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Update privacy entries

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Thanks to forum user QubicRoot for feedback on these entries.
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introduction/faq.md
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@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ In this way, Qubes allows you to do everything on the same physical computer wit
Moreover, all of these isolated qubes are integrated into a single, usable system.
Programs are isolated in their own separate qubes, but all windows are displayed in a single, unified desktop environment with unforgeable colored window borders so that you can easily identify windows from different security levels.
Common attack vectors like network cards and USB controllers are isolated in their own hardware qubes while their functionality is preserved through secure [networking][network] , [firewalls], and [USB device management][USB].
Common attack vectors like network cards and USB controllers are isolated in their own hardware qubes while their functionality is preserved through secure [networking][network], [firewalls], and [USB device management][USB].
Integrated [file] and [clipboard] copy and paste operations make it easy to work across various qubes without compromising security.
The innovative [Template] system separates software installation from software use, allowing qubes to share a root filesystem without sacrificing security (and saving disk space, to boot).
Qubes even allows you to sanitize PDFs and images in a few clicks.
@ -69,22 +69,32 @@ Those concerned about physical hardware attacks will benefit from [Anti Evil Mai
### How does Qubes OS provide privacy?
There can be no privacy without security, since security vulnerabilities allow privacy measures to be circumvented.
This makes Qubes exceptionally well-suited for implementing effective privacy tools.
Users concerned about privacy will appreciate the integration of [Whonix][Qubes-Whonix] into Qubes, which makes it easy to use [Tor] securely.
For more information about how to use this powerful tool correctly and safely, please see [Whonix][Qubes-Whonix].
### What about privacy in non-Whonix qubes?
Non-[Whonix][Qubes-Whonix] qubes do not claim to provide any special privacy (as opposed to security) properties.
Qubes OS does not claim to provide special privacy (as opposed to security) properties in non-[Whonix][Qubes-Whonix] qubes.
This includes [DisposableVMs][disposable].
For example, a standard [Fedora](/doc/templates/fedora/) qube is expected to have basically the same privacy properties as that upstream Fedora distribution, enhanced to some degree by the control Qubes provides over that qube.
For most users, this level of privacy may be good enough for many common activities.
However, users seeking more advanced privacy features should use [Whonix][Qubes-Whonix] qubes.
Privacy is far more difficult than is commonly understood.
In addition to the [web browser](https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/), there is also [VM fingerprinting](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/VM_Fingerprinting) and [advanced deanonymization attacks](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Advanced_Deanonymization_Attacks) that most users have never considered (and this is just to mention a few examples).
The Whonix Project specializes in [protecting against these risks](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Protocol-Leak-Protection_and_Fingerprinting-Protection).
The [Whonix Project](https://www.whonix.org/) specializes in [protecting against these risks](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Protocol-Leak-Protection_and_Fingerprinting-Protection).
In order to achieve the same results in non-Whonix qubes (including DisposableVMs), one would have to reinvent Whonix.
Such duplication of effort makes no sense when Whonix already exists and is already integrated into Qubes OS.
When you need privacy, use Whonix.
When you use a non-Whonix qube, do not expect it.
Therefore, when you need privacy, you should use Whonix qubes.
Remember, though, that privacy is difficult to achieve and maintain.
Whonix is a powerful tool, but no tool is perfect.
Read the [documentation](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Documentation) thoroughly and exercise care when using it.
### How does Qubes OS compare to using a "live CD" OS?