Merge pull request #51 from b4dger/patch-3

Update full-screen-mode.md
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Axon 2015-10-30 06:01:40 +00:00
commit b5fb31c2fd

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@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Normally Qubes GUI virtualization daemon restricts the VM from "owning" the full
Why is full screen mode potentially dangerous?
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If one allowed one of the VMs to "own" the full screen, e.g. to show a movie on a full screen, it might not be possible for the user to further realize if the applications/VM really "released" the full screen, or does it keep emulating the whole desktop and pretends to be the trusted Window Manager, drawing shapes on the screen that look e.g. like other windows, belonging to other domains (e.g. to trick the user into entering a secret passphrase into a window that looks like belonging to some trusted domain).
If one allowed one of the VMs to "own" the full screen, e.g. to show a movie on a full screen, it might not be possible for the user to know if the applications/VM really "released" the full screen, or if it has started emulating the whole desktop and pretending to be the trusted Window Manager, drawing shapes on the screen that look e.g. like other windows, belonging to other domains (e.g. to trick the user into entering a secret passphrase into a window that looks like belonging to some trusted domain).
Secure use of full screen mode
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@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ VM: {
};
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The string 'personal' above is exemplary and should be replaced by the actual name of the VM for which you want to enable this functionality.
The string 'personal' above is an example only and should be replaced by the actual name of the VM for which you want to enable this functionality.
One can also enable this functionality for all the VMs globally in the same file, by modifying the 'global' section: