Merge branch 'master' into unman-patch-2-1

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Andrew David Wong 2018-11-13 20:12:56 -06:00
commit b7c080ddb3
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3 changed files with 24 additions and 38 deletions

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@ -225,26 +225,6 @@ Good general content that was submitted only to one branch would effectively dis
For further discussion about version-specific documentation in Qubes, see [here][version-thread].
Contribution Suggestions
------------------------
* If you find any inaccuracies in the documentation, please correct them!
* If you find an inaccuracy but don't know how to correct it, you can still help
by documenting the inaccuracy. For example, if you have *thoroughly* tested
a set of steps in the documentation and know *for certain* that they no
longer work on a certain version of Qubes (maybe because the steps are
out-of-date), then please add a note to the documentation indicating this.
You may also wish to provide a link to a relevant thread on the [mailing
lists].
* Where appropriate, specify the version of the software to which your
contribution applies. For example, if you're contributing a set of
instructions for doing something in dom0, specify the version(s) of Qubes OS
with which you know these instructions to work. This allows future readers to
more easily estimate the accuracy and applicability of information.
Style Guidelines
----------------

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@ -32,16 +32,6 @@ Enabling full screen mode for select VMs
If you want to enable full screen mode for select VMs, you can do that by creating the following entry in the `/etc/qubes/guid.conf` file in Dom0:
**Note:** Regardless of the settings below, you can always put a window into
fullscreen mode in Xfce4 using the trusted window manager by right-clicking on
a window's title bar and selecting "Fullscreen". This functionality should still
be considered safe, since a VM window still can't voluntarily enter fullscreen
mode. The user must select this option from the trusted window manager in dom0.
To exit fullscreen mode from here, press `alt` + `space` to bring up the title
bar menu again, then select "Leave Fullscreen".
**Note:** There should be only one `VM: {}` block in the file (or you will [get into problems](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-users/-Yf9yNvTsVI/xXsEm8y2lrYJ))
~~~
VM: {
personal: {
@ -52,6 +42,8 @@ VM: {
The string 'personal' above is an example only and should be replaced by the actual name of the VM for which you want to enable this functionality.
**Note:** There should be only one `VM: {}` block in the file (or you will [get into problems](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-users/-Yf9yNvTsVI/xXsEm8y2lrYJ))
One can also enable this functionality for all the VMs globally in the same file, by modifying the 'global' section:
~~~
@ -66,3 +58,13 @@ global: {
~~~
Be sure to restart the VM(s) after modifying this file, for the changes to take effect.
**Note:** Regardless of the settings above, you can always put a window into
fullscreen mode in Xfce4 using the trusted window manager by right-clicking on
a window's title bar and selecting "Fullscreen". This functionality should still
be considered safe, since a VM window still can't voluntarily enter fullscreen
mode. The user must select this option from the trusted window manager in dom0.
To exit fullscreen mode from here, press `alt` + `space` to bring up the title
bar menu again, then select "Leave Fullscreen".
For StandaloneHVMs, you should set the screen resolution in the qube to that of the host, (or larger), *before* setting fullscreen mode in Xfce4.

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@ -74,14 +74,16 @@ signed before the operation gets approved. Perhaps the GPG backend domain
could start a Disposable VM and have the to-be-signed document displayed
there? To Be Determined.
- The Split GPG client will fail to sign or encrypt if the private key in the
GnuPG backend is protected by a passphrase, it will give a *"Inappropriate ioctl
for device"* error. Avoid setting passphrases for the private keys in the GPG
backend domain, it won't provide extra security anyway, as explained before. If
you have a private key that already has a passphrase set use
`gpg2 --edit-key {key_id}`, then `passwd` to set an empty passphrase. Be aware
that `pinentry-ncurses` doesn't allow setting empty passphrases, so you would need
to install `pinentry-gtk` for it to work.
- The Split GPG client will fail to sign or encrypt if the private key in the
GnuPG backend is protected by a passphrase. It will give an `Inappropriate ioctl
for device` error. Do not set passphrases for the private keys in the GPG
backend domain. Doing so won't provide any extra security anyway, as explained
[above][intro] and [below][using split GPG with subkeys]. If you are generating
a new key pair, or if you have a private key that already has a passphrase, you
can use `gpg2 --edit-key <key_id>` then `passwd` to set an empty passphrase.
Note that `pinentry` might show an error when you try to set an empty
passphrase, but it will still make the change. (See [this StackExchange
answer][se-pinentry] for more information.)
## Configuring Split GPG ##
@ -396,6 +398,8 @@ exercise caution and use your good judgment.)
[#474]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/474
[using split GPG with subkeys]: #advanced-using-split-gpg-with-subkeys
[intro]: #what-is-split-gpg-and-why-should-i-use-it-instead-of-the-standard-gpg
[se-pinentry]: https://unix.stackexchange.com/a/379373
[subkeys]: https://wiki.debian.org/Subkeys
[copied]: /doc/copying-files#on-inter-qube-file-copy-security
[pasted]: /doc/copy-paste#on-copypaste-security