periodic upgrades are also important for templates. For example, you might be using a [Fedora template](/doc/templates/fedora/). The [Fedora Project](https://getfedora.org/) is independent of the Qubes OS Project. They set their own [schedule](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_Release_Life_Cycle#Maintenance_Schedule) for when each Fedora release reaches EOL. You can always find out when an OS reaches EOL from the upstream project that maintains it. We also pass along any EOL notices we receive for official template OSes as a convenience to Qubes users (see the [supported template releases](/doc/supported-releases/#templates)).
|
||||
|
||||
The one exception to all this is the specific release used for dom0 (not to be confused with Qubes OS as a whole), which [doesn't have to be upgraded](/doc/supported-releases/#note-on-dom0-and-eol).
|
||||
|
||||
## Microcode Updates
|
||||
|
||||
x86\_64 CPUs contain special low-level software called **microcode**, which
|
||||
is used to implement certain instructions and runs on various processors that
|
||||
are outside of Qubes OS's control. Most microcode is in an on-CPU ROM, but
|
||||
CPU vendors provide patches that modify small parts of this microcode. These
|
||||
patches can be loaded from the BIOS or by the OS.
|
||||
|
||||
The fixes for some QSBs require a microcode update to work. Furthermore,
|
||||
microcode updates will sometimes fix vulnerabilities "silently". This means
|
||||
that the vulnerability impacts the security of Qubes OS, but the Qubes OS
|
||||
Security Team is not informed that a vulnerability exists, so no QSB is ever
|
||||
issued. Therefore, it is critical to update microcode.
|
||||
|
||||
Intel provides microcode updates for all of their CPUs in a public Git
|
||||
repository, and allows OS vendors (such as Qubes OS) to distribute the updates
|
||||
free of charge. AMD, however, only provides microcode for server CPUs.
|
||||
AMD client CPUs can only receive microcode updates via a system firmware
|
||||
update. Worse, there is often a significant delay between when a vulnerability
|
||||
becomes public and when firmware that includes updated microcode is available
|
||||
to Qubes OS users. This is why Qubes OS recommends Intel CPUs instead of
|
||||
AMD CPUs.
|
||||
|
||||
## Firmware updates
|
||||
|
||||
Modern computers have many processors other than those that run Qubes OS.
|
||||
Furthermore, the main processor cores also run firmware, which is used to
|
||||
boot the system and often provides some services at runtime. Both kinds
|
||||
of firmware can have bugs and vulnerabilities, so it is critical to keep
|
||||
them updated.
|
||||
|
||||
Some firmware is loaded by the OS at runtime.
|
||||
Such firmware is provided by the `linux-firmware` package and can be updated the usual way.
|
||||
Other devices have persistent firmware that must be updated manually.
|
||||
|
||||
Qubes OS supports updating system firmware in three different ways.
|
||||
Which one to use depends on the device whose firmware is being updated.
|
||||
|
||||
- If a device is attached to a domU, it should be updated using **fwupd**.
|
||||
fwupd is included in both Debian and Fedora repositories.
|
||||
It requires Internet access to use, but you can use the updates proxy if you
|
||||
need to update firmware from an offline VM. You can use either the
|
||||
command-line `fwupdmgr` tool or any of the graphical interfaces to fwupd.
|
||||
|
||||
- If a device is attached to dom0, use the `qubes-fwupdmgr` command-line tool.
|
||||
This tool uses fwupd internally, but it fetches firmware and metadata over
|
||||
qrexec from the dom0 UpdateVM, rather than fetching them from the Internet.
|
||||
Unfortunately, their is no graphical interface for this tool yet.
|
||||
|
||||
- System76 systems use a special update tool which is simpler than fwupd.
|
||||
Support for this tool is currently in progress. Once it is finished,
|
||||
users will be able to use the **system76-firmware-cli** command-line
|
||||
tool to update the firmware.
|
||||
|
||||
Firmware updates are important on all systems, but they are especially
|
||||
important on AMD client systems. These doesn't support loading microcode from
|
||||
the OS, so firmware updates are the **only** way to obtain microcode updates.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -88,6 +88,13 @@ domUs lack direct hardware access.
|
|||
* Sometimes the term [VM](#vm) is used as a synonym for domU. This is
|
||||
technically inaccurate, as [dom0](#dom0) is also a VM in Xen.
