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Andrew David Wong 2023-04-26 15:24:54 -07:00
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introduction/faq.md
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@ -784,7 +784,7 @@ UEFI Secure Boot is not supported out of the box as UEFI support in Xen is very
Arguably secure boot reliance on UEFI integrity is not the best design. Arguably secure boot reliance on UEFI integrity is not the best design.
The relevant binaries (shim.efi, xen.efi, kernel / initramfs) are not signed by the Qubes Team and secure boot has not been tested. The relevant binaries (shim.efi, xen.efi, kernel / initramfs) are not signed by the Qubes Team and secure boot has not been tested.
Intel TXT (used in [Anti Evil Maid](/doc/anti-evil-maid/)) at least tries to avoid or limit trust in BIOS. Intel TXT (used in [Anti Evil Maid](/doc/anti-evil-maid/)) at least tries to avoid or limit trust in BIOS.
See the Heads project [[1]](https://trmm.net/Heads) [[2]](http://osresearch.net/) for a better-designed non-UEFI-based secure boot scheme with very good support for Qubes. See the Heads project [[1]](https://trmm.net/Heads) [[2]](https://osresearch.net/) for a better-designed non-UEFI-based secure boot scheme with very good support for Qubes.
### What is the canonical way to detect Qubes VM? ### What is the canonical way to detect Qubes VM?