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about/code-of-conduct.md
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@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Examples of unacceptable behavior by participants include:
- Publishing others' private information, such as a physical or electronic address, without explicit permission
- Other conduct which could reasonably be considered inappropriate in a professional setting
(Please also see our [mailing list discussion guidelines](https://www.qubes-os.org/mailing-lists/#discussion-list-guidelines).)
(Please also see our [mailing list discussion guidelines](/mailing-lists/#discussion-list-guidelines).)
## Our Responsibilities

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about/faq.md
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@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ At the same time, due to the smart use of Xen shared memory, our GUI implementat
### Why passwordless sudo?
Please refer to [this page](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/vm-sudo/).
Please refer to [this page](/doc/vm-sudo/).
### How should I report documentation issues?
@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ Qubes assumes that the user who controls Dom0 controls the whole system.
It is very difficult to **securely** implement multi-user support.
See [here](https://groups.google.com/group/qubes-devel/msg/899f6f3efc4d9a06) for details.
However, in Qubes 4.x we will be implementing management functionality. See [Admin API](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/06/27/qubes-admin-api/) and [Core Stack](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/10/03/core3/) for more details.
However, in Qubes 4.x we will be implementing management functionality. See [Admin API](/news/2017/06/27/qubes-admin-api/) and [Core Stack](/news/2017/10/03/core3/) for more details.
### What are the system requirements for Qubes OS?
@ -345,14 +345,14 @@ Another solution would be to set the pci_strictreset option in dom0:
- In Qubes R4.x, when attaching the PCI device to the VM (where `<BDF>` can be obtained from running [qvm-pci](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-pci/)):
qvm-pci attach -persistent -option no-strict-reset=true usbVM dom0:<BDF>
qvm-pci attach --persistent --option no-strict-reset=true usbVM dom0:<BDF>
- In Qubes R3.x, by modifying the VM's properties:
qvm-prefs usbVM -s pci_strictreset false
These options allow the VM to ignore the error and the VM will start.
Please review the note on [this page](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/Dom0Tools/QvmPrefs/) and be aware of the potential risk.
Please review the notes on [this page](/doc/Dom0Tools/QvmPrefs/) and [here](/doc/assigning-devices/) and be aware of the potential risks.
### I assigned a PCI device to a qube, then unassigned it/shut down the qube. Why isn't the device available in dom0?
@ -371,6 +371,8 @@ or
MOD=`modprobe -R $MODALIAS | head -n 1`
echo 0000:<BDF> > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/$MOD/bind
See also [here](/doc/assigning-devices/).
### How do I install Flash in a Debian qube?
The Debian way is to install the flashplugin-nonfree package.
@ -413,7 +415,7 @@ For Fedora:
The recommended approach is to pass only the specific partition you intend to use from [`sys-usb`](/doc/usb/) to another qube via [qvm-block](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-block/). They will show up in the destination qube as `/dev/xvd*` and must be mounted manually. Another approach is to attach the entire USB drive to your destination qube. However, this could theoretically lead to an attack because it forces the destination qube to parse the device's partition table. If you believe your device is safe, you may proceed to attach it.
In Qubes 4.0, this is accomplished with the widget located in the tool tray (default top right corner, look for an icon with a yellow square). From the top part of the list, click on the drive you want to attach, then select the qube to attach it to. Although you can also attach the entire USB device to a qube by selecting it from the bottom part of the list, in general this approach should not be used because you are exposing the target qube to unnecessary additional attack surface.
In Qubes 4.0, this is accomplished with the Devices Widget located in the tool tray (default top right corner, look for an icon with a yellow square). From the top part of the list, click on the drive you want to attach, then select the qube to attach it to. Although you can also attach the entire USB device to a qube by selecting it from the bottom part of the list, in general this approach should not be used because you are exposing the target qube to unnecessary additional attack surface.
In Qubes 3.2, you can use the Qubes VM Manager. Simply insert your USB drive, right-click on the desired qube in the Qubes VM Manager list, click Attach/detach block devices, and select your desired action and device.