|
||||
|
||||
## firmware
|
||||
|
||||
Software that runs outside the control of the operating system.
|
||||
Some firmware executes on the same CPU cores as Qubes OS does, but
|
||||
all computers have many additional processors that the operating system
|
||||
does not run on, and these computers also run firmware.
|
||||
|
||||
## HVM
|
||||
|
||||
Hardware-assisted Virtual Machine. Any fully virtualized, or hardware-assisted,
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -37,359 +37,124 @@ Unfortunately this problem of signing reliability is not solvable by Split GPG.)
|
|||
With Qubes Split GPG this problem is drastically minimized, because each time the key is to be used the user is asked for consent (with a definable time out, 5 minutes by default), plus is always notified each time the key is used via a tray notification from the domain where GPG backend is running.
|
||||
This way it would be easy to spot unexpected requests to decrypt documents.
|
||||
|
||||
[](/attachment/doc/r2-split-gpg-1.png)
|
||||
[](/attachment/doc/r2-split-gpg-3.png)
|
||||
## Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
## Configuring Split GPG
|
||||
|
||||
In dom0, make sure the `qubes-gpg-split-dom0` package is installed.
|
||||
Create/Edit `/etc/qubes/policy.d/30-user-gpg2.policy` in dom0, and add a line like this:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
[user@dom0 ~]$ sudo qubes-dom0-update qubes-gpg-split-dom0
|
||||
qubes.Gpg2 + gpg-client-vm @default allow target=gpg-server-vm
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Make sure you have the `qubes-gpg-split` package installed in the template you will use for the GPG domain.
|
||||
|
||||
For Debian or Whonix:
|
||||
Import/Generate your secret keys in the server domain.
|
||||
For example:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
[user@debian-10 ~]$ sudo apt install qubes-gpg-split
|
||||
gpg-server-vm$ gpg --import /path/to/my/secret-keys-export
|
||||
gpg-server-vm$ gpg --import-ownertrust /path/to/my/ownertrust-export
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
For Fedora:
|
||||
or
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
[user@fedora-32 ~]$ sudo dnf install qubes-gpg-split
|
||||
gpg-server-vm$ gpg --gen-key
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Setting up the GPG backend domain
|
||||
In dom0 enable the `split-gpg2-client` service in the client domain, for example via the command-line:
|
||||
|
||||
First, create a dedicated app qube for storing your keys (we will be calling it the GPG backend domain).
|
||||
It is recommended that this domain be network disconnected (set its netvm to `none`) and only used for this one purpose.
|
||||
In later examples this app qube is named `work-gpg`, but of course it might have any other name.
|
||||
|
||||
Make sure that gpg is installed there.
|
||||
At this stage you can add the private keys you want to store there, or you can now set up Split GPG and add the keys later.
|
||||
To check which private keys are in your GPG keyring, use:
|
||||
|
||||
```shell_session
|
||||
[user@work-gpg ~]$ gpg -K
|
||||
/home/user/.gnupg/secring.gpg
|
||||
-----------------------------
|
||||
sec 4096R/3F48CB21 2012-11-15
|
||||
uid Qubes OS Security Team <security@qubes-os.org>
|
||||
ssb 4096R/30498E2A 2012-11-15
|
||||
(...)
|
||||
```shell
|
||||
dom0$ qvm-service <SPLIT_GPG2_CLIENT_DOMAIN_NAME> split-gpg2-client on
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
This is pretty much all that is required.
|
||||
However, you might want to modify the default timeout: this tells the backend for how long the user's approval for key access should be valid.
|
||||
(The default is 5 minutes.) You can change this via the `QUBES_GPG_AUTOACCEPT` environment variable.
|
||||
You can override it e.g. in `~/.profile`:
|
||||
To verify if this was done correctly:
|
||||
|
||||
```shell_session
|
||||
[user@work-gpg ~]$ echo "export QUBES_GPG_AUTOACCEPT=86400" >> ~/.profile
|
||||
```shell
|
||||
dom0$ qvm-service <SPLIT_GPG2_CLIENT_DOMAIN_NAME>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Please note that previously, this parameter was set in ~/.bash_profile.
|
||||
This will no longer work.
