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4
AntiEvilMaid.md
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@ -22,14 +22,14 @@ In Dom0 install anti-evil-maid:
sudo qubes-dom0-update anti-evil-maid
{% endhighlight %}
More information regarding configuration in the [README](http://git.qubes-os.org/?p=joanna/antievilmaid.git;a=blob_plain;f=README;hb=HEAD) file.
More information regarding configuration in the [README](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-antievilmaid/blob/master/README) file.
Security Considerations
-----------------------
[Qubes security guidelines](/doc/SecurityGuidelines/) dictate that USB devices should never be attached directly to dom0, since this can result in the entire system being compromised. However, in its default configuration, installing and using AEM requires attaching a USB drive (i.e., [mass storage device](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USB_mass_storage_device_class)) directly to dom0. (The other option is to install AEM to an internal disk. However, this carries significant security implications, as explained [here](http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com/2011/09/anti-evil-maid.html).) This presents us with a classic security trade-off: each Qubes user must make a choice between protecting dom0 from a potentially malicious USB drive, on the one hand, and protecting the system from Evil Maid attacks, on the other hand. Given the practical feasibility of attacks like [BadUSB](https://srlabs.de/badusb/) and revelations regarding pervasive government hardware backdoors, this is no longer a straightforward decision. New, factory-sealed USB drives cannot simply be assumed to be "clean" (e.g., to have non-malicious microcontroller firmware). Therefore, it is up to each individual Qubes user to evaluate the relative risk of each attack vector against his or her security model.
For example, a user who frequently travels with a Qubes laptop holding sensitive data may be at a much higher risk of Evil Maid attacks than a home user with a stationary Qubes desktop. If the frequent traveler judges her risk of an Evil Maid attack to be higher than the risk of a malicious USB device, she might reasonably opt to install and use AEM. On the other hand, the home user might deem the probability of an Evil Maid attack occurring in her own home to be so low that there is a higher probability that any USB drive she purchases is already compromised, in which case she might reasonably opt never to attach any USB devices directly to dom0. (In either case, users can--and should--secure dom0 against further USB-related attacks through the use of a [USBVM](/doc/SecurityGuidelines/#CreatingandUsingaUSBVM).)
For example, a user who frequently travels with a Qubes laptop holding sensitive data may be at a much higher risk of Evil Maid attacks than a home user with a stationary Qubes desktop. If the frequent traveler judges her risk of an Evil Maid attack to be higher than the risk of a malicious USB device, she might reasonably opt to install and use AEM. On the other hand, the home user might deem the probability of an Evil Maid attack occurring in her own home to be so low that there is a higher probability that any USB drive she purchases is already compromised, in which case she might reasonably opt never to attach any USB devices directly to dom0. (In either case, users can--and should--secure dom0 against further USB-related attacks through the use of a [USBVM](/doc/SecurityGuidelines/#creating-and-using-a-usbvm).)
For more information, please see [this discussion thread](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-devel/EBc4to5IBdg/n1hfsHSfbqsJ).

2
CopyingFiles.md
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@ -37,4 +37,4 @@ However, one should keep in mind that performing a data transfer from *less trus
See also [this article](http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com/2011/03/partitioning-my-digital-life-into.html) for more information on this topic, and some ideas of how we might solve this problem in some future version of Qubes.
You may also want to read how to [revoke "Yes to All" authorization](/doc/Qrexec/#RevokingYestoAllauthorization)
You may also want to read how to [revoke "Yes to All" authorization](/doc/Qrexec/#revoking-yes-to-all-authorization)

