From 9bb30e2205628a75abb7e972e0698c296520469b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Smith Date: Sun, 18 Jul 2021 22:37:53 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] Resolve grammatical error, return to "this verification" wording (#1179) --- project-security/verifying-signatures.md | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/project-security/verifying-signatures.md b/project-security/verifying-signatures.md index 060a6cfc..635b75c3 100644 --- a/project-security/verifying-signatures.md +++ b/project-security/verifying-signatures.md @@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ can be confident that these hash values came from the Qubes devs. Whenever you use one of the [Qubes repositories](https://github.com/QubesOS), you should use Git to verify the PGP signature in a tag on the latest commit or -on the latest commit itself (one or both may be present, but only one is +on the latest commit itself. (One or both may be present, but only one is required.) If there is no trusted signed tag or commit on top, any commits after the latest trusted signed tag or commit should **not** be trusted. If you come across a repo with any unsigned commits, you should not add any of your own @@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ signed tags or commits on top of them unless you personally vouch for the trustworthiness of the unsigned commits. Instead, ask the person who pushed the unsigned commits to sign them. -You should always perform Git verification on a trusted local machine with +You should always perform this verification on a trusted local machine with properly validated keys (which are available in the [Qubes Security Pack](/security/pack/)) rather than relying on a third party, such as GitHub. While the GitHub interface may claim that a commit has a verified signature