|
||||
If you have the parameter set in ~/.bash_profile you *must* update your configuration.
|
||||
Output should be:
|
||||
|
||||
Please be aware of the caveat regarding passphrase-protected keys in the [Current limitations](#current-limitations) section.
|
||||
|
||||
### Configuring the client apps to use Split GPG backend
|
||||
|
||||
Normally it should be enough to set the `QUBES_GPG_DOMAIN` to the GPG backend domain name and use `qubes-gpg-client` in place of `gpg`, e.g.:
|
||||
|
||||
```shell_session
|
||||
[user@work-email ~]$ export QUBES_GPG_DOMAIN=work-gpg
|
||||
[user@work-email ~]$ gpg -K
|
||||
[user@work-email ~]$ qubes-gpg-client -K
|
||||
/home/user/.gnupg/secring.gpg
|
||||
-----------------------------
|
||||
sec 4096R/3F48CB21 2012-11-15
|
||||
uid Qubes OS Security Team <security@qubes-os.org>
|
||||
ssb 4096R/30498E2A 2012-11-15
|
||||
(...)
|
||||
|
||||
[user@work-email ~]$ qubes-gpg-client secret_message.txt.asc
|
||||
(...)
|
||||
```shell
|
||||
split-gpg2-client on
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Note that running normal `gpg -K` in the demo above shows no private keys stored in this app qube.
|
||||
Restart the client domain.
|
||||
|
||||
A note on `gpg` and `gpg2`:
|
||||
|
||||
Throughout this guide, we refer to `gpg`, but note that Split GPG uses `gpg2` under the hood for compatibility with programs like Enigmail (which now supports only `gpg2`).
|
||||
If you encounter trouble while trying to set up Split GPG, make sure you're using `gpg2` for your configuration and testing, since keyring data may differ between the two installations.
|
||||
|
||||
### Advanced Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
The `qubes-gpg-client-wrapper` script sets the `QUBES_GPG_DOMAIN` variable automatically based on the content of the file `/rw/config/gpg-split-domain`, which should be set to the name of the GPG backend VM. This file survives the app qube reboot, of course.
|
||||
|
||||
```shell_session
|
||||
[user@work-email ~]$ sudo bash
|
||||
[root@work-email ~]$ echo "work-gpg" > /rw/config/gpg-split-domain
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Split GPG's default qrexec policy requires the user to enter the name of the app qube containing GPG keys on each invocation. To improve usability for applications like Thunderbird with Enigmail, in `dom0` place the following line at the top of the file `/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.Gpg`:
|
||||
Export the **public** part of your keys and import them in the client domain.
|
||||
Also import/set proper "ownertrust" values.
|
||||
For example:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
work-email work-gpg allow
|
||||
gpg-server-vm$ gpg --export > public-keys-export
|
||||
gpg-server-vm$ gpg --export-ownertrust > ownertrust-export
|
||||
gpg-server-vm$ qvm-copy public-keys-export ownertrust-export
|
||||
|
||||
gpg-client-vm$ gpg --import ~/QubesIncoming/gpg-server-vm/public-keys-export
|
||||
gpg-client-vm$ gpg --import-ownertrust ~/QubesIncoming/gpg-server-vm/ownertrust-export
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
where `work-email` is the Thunderbird + Enigmail app qube and `work-gpg` contains your GPG keys.
|
||||
|
||||
You may also edit the qrexec policy file for Split GPG in order to tell Qubes your default gpg vm (qrexec prompts will appear with the gpg vm preselected as the target, instead of the user needing to type a name in manually). To do this, append `default_target=<vmname>` to `ask` in `/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.Gpg`. For the examples given on this page:
|
||||
This should be enough to have it running:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
@anyvm @anyvm ask default_target=work-gpg
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Note that, because this makes it easier to accept Split GPG's qrexec authorization prompts, it may decrease security if the user is not careful in reviewing presented prompts. This may also be inadvisable if there are multiple app qubes with Split GPG set up.
|
||||
|
||||
## Using Thunderbird
|
||||
|
||||
### Thunderbird 78 and higher
|
||||
|
||||
Starting with version 78, Thunderbird has a built-in PGP feature and no longer requires the Enigmail extension. For users coming from the Enigmail extension, the built-in functionality is more limited currently, including that **public keys must live in your** `work-email` **qube with Thunderbird rather than your offline** `work-gpg` **qube**.