10
DevelFaq.md
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@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ redirect_from: /wiki/DevelFaq/
Qubes Developers FAQ
====================
1. 1. [Q: Why does dom0 need to be 64-bit?](#Q:Whydoesdom0needtobe64-bit)
2. [Q: Why do you use KDE in Dom0? What is the roadmap for Gnome support?](#Q:WhydoyouuseKDEinDom0WhatistheroadmapforGnomesupport)
3. [Q: What is the recommended build environment?](#Q:Whatistherecommendedbuildenvironment)
4. [Q: How to build Qubes from sources?](#Q:HowtobuildQubesfromsources)
5. [Q: How do I submit a patch?](#Q:HowdoIsubmitapatch)
1. 1. [Q: Why does dom0 need to be 64-bit?](#q-why-does-dom0-need-to-be-64-bit)
2. [Q: Why do you use KDE in Dom0? What is the roadmap for Gnome support?](#q-why-do-you-use-kde-in-dom0-what-is-the-roadmap-for-gnome-support)
3. [Q: What is the recommended build environment?](#q-what-is-the-recommended-build-environment)
4. [Q: How to build Qubes from sources?](#q-how-to-build-qubes-from-sources)
5. [Q: How do I submit a patch?](#q-how-do-i-submit-a-patch)
### Q: Why does dom0 need to be 64-bit?

2
GettingStarted.md
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@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Each domain, apart from having a distinct name, is also assigned a **label**, wh
![snapshot12.png](/attachment/wiki/GettingStarted/snapshot12.png)
In addition to AppVMs and TemplateVMs, there's one special domain called "dom0," which is where the Desktop Manager runs. This is where you log in to the system. Dom0 is more trusted than any other domain (including TemplateVMs and black-labeled domains). If dom0 were ever compromised, it would be Game Over<sup>TM</sup>. (The entire system would effectively be compromised.) Due to its overarching importance, dom0 has no network connectivity and is used only for running the Window and Desktop Managers. Dom0 shouldn't be used for anything else. In particular, [you should never run user applications in dom0](/doc/SecurityGuidelines/#Dom0Precautions). (That's what your AppVMs are for!)
In addition to AppVMs and TemplateVMs, there's one special domain called "dom0," which is where the Desktop Manager runs. This is where you log in to the system. Dom0 is more trusted than any other domain (including TemplateVMs and black-labeled domains). If dom0 were ever compromised, it would be Game Over<sup>TM</sup>. (The entire system would effectively be compromised.) Due to its overarching importance, dom0 has no network connectivity and is used only for running the Window and Desktop Managers. Dom0 shouldn't be used for anything else. In particular, [you should never run user applications in dom0](/doc/SecurityGuidelines/#dom0-precautions). (That's what your AppVMs are for!)
Qubes VM Manager and Command Line Tools
---------------------------------------

16
InstallationGuideR2rc1.md
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@ -8,13 +8,13 @@ redirect_from: /wiki/InstallationGuideR2rc1/
Installation Guide for Qubes Release 2 rc1
==========================================
1. [Hardware Requirements](#HardwareRequirements)
2. [Download installer ISO](#DownloadinstallerISO)
3. [Burning the ISO onto a DVD or USB stick](#BurningtheISOontoaDVDorUSBstick)
4. [Upgrading](#Upgrading)
5. [Troubleshooting problems with the installer](#Troubleshootingproblemswiththeinstaller)
6. [Known Issues](#KnownIssues)
7. [Getting Help](#GettingHelp)
1. [Hardware Requirements](#hardware-requirements)
2. [Download installer ISO](#download-installer-iso)
3. [Burning the ISO onto a DVD or USB stick](#burning-the-iso-onto-a-dvd-or-usb-stick)
4. [Upgrading](#upgrading)
5. [Troubleshooting problems with the installer](#troubleshooting-problems-with-the-installer)
6. [Known Issues](#known-issues)
7. [Getting Help](#getting-help)
Hardware Requirements
---------------------
@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ Known Issues
- If your GPU is not correctly supported by the Dom0 kernel (e.g. the 3D desktop effects do not run smoothly) then you might experience "heaviness" with Windows 7-based AppVMs. In that case, please solve the problem with your GPU support in Dom0 in the first place (by using a different kernel), or install Qubes OS on a different system.
- HVMs with Qubes Tools installed will not have access to the network if firewallvm uses 3.12 kernel (the default). The workaround is to use older (3.11) kernel for firewallvm. You need to [install kernel-qubes-vm-3.11.10 package](/doc/SoftwareUpdateDom0/#Howtodowngradeaspecificpackage), then ensure that it is used for firewallvm (for example using Qubes Manager - advanced tab of VM settings).
- HVMs with Qubes Tools installed will not have access to the network if firewallvm uses 3.12 kernel (the default). The workaround is to use older (3.11) kernel for firewallvm. You need to [install kernel-qubes-vm-3.11.10 package](/doc/SoftwareUpdateDom0/#how-to-downgrade-a-specific-package), then ensure that it is used for firewallvm (for example using Qubes Manager - advanced tab of VM settings).
- Just after installation, applications menu will not contain colorful application icons (new feature), only padlock in VM color. To get colorful icons, you need to start template VM (fedora-20-x64) and call `qvm-sync-appmenus fedora-20-x64` in dom0 terminal. If you have other Template VMs or Standalone VMs, repeat the steps for them too.