219
basics_dev/gsoc.md
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@ -92,44 +92,6 @@ If applicable, links to more information or discussions
**Mentor**: Name and email address.
```
### Qubes MIME handlers
**Project**: Qubes MIME handlers
**Brief explanation**: [#441](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/441) (including remembering decision whether some file
should be opened in DispVM or locally)
**Expected results**:
- Design mechanism for recognising which files should be opened locally and which in Disposable VM. This mechanism should:
- Respect default action like "by default open files in Disposable VM" (this
may be about files downloaded from the internet, transferred from
other VM etc).
- Allow setting persistent flag for a file that should be opened in specific
way ("locally"); this flag should local to the VM - it shouldn't be possible
to preserve (or even fabricate) the flag while transferring the file from/to
VM.
- See linked ticket for simple ideas.
- Implement generic file handler to apply this mechanism; it should work
regardless of file type, and if file is chosen to be opened locally, normal
(XDG) rules of choosing application should apply.
- Setting/unsetting the flag should be easy - like if once file is chosen to
be opened locally, it should remember that decision.
- Preferably use generic mechanism to integrate it into file managers (XDG
standards). If not possible - integrate with Nautilus and Dolphin.
- Optionally implement the same for Windows.
- Document the mechanism (how the flag is stored, how mechanism is plugged
into file managers etc).
- Write unit tests and integration tests.
**Knowledge prerequisite**:
- XDG standards
- Bash or Python scripting
- Basic knowledge of configuration/extension for file managers
**Mentor**: [Marek Marczykowski-Górecki](/team/)
### Template manager, new template distribution mechanism
**Project**: Template manager, new template distribution mechanism
@ -181,6 +143,84 @@ would override all the user changes there). More details:
**Mentor**: [Marek Marczykowski-Górecki](/team/)
### Easy inter-VM networking configuration
**Project**: Easy inter-VM networking configuration
**Brief explanation**: Utility to easily configure selected VMs to be reachable (by network) from other VMs or outside network. Currently such configuration require adding iptables rules in multiple VMs manually. For exposing VM to outside network, it may be good to adopt qrexec-based TCP forwarding ([#2148](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2148)).
**Expected results**:
- support firewall rules for inter-VM traffic in qubes-firewall - both VM side (qubes-firewall service) and dom0 configuration side (relevant Admin API calls)
- mechanism for configuring firewall in target VM, especially INPUT iptables chain - currently it is hardcoded to drop new incoming connections
- convenient tool (or modification to existing tool) for controlling above mechanisms
- integration the above with existing GUI tools (especially VM settings)
Relevant links:
- [Qubes networking and firewall documentation](/doc/firewall/)
- [qubes-firewall service code](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-core-agent-linux/blob/master/qubesagent/firewall.py)
**Knowledge prerequisite**:
- iptables
- basics of nft
- python3
**Mentor**: [Marek Marczykowski-Górecki](/team/)
### Mechanism for maintaining in-VM configuration
**Project**: Mechanism for maintaining in-VM configuration
**Brief explanation**: Large number of VMs is hard to maintain. Templates helps with keeping them updated, but many applications have configuration in user home directory, which is not synchronized.
**Expected results**:
- Design a mechanism how to _safely_ synchronize application configuration living in user home directory (`~/.config`, some other "dotfiles"). Mechanism should be resistant against malicious VM forcing its configuration on other VMs. Some approach could be a strict control which VM can send what changes (whitelist approach, not blacklist).
- Implementation of the above mechanism.
- Documentation how to configure it securely.
**Knowledge prerequisite**:
- shell and/or python scripting
- Qubes OS qrexec services
**Mentor**: [Marek Marczykowski-Górecki](/team/), [Wojtek Porczyk](/team/).
### Wayland support in GUI agent and/or GUI daemon
**Project**: Wayland support in GUI agent and/or GUI daemon
**Brief explanation**: Currently both GUI agent (VM side of the GUI virtualization) and GUI daemon (dom0 side of GUI virtualization) support X11 protocol only. It may be useful to add support for Wayland there. Note that those are in fact two independent projects:
1. GUI agent - make it work as Wayland compositor, instead of extracting window's composition buffers using custom X11 driver
2. GUI daemon - act as Wayland application, showing windows retrieved from VMs, keeping zero-copy display path (window content is directly mapped from application running in VM, not copied)
**Expected results**:
Choose either of GUI agent, GUI daemon. Both are of similar complexity and each separately looks like a good task for GSoC time period.
- design relevant GUI agent/daemon changes, the GUI protocol should not be affected
- consider window decoration handling - VM should have no way of spoofing those, so it must be enforced by GUI daemon (either client-side - by GUI daemon itself, or server-side, based on hints given by GUI daemon)
- implement relevant GUI agent/daemon changes
- implement tests for new GUI handling, similar to existing tests for X11 based GUI
Relevant links:
- [Low level GUI documentation](/doc/gui/)
- [qubes-gui-agent-linux](https://github.com/qubesos/qubes-gui-agent-linux)
- [qubes-gui-daemon](https://github.com/qubesos/qubes-gui-daemon)
- [Use Wayland instead of X11 to increase performance](https://github.com/qubesos/qubes-issues/issues/3366)
**Knowledge prerequisite**:
- Wayland architecture
- basics of X11 (for understanding existing code)
- C language
- using shared memory (synchronization methods etc)
**Mentor**: [Marek Marczykowski-Górecki](/team/).
### Qubes Live USB
**Project**: Revive Qubes Live USB, integrate it with installer
@ -231,37 +271,8 @@ details: [#1552](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1552),
**Mentor**: [Thomas Leonard](mailto:talex5@gmail.com), [Marek Marczykowski-Górecki](/team/)
### IPv6 support
**Project**: IPv6 support
**Brief explanation**: Add support for native IPv6 in Qubes VMs. This should
include IPv6 routing (+NAT...), IPv6-aware firewall, DNS configuration, dealing
with IPv6 being available or not in directly connected network. See
[#718](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/718) for more details.
**Expected results**:
- Add IPv6 handling to network configuration scripts in VMs
- Add support for IPv6 in Qubes firewall (including CLI/GUI tools to configure it)
- Design and implement simple mechanism to propagate information about IPv6
being available at all (if necessary). This should be aware of ProxyVMs
potentially adding/removing IPv6 support - like VPN, Tor etc.
- Add unit tests and integration tests for both configuration scripts and UI
enhancements.
- Update documentation.
**Knowledge prerequisite**:
- network protocols, especially IPv6, TCP, DNS, DHCPv6, ICMPv6 (including
autoconfiguration)
- ip(6)tables, nftables, NAT
- Python and Bash scripting
- network configuration on Linux: ip tool, configuration files on Debian and
Fedora, NetworkManager
**Mentor**: [Marek Marczykowski-Górecki](/team/)
### Thunderbird, Firefox and Chrome extensions
**Project**: additional Thunderbird, Firefox and Chrome extensions
**Brief explanation**:
@ -315,31 +326,7 @@ immune to altering past entries. See
- systemd
- Python/Bash scripting
**Mentor**: Inquire on [qubes-devel][ml-devel].
### GUI improvements
**Project**: GUI improvements
**Brief explanation**:
* GUI for enabling USB keyboard: [#2329](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2329)
* GUI for enabling USB passthrough: [#2328](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2328)
* GUI interface for /etc/qubes/guid.conf: [#2304](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2304)
* Improving inter-VM file copy / move UX master ticket: [#1839](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1839)
* and comprehensive list of GUI issues: [#1117](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1117)
**Expected results**:
- Add/enhance GUI tools to configure/do things mentioned in description above.
Reasonable subset of those things is acceptable.
- Write tests for added elements.
**Knowledge prerequisite**:
- Python, PyGTK
**Mentor**: Inquire on [qubes-devel][ml-devel].
**Mentor**: [Marek Marczykowski-Górecki](/team/)
### Xen GPU pass-through for Intel integrated GPUs
**Project**: Xen GPU pass-through for Intel integrated GPUs (largely independent of Qubes)
@ -389,6 +376,10 @@ details in [#2618](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2618).
**Knowledge prerequisite**:
- nftables
- iptables
- IPv6
**Mentor**: [Patrick Schleizer](/team/)
### Audio support for Qubes Windows Tools
@ -424,27 +415,7 @@ details in [#2618](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2618).
**Mentor**: [Rafał Wojdyła](/team/)
### Make Anti Evil Maid resistant against shoulder surfing and video surveillance
**Project**: Observing the user during early boot should not be sufficient to defeat the protection offered by Anti Evil Maid.
**Brief explanation**:
1. Implement optional support for time-based one-time-password seed secrets. Instead of verifying a static text or picture (which the attacker can record and replay later on a compromised system), the user would verify an ephemeral six-digit code displayed on another device, e.g. a smartphone running any Google Authenticator compatible code generator app.
2. Implement optional support for storing a passphrase-encrypted LUKS disk decryption key on a secondary AEM device. The attacker would then have to seize this device in order to decrypt the user's data; just recording the passphrase as it is entered would no longer be enough.
**Expected results**: AEM package updates implementing both features, with fallback support in case the user does not have their smartphone or secondary AEM device at hand. Good UX and documentation for enrolling or upgrading users.
**Knowledge prerequisite**:
- Bash scripting
- The AEM threat model
- GRUB2, dracut, systemd, LUKS
**Mentor**: [Rusty Bird](mailto:rustybird@openmailbox.org)
### GNOME support in dom0
### GNOME support in dom0 / GUI VM
**Project**: GNOME support in dom0
@ -508,7 +479,7 @@ details in [#2618](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2618).
**Brief explanation**: A long-term goal is to be able to build the entire OS and installation media in a completely bit-wise deterministic manner, but there are many baby steps to be taken along that path. See:
- "[Security challenges for the Qubes build process](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2016/05/30/build-security/)"
- "[Security challenges for the Qubes build process](/news/2016/05/30/build-security/)"
- [This mailing list post](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-devel/gq-wb9wTQV8/mdliS4P2BQAJ)
- and [reproducible-builds.org](https://reproducible-builds.org/)
@ -516,9 +487,9 @@ for more information and qubes-specific background.
**Expected results**: Significant progress towards making the Qubes build process deterministic. This would likely involve cooperation with and hacking on several upstream build tools to eliminate sources of variability.
**Knoledge prerequisite**: qubes-builder [[1]](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qubes-builder/) [[2]](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qubes-builder-details/) [[3]](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-builder/tree/master/doc), and efficient at introspecting complex systems: comfortable with tracing and debugging tools, ability to quickly identify and locate issues within a large codebase (upstream build tools), etc.
**Knoledge prerequisite**: qubes-builder [[1]](/doc/qubes-builder/) [[2]](/doc/qubes-builder-details/) [[3]](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-builder/tree/master/doc), and efficient at introspecting complex systems: comfortable with tracing and debugging tools, ability to quickly identify and locate issues within a large codebase (upstream build tools), etc.
**Mentor**: Inquire on [qubes-devel][ml-devel].
**Mentor**: [Marek Marczykowski-Górecki](/team/)
### Android development in Qubes
@ -542,17 +513,17 @@ We adapted some of the language here about GSoC from the [KDE GSoC page](https:/
[2017-archive]: https://summerofcode.withgoogle.com/archive/2017/organizations/5074771758809088/
[gsoc-qubes]: https://summerofcode.withgoogle.com/organizations/6239659689508864/
[gsoc]: https://summerofcode.withgoogle.com/
[team]: https://www.qubes-os.org/team/
[team]: /team/
[gsoc-faq]: https://developers.google.com/open-source/gsoc/faq
[contributing]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/contributing/#contributing-code
[patches]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/source-code/#how-to-send-patches
[code-signing]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/code-signing/
[ml-devel]: https://www.qubes-os.org/mailing-lists/#qubes-devel
[contributing]: /doc/contributing/#contributing-code
[patches]: /doc/source-code/#how-to-send-patches
[code-signing]: /doc/code-signing/
[ml-devel]: /mailing-lists/#qubes-devel
[gsoc-participate]: https://developers.google.com/open-source/gsoc/
[gsoc-student]: https://developers.google.com/open-source/gsoc/resources/manual#student_manual
[how-to-gsoc]: http://teom.org/blog/kde/how-to-write-a-kick-ass-proposal-for-google-summer-of-code/
[gsoc-submit]: https://summerofcode.withgoogle.com/
[mailing-lists]: https://www.qubes-os.org/mailing-lists/
[mailing-lists]: /mailing-lists/
[qubes-issues]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues
[qubes-issues-suggested]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue%20is%3Aopen%20label%3A%22P%3A%20minor%22%20label%3A%22help%20wanted%22
[qubes-builder]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qubes-builder/
[qubes-builder]: /doc/qubes-builder/

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basics_user/contributing.md
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@ -75,6 +75,6 @@ be grateful to [receive your patch][patch].
[Facebook]: https://www.facebook.com/QubesOS
[GitHub issues]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues
[qubes-devel]: /mailing-lists/#qubes-devel
[Community-Developed Feature Tracker]: https://www.qubes-os.org/qubes-issues/
[Community-Developed Feature Tracker]: /qubes-issues/
[Qubes download mirror]: /downloads/mirrors/

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basics_user/doc-guidelines.md
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@ -146,25 +146,25 @@ Style Guidelines
Markdown Conventions
--------------------
All the documentation is written in Markdown for maximum accessibility. When
making contributions, please try to observe the following style conventions:
All the documentation is written in Markdown for maximum accessibility.
When making contributions, please try to observe the following style conventions:
* Use spaces instead of tabs.
* Insert a newline at the end of each sentence.
* Rationale: This practice is most appropriate for source that consists
primarily of natural language text. It results in the most useful diffs
and facilitates translation into other languages while mostly preserving
source readability.
* If appropriate, make numerals in numbered lists match between Markdown
source and HTML output.
* Rationale: In the event that a user is required to read the Markdown source
directly, this will make it easier to follow, e.g., numbered steps in a set
of instructions.
* In order to enable offline browsing, use relative paths (e.g., `/doc/doc-guidelines/` instead of `https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/doc-guidelines/`, except when the source text will be reproduced outside of the Qubes website repo.
Examples of exceptions:
* [QSBs] (intended to be read as plain text)
* [News] posts (plain text is reproduced on the [mailing lists])
* URLs that appear inside code blocks (e.g., in comments and document templates)
* Files like `README.md` and `CONTRIBUTING.md`
* Insert a newline at, and only at, the end of each sentence, except when the text will be reproduced outside of the Qubes website repo (see previous item for examples).
* Rationale: This practice results in one sentence per line, which is most appropriate for source that consists primarily of natural language text.
It results in the most useful diffs and facilitates translation into other languages while mostly preserving source readability.
* If appropriate, make numerals in numbered lists match between Markdown source and HTML output.
* Rationale: In the event that a user is required to read the Markdown source directly, this will make it easier to follow, e.g., numbered steps in a set of instructions.
* Use hanging indentations
where appropriate.
* Use underline headings (`=====` and `-----`) if possible. If this is not
possible, use Atx-style headings on both the left and right sides
(`### H3 ###`).
* Use underline headings (`=====` and `-----`) if possible.
If this is not possible, use Atx-style headings on both the left and right sides (`### H3 ###`).
* Use `[reference-style][ref]` links.
`[ref]: https://daringfireball.net/projects/markdown/syntax#link`
@ -188,5 +188,8 @@ Please try to write good commit messages, according to the
[gh-pull]: https://help.github.com/articles/using-pull-requests/
[GitHub]: https://github.com/
[mailing lists]: /mailing-lists/
[QSBs]: /security/bulletins/
[News]: /news/
[md]: https://daringfireball.net/projects/markdown/
[git-commit]: /doc/coding-style/#commit-message-guidelines

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basics_user/getting-started.md
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@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ Qubes VM Manager and Command Line Tools
All aspects of the Qubes system can be controlled using command line tools run under a dom0 console.
To open a console window in dom0, either go to Start-\>System Tools-\>Konsole or press Alt-F2 and type `konsole`.