|
||||
|
||||
In `work-email`, use the Thunderbird config editor (found at the bottom of preferences/options), and search for `mail.openpgp.allow_external_gnupg`. Switch the value to true. Still in config editor, search for `mail.openpgp.alternative_gpg_path`. Set its value to `/usr/bin/qubes-gpg-client-wrapper`. Restart Thunderbird after this change.
|
||||
|
||||
[](/attachment/doc/tb78-1.png)
|
||||
[](/attachment/doc/tb78-2.png)
|
||||
[](/attachment/doc/tb78-3.png)
|
||||
|
||||
You need to obtain your key ID which should be **exactly 16 characters**. Enter the command `qubes-gpg-client-wrapper -K --keyid-format long`:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
[user@work-email ~]$ qubes-gpg-client-wrapper -K --keyid-format long
|
||||
gpg-client-vm$ gpg -K
|
||||
/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx
|
||||
-----------------------------
|
||||
sec rsa2048/777402E6D301615C 2020-09-05 [SC] [expires: 2022-09-05]
|
||||
F7D2D4E922DFB7B2589AF3E9777402E6D301615C
|
||||
uid [ultimate] Qubes test <user@localhost>
|
||||
ssb rsa2048/370CE932085BA13B 2020-09-05 [E] [expires: 2022-09-05]
|
||||
sec# rsa2048 2019-12-18 [SC] [expires: 2021-12-17]
|
||||
50C2035AF57B98CD6E4010F1B808E4BB07BA9EFB
|
||||
uid [ultimate] test
|
||||
ssb# rsa2048 2019-12-18 [E]
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
[user@work-email ~]$ qubes-gpg-client-wrapper --armor --export 777402E6D301615C > 777402E6D301615C.asc
|
||||
```
|
||||
If you want change some server option copy `/usr/share/doc/split-gpg2/examples/qubes-split-gpg2.conf.example` to `~/.config/qubes-split-gpg2/qubes-split-gpg2.conf` and change it as desired, it will take precedence over other loaded files, such as the drop-in configuration files with the suffix `.conf` in `~/.config/qubes-split-gpg2/conf.d/`.
|
||||
|
||||
Open the Account Settings and open the *End-to-End Encryption* tab of the respective email account. Click the *Add Key* button. You'll be offered the choice *Use your external key through GnuPG*. Select it and click Continue.
|
||||
If you have a passphrase on your keys and `gpg-agent` only shows the "keygrip" (something like the fingerprint of the private key) when asking for the passphrase, then make sure that you have imported the public key part in the server domain.
|
||||
|
||||
[](/attachment/doc/tb78-4.png)
|
||||
[](/attachment/doc/tb78-5.png)
|
||||
## Subkeys vs primary keys
|
||||
|
||||
The key ID reference you would need here is `777402E6D301615C`. Now paste or type the ID of the secret key that you would like to use. Be careful to enter it correctly, because your input isn't verified. Confirm to save this key ID. Now you can select the key ID to use.
|
||||
split-gpg2 only knows a hash of the data being signed.
|
||||
Therefore, it cannot differentiate between e.g. signatures of a piece of data or signatures of another key.
|
||||
This means that a client can use split-gpg2 to sign other keys, which split-gpg1 did not allow.
|
||||
|
||||
[](/attachment/doc/tb78-6.png)
|
||||
[](/attachment/doc/tb78-7.png)
|
||||
To prevent this, split-gpg2 creates a new GnuPG home directory and imports the secret subkeys (**not** the primary key!) to it.
|
||||
Clients will be able to use the secret parts of the subkeys, but not of the primary key.
|
||||
If your primary key is able to sign data and certify other keys, and your only subkey can only perform encryption, this means that all signing will fail.
|
||||
To make signing work again, generate a subkey that is capable of signing but **not** certification.
|
||||
split-gpg2 does not generate this key for you, so you need to generate it yourself.
|
||||
If you want to generate a key in software, use the `addkey` command of `gpg2 --edit-key`.
|
||||
If you want to generate a key on a smartcard or other hardware token, use `addcardkey` instead.