4
QubesDownloads.md
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@ -29,13 +29,13 @@ Qubes Release 2
- [Digital Signature](http://sourceforge.net/projects/qubesos/files/Qubes-R2-x86_64-DVD.iso.asc/download) (via sourceforge.net)
- **[Installation Guide for Qubes R2](/doc/InstallationGuideR2/)**
- [Upgrading to Qubes R2](/doc/InstallationGuideR2/#Upgrading)
- [Upgrading to Qubes R2](/doc/InstallationGuideR2/#upgrading)
- [Qubes-R2-rc2-x86\_64-DVD.iso](http://sourceforge.net/projects/qubesos/files/Qubes-R2-rc2-x86_64-DVD.iso/download) (via sourceforge.net)
- [Digital Signature](http://sourceforge.net/projects/qubesos/files/Qubes-R2-rc2-x86_64-DVD.iso.asc/download) (via sourceforge.net)
- **[Installation Guide for Qubes R2 rc2](/doc/InstallationGuideR2rc2/)**
- [Upgrading to Qubes R2 rc2](/doc/InstallationGuideR2rc2/#Upgrading)
- [Upgrading to Qubes R2 rc2](/doc/InstallationGuideR2rc2/#upgrading)
Qubes Release 1
---------------

2
QubesLists.md
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@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ The `qubes-users` Mailing List
This list is for helping users solve various daily problems with Qubes OS. Examples of topics or questions suitable for this list include:
- [HCL reports](/hcl/#GeneratingandSubmittingNewReports).
- [HCL reports](/doc/hcl/#generating-and-submitting-new-reports).
- Installation problems.
- Hardware compatibility problems.
- Bug reports.