Various command line tools are described as part of this guide, and the whole reference can be found [here](/doc/dom0-tools/).
Various command line tools are described as part of this guide, and the whole reference can be found [here](/doc/tools/).
![r2b1-dom0-konsole.png](/attachment/wiki/GettingStarted/r2b1-dom0-konsole.png)

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basics_user/reporting-bugs.md
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@ -17,70 +17,64 @@ Reporting Bugs
==============
One of the most important ways in which you can [contribute to the Qubes OS Project] is by reporting any bugs you have found.
Please note that there is a separate process for [reporting security issues](/security/).
Before you submit a report
--------------------------
Important
---------
Before you submit a bug report, please take a moment to:
* Check whether your issue has already been reported.
* Determine which venue is most appropriate for it.
* Read the [documentation] to see whether what you've found is really a bug.
* Search through the existing [Qubes issues][qubes-issues] by typing your key
words in the **Filters** box. Make sure to check both currently open issues,
as well as issues that are already closed. If you find an issue that seems to
be similar to yours, read through it. If this issue is the same as yours, you
can comment with additional information to help the maintainer debug it.
Adding a comment will subscribe you to email notifications, which can be
helpful in getting important updates regarding the issue. If you don't have
anything to add but still want to receive email updates, you can click the
"watch" button at the bottom of the comments.
* Search through our [mailing list] archives by visiting the Google Groups web
interfaces for both [qubes-users] and [qubes-devel].
- **To disclose a security issue confidentially, please see the [Security] page.**
- **In all other cases, please do not email individual developers about bugs.**
- **Please note that many issues can be resolved by reading the [documentation].**
Where to submit your report
---------------------------
Our [GitHub issues][qubes-issues] tracker is not intended for personal,
localized troubleshooting questions, such as problems that affect only a
specific laptop model. Those questions are more likely to be answered in
[qubes-users], which receives much more traffic. Instead, GitHub issues are
meant to track more general bugs and enhancements that affect a broad range of
Qubes users.
How to copy information out of Dom0
-----------------------------------
See [Copying from (and to) dom0](/doc/copy-from-dom0/).
How to submit a report on the mailing lists
-------------------------------------------
Please see the [mailing list guidelines][mailing list].
All issues pertaining to the Qubes OS Project (including auxiliary infrastructure such as the [website]) are tracked in [qubes-issues], our GitHub issues tracker.
However, [qubes-issues] is not intended for personal, localized troubleshooting questions, such as problems that affect only a specific laptop model.
Those questions should instead be asked in [qubes-users], where they are more likely to be answered.
Instead, [qubes-issues] is meant for tracking more general bugs and enhancements that affect a broad range of Qubes users.
Please see the sections [How to submit a report on GitHub] and [How to submit a report on the mailing lists] below for more information.
How to submit a report on GitHub
--------------------------------
We track all bugs in the [qubes-issues] tracker on GitHub.
**Before you submit an issue in [qubes-issues], please check to see whether it has already been reported.**
Search through the existing issues by typing your key words in the **Filters** box.
Make sure to check both currently open issues, as well as issues that are already closed.
If you find an issue that seems to be similar to yours, read through it.
If this issue is the same as yours, you can comment with additional information to help the maintainer debug it.
Adding a comment will subscribe you to email notifications, which can be helpful in getting important updates regarding the issue.
If you don't have anything to add but still want to receive email updates, you can click the "watch" button at the bottom of the comments.
When you file a new issue, you should be sure to include the version of Qubes
your'e using, as well as versions of related software packages. If your issue is
related to hardware, provide as many details as possible about the hardware,
which could include using command-line tools such as `lspci`.
When you file a new issue, you should be sure to include the version of Qubes you're using, as well as versions of related software packages.
If your issue is related to hardware, provide as many details as possible about the hardware, which could include using command-line tools such as `lspci`.
If you're reporting a bug in a package that is in a [testing] repository, please reference the appropriate issue in the [updates-status] repository.
Project maintainers really appreciate thorough explanations.
It usually helps them address the problem more quickly, so everyone wins!
Project maintainers really appreciate thorough explanations. It usually
helps them address the problem more quickly, so everyone wins!
Once your issue is addressed, your GitHub issue may be closed.
After that, the package containing the fix will move to the appropriate [testing] repository, then to the appropriate stable repository.
If you so choose, you can test the fix while it's in the [testing] repository, or you can wait for it to land in the stable repository.
If, after testing the fix, you find that it does not really fix your bug, please leave a comment on your issue explaining the situation.
When you do, we will receive a notification and respond on your issue or reopen it (or both).
Please **do not** create a duplicate issue or attempt to contact the developers individually about your problem.
How to submit a report on the mailing lists
-------------------------------------------
Before submitting a report on the mailing lists, please check to see whether your issue has already been reported by searching through the archives.
You can do this by visiting the Google Groups web interfaces for both [qubes-users] and [qubes-devel].
Please see the [Mailing Lists] page for further information.
How to copy information out of dom0
-----------------------------------
Copying information out of dom0 can be useful when reporting bugs.
See [Copying from (and to) dom0] for more information.
Testing new releases and updates
@ -96,12 +90,17 @@ Please see our guidelines on [how to contribute code].
[contribute to the Qubes OS Project]: /doc/contributing/
[Security]: /security/
[documentation]: /doc/
[website]: /
[qubes-issues]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues
[mailing list]: https://www.qubes-os.org/mailing-lists/
[qubes-users]: https://groups.google.com/group/qubes-users
[qubes-devel]: https://groups.google.com/group/qubes-devel
[Mailing List]: /mailing-lists/
[qubes-users]: /mailing-lists/#qubes-users
[qubes-devel]: /mailing-lists/#qubes-devel
[How to submit a report on GitHub]: #how-to-submit-a-report-on-github
[How to submit a report on the mailing lists]: #how-to-submit-a-report-on-the-mailing-lists
[testing]: /doc/testing/
[updates-status]: https://github.com/QubesOS/updates-status/issues
[Copying from (and to) dom0]: /doc/copy-from-dom0/
[how to contribute code]: /doc/contributing/#contributing-code

2
building/building-archlinux-template.md
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@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ redirect_from:
gpg --keyserver pgp.mit.edu --recv-keys 0xDDFA1A3E36879494
* Verify its fingerprint, set as 'trusted'. [This is described here](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/VerifyingSignatures).
* Verify its fingerprint, set as 'trusted'. [This is described here](/doc/VerifyingSignatures).
* Download the Qubes developers' keys.

2
building/qubes-builder.md
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@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ redirect_from:
- /wiki/QubesBuilder/
---
**Note: The build system has been improved since this how-to was last updated. The [Archlinux template building instructions](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/building-archlinux-template/) contain more up-to-date and detailed information on how to use the build system.**
**Note: The build system has been improved since this how-to was last updated. The [Archlinux template building instructions](/doc/building-archlinux-template/) contain more up-to-date and detailed information on how to use the build system.**
Building Qubes from scratch
===========================

184
common-tasks/backup-restore.md
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@ -11,96 +11,218 @@ redirect_from:
Qubes Backup, Restoration, and Migration
========================================
**Caution:** The Qubes backup system currently relies on a [weak key derivation scheme](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/971). It is *strongly recommended* that users select a *high-entropy* passphrase for use with Qubes backups.
**Caution:** The Qubes R3.2 backup system currently relies on a [weak key derivation scheme](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/971).
Although resolved in R4.0 and higher with the switch to scrypt, it is *strongly recommended* that users select a *high-entropy* passphrase for use with Qubes backups.
With Qubes, it's easy to back up and restore your whole system, as well as to migrate between two physical machines.
As of Qubes R2B3, these functions are integrated into the Qubes VM Manager GUI. There are also two command-line tools available which perform the same functions: [qvm-backup](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-backup/) and [qvm-backup-restore](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-backup-restore/).
As of Qubes R2B3, these functions are integrated into the Qubes VM Manager GUI.
There are also two command-line tools available which perform the same functions: [qvm-backup](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-backup/) and [qvm-backup-restore](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-backup-restore/).
Creating a Backup
Creating a Backup (R4.0 and later)
-----------------
1. In **Qubes VM Manager**, click **System** on the menu bar, then click **Backup VMs** in the drop-down list. This brings up the **Qubes Backup VMs** window.
1. Go to **Applications menu -> System Tools -> Backup Qubes**.
This brings up the **Qubes Backup VMs** window.
2. Move the VMs that you want to back up to the right-hand **Selected** column. VMs in the left-hand **Available** column will not be backed up.
2. Move the VMs that you want to back up to the right-hand **Selected** column.
VMs in the left-hand **Available** column will not be backed up.
**Note:** A VM must be shut down in order to be backed up. Currently running VMs appear in red.
You may choose whether to compress backups by checking or unchecking the **Compress the backup** box.
Normally this should be left on unless you have a specific reason otherwise.
Once you have selected all desired VMs, click **Next**.
3. Select the destination for the backup:
If you wish to send your backup to a (currently running) VM, select the VM in the drop-down box next to **Target AppVM**.
If you wish to send your backup to a [USB mass storage device](/doc/stick-mounting/), first mount the device in a VM, then select the mount point inside that VM as the backup destination.
If you wish to send your backup to a [USB mass storage device](/doc/usb/), you can use the directory selection widget to mount a connected device (under "Other locations" item on the left); or first mount the device in a VM, then select the mount point inside that VM as the backup destination.
You must also specify a directory on the device or in the VM, or a command to be executed in the VM as a destination for your backup. For example, if you wish to send your backup to the `~/backups` folder in the target VM, you would simply type `backups` in this field. This destination directory must already exist. If it does not exist, you must create it manually prior to backing up.
You must also specify a directory on the device or in the VM, or a command to be executed in the VM as a destination for your backup.
For example, if you wish to send your backup to the `~/backups` folder in the target VM, you would simply browse to it using the convenient directory selection dialog (`...`) at the right.
This destination directory must already exist.
If it does not exist, you must create it manually prior to backing up.
By specifying the appropriate directory as the destination in a VM, it is possible to send the backup directly to, e.g., a USB mass storage device attached to the VM. Likewise, it is possible to enter any command as a backup target by specifying the command as the destination in the VM. This can be used to send your backup directly to, e.g., a remote server using SSH.
By specifying the appropriate directory as the destination in a VM, it is possible to send the backup directly to, e.g., a USB mass storage device attached to the VM.
Likewise, it is possible to enter any command as a backup target by specifying the command as the destination in the VM.
This can be used to send your backup directly to, e.g., a remote server using SSH.
**Note:** The supplied passphrase is used for **both** encryption/decryption and integrity verification.
At this point, you may also choose whether to save your settings by checking or unchecking the **Save settings as default backup profile** box.
**Warning: Saving the settings will result in your backup passphrase being saved in plaintext in dom0, so consider your threat model before checking this box.**
4. You will now see the summary of VMs to be backed up.
If there are any issues preventing the backup, they will be listed here and the **Next** button grayed out.
5. When you are ready, click **Next**.
Qubes will proceed to create your backup.
Once the progress bar has completed, you may click **Finish**.
Creating a Backup (R3.2 and earlier)
-----------------
1. In **Qubes VM Manager**, click **System** on the menu bar, then click **Backup VMs** in the drop-down list.
This brings up the **Qubes Backup VMs** window.
2. Move the VMs that you want to back up to the right-hand **Selected** column.
VMs in the left-hand **Available** column will not be backed up.
**Note:** A VM must be shut down in order to be backed up.
Currently running VMs appear in red.
Once you have selected all desired VMs, click **Next**.
3. Select the destination for the backup:
If you wish to send your backup to a (currently running) VM, select the VM in the drop-down box next to **Target AppVM**.
If you wish to send your backup to a [USB mass storage device](/doc/usb/), you can use the directory selection widget to mount a connected device (under "Other locations" item on the left); or first mount the device in a VM, then select the mount point inside that VM as the backup destination.
You must also specify a directory on the device or in the VM, or a command to be executed in the VM as a destination for your backup.
For example, if you wish to send your backup to the `~/backups` folder in the target VM, you would simply browse to it using the convenient directory selection dialog (`...`) at the right.
If it does not exist, you must create it manually prior to backing up.
By specifying the appropriate directory as the destination in a VM, it is possible to send the backup directly to, e.g., a USB mass storage device attached to the VM.
Likewise, it is possible to enter any command as a backup target by specifying the command as the destination in the VM.
This can be used to send your backup directly to, e.g., a remote server using SSH.
At this point, you must also choose whether to encrypt your backup by checking or unchecking the **Encrypt backup** box.
**Note:** It is strongly recommended that you opt to encrypt all backups which will be sent to untrusted destinations!
**Note:** The supplied passphrase is used for **both** encryption/decryption and integrity verification. If you decide not to encrypt your backup (by unchecking the **Encrypt backup** box), the passphrase you supply will be used **only** for integrity verification. If you supply a passphrase but do not check the **Encrypt backup** box, your backup will **not** be encrypted!
**Note:** The supplied passphrase is used for **both** encryption/decryption and integrity verification.
If you decide not to encrypt your backup (by unchecking the **Encrypt backup** box), the passphrase you supply will be used **only** for integrity verification.
If you supply a passphrase but do not check the **Encrypt backup** box, your backup will **not** be encrypted!
4. When you are ready, click **Next**. Qubes will proceed to create your backup. Once the progress bar has completed, you may click **Finish**.
4. You will now see the summary of VMs to be backed up.
If there are any issues preventing the backup, they will be listed here and the **Next** button grayed out.
5. When you are ready, click **Next**.
Qubes will proceed to create your backup.
Once the progress bar has completed, you may click **Finish**.
Restoring from a Backup
Restoring from a Backup (R4.0 and later)
-----------------------
1. In **Qubes VM Manager**, click **System** on the menu bar, then click **Restore VMs from backup** in the drop-down list. This brings up the **Qubes Restore VMs** window.
1. Go to **Applications menu -> System Tools -> Restore Backup**.
This brings up the **Qubes Restore VMs** window.
2. Select the source location of the backup to be restored:
- If your backup is located on a [USB mass storage device](/doc/stick-mounting/), select the device in the drop-down box next to **Device**.
- If your backup is located on a [USB mass storage device](/doc/usb/), attach it first to another VM or select `sys-usb` in the next item.
- If your backup is located in a (currently running) VM, select the VM in the drop-down box next to **AppVM**.