|
||||
|
||||
This key ID will be used to digitally sign or send an encrypted message with your account. For this to work, Thunderbird needs a copy of your public key. At this time, Thunderbird doesn't fetch the public key from `/usr/bin/qubes-gpg-client-wrapper`, you must manually import it. Export the key as follow (assuming the key ID would be `777402E6D301615C`):
|
||||
## Advanced usage
|
||||
|
||||
[](/attachment/doc/tb78-8.png)
|
||||
[](/attachment/doc/tb78-9.png)
|
||||
There are a few option not described in this README.
|
||||
See the comments in the example (config and the source code)[https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-app-linux-split-gpg2/blob/main/qubes-split-gpg2.conf.example].
|
||||
|
||||
Use Thunderbird's Tools menu to open *OpenPGP Key Management*. In that window, use the File menu to access the *Import Public Key(s) From File* command. Open the file with your public key. After the import was successful, right click on the imported key in the list and select *Key Properties*. You must mark your own key as *Yes, I've verified in person this key has the correct fingerprint*.
|
||||
Similar to a smartcard, split-gpg2 only tries to protect the private key.
|
||||
For advanced usages, consider if a specialized RPC service would be better.
|
||||
It could do things like checking what data is singed, detailed logging, exposing the encrypted content only to a VM without network, etc.
|
||||
|
||||
Once this is done, you should be able to send an encrypted and signed email by selecting *Require Encryption* or *Digitally Sign This Message* in the compose menu *Options* or *Security* toolbar button. You can try it by sending an email to yourself.
|
||||
Using split-gpg2 as the "backend" for split-gpg1 is known to work.
|
||||
|
||||
[](/attachment/doc/tb78-10.png)
|
||||
## Allow key generation
|
||||
|
||||
For more details about using smart cards/Split GPG with Thunderbird PGP feature, please see [Thunderbird:OpenPGP:Smartcards](https://wiki.mozilla.org/Thunderbird:OpenPGP:Smartcards) from which the above documentation is inspired.
|
||||
By setting `allow_keygen = yes` in `qubes-split-gpg2.conf` you can allow the client to generate new keys.
|
||||
Normal usage should not need this.
|
||||
|
||||
### Older Thunderbird versions
|
||||
**Warning**: This feature is new and not much tested.
|
||||
Therefore it's not security supported!
|
||||
|
||||
For Thunderbird versions below 78, the traditional Enigmail + Split GPG setup is required.
|
||||
It is recommended to set up and use `/usr/bin/qubes-gpg-client-wrapper`, as discussed above, in Thunderbird through the Enigmail addon.
|
||||
## Copyright
|
||||
|
||||
**Warning:** Before adding any account, configuring Enigmail with `/usr/bin/qubes-gpg-client-wrapper` is **required**. By default, Enigmail will generate a default GPG key in `work-email` associated with the newly created Thunderbird account. Generally, it corresponds to the email used in `work-gpg` associated to your private key. In consequence, a new, separate private key will be stored in `work-email` but it _does not_ correspond to your private key in `work-gpg`. Comparing the `fingerprint` or `expiration date` will show that they are not the same private key. In order to prevent Enigmail using this default generated local key in `work-email`, you can safely remove it.
|
||||
Copyright (C) 2014 HW42 <hw42@ipsumj.de>\
|
||||
Copyright (C) 2019 Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
|
||||
|
||||
On a fresh Enigmail install, your need to change the default `Enigmail Junior Mode`. Go to Thunderbird preferences and then privacy tab. Select `Force using S/MIME and Enigmail`. Then, in the preferences of Enigmail, make it point to `/usr/bin/qubes-gpg-client-wrapper` instead of the standard GnuPG binary:
|
||||
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
|
||||
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
|
||||
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
|
||||
(at your option) any later version.
|
||||
|
||||
[](/attachment/doc/tb-enigmail-split-gpg-settings-2.png)
|
||||
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
|
||||
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
|
||||
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
|
||||
GNU General Public License for more details.
|
||||
|
||||
## Using Keybase with Split GPG
|
||||
|
||||
Keybase, a security focused messaging and file-sharing app with GPG integration, can be configured to use Split GPG.