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SecurityGuidelines.md
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@ -8,17 +8,17 @@ redirect_from: /wiki/SecurityGuidelines/
Security Guidelines
===================
1. [Security Guidelines](#SecurityGuidelines)
1. [Download Verification](#DownloadVerification)
2. [Observing Security Contexts](#ObservingSecurityContexts)
3. [Installing Versus Running Programs](#InstallingVersusRunningPrograms)
4. [Enabling and Verifying VT-d/IOMMU](#EnablingandVerifyingVT-dIOMMU)
5. [Updating Software](#UpdatingSoftware)
6. [Handling Untrusted Files](#HandlingUntrustedFiles)
7. [Anti Evil Maid](#AntiEvilMaid)
8. [Reassigning USB Controllers](#ReassigningUSBControllers)
9. [Creating and Using a USBVM](#CreatingandUsingaUSBVM)
10. [Dom0 Precautions](#Dom0Precautions)
1. [Security Guidelines](#security-guidelines)
1. [Download Verification](#download-verification)
2. [Observing Security Contexts](#observing-security-contexts)
3. [Installing Versus Running Programs](#installing-versus-running-programs)
4. [Enabling and Verifying VT-d/IOMMU](#enabling-and-verifying-vt-diommu)
5. [Updating Software](#updating-software)
6. [Handling Untrusted Files](#handling-untrusted-files)
7. [Anti Evil Maid](#anti-evil-maid)
8. [Reassigning USB Controllers](#reassigning-usb-controllers)
9. [Creating and Using a USBVM](#creating-and-using-a-usbvm)
10. [Dom0 Precautions](#dom0-precautions)
The [Qubes introduction](http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com/2012/09/introducing-qubes-10.html) makes clear that without some active and responsible participation of the user, no real security is possible. So, for example, Qubes does not automagically make your Firefox (or any other app) running in one of the AppVMs suddenly more secure. It is just as [secure (or insecure)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_insecurity) as on a normal Linux or Windows OS. But what drastically changes is the context in which your applications are used. [This context](/doc/QubesArchitecture/) is a [responsibility of the user](/doc/SecurityGoals/). But participation requires knowledge. So it is worth stressing some basic items:
@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ This will cause your new **USBVM** to automatically start when the system starts
Dom0 Precautions
----------------
As explained [here](/doc/GettingStarted/#AppVMsDomainsandTemplateVMs), dom0 should not be used for any user operations. There are several reasons for this:
As explained [here](/doc/GettingStarted/#appvms-domains-and-templatevms), dom0 should not be used for any user operations. There are several reasons for this:
1. Secure isolation among domUs (i.e., AppVMs, StandaloneVMs, HVMs, etc.) is the *raison d'être* of Qubes. This is the primary reason that we recommend the delegation of all user activities to some number of AppVMs. In the event that any given VM is compromised, only that particular VM is compromised. (TemplateVMs are the exception to this. If a TemplateVM were compromised, then every AppVM based on it might also be compromised. Even in this case, however, the entire system would not necessarily have been compromised, since StandaloneVM(s), HVM(s), and/or multiple TemplateVMs might be in use.) By contrast, if dom0 were ever compromised, the entire system would thereby be compromised.
2. Due to the absence of convenience mechanisms in dom0 such as the inter-VM clipboard and inter-VM file copying, it is significantly less convenient to attempt to use dom0 for user operations (e.g., password management) in conjunction with AppVMs than it is to use another dedicated AppVM (e.g., a "vault" VM).

2
SoftwareUpdateVM.md
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@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ The default template is called **fedora-14-x64** in Qubes R1 and **fedora-20-x64
The side effect of this mechanism is, of course, that if you install any software in your AppVM, more specifically in any directory other than `/home` or `/usr/local` then it will disappear after the AppVM reboot (as the root filesystem for this AppVM will again be "taken" from the Template VM). **This means one normally install software in the Template VM, not in AppVMs.**
Unlike VM private filesystems, the template VM root filesystem does not support discard, so deleting files does not free the space in dom0. See [these instructions](/doc/FedoraTemplateUpgrade/#Compactingtemplatesroot.img) to recover space in dom0.
Unlike VM private filesystems, the template VM root filesystem does not support discard, so deleting files does not free the space in dom0. See [these instructions](/doc/FedoraTemplateUpgrade/#compacting-templates-rootimg) to recover space in dom0.
Installing (or updating) software in the template VM
----------------------------------------------------

2
SourceCode.md
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@ -33,4 +33,4 @@ git clone git://github.com/QubesOS/core-admin.git core-admin
If you want to contribute to the project, there are two preferred ways:
1. Use github [fork & pull requests](https://guides.github.com/activities/forking/)
2. [sending a patch](/doc/DevelFaq/#Q:HowdoIsubmitapatch) via the project's mailing list (`git format-patch`).
2. [sending a patch](/doc/DevelFaq/#q-how-do-i-submit-a-patch) via the project's mailing list (`git format-patch`).