You must also specify the directory in which the backup resides (or a command to be executed in a VM). If you followed the instructions in the previous section, "Creating a Backup," then your backup is most likely in the location you chose as the destination in step 3. For example, if you had chosen the `~/backups` directory of a VM as your destination in step 3, you would now select the same VM and again type `backups` into the **Backup directory** field.
**Note:** After you have typed the directory location of the backup in the **Backup directory** field, click the ellipsis button `...` to the right of the field.
You must also specify the directory and filename of the backup (or a command to be executed in a VM) in the **Backup file** field.
If you followed the instructions in the previous section, "Creating a Backup," then your backup is most likely in the location you chose as the destination in step 3.
For example, if you had chosen the `~/backups` directory of a VM as your destination in step 3, you would now select the same VM and again browse to (using `...`) the `backups` folder.
Once you've located the backup file, double-click it or select it and hit **OK**.
3. There are three options you may select when restoring from a backup:
1. **ignore missing**: If any of the VMs in your backup depended upon a NetVM, ProxyVM, or TemplateVM that is not present in (i.e., "missing from") the current system, checking this box will ignore the fact that they are missing and restore the VMs anyway.
2. **ignore username mismatch**: This option applies only to the restoration of dom0's home directory. If your backup was created on a Qubes system which had a different dom0 username than the dom0 username of the current system, then checking this box will ignore the mismatch between the two usernames and proceed to restore the home directory anyway.
3. **skip dom0**: If this box is checked, dom0's home directory will not be restored from your backup.
1. **ignore missing templates and net VMs**: If any of the VMs in your backup depended upon a NetVM or TemplateVM that is not present in (i.e., "missing from") the current system, checking this box will ignore the fact that they are missing and restore the VMs anyway and set them to use the default NetVM and system default template.
2. **ignore username mismatch**: This option applies only to the restoration of dom0's home directory.
If your backup was created on a Qubes system which had a different dom0 username than the dom0 username of the current system, then checking this box will ignore the mismatch between the two usernames and proceed to restore the home directory anyway.
3. **Verify backup integrity, do not restore the data**: This will scan the backup file for corrupted data.
However, it does not currently detect if it is missing data as long as it is a correctly structured, non-corrupted backup file.
See [issue #3498](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3498) for more details.
4. If your backup is encrypted, you must check the **Encrypted backup** box. If a passphrase was supplied during the creation of your backup (regardless of whether it is encrypted), then you must supply it here.
4. If your backup is encrypted, you must check the **Encrypted backup** box.
If a passphrase was supplied during the creation of your backup (regardless of whether it is encrypted), then you must supply it here.
**Note:** The passphrase which was supplied when the backup was created was used for **both** encryption/decryption and integrity verification. If the backup was not encrypted, the supplied passphrase is used only for integrity verification.
**Note:** The passphrase which was supplied when the backup was created was used for **both** encryption/decryption and integrity verification.
If the backup was not encrypted, the supplied passphrase is used only for integrity verification.
All backups made from a Qubes R4.0 system will be encrypted.
**Note:** A VM cannot be restored from a backup if a VM with the same name already exists on the current system. You must first remove or change the name of any VM with the same name in order to restore such a VM.
5. You will now see the summary of VMs to be restored.
If there are any issues preventing the restore, they will be listed here and the **Next** button grayed out.
5. When you are ready, click **Next**. Qubes will proceed to restore from your backup. Once the progress bar has completed, you may click **Finish**.
6. When you are ready, click **Next**.
Qubes will proceed to restore from your backup.
Once the progress bar has completed, you may click **Finish**.
Restoring from a Backup (R3.2 and earlier)
-----------------------
1. In **Qubes VM Manager**, click **System** on the menu bar, then click **Restore VMs from backup** in the drop-down list.
This brings up the **Qubes Restore VMs** window.
2. Select the source location of the backup to be restored:
- If your backup is located on a [USB mass storage device](/doc/usb/), attach it first to another VM or select `sys-usb` in the next item.
- If your backup is located in a (currently running) VM, select the VM in the drop-down box next to **AppVM**.
You must also specify the directory and filename of the backup (or a command to be executed in a VM) in the **Backup file** field.
If you followed the instructions in the previous section, "Creating a Backup," then your backup is most likely in the location you chose as the destination in step 3.
For example, if you had chosen the `~/backups` directory of a VM as your destination in step 3, you would now select the same VM and again browse to (using `...`) the `backups` folder.
Once you've located the backup file, double-click or select it and hit **OK**.
3. There are three options you may select when restoring from a backup:
1. **ignore missing**: If any of the VMs in your backup depended upon a NetVM, ProxyVM, or TemplateVM that is not present in (i.e., "missing from") the current system, checking this box will ignore the fact that they are missing and restore the VMs anyway and set them to use the default NetVM and system default template.
2. **ignore username mismatch**: This option applies only to the restoration of dom0's home directory.
If your backup was created on a Qubes system which had a different dom0 username than the dom0 username of the current system, then checking this box will ignore the mismatch between the two usernames and proceed to restore the home directory anyway.
3. **Verify backup integrity, do not restore the data**: This will scan the backup file for corrupted data.
However, it does not currently detect if it is missing data as long as it is a correctly structured, non-corrupted backup file. See [issue #3498](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3498) for more details.
4. If your backup is encrypted, you must check the **Encrypted backup** box.
If a passphrase was supplied during the creation of your backup (regardless of whether it is encrypted), then you must supply it here.
**Note:** The passphrase which was supplied when the backup was created was used for **both** encryption/decryption and integrity verification.
If the backup was not encrypted, the supplied passphrase is used only for integrity verification.
**Note:** A VM cannot be restored from a backup if a VM with the same name already exists on the current system.
You must first remove or change the name of any VM with the same name in order to restore such a VM.
5. You will now see the summary of VMs to be restored.
If there are any issues preventing the restore, they will be listed here and the **Next** button grayed out.
6. When you are ready, click **Next**.
Qubes will proceed to restore from your backup.
Once the progress bar has completed, you may click **Finish**.
Emergency Backup Recovery without Qubes
---------------------------------------
The Qubes backup system has been designed with emergency disaster recovery in mind. No special Qubes-specific tools are required to access data backed up by Qubes. In the event a Qubes system is unavailable, you can access your data on any GNU/Linux system with the following procedure.
The Qubes backup system has been designed with emergency disaster recovery in mind.
No special Qubes-specific tools are required to access data backed up by Qubes.
In the event a Qubes system is unavailable, you can access your data on any GNU/Linux system with the following procedure.
For emergency restore of backup created on Qubes R2 or newer take a look [here](/doc/backup-emergency-restore-v3/). For backups created on earlier Qubes version, take a look [here](/doc/backup-emergency-restore-v2/).
Refer to the following for emergency restore of a backup created on:
* [Qubes R4 or newer](/doc/backup-emergency-restore-v4/)
* [Qubes R3](/doc/backup-emergency-restore-v3/)
* [Qubes R2 or older](/doc/backup-emergency-restore-v2/)
Migrating Between Two Physical Machines
---------------------------------------
In order to migrate your Qubes system from one physical machine to another, simply follow the backup procedure on the old machine, [install Qubes](/downloads/) on the new machine, and follow the restoration procedure on the new machine. All of your settings and data will be preserved!
In order to migrate your Qubes system from one physical machine to another, simply follow the backup procedure on the old machine, [install Qubes](/downloads/) on the new machine, and follow the restoration procedure on the new machine.
All of your settings and data will be preserved!
Choosing a Backup Passphrase
----------------------------
Here are some things to consider when selecting a passphrase for your backups:
* If you plan to store the backup for a long time or on third-party servers, you should make sure to use a very long, high-entropy passphrase. (Depending on the decryption passphrase you use for your system drive, this may necessitate selecting a stronger passphrase. If your system drive decryption passphrase is already sufficiently strong, it may not.)
* An adversary who has access to your backups may try to substitute one backup for another. For example, when you attempt to retrieve a recent backup, the adversary may instead give you a very old backup containing a compromised VM. If you're concerned about this type of attack, you may wish to use a different passphrase for each backup, e.g., by appending a number or date to the passphrase.
* If you're forced to enter your system drive decryption passphrase in plain view of others (where it can be shoulder-surfed), then you may want to use a different passphrase for your backups (even if your system drive decryption passphrase is already maximally strong). On the othe hand, if you're careful to avoid shoulder-surfing and/or have a passphrase that's difficult to detect via shoulder-surfing, then this may not be a problem for you.
* If you plan to store the backup for a long time or on third-party servers, you should make sure to use a very long, high-entropy passphrase.
(Depending on the decryption passphrase you use for your system drive, this may necessitate selecting a stronger passphrase.
If your system drive decryption passphrase is already sufficiently strong, it may not.)
* An adversary who has access to your backups may try to substitute one backup for another.
For example, when you attempt to retrieve a recent backup, the adversary may instead give you a very old backup containing a compromised VM.
If you're concerned about this type of attack, you may wish to use a different passphrase for each backup, e.g., by appending a number or date to the passphrase.
* If you're forced to enter your system drive decryption passphrase in plain view of others (where it can be shoulder-surfed), then you may want to use a different passphrase for your backups (even if your system drive decryption passphrase is already maximally strong).
On the othe hand, if you're careful to avoid shoulder-surfing and/or have a passphrase that's difficult to detect via shoulder-surfing, then this may not be a problem for you.
Notes
-----
* The Qubes backup system relies on `openssl enc`, which is known to use a very weak key derivation scheme. The Qubes backup system also uses the same passphrase for authentication and for encryption, which is problematic from a security perspective. Users are advised to use a very high entropy passphrase for Qubes backups. For a full discussion, see [this ticket](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/971) and [this thread](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-devel/CZ7WRwLXcnk/u_rZPoVxL5IJ).
* The Qubes R3.2 and earlier backup system relies on `openssl enc`, which is known to use a very weak key derivation scheme.
The Qubes backup system also uses the same passphrase for authentication and for encryption, which is problematic from a security perspective.
Users are advised to use a very high entropy passphrase for Qubes backups.
For a full discussion, see [this ticket](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/971) and [this thread](https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-devel/CZ7WRwLXcnk/u_rZPoVxL5IJ).
* For the technical details of the backup system, please refer to [this thread](https://groups.google.com/d/topic/qubes-devel/TQr_QcXIVww/discussion).
* If working with symlinks, note the issues described in [this thread](https://groups.google.com/d/topic/qubes-users/EITd1kBHD30/discussion).

2
common-tasks/dispvm.md
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@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Thus if an AppVM uses sys-net as its NetVM, any DispVM launched from this AppVM
You can change this behaviour for individual VMs: in Qubes VM Manager open VM Settings for the VM in question and go to the "Advanced" tab.
Here you can edit the "NetVM for DispVM" setting to change the NetVM of any DispVM launched from that VM.
A Disposable VM launched from the Start Menu inherits the NetVM of the [DVM Template](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/glossary/#dvm-template).
A Disposable VM launched from the Start Menu inherits the NetVM of the [DVM Template](/doc/glossary/#dvm-template).
By default the DVM template is called `fedora-XX-dvm` (where `XX` is the Fedora version of the default TemplateVM).
As an "internal" VM it is hidden in Qubes VM Manager, but can be shown by selecting "Show/Hide internal VMs".
Note that changing the "NetVM for DispVM" setting for the DVM Template does *not* affect the NetVM of DispVMs launched from the Start Menu; only changing the DVM Template's own NetVM does.

24
common-tasks/software-update-dom0.md
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@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Updating software in dom0
Why would one want to update software in dom0?
----------------------------------------------
Normally, there should be few reasons for updating software in dom0. This is because there is no networking in dom0, which means that even if some bugs are discovered e.g. in the dom0 Desktop Manager, this really is not a problem for Qubes, because none of the third-party software running in dom0 is accessible from VMs or the network in any way. Some exceptions to this include: Qubes GUI daemon, Xen store daemon, and disk back-ends. (We plan move the disk backends to an untrusted domain in Qubes 2.0.) Of course, we believe this software is reasonably secure, and we hope it will not need patching.
Normally, there should be few reasons for updating software in dom0. This is because there is no networking in dom0, which means that even if some bugs are discovered e.g. in the dom0 Desktop Manager, this really is not a problem for Qubes, because none of the third-party software running in dom0 is accessible from VMs or the network in any way. Some exceptions to this include: Qubes GUI daemon, Xen store daemon, and disk back-ends. (We plan move the disk backends to an untrusted domain.) Of course, we believe this software is reasonably secure, and we hope it will not need patching.
However, we anticipate some other situations in which updating dom0 software might be necessary or desirable:
@ -58,12 +58,12 @@ Of course, command line tools are still available for accomplishing various upda
sudo qubes-dom0-update package-version
~~~
Yum will say that there is no update, but the package will nonetheless be downloaded to dom0.
Dnf will say that there is no update, but the package will nonetheless be downloaded to dom0.
2. Downgrade the package:
~~~
sudo yum downgrade package-version
sudo dnf downgrade package-version
~~~
### How to re-install a package
@ -76,21 +76,21 @@ You can re-install in a similar fashion to downgrading.
sudo qubes-dom0-update package
~~~
Yum will say that there is no update, but the package will nonetheless be downloaded to dom0.
Dnf will say that there is no update, but the package will nonetheless be downloaded to dom0.
2. Re-install the package:
~~~
sudo yum reinstall package
sudo dnf reinstall package
~~~
Note that yum will only re-install if the installed and downloaded versions match. You can ensure they match by either updating the package to the latest version, or specifying the package version in the first step using the form `package-version`.
Note that Dnf will only re-install if the installed and downloaded versions match. You can ensure they match by either updating the package to the latest version, or specifying the package version in the first step using the form `package-version`.
### How to uninstall a package
If you've installed a package such as anti-evil-maid, you can remove it with the following command:
sudo yum remove anti-evil-maid
sudo dnf remove anti-evil-maid
### Testing repositories
@ -124,8 +124,16 @@ is needed for the VMs. (Note that the following example enables the unstable rep
sudo qubes-dom0-update --enablerepo=qubes-dom0-unstable kernel kernel-qubes-vm
~~~
Rebuild grub config.
If the update process does not automatically do it (you should see it mentioned in the CLI output
from the update command), you may need to manually rebuild the EFI or grub config depending on which
your system uses.
EFI (Replace the file names with the correct versions for your updated kernel)
~~~
sudo /usr/bin/dracut -f /boot/efi/EFI/qubes/initramfs-4.4.31-11.pvops.qubes.x86_64.img 4.4.31-11.pvops.qubes.x86_64
~~~
Grub2
~~~
sudo grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
~~~