|
||||
|
||||
The Keybase service does not preserve/pass the `QUBES_GPG_DOMAIN` environment variable through to underlying GPG processes, so it **must** be configured to use `/usr/bin/qubes-gpg-client-wrapper` (as discussed above) rather than `/usr/bin/qubes-gpg-client`.
|
||||
|
||||
The following command will configure Keybase to use `/usr/bin/qubes-gpg-client-wrapper` instead of its built-in GPG client:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
$ keybase config set gpg.command /usr/bin/qubes-gpg-client-wrapper
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Now that Keybase is configured to use `qubes-gpg-client-wrapper`, you will be able to use `keybase pgp select` to choose a GPG key from your backend GPG app qube and link that key to your Keybase identity.
|
||||
|
||||
## Using Git with Split GPG
|
||||
|
||||
Git can be configured to utilize Split GPG, something useful if you would like to contribute to the Qubes OS Project as every commit is required to be signed.
|
||||
The most basic `~/.gitconfig` file enabling Split GPG looks something like this.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
[user]
|
||||
name = <YOUR_NAME>
|
||||
email = <YOUR_EMAIL_ADDRESS>
|
||||
signingKey = <YOUR_KEY_ID>
|
||||
|
||||
[gpg]
|
||||
program = qubes-gpg-client-wrapper
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Your key id is the public id of your signing key, which can be found by running `qubes-gpg-client --list-keys`.
|
||||
In this instance, the key id is E142F75A6B1B610E0E8F874FB45589245791CACB.
|
||||
|
||||
```shell_session
|
||||
[user@work-email ~]$ qubes-gpg-client --list-keys
|
||||
/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx
|
||||
-----------------------------
|
||||
pub ed25519 2022-08-16 [C]
|
||||
E142F75A6B1B610E0E8F874FB45589245791CACB
|
||||
uid [ultimate] Qubes User <user@example.com>
|
||||
sub ed25519 2022-08-16 [S]
|
||||
sub cv25519 2022-08-16 [E]
|
||||
sub ed25519 2022-08-16 [A]
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
To sign commits, you now add the "-S" flag to your commit command, which should prompt for Split GPG usage.
|
||||
If you would like to automatically sign all commits, you can add the following snippet to `~/.gitconfig`.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
[commit]
|
||||
gpgSign = true
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Lastly, if you would like to add aliases to sign and verify tags using the conventions the Qubes OS Project recommends, refer to the [code signing documentation](/doc/code-signing/#using-pgp-with-git).
|
||||
|
||||
## Importing public keys
|
||||
|
||||
Use `qubes-gpg-import-key` in the client app qube to import the key into the GPG backend VM.
|
||||
|
||||
```shell_session
|
||||
[user@work-email ~]$ export QUBES_GPG_DOMAIN=work-gpg
|
||||
[user@work-email ~]$ qubes-gpg-import-key ~/Downloads/marmarek.asc
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
A safe, unspoofable user consent dialog box is displayed.
|
||||
|
||||
[](/attachment/doc/r2-split-gpg-5.png)
|
||||
|
||||
Selecting "Yes to All" will add a line in the corresponding [RPC Policy](/doc/rpc-policy/) file.
|
||||
|
||||
## Advanced: Using Split GPG with Subkeys
|
||||
|
||||
Users with particularly high security requirements may wish to use Split GPG with [subkeys](https://wiki.debian.org/Subkeys).
|
||||
However, this setup comes at a significant cost: It will be impossible to sign other people's keys with the master secret key without breaking this security model.
|
||||
Nonetheless, if signing others' keys is not required, then Split GPG with subkeys offers unparalleled security for one's master secret key.
|
||||
|
||||
### Setup Description
|
||||
|
||||
In this example, the following keys are stored in the following locations (see below for definitions of these terms):
|
||||
|
||||
| PGP Key(s) | VM Name |
|
||||
| ---------- | ------------ |
|
||||
| `sec` | `vault` |
|
||||
| `ssb` | `work-gpg` |
|
||||
| `pub` | `work-email` |
|
||||
|
||||
- `sec` (master secret key)
|
||||
|
||||
* Depending on your needs, you may wish to create this as a **certify-only (C)** key, i.e., a key which is capable only of signing (a.k.a., "certifying") other keys.
|
||||
This key may be created *without* an expiration date.
|
||||
This is for two reasons.
|
||||
First, the master secret key is never to leave the `vault` VM, so it is extremely unlikely ever to be obtained by an adversary (see below).
|
||||
Second, an adversary who *does* manage to obtain the master secret key either possesses the passphrase to unlock the key (if one is used) or does not.
|
||||
An adversary who *does* possess the passphrase can simply use it to legally extend the expiration date of the key (or remove it entirely).
|
||||
An adversary who does *not* possess the passphrase cannot use the key at all.
|
||||
In either case, an expiration date provides no additional benefit.
|
||||
|
||||
* By the same token, however, having a passphrase on the key is of little value.
|
||||
An adversary who is capable of stealing the key from your `vault` would almost certainly also be capable of stealing the passphrase as you enter it.
|
||||
An adversary who obtains the passphrase can then use it in order to change or remove the passphrase from the key.
|
||||
Therefore, using a passphrase at all should be considered optional.
|
||||
It is, however, recommended that a **revocation certificate** be created and safely stored in multiple locations so that the master keypair can be revoked in the (exceedingly unlikely) event that it is ever compromised.
|
||||
|
||||
- `ssb` (secret subkey)
|
||||
|
||||
* Depending on your needs, you may wish to create two different subkeys: one for **signing (S)** and one for **encryption (E)**.
|
||||
You may also wish to give these subkeys reasonable expiration dates (e.g., one year).
|
||||
Once these keys expire, it is up to you whether to *renew* these keys by extending the expiration dates or to create *new* subkeys when the existing set expires.
|
||||
|
||||
* On the one hand, an adversary who obtains any existing encryption subkey (for example) will be able to use it in order to decrypt all emails (for example) which were encrypted to that subkey.
|
||||
If the same subkey were to continue to be used--and its expiration date continually extended--only that one key would need to be stolen (e.g., as a result of the `work-gpg` VM being compromised; see below) in order to decrypt *all* of the user's emails.
|
||||
If, on the other hand, each encryption subkey is used for at most approximately one year, then an adversary who obtains the secret subkey will be capable of decrypting at most approximately one year's worth of emails.
|
||||
|
||||
* On the other hand, creating a new signing subkey each year without renewing (i.e., extending the expiration dates of) existing signing subkeys would mean that all of your old signatures would eventually read as "EXPIRED" whenever someone attempts to verify them.
|
||||
This can be problematic, since there is no consensus on how expired signatures should be handled.
|
||||
Generally, digital signatures are intended to last forever, so this is a strong reason against regularly retiring one's signing subkeys.
|
||||
|
||||
- `pub` (public key)
|
||||
|
||||
* This is the complement of the master secret key.
|
||||
It can be uploaded to keyservers (or otherwise publicly distributed) and may be signed by others.
|
||||
|
||||
- `vault`
|
||||
|
||||
* This is a network-isolated VM.
|
||||
The initial master keypair and subkeys are generated in this VM.
|
||||
The master secret key *never* leaves this VM under *any* circumstances.
|
||||
No files or text is *ever* [copied](/doc/how-to-copy-and-move-files/#security) or [pasted](/doc/how-to-copy-and-paste-text/#security) into this VM under *any* circumstances.
|
||||
|
||||
- `work-gpg`
|
||||
|
||||
* This is a network-isolated VM.
|
||||
This VM is used *only* as the GPG backend for `work-email`.
|
||||
The secret subkeys (but *not* the master secret key) are [copied](/doc/how-to-copy-and-move-files/#security) from the `vault` VM to this VM.
|
||||
Files from less trusted VMs are *never* [copied](/doc/how-to-copy-and-move-files/#security) into this VM under *any* circumstances.
|
||||
|
||||
- `work-email`
|
||||
|
||||
* This VM has access to the mail server.
|
||||
It accesses the `work-gpg` VM via the Split GPG protocol.
|
||||
The public key may be stored in this VM so that it can be attached to emails and for other such purposes.
|
||||
|
||||
### Security Benefits
|
||||
|
||||
In the standard Split GPG setup, there are at least two ways in which the `work-gpg` VM might be compromised.
|
||||
First, an attacker who is capable of exploiting a hypothetical bug in `work-email`'s [MUA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mail_user_agent) could gain control of the `work-email` VM and send a malformed request which exploits a hypothetical bug in the GPG backend (running in the `work-gpg` VM), giving the attacker control of the `work-gpg` VM.