2
SystemRequirements.md
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@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Important Notes
---------------
- Qubes **can** be installed on systems which do not meet the recommended requirements. Such systems will still offer significant security improvements over traditional operating systems, since things like GUI isolation and kernel protection do not require special hardware.
- Qubes **can** be installed on a USB flash drive or external disk, and testing has shown that this works very well. A fast USB 3.0 flash drive is recommended for this. (As a reminder, its capacity must be at least 32 GB.) Simply plug the flash drive into the computer before booting into the Qubes installer from a separate installation medium, choose the flash drive as the target installation disk, and proceed with the installation normally. After Qubes has been installed on the flash drive, it can then be plugged into other computers in order to boot into Qubes. In addition to the convenience of having a portable copy of Qubes, this allows users to test for hardware compatibility on multiple machines (e.g., at a brick-and-mortar computer store) before deciding on which computer to purchase. (See [here](/hcl/#GeneratingandSubmittingNewReports) for advice on hardware compatibility testing.) Keep in mind to also change assigned devices for your netvm and usbvm, if you move between different machines.
- Qubes **can** be installed on a USB flash drive or external disk, and testing has shown that this works very well. A fast USB 3.0 flash drive is recommended for this. (As a reminder, its capacity must be at least 32 GB.) Simply plug the flash drive into the computer before booting into the Qubes installer from a separate installation medium, choose the flash drive as the target installation disk, and proceed with the installation normally. After Qubes has been installed on the flash drive, it can then be plugged into other computers in order to boot into Qubes. In addition to the convenience of having a portable copy of Qubes, this allows users to test for hardware compatibility on multiple machines (e.g., at a brick-and-mortar computer store) before deciding on which computer to purchase. (See [here](/doc/HCL/#generating-and-submitting-new-reports) for advice on hardware compatibility testing.) Keep in mind to also change assigned devices for your netvm and usbvm, if you move between different machines.
- Installing Qubes in a virtual machine is not recommended, as it uses its own bare-metal hypervisor (Xen).
- Macintosh PCs are not currently supported due to keyboard and mouse problems - details in \#230. (Patches welcome!)
- [Advice on finding a VT-d capable notebook](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-users/Sz0Nuhi4N0o/ZtpJdoc0OY8J).

56
UserFaq.md
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@ -8,36 +8,36 @@ redirect_from: /wiki/UserFaq/
Qubes Users' FAQ
================
1. [General Questions](#GeneralQuestions)
1. [Is Qubes just another Linux distribution?](#IsQubesjustanotherLinuxdistribution)
2. [How is Qubes different from other security solutions?](#HowisQubesdifferentfromothersecuritysolutions)
3. [What is the main concept behind Qubes?](#WhatisthemainconceptbehindQubes)
4. [What about other approaches to security?](#Whataboutotherapproachestosecurity)
5. [What about safe languages and formally verified microkernels?](#Whataboutsafelanguagesandformallyverifiedmicrokernels)
6. [Why does Qubes use virtualization?](#WhydoesQubesusevirtualization)
7. [Does Qubes run every app in a separate VM?](#DoesQubesruneveryappinaseparateVM)
8. [Why does Qubes use Xen instead of KVM or some other hypervisor?](#WhydoesQubesuseXeninsteadofKVMorsomeotherhypervisor)
9. [What about this other/new (micro)kernel/hypervisor?](#Whataboutthisothernewmicrokernelhypervisor)
10. [What's so special about Qubes' GUI virtualization?](#WhatssospecialaboutQubesGUIvirtualization)
11. [Can I watch YouTube videos in AppVMs?](#CanIwatchYouTubevideosinAppVMs)
12. [Can I run applications, like games, which require 3D support?](#CanIrunapplicationslikegameswhichrequire3Dsupport)
13. [Is Qubes a multi-user system?](#IsQubesamulti-usersystem)
1. [General Questions](#general-questions)
1. [Is Qubes just another Linux distribution?](#is-qubes-just-another-linux-distribution)
2. [How is Qubes different from other security solutions?](#how-is-qubes-different-from-other-security-solutions)
3. [What is the main concept behind Qubes?](#what-is-the-main-concept-behind-qubes)
4. [What about other approaches to security?](#what-about-other-approaches-to-security)
5. [What about safe languages and formally verified microkernels?](#what-about-safe-languages-and-formally-verified-microkernels)
6. [Why does Qubes use virtualization?](#why-does-qubes-use-virtualization)
7. [Does Qubes run every app in a separate VM?](#does-qubes-run-every-app-in-a-separate-vm)
8. [Why does Qubes use Xen instead of KVM or some other hypervisor?](#why-does-qubes-use-xen-instead-of-kvm-or-some-other-hypervisor)
9. [What about this other/new (micro)kernel/hypervisor?](#what-about-this-othernew-microkernelhypervisor)
10. [What's so special about Qubes' GUI virtualization?](#whats-so-special-about-qubes-gui-virtualization)
11. [Can I watch YouTube videos in AppVMs?](#can-i-watch-youtube-videos-in-appvms)
12. [Can I run applications, like games, which require 3D support?](#can-i-run-applications-like-games-which-require-3d-support)
13. [Is Qubes a multi-user system?](#is-qubes-a-multi-user-system)
2. [Installation & Hardware Compatibility](#InstallationHardwareCompatibility)
1. [How much disk space does each AppVM require?](#HowmuchdiskspacedoeseachAppVMrequire)
2. [How much memory is recommended for Qubes?](#HowmuchmemoryisrecommendedforQubes)
3. [Can I install Qubes on a system without VT-x?](#CanIinstallQubesonasystemwithoutVT-x)
4. [Can I install Qubes on a system without VT-d?](#CanIinstallQubesonasystemwithoutVT-d)
5. [Can I use AMD-v instead of VT-x?](#CanIuseAMD-vinsteadofVT-x)
6. [Can I install Qubes in a virtual machine (e.g., on VMWare)?](#CanIinstallQubesinavirtualmachinee.g.onVMWare)
7. [Why does my network adapter not work?](#Whydoesmynetworkadapternotwork)
2. [Installation & Hardware Compatibility](#installation--hardware-compatibility)
1. [How much disk space does each AppVM require?](#how-much-disk-space-does-each-appvm-require)
2. [How much memory is recommended for Qubes?](#how-much-memory-is-recommended-for-qubes)
3. [Can I install Qubes on a system without VT-x?](#can-i-install-qubes-on-a-system-without-vt-x)
4. [Can I install Qubes on a system without VT-d?](#can-i-install-qubes-on-a-system-without-vt-d)
5. [Can I use AMD-v instead of VT-x?](#can-i-use-amd-v-instead-of-vt-x)
6. [Can I install Qubes in a virtual machine (e.g., on VMWare)?](#can-i-install-qubes-in-a-virtual-machine-eg-on-vmware)
7. [Why does my network adapter not work?](#why-does-my-network-adapter-not-work)
3. [Common Problems](#CommonProblems)
1. [My AppVMs lost Internet access after a TemplateVM update. What should I do?](#MyAppVMslostInternetaccessafteraTemplateVMupdate.WhatshouldIdo)
2. [My keyboard layout settings are not behaving correctly. What should I do?](#Mykeyboardlayoutsettingsarenotbehavingcorrectly.WhatshouldIdo)
3. [My dom0 and/or TemplateVM update stalls when attempting to update via …](#Mydom0andorTemplateVMupdatestallswhenattemptingtoupdateviatheGUItool.WhatshouldIdo)
4. [How do I run a Windows HVM in non-seamless mode (i.e., as a single window)?](#HowdoIrunaWindowsHVMinnon-seamlessmodei.e.asasinglewindow)
5. [I assigned a PCI device to an AppVM, then unassigned it/shut down the …](#IassignedaPCIdevicetoanAppVMthenunassigneditshutdowntheAppVM.Whyisntthedeviceavailableindom0)
3. [Common Problems](#common-problems)
1. [My AppVMs lost Internet access after a TemplateVM update. What should I do?](#my-appvms-lost-internet-access-after-a-templatevm-update-what-should-i-do)
2. [My keyboard layout settings are not behaving correctly. What should I do?](#my-keyboard-layout-settings-are-not-behaving-correctly-what-should-i-do)
3. [My dom0 and/or TemplateVM update stalls when attempting to update via …](#my-dom0-andor-templatevm-update-stalls-when-attempting-to-update-via-the-gui-tool-what-should-i-do)
4. [How do I run a Windows HVM in non-seamless mode (i.e., as a single window)?](#how-do-i-run-a-windows-hvm-in-non-seamless-mode-ie-as-a-single-window)
5. [I assigned a PCI device to an AppVM, then unassigned it/shut down the …](#i-assigned-a-pci-device-to-an-appvm-then-unassigned-itshut-down-the-appvm-why-isnt-the-device-available-in-dom0)
General Questions
-----------------