3
common-tasks/tips-and-tricks.md
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@ -58,4 +58,5 @@ Trim for standalone AppVMs
---------------------
The `qvm-trim-template` command is not available for a standalone AppVM.
It is still possible to trim the AppVM disks by using the `fstrim --all` command from the appvm
It is still possible to trim the AppVM disks by using the `fstrim --all` command from the appvm.
You can also add the `discard` option to the mount line in `/etc/fstab` inside the standalone AppVM if you want trimming to be performed automatically, but there may be a performance impact on writes and deletes.

595
common-tasks/usb.md
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@ -21,6 +21,322 @@ redirect_from:
Using and Managing USB Devices
==============================
How to attach USB drives
------------------------
(**Note:** In the present context, the term "USB drive" denotes any
[USB mass storage device][mass-storage]. In addition to smaller flash memory
sticks, this includes things like USB external hard drives.)
Qubes OS supports the ability to attach a USB drive (or just one or more of its
partitions) to any qube easily, no matter which qube actually handles the USB
controller.
### R4.0 ###
USB drive mounting is integrated into the Devices Widget. This is the tool tray
icon with a yellow square located in the top right of your screen by default.
Simply insert
your USB drive and click on the widget. You will see multiple entries for your
USB drive; typically, `sys-usb:sda`, `sys-usb:sda1`, and `sys-usb:2-1` for example.
The simplest (but slightly less secure, see note below about attaching individual
partitions) option is to attach the entire block drive. In our example, this is `sda`,
so hover over it.
This will pop up a submenu showing running VMs to which the USB drive can be connected.
Click on one and your USB drive will be attached!
Note that attaching individual partitions can be slightly more secure because it doesn't
force the target AppVM to parse the partition table. However, it often means the
AppVM won't detect the new partition and you will need to manually mount it inside
the AppVM. See below for more detailed steps.
The command-line tool you may use to mount whole USB drives or their partitions
is `qvm-block`. This tool can be used to assign a USB drive to a qube as
follows:
1. Insert your USB drive.
2. In a dom0 console (running as a normal user), list all available block
devices:
qvm-block
This will list all available block devices connected to any USB controller
in your system, no matter which qube hosts the controller. The name of the
qube hosting the USB controller is displayed before the colon in the device
name. The string after the colon is the name of the device used within the
qube, like so:
dom0:sdb1 Cruzer () 4GiB
usbVM:sdb1 Disk () 2GiB
**Note:** If your device is not listed here, you may refresh the list by
calling from the qube to which the device is connected (typically `sys-usb`):
sudo udevadm trigger --action=change
3. Assuming your USB drive is attached to `sys-usb` and is `sdb`, we attach the
device to a qube with the name `personal` like so:
qvm-block attach personal sys-usb:sdb
This will attach the device to the qube as `/dev/xvdi` if that name is not
already taken by another attached device, or `/dev/xvdj`, etc.
You may also mount one partition at a time by using the same command with
the partition number after `sdb`.
4. The USB drive is now attached to the qube. If using a default qube, you may
open the Nautilus file manager in the qube, and your drive should be
visible in the **Devices** panel on the left. If you've attached a single
partition, you may need to manually mount before it becomes visible:
```
cd ~
mkdir mnt
sudo mount /dev/xvdi mnt
```
5. When you finish using your USB drive, click the eject button or right-click
and select **Unmount**. If you've manually mounted a single partition
in the above step, use:
`sudo umount mnt`
6. In a dom0 console, detach the stick
qvm-block detach <vmname> <device>
7. You may now remove the device.
### R3.2 ###
USB drive mounting is integrated into the Qubes VM Manager GUI. Simply insert
your USB drive, right-click on the desired qube in the Qubes VM Manager list,
click **Attach/detach block devices**, and select your desired action and
device. This, however, only works for the whole device. If you would like to
attach individual partitions, you must use the command-line tool.
Note that attaching individual partitions can be slightly more secure because it doesn't
force the target AppVM to parse the partition table. However, it often means the
AppVM won't detect the new partition and you will need to manually mount it inside
the AppVM. See below for more detailed steps.
The command-line tool you may use to mount whole USB drives or their partitions
is `qvm-block`. This tool can be used to assign a USB drive to a qube as
follows:
1. Insert your USB drive.
2. In a dom0 console (running as a normal user), list all available block
devices:
qvm-block
This will list all available block devices connected to any USB controller
in your system, no matter which qube hosts the controller. The name of the
qube hosting the USB controller is displayed before the colon in the device
name. The string after the colon is the name of the device used within the
qube, like so:
dom0:sdb1 Cruzer () 4GiB
usbVM:sdb1 Disk () 2GiB
**Note:** If your device is not listed here, you may refresh the list by
calling from the qube to which the device is connected (typically `sys-usb`):
sudo udevadm trigger --action=change
3. Assuming your USB drive is attached to `sys-usb` and is `sdb`, we attach the
device to a qube with the name `personal` like so:
qvm-block -a personal sys-usb:sdb
This will attach the device to the qube as `/dev/xvdi` if that name is not
already taken by another attached device, or `/dev/xvdj`, etc.
You may also mount one partition at a time by using the same command with
the partition number after `sdb`. This is slightly more secure because it
does not force the target AppVM to parse the partition table.
**Warning:** when working with single partitions, it is possible to assign
the same partition to multiple qubes. For example, you could attach `sdb1`
to qube1 and then `sdb` to qube2. It is up to the user not to make this
mistake. The Xen block device framework currently does not provide an easy
way around this. Point 2 of [this comment on issue 1072][1072-comm2] gives
details about this.
4. The USB drive is now attached to the qube. If using a default qube, you may
open the Nautilus file manager in the qube, and your drive should be
visible in the **Devices** panel on the left. If you've attached a single
partition, you may need to manually mount before it becomes visible:
```
cd ~
mkdir mnt
sudo mount /dev/xvdi mnt
```
5. When you finish using your USB drive, click the eject button or right-click
and select **Unmount**. If you've manually mounted a single partition
in the above step, use:
`sudo umount mnt`
6. In a dom0 console, detach the stick
qvm-block -d <device>
or
qvm-block -d <vmname>
7. You may now remove the device.
**Warning:** Do not remove the device before detaching it from the VM!
Otherwise, you will not be able to attach it anywhere later. See issue [1082]
for details.
If the device does not appear in Nautilus, you will need to mount it
manually. The device will show up as `/dev/xvdi` (or `/dev/xvdj` if there is
already one device attached -- if two, `/dev/xvdk`, and so on).
### What if I removed the device before detaching it from the VM? (R3.2) ###
Currently (until issue [1082] gets implemented), if you remove the device
before detaching it from the qube, Qubes OS (more precisely, `libvirtd`) will
think that the device is still attached to the qube and will not allow attaching
further devices under the same name. The easiest way to recover from such a
situation is to reboot the qube to which the device was attached, but if this
isn't an option, you can manually recover from the situation by following these
steps:
1. Physically connect the device back. You can use any device as long as it
will be detected under the same name (for example, `sdb`).
2. Attach the device manually to the same VM using the `xl block-attach`
command. It is important to use the same "frontend" device name (by default,
`xvdi`). You can get it from the `qvm-block` listing:
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-block
sys-usb:sda DataTraveler_2.0 () 246 MiB (attached to 'testvm' as 'xvdi')
[user@dom0 ~]$ sudo xl block-attach testvm phy:/dev/sda backend=sys-usb xvdi
In above example, all `xl block-attach` parameters can be deduced from the
output of `qvm-block`. In order:
* `testvm` - name of target qube to which device was attached - listed in
brackets by `qvm-block` command
* `phy:/dev/sda` - physical path at which device appears in source qube
(just after source qube name in `qvm-block` output)
* `backend=sys-usb` - name of source qube, can be omitted in case of dom0
* `xvdi` - "frontend" device name (listed at the end of line in `qvm-block`
output)
3. Now properly detach the device, either using Qubes VM Manager or the
`qvm-block -d` command.
Attaching a single USB device to a qube (USB passthrough)
---------------------------------------------------------
Starting with Qubes 3.2, it is possible to attach a single USB device to any
Qube. While this is useful feature, it should be used with care, because there
are [many security implications][usb-challenges] from using USB devices and USB
passthrough will **expose your target qube** for most of them. If possible, use
method specific for particular device type (for example block devices described
above), instead of this generic one.
### Installation of qubes-usb-proxy ###
[installation]: #installation-of-qubes-usb-proxy
To use this feature, you need to install [`qubes-usb-proxy`][qubes-usb-proxy] package in the
templates used for the USB qube and qubes you want to connect USB devices to. Note
you cannot pass through devices from dom0 (in other words: USB VM is required).
`qubes-usb-proxy` should be installed by default in the template VM.
However, if you receive this error: `ERROR: qubes-usb-proxy not installed in the VM`,
you can install the `qubes-usb-proxy` with the package manager in the VM
you want to attach the USB device to.
- Fedora: `sudo dnf install qubes-usb-proxy`
- Debian/Ubuntu: `sudo apt-get install qubes-usb-proxy`
### Usage of qubes-usb-proxy (R4.0) ###
This feature is also available from the Devices Widget. This is the tool tray
icon with a yellow square located in the top right of your screen by default.
Simply insert
your USB device and click on the widget. You will see an entry for your device
such as `sys-usb:2-5 - 058f_USB_2.0_Camera` for example.
Hover over it.
This will pop up a submenu showing running VMs to which the USB device can be connected.
Click on one and your device will be attached! You may also use the command line:
Listing available USB devices:
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb
sys-usb:2-4 04ca:300d 04ca_300d
sys-usb:2-5 058f:3822 058f_USB_2.0_Camera
sys-usb:2-1 03f0:0641 PixArt_HP_X1200_USB_Optical_Mouse
Attaching selected USB device:
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb attach conferences sys-usb:2-5
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb
conferences:2-1 058f:3822 058f_USB_2.0_Camera
sys-usb:2-4 04ca:300d 04ca_300d
sys-usb:2-5 058f:3822 058f_USB_2.0_Camera (attached to conferences)
sys-usb:2-1 03f0:0641 PixArt_HP_X1200_USB_Optical_Mouse
Now, you can use your USB device (camera in this case) in the `conferences` qube.
If you see the error `ERROR: qubes-usb-proxy not installed in the VM` instead,
please refer to the [Installation Section][installation].
When you finish, detach the device. This can be done in the GUI by
clicking on the Devices Widget. You will see an entry in bold for your device
such as **`sys-usb:2-5 - 058f_USB_2.0_Camera`**.
Hover over it.
This will pop up a submenu showing running VMs. The one which your device is
connected to will have an Eject button next to it. Click that and your device
will be detached. You may also use the command line:
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb detach conferences sys-usb:2-5
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb
sys-usb:2-4 04ca:300d 04ca_300d
sys-usb:2-5 058f:3822 058f_USB_2.0_Camera
sys-usb:2-1 03f0:0641 PixArt_HP_X1200_USB_Optical_Mouse
### Usage of qubes-usb-proxy (R3.2) ###
Listing available USB devices:
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb
sys-usb:2-4 04ca:300d 04ca_300d
sys-usb:2-5 058f:3822 058f_USB_2.0_Camera
sys-usb:2-1 03f0:0641 PixArt_HP_X1200_USB_Optical_Mouse
Attaching selected USB device:
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb -a conferences sys-usb:2-5
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb
conferences:2-1 058f:3822 058f_USB_2.0_Camera
sys-usb:2-4 04ca:300d 04ca_300d
sys-usb:2-5 058f:3822 058f_USB_2.0_Camera (attached to conferences)
sys-usb:2-1 03f0:0641 PixArt_HP_X1200_USB_Optical_Mouse
Now, you can use your USB device (camera in this case) in the `conferences` qube.
If you see the error `ERROR: qubes-usb-proxy not installed in the VM` instead,
please refer to the [Installation Section][installation].
When you finish, detach the device:
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb -d sys-usb:2-5
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb
sys-usb:2-4 04ca:300d 04ca_300d
sys-usb:2-5 058f:3822 058f_USB_2.0_Camera
sys-usb:2-1 03f0:0641 PixArt_HP_X1200_USB_Optical_Mouse
This feature is not available in Qubes Manager.
Creating and Using a USB qube
-----------------------------
@ -40,17 +356,14 @@ fatal to the security of the whole system). With a USB qube, every time you
connect an untrusted USB drive to a USB port managed by that USB controller, you
will have to attach it to the qube in which you wish to use it (if different
from the USB qube itself), either by using Qubes VM Manager or the command line
(see instructions above).
(see instructions above). The USB controller may be assigned on the **Devices** tab of a
qube's settings page in Qubes VM Manager or by using the
[qvm-pci][Assigning Devices] command. For guidance on finding the correct USB
controller, see [here][usb-controller].
You can create a USB qube using the management stack by performing the following
steps as root in dom0:
as root in dom0:
1. Enable `sys-usb`:
sudo qubesctl top.enable qvm.sys-usb
2. Apply the configuration:
sudo qubesctl state.highstate
sudo qubesctl state.sls qvm.sys-usb
Alternatively, you can create a USB qube manually as follows:
@ -100,12 +413,22 @@ will hang.
The procedure to hide all USB controllers from dom0 is as follows:
1. Open the file `/etc/default/grub` in dom0.
2. Find the line that begins with `GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX`.
3. Add `rd.qubes.hide_all_usb` to that line.
4. Save and close the file.
5. Run the command `grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg` in dom0.
6. Reboot.
* GRUB2
1. Open the file `/etc/default/grub` in dom0.
2. Find the line that begins with `GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX`.
3. Add `rd.qubes.hide_all_usb` to that line.
4. Save and close the file.
5. Run the command `grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg` in dom0.
6. Reboot.
* EFI
1. Open the file `/boot/efi/EFI/qubes/xen.cfg` in dom0.
2. Find the lines that begin with `kernel=`. There may be more than one.
3. Add `rd.qubes.hide_all_usb` to those lines.
4. Save and close the file.
5. Reboot.
(Note: Beginning with R3.2, `rd.qubes.hide_all_usb` is set automatically if you
opt to create a USB qube during installation. This also occurs automatically if
@ -125,15 +448,26 @@ Removing a USB qube
**Warning:** This procedure will result in your USB controller(s) being attached
directly to dom0.
1. Shut down the USB qube.
2. In Qubes Manager, right-click on the USB qube and select "Remove VM."
3. Open the file `/etc/default/grub` in dom0.
4. Find the line(s) that begins with `GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX`.
5. If `rd.qubes.hide_all_usb` appears anywhere in those lines, remove it.
6. Save and close the file.
7. Run the command `grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg` in dom0.
8. Reboot.
* GRUB2
1. Shut down the USB qube.
2. In Qubes Manager, right-click on the USB qube and select "Remove VM."
3. Open the file `/etc/default/grub` in dom0.
4. Find the line(s) that begins with `GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX`.
5. If `rd.qubes.hide_all_usb` appears anywhere in those lines, remove it.
6. Save and close the file.
7. Run the command `grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg` in dom0.
8. Reboot.
* EFI
1. Shut down the USB qube.
2. In Qubes Manager, right-click on the USB qube and select "Remove VM."
3. Open the file `/boot/efi/EFI/qubes/xen.cfg` in dom0.
4. Find the line(s) that begins with `kernel=`.
5. If `rd.qubes.hide_all_usb` appears anywhere in those lines, remove it.
6. Save and close the file.
7. Reboot.
Security Warning about USB Input Devices
----------------------------------------
@ -160,6 +494,24 @@ How to use a USB keyboard
**Caution:** Please carefully read the [Security Warning about USB Input Devices] before proceeding.
If you use USB keyboard, automatic USB qube creation during installation is disabled.
Additional steps are required to avoid locking you out from the system.
Those steps are not performed by default, because of risk explained in [Security Warning about USB Input Devices].
### R4.0, using salt ###
To allow USB keyboard usage (including early boot for LUKS passphrase), make sure you have the latest `qubes-mgmt-salt-dom0-virtual-machines` package (simply [install dom0 updates][dom0-updates]) and execute in dom0:
sudo qubesctl state.sls qvm.usb-keyboard
The above command will take care of all required configuration, including creating USB qube if not present.
Note that it will expose dom0 to USB devices while entering LUKS passphrase.
Users are advised to physically disconnect other devices from the system for that time, to minimize the risk.
If you wish to perform only subset of this configuration (for example do not enable USB keyboard during boot), see manual instructions below.
### R3.2, manual ###
In order to use a USB keyboard, you must first attach it to a USB qube, then give that qube permission to pass keyboard input to dom0.
Edit the `qubes.InputKeyboard` policy file in dom0, which is located here:
@ -178,12 +530,20 @@ For a confirmation dialog each time the USB keyboard is connected, change this l
sys-usb dom0 ask,default_target=dom0
```
Additionally, if you want to use USB keyboard to enter LUKS passphrase, it is incompatible with [hiding USB controllers from dom0][How to hide all USB controllers from dom0].
You need to revert that procedure (remove `rd.qubes.hide_all_usb` option from files mentioned there) and employ alternative protection during system boot - disconnect other devices during startup.
How to use a USB mouse
----------------------
**Caution:** Please carefully read the [Security Warning about USB Input Devices] before proceeding.
In order to use a USB mouse, you must first attach it to a USB qube, then give that qube permission to pass mouse input to dom0.
In order to use a USB mouse, you must first attach it to a USB qube, then give that
qube permission to pass mouse input to dom0.
The following steps are already done by default if you created the sys-usb qube with
`qubesctl state.sls qvm.sys-usb` above, or let Qubes create it for you on first boot. However,
if you've created the USB qube manually:
Edit the `qubes.InputMouse` policy file in dom0, which is located here:
/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.InputMouse
@ -201,189 +561,6 @@ For a confirmation dialog each time the USB mouse is connected, change this line
sys-usb dom0 ask,default_target=dom0
```
How to attach USB drives
------------------------
(**Note:** In the present context, the term "USB drive" denotes any
[USB mass storage device][mass-storage]. In addition to smaller flash memory
sticks, this includes things like USB external hard drives.)
Qubes OS supports the ability to attach a USB drive (or just one or more of its
partitions) to any qube easily, no matter which qube actually handles the USB
controller. (The USB controller may be assigned on the **Devices** tab of a
qube's settings page in Qubes VM Manager or by using the
[qvm-pci][Assigning Devices] command. For guidance on finding the correct USB
controller, see [here][usb-controller].)
USB drive mounting is integrated into the Qubes VM Manager GUI. Simply insert
your USB drive, right-click on the desired qube in the Qubes VM Manager list,
click **Attach/detach block devices**, and select your desired action and
device. This, however, only works for the whole device. If you would like to
attach individual partitions, you must use the command-line tool.
The command-line tool you may use to mount whole USB drives or their partitions
is `qvm-block`. This tool can be used to assign a USB drive to a qube as
follows:
1. Insert your USB drive.
2. In a dom0 console (running as a normal user), list all available block
devices:
qvm-block -l
This will list all available block devices connected to any USB controller
in your system, no matter which qube hosts the controller. The name of the
qube hosting the USB controller is displayed before the colon in the device
name. The string after the colon is the name of the device used within the
qube, like so:
dom0:sdb1 Cruzer () 4GiB
usbVM:sdb1 Disk () 2GiB
**Note:** If your device is not listed here, you may refresh the list by
calling (from the qube to which the device is connected):
sudo udevadm trigger --action=change
3. Assuming your USB drive is attached to dom0 and is `sdb`, we attach the
device to a qube with the name `personal` like so:
qvm-block -a personal dom0:sdb
This will attach the device to the qube as `/dev/xvdi` if that name is not
already taken by another attached device, or `/dev/xvdj`, etc.
You may also mount one partition at a time by using the same command with
the partition number after `sdb`.
**Warning:** when working with single partitions, it is possible to assign
the same partition to multiple qubes. For example, you could attach `sdb1`
to qube1 and then `sdb` to qube2. It is up to the user not to make this
mistake. The Xen block device framework currently does not provide an easy
way around this. Point 2 of [this comment on issue 1072][1072-comm2] gives
details about this.
4. The USB drive is now attached to the qube. If using a default qube, you may
open the Nautilus file manager in the qube, and your drive should be
visible in the **Devices** panel on the left.
5. When you finish using your USB drive, click the eject button or right-click
and select **Unmount**.
6. In a dom0 console, detach the stick
qvm-block -d <device>
or
qvm-block -d <vmname>
7. You may now remove the device.
**Warning:** Do not remove the device before detaching it from the VM!
Otherwise, you will not be able to attach it anywhere later. See issue [1082]
for details.
If the device does not appear in Nautilus, you will need to mount it
manually. The device will show up as `/dev/xvdi` (or `/dev/xvdj` if there is
already one device attached -- if two, `/dev/xvdk`, and so on).
### What if I removed the device before detaching it from the VM? ###
Currently (until issue [1082] gets implemented), if you remove the device
before detaching it from the qube, Qubes OS (more precisely, `libvirtd`) will
think that the device is still attached to the qube and will not allow attaching
further devices under the same name. The easiest way to recover from such a
situation is to reboot the qube to which the device was attached, but if this
isn't an option, you can manually recover from the situation by following these
steps:
1. Physically connect the device back. You can use any device as long as it
will be detected under the same name (for example, `sdb`).
2. Attach the device manually to the same VM using the `xl block-attach`
command. It is important to use the same "frontend" device name (by default,
`xvdi`). You can get it from the `qvm-block` listing:
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-block
sys-usb:sda DataTraveler_2.0 () 246 MiB (attached to 'testvm' as 'xvdi')
[user@dom0 ~]$ xl block-attach testvm phy:/dev/sda backend=sys-usb xvdi
In above example, all `xl block-attach` parameters can be deduced from the
output of `qvm-block`. In order:
* `testvm` - name of target qube to which device was attached - listed in
brackets by `qvm-block` command
* `phy:/dev/sda` - physical path at which device appears in source qube
(just after source qube name in `qvm-block` output)
* `backend=sys-usb` - name of source qube, can be omitted in case of dom0
* `xvdi` - "frontend" device name (listed at the end of line in `qvm-block`
output)
3. Now properly detach the device, either using Qubes VM Manager or the
`qvm-block -d` command.
Attaching a single USB device to a qube (USB passthrough)
---------------------------------------------------------
Starting with Qubes 3.2, it is possible to attach a single USB device to any
Qube. While this is useful feature, it should be used with care, because there
are [many security implications][usb-challenges] from using USB devices and USB
passthrough will **expose your target qube** for most of them. If possible, use
method specific for particular device type (for example block devices described
above), instead of this generic one.
### Installation of qubes-usb-proxy ###
[installation]: #installation-of-qubes-usb-proxy
To use this feature, you need to install [`qubes-usb-proxy`][qubes-usb-proxy] package in the
templates used for the USB qube and qubes you want to connect USB devices to. Note
you cannot pass through devices from dom0 (in other words: USB VM is required).
`qubes-usb-proxy` should be installed by default in the template VM.
However, if you receive this error: `ERROR: qubes-usb-proxy not installed in the VM`,
you can install the `qubes-usb-proxy` with the package manager in the VM
you want to attach the USB device to.
- Fedora: `sudo dnf install qubes-usb-proxy`
- Debian/Ubuntu: `sudo apt-get install qubes-usb-proxy`
### Usage of qubes-usb-proxy ###
Listing available USB devices:
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb
sys-usb:2-4 04ca:300d 04ca_300d
sys-usb:2-5 058f:3822 058f_USB_2.0_Camera
sys-usb:2-1 03f0:0641 PixArt_HP_X1200_USB_Optical_Mouse
Attaching selected USB device:
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb -a conferences sys-usb:2-5
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb
conferences:2-1 058f:3822 058f_USB_2.0_Camera
sys-usb:2-4 04ca:300d 04ca_300d
sys-usb:2-5 058f:3822 058f_USB_2.0_Camera (attached to conferences)
sys-usb:2-1 03f0:0641 PixArt_HP_X1200_USB_Optical_Mouse
Now, you can use your USB device (camera in this case) in the `conferences` qube.
If you see the error `ERROR: qubes-usb-proxy not installed in the VM` instead,
please refer to the [Installation Section][installation].
When you finish, detach the device:
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb -d sys-usb:2-5
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-usb
sys-usb:2-4 04ca:300d 04ca_300d
sys-usb:2-5 058f:3822 058f_USB_2.0_Camera
sys-usb:2-1 03f0:0641 PixArt_HP_X1200_USB_Optical_Mouse
This feature is not yet available in Qubes Manager however, if you would like to contribute to Qubes OS project by implementing it and are a student please consider applying for the [Google Summer of Code][gsoc-page] scholarship and choosing QubesOS Project as a mentor organization. You can find list of our our Project Ideas [here][project-page].
[mass-storage]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USB_mass_storage_device_class
[Assigning Devices]: /doc/assigning-devices/
[usb-controller]: /doc/assigning-devices/#finding-the-right-usb-controller
@ -398,8 +575,8 @@ This feature is not yet available in Qubes Manager however, if you would like to
[1618]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1618
[create a USB qube]: #creating-and-using-a-usb-qube
[usb-challenges]: https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/05/31/usb-security-challenges.html
[project-page]: /gsoc/
[gsoc-page]: https://summerofcode.withgoogle.com/organizations/6239659689508864/
[YubiKey]: /doc/YubiKey/
[Security Warning about USB Input Devices]: #security-warning-about-usb-input-devices
[How to hide all USB controllers from dom0]: #how-to-hide-all-usb-controllers-from-dom0
[qubes-usb-proxy]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-app-linux-usb-proxy
[dom0-updates]: /doc/software-update-dom0/#how-to-update-software-in-dom0