|
||||
Second, a malicious public key file which is imported into the `work-gpg` VM might exploit a hypothetical bug in the GPG backend which is running there, again giving the attacker control of the `work-gpg` VM.
|
||||
In either case, such an attacker might then be able to leak both the master secret key and its passphrase (if any is used, it would regularly be input in the work-gpg VM and therefore easily obtained by an attacker who controls this VM) back to the `work-email` VM or to another VM (e.g., the `netvm`, which is always untrusted by default) via the Split GPG protocol or other [covert channels](/doc/data-leaks/).
|
||||
Once the master secret key is in the `work-email` VM, the attacker could simply email it to himself (or to the world).
|
||||
|
||||
In the alternative setup described in this section (i.e., the subkey setup), even an attacker who manages to gain access to the `work-gpg` VM will not be able to obtain the user's master secret key since it is simply not there.
|
||||
Rather, the master secret key remains in the `vault` VM, which is extremely unlikely to be compromised, since nothing is ever copied or transferred into it.
|
||||
[^a-note] The attacker might nonetheless be able to leak the secret subkeys from the `work-gpg` VM in the manner described above, but even if this is successful, the secure master secret key can simply be used to revoke the compromised subkeys and to issue new subkeys in their place.
|
||||
(This is significantly less devastating than having to create a new *master* keypair.)
|
||||
|
||||
[^a-note]: In order to gain access to the `vault` VM, the attacker would require the use of, e.g., a general Xen VM escape exploit or a [signed, compromised package which is already installed in the template](/doc/templates/#trusting-your-templates) upon which the `vault` VM is based.
|
||||
|
||||
### Subkey Tutorials and Discussions
|
||||
|
||||
(Note: Although the tutorials below were not written with Qubes Split GPG in mind, they can be adapted with a few commonsense adjustments.
|
||||
As always, exercise caution and use your good judgment.)
|
||||
|
||||
* ["OpenPGP in Qubes OS" on the qubes-users mailing list](https://groups.google.com/d/topic/qubes-users/Kwfuern-R2U/discussion)
|
||||
* ["Creating the Perfect GPG Keypair" by Alex Cabal](https://alexcabal.com/creating-the-perfect-gpg-keypair/)
|
||||
* ["GPG Offline Master Key w/ smartcard" maintained by Abel Luck](https://gist.github.com/abeluck/3383449)
|
||||
* ["Using GnuPG with QubesOS" by Alex](https://apapadop.wordpress.com/2013/08/21/using-gnupg-with-qubesos/)
|
||||
|
||||
## Current limitations
|
||||
|
||||
* Current implementation requires importing of public keys to the vault domain.
|
||||
This opens up an avenue to attack the gpg running in the backend domain via a hypothetical bug in public key importing code.
|
||||
See ticket [#474](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/474) for more details and plans how to get around this problem, as well as the section on [using Split GPG with subkeys](#advanced-using-split-gpg-with-subkeys).
|
||||
|
||||
* It doesn't solve the problem of allowing the user to know what is to be signed before the operation gets approved.
|
||||
Perhaps the GPG backend domain could start a disposable and have the to-be-signed document displayed there? To Be Determined.
|
||||
|
||||
* The Split GPG client will fail to sign or encrypt if the private key in the GnuPG backend is protected by a passphrase.
|
||||
It will give an `Inappropriate ioctl for device` error.
|
||||
Do not set passphrases for the private keys in the GPG backend domain.
|
||||
Doing so won't provide any extra security anyway, as explained in the introduction and in [using Split GPG with subkeys](#advanced-using-split-gpg-with-subkeys).
|
||||
If you are generating a new key pair, or if you have a private key that already has a passphrase, you can use `gpg2 --edit-key <key_id>` then `passwd` to set an empty passphrase.
|
||||
Note that `pinentry` might show an error when you try to set an empty passphrase, but it will still make the change.
|
||||
(See [this StackExchange answer](https://unix.stackexchange.com/a/379373) for more information.)
|
||||
Note: The error shows only if you **do not** have graphical pinentry installed.
|
||||
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
|
||||
with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
|
||||
51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
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