2
configuration/fetchmail.md
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@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Fetchmail is standalone MRA (Mail Retrieval Agent) aka "IMAP/POP3 client". Its s
Installation
------------
`yum install fetchmail`
`dnf install fetchmail`
Configuration
-------------

4
configuration/postfix.md
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@ -16,11 +16,11 @@ Postfix is full featured MTA (Message Transfer Agent). Here we will configure it
Installation
------------
`yum install postfix procmail make cyrus-sasl cyrus-sasl-plain`
`dnf install postfix procmail make cyrus-sasl cyrus-sasl-plain`
Cyrus-sasl is installed to authenticate to remote servers. Procmail is not strictly necessary, but is useful to sort your incoming mail, for example to put each mailing list in its own directory. Make is also not necessary, but is used to keep Postfix lookup tables.
You should also check `alternatives` command, to see if it is the default `mta`. It probably is not. You may need to `yum remove ssmtp` or something
You should also check `alternatives` command, to see if it is the default `mta`. It probably is not. You may need to `dnf remove ssmtp` or something
Configuration
-------------

2
configuration/resize-disk-image.md
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@ -133,4 +133,4 @@ You will see that there is unallocated free space at the end of your primary dis
You can use standard linux tools like fdisk and mkfs to make this space available.
[resizing the root disk image]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/resize-root-disk-image/
[resizing the root disk image]: /doc/resize-root-disk-image/

4
configuration/secondary-storage.md
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@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Known Issues
dom0.) Do not attempt to detach these disks. (They will automatically be
detached when you shut down the AppVM.) [[2]]
[Qubes Backup]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/BackupRestore/
[TemplateVM]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/Templates/
[Qubes Backup]: /doc/BackupRestore/
[TemplateVM]: /doc/Templates/
[1]: https://groups.google.com/d/topic/qubes-users/EITd1kBHD30/discussion
[2]: https://groups.google.com/d/topic/qubes-users/nDrOM7dzLNE/discussion

117
configuration/vpn.md
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@ -60,37 +60,87 @@ Set up a ProxyVM as a VPN gateway using NetworkManager
Set up a ProxyVM as a VPN gateway using iptables and CLI scripts
----------------------------------------------------------------
This method is more involved than the one above, but has anti-leak features that also make the connection _fail closed_ should it be interrupted. It has been tested with Fedora 23 and Debian 8 templates.
This method is more involved than the one above, but has anti-leak features that also make the connection _fail closed_ should it be interrupted.
It has been tested with Fedora 23 and Debian 8 templates.
1. Create a new VM, name it, click the ProxyVM radio button, and choose a color and template.
![Create\_New\_VM.png](/attachment/wiki/VPN/Create_New_VM.png)
Note: Do not enable NetworkManager in the ProxyVM, as it can interfere with the scripts' DNS features. If you enabled NetworkManager or used other methods in a previous attempt, do not re-use the old ProxyVM... Create a new one according to this step.
Note: Do not enable NetworkManager in the ProxyVM, as it can interfere with the scripts' DNS features.
If you enabled NetworkManager or used other methods in a previous attempt, do not re-use the old ProxyVM...
Create a new one according to this step.
If your choice of template VM doesn't already have the VPN client software, you'll need to install the software in the template before proceeding. Disable any auto-starting service that comes with the software package: for example `sudo systemctl disable openvpn.service`.
If your choice of TemplateVM doesn't already have the VPN client software, you'll need to install the software in the template before proceeding.
Disable any auto-starting service that comes with the software package.
For example for OpenVPN.
sudo systemctl disable openvpn.service
You may also wish to install `nano` or another simple text editor for entering the scripts below.
2. Set up and test the VPN client.
Make sure the VPN VM and its TemplateVM is not running.
Run a terminal (CLI) in the VPN VM -- this will start the VM.
Then create a new `/rw/config/vpn` folder with.
Make sure the VPN VM and its template VM are not running.
sudo mkdir /rw/config/vpn
Run a terminal (CLI) in the VPN VM -- this will start the VM. Then make a new 'vpn' folder with `sudo mkdir /rw/config/vpn` and copy your VPN config files here (the example config filename used here is `openvpn-client.ovpn`). Files accompanying the main config such as *.crt and *.pem should also go here, and should not be referenced in the main config by absolute paths such as '/etc/...'.
Copy your VPN config files to `/rw/config/vpn`.
Your VPN config file should be named `openvpn-client.ovpn`) so you can use the scripts below as is without modification.
Otherwise you would have to replace the file name.
`openvpn-client.ovpn` contents:
Notes about VPN config options: The VPN scripts here are intended to work with commonly used `tun` interfaces, whereas `tap` mode is untested. Also, the config should route all traffic through your VPN's interface after a connection is created; For openvpn the directive for this is `redirect-gateway def1`. Lastly, the VPN client may not be able to prompt you for credentials when connecting to the server: Creating a file in the 'vpn' folder with your credentials and using a directive such as openvpn's `auth-user-pass <filename>` is recommended.
* Files accompanying the main config such as `*.crt` and `*.pem` should also go to `/rw/config/vpn` folder.
* Files referenced in `openvpn-client.ovpn` should not use absolute paths such as `/etc/...`.
The VPN scripts here are intended to work with commonly used `tun` interfaces, whereas `tap` mode is untested.
Also, the config should route all traffic through your VPN's interface after a connection is created; For OpenVPN the directive for this is `redirect-gateway def1`.
sudo nano /rw/config/vpn/openvpn-client.ovpn
Make sure it already includes or add:
redirect-gateway def1
The VPN client may not be able to prompt you for credentials when connecting to the server.
Create a file in the `/rw/config/vpn` folder with your credentials and using a directive.
For example for OpenVPN, add:
auth-user-pass pass.txt
Save file `/rw/config/vpn/openvpn-client.ovpn`.
Make sure a `/rw/config/vpn/pass.txt` file actually exists.
sudo nano /rw/config/vpn/pass.txt
Add:
username
password
Replace `username` and `password` with your actual username and password.
**Test your client configuration:**
Run the client from a CLI prompt in the 'vpn' folder, preferably as root.
For example:
__Test your client configuration:__ Run the client from a CLI prompt in the 'vpn' folder, preferably as root. For example:
```
sudo openvpn --cd /rw/config/vpn --config openvpn-client.ovpn
```
Watch for status messages that indicate whether the connection is successful and test from another VPN VM terminal window with `ping` and `traceroute`. DNS may be tested at this point by replacing addresses in `/etc/resolv.conf` with ones appropriate for your VPN (although this file will not be used when setup is complete). Diagnose any connection problems using resources such as client documentation and help from your VPN service provider.
Watch for status messages that indicate whether the connection is successful and test from another VPN VM terminal window with `ping`.
ping 8.8.8.8
`ping` can be aborted by pressing the two keys `ctrl` + `c` at the same time.
DNS may be tested at this point by replacing addresses in `/etc/resolv.conf` with ones appropriate for your VPN (although this file will not be used when setup is complete).
Diagnose any connection problems using resources such as client documentation and help from your VPN service provider.
Proceed to the next step when you're sure the basic VPN connection is working.
3. Create the DNS-handling script.
Use `sudo nano /rw/config/vpn/qubes-vpn-handler.sh` to edit and add:
sudo nano /rw/config/vpn/qubes-vpn-handler.sh
Edit and add:
~~~
#!/bin/bash
@ -130,22 +180,31 @@ This method is more involved than the one above, but has anti-leak features that
esac
~~~
Now save the script and make it executable:
`sudo chmod +x /rw/config/vpn/qubes-vpn-handler.sh`
Save the script.
Make it executable.
4. Configure client to use the DNS handling script. Using openvpn as an example, edit the config with `sudo nano /rw/config/vpn/openvpn-client.ovpn` and add these lines:
sudo chmod +x /rw/config/vpn/qubes-vpn-handler.sh
4. Configure client to use the DNS handling script. Using openvpn as an example, edit the config.
sudo nano /rw/config/vpn/openvpn-client.ovpn
Add the following.
~~~
script-security 2
up 'qubes-vpn-handler.sh up'
down 'qubes-vpn-handler.sh down'
~~~
Remove other instances of lines starting with `script-security`, `up` or `down` should there be any others.
Save the script.
**Restart the client and test the connection again** ...this time from an AppVM!
5. Set up iptables anti-leak rules.
Edit the firewall script.
Edit the firewall script with `sudo nano /rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script` then clear out the existing lines and add:
sudo nano /rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script
Clear out the existing lines and add:
~~~
#!/bin/bash
@ -171,12 +230,16 @@ This method is more involved than the one above, but has anti-leak features that
iptables -I OUTPUT -p all -o eth0 -m owner --gid-owner qvpn -j ACCEPT
~~~
Now save the script and make it executable:
`sudo chmod +x /rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script`
Save the script.
Make it executable.
sudo chmod +x /rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script
5. Set up the VPN's autostart.
Use `sudo nano /rw/config/rc.local` to clear out the existing lines and add:
sudo nano /rw/config/rc.local
Clear out the existing lines and add:
~~~
#!/bin/bash
@ -188,12 +251,15 @@ This method is more involved than the one above, but has anti-leak features that
sg qvpn -c "$VPN_CLIENT $VPN_OPTIONS"
~~~
Change the `VPN_CLIENT` and `VPN_OPTIONS` variables to match your VPN software.
If you are using anything other than OpenVPN, change the `VPN_CLIENT` and `VPN_OPTIONS` variables to match your VPN software.
Save the script.
Make it executable.
Now save the script and make it executable:
`sudo chmod +x /rw/config/rc.local`
sudo chmod +x /rw/config/rc.local`
6. Restart the new VM!
The link should then be established automatically with a popup notification to that effect.
6. Restart the new VM! The link should then be established automatically with a popup notification to that effect.
Usage
-----
@ -202,14 +268,13 @@ Configure your AppVMs to use the VPN VM as a NetVM...
![Settings-NetVM.png](/attachment/wiki/VPN/Settings-NetVM.png)
If you want to be able to use the [Qubes firewall](/doc/firewall), create a new FirewallVM (as a ProxyVM) and set it to use the VPN VM as its NetVM.
Then, configure AppVMs to use your new FirewallVM as their NetVM.
If you want to update your TemplateVMs through the VPN, enable the `qubes-updates-proxy` service in your new FirewallVM.
You can do this in the Services tab in Qubes VM Manager or on the command-line:
$ qvm-service -e <name> qubes-updates-proxy
qvm-service -e <name> qubes-updates-proxy
Then, configure your templates to use your new FirewallVM as their NetVM.

4
configuration/w3m.md
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@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ You can reduce the [browser fingerprint](https://panopticlick.eff.org/about#brow
* Set `user_agent` to `user_agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/45.0`.
By default w3m identifies itself as `w3m/` + version number. The user agent `Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/45.0` is the most common and the one used by the Tor Browser Bundle (TBB). One in fourteen browsers finderprinted by Panopticlick has this value.
By default w3m identifies itself as `w3m/` + version number. The user agent `Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/45.0` is the most common and the one used by the Tor Browser Bundle (TBB). One in fourteen browsers fingerprinted by Panopticlick has this value.
* Make w3m use the same HTTP_ACCEPT headers the TBB by adding the following lines at the end of the file:
@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ You can reduce the [browser fingerprint](https://panopticlick.eff.org/about#brow
These changes will hide your computer's locale and some other information that may or may not be unique to the VM in which it is running. With the modifications above w3m will have the same headers as about one in fifteen browsers fingerprinted by Panopticlick.
Testing these settings on <https://browserprint.info> returns a fingerprint that is destinguishable from that of the TBB (with JavaScript disabled) only by 'Screen Size (CSS)' and 'Browser supports HSTS?'.\* (<https://panopticlick.eff.org> does not work with w3m.) Due to the low number of w3m users it is highly likely that you will have an unique browser fingerprint among the visitors of a website using somewhat sofisticated browser fingerprinting technology. But at least your browser fingerprint will not reveal your computer's locale settings or other specifics about it in the HTTP_ACCEPT headers. And while it may be inferred from your fingerprint that you use w3m, it is not be explicitly stated in the User-Agent header.
Testing these settings on <https://browserprint.info> returns a fingerprint that is distinguishable from that of the TBB (with JavaScript disabled) only by 'Screen Size (CSS)' and 'Browser supports HSTS?'.\* (<https://panopticlick.eff.org> does not work with w3m.) Due to the low number of w3m users it is highly likely that you will have an unique browser fingerprint among the visitors of a website using somewhat sophisticated browser fingerprinting technology. But at least your browser fingerprint will not reveal your computer's locale settings or other specifics about it in the HTTP_ACCEPT headers. And while it may be inferred from your fingerprint that you use w3m, it is not be explicitly stated in the User-Agent header.
**Reminder: Do not rely on these settings for anonymity. Using w3m is all but guaranteed to make you stand out in the crowd.**

2
customization/kde.md
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@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Installation
------------
Prior to R3.2, KDE was the default desktop environment in Qubes. Beginning with
R3.2, however, [XFCE is the new default desktop environment](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/3.2/release-notes/). Nonetheless, it is
R3.2, however, [XFCE is the new default desktop environment](/doc/releases/3.2/release-notes/). Nonetheless, it is
still possible to install KDE by issuing this command in dom0:
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update @kde-desktop-qubes

2
customization/xfce.md
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@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ XFCE installation in dom0
**Disclaimer: The article is obsolete for Qubes OS 3.2 and later.**
Prior to R3.2, KDE was the default desktop environment in Qubes. Beginning with
R3.2 [XFCE is the new default desktop environment](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/3.2/release-notes/) and does not require manual installation.
R3.2 [XFCE is the new default desktop environment](/doc/releases/3.2/release-notes/) and does not require manual installation.
Installation:

7
doc.md
View File

@ -113,7 +113,6 @@ Privacy Guides
* [Whonix for Privacy & Anonymity](/doc/whonix/)
* [Running Tails in Qubes](/doc/tails/)
* [Anonymizing your MAC Address](/doc/anonymizing-your-mac-address/)
* [TorVM](/doc/torvm/)
* [Martus](/doc/martus/)
* [Signal](/doc/signal/)
* [Reducing the fingerprint of the text-based web browser w3m](/doc/w3m/)
@ -177,8 +176,10 @@ Troubleshooting
Reference Pages
---------------
* [Dom0 Command-Line Tools](/doc/dom0-tools/)
* [DomU Command-Line Tools](/doc/vm-tools/)
* [Command-Line Tools: Qubes 3.2, dom0](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/)
* [Command-Line Tools: Qubes 3.2, domU](/doc/tools/3.2/domU/)
* [Command-Line Tools: Qubes 4.0, dom0](/doc/tools/4.0/dom0/)
* [Command-Line Tools: Qubes 4.0, domU](/doc/tools/4.0/domU/)
* [Glossary of Qubes Terminology](/doc/glossary/)
* [Qubes Service Framework](/doc/qubes-service/)
* [Command Execution in VMs (and Qubes RPC)](/doc/qrexec/)

2
installing/live-usb.md
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@ -121,5 +121,5 @@ Downloading and burning
and `of` or specify an incorrect device, you could accidentally overwrite
your primary system drive. Please be careful!
[project-page]: https://www.qubes-os.org/gsoc/
[project-page]: /gsoc/
[gsoc-page]: https://summerofcode.withgoogle.com/organizations/6239659689508864/

15
installing/upgrade/upgrade-to-r4.0.md
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@ -84,18 +84,19 @@ Restore from your backup
4. Go to **Qubes menu -> System Tools -> Qubes Manager** to start it.
5. Follow the **Restoring from a Backup** section in the [Backup, Restoration, and Migration](/doc/backup-restore/) guide.
It is cleanest to restore only the [AppVMs](/doc/glossary/#appvm) and [StandaloneVMs](/doc/glossary/#standalonevm) from R3.2, so it is recommended not to select any **sys-** or templates to restore unless you've heavily customized them.
If the restore tool complains about missing templates, you can select the option to restore the AppVMs anyways, then change them after restore to use one of the default R4.0 templates.
We recommend that you restore only your [TemplateBasedVMs](/doc/glossary/#templatebasedvm) and [StandaloneVMs](/doc/glossary/#standalonevm) from R3.2.
Using [TemplateVMs](/doc/templates/) and [SystemVMs](/doc/glossary/#systemvm) from R3.2 is not fully supported (see [#3514](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3514)).
Instead, we recommend using the TemplateVMs that were created specifically for R4.0, which you can [customize](/doc/software-update-vm/) according to your needs.
For the TemplateVM OS versions supported in R4.0, see [Supported Versions](/doc/supported-versions/#templatevms).
If the restore tool complains about missing templates, you can select the option to restore the AppVMs anyway, then change them afterward to use one of the default R4.0 templates.
Upgrade all Template and Standalone VM(s)
-----------------------------------------
By default, in Qubes R4.0, there are few [TemplateVMs](/doc/templates/) and no [StandaloneVMs](/doc/glossary/#standalonevm).
However, users are free to create StandaloneVMs.
More information on using multiple TemplateVMs, as well as StandaloneVMs, can be found [here](/doc/software-update-vm/).
We strongly recommend that you upgrade **all** TemplateVMs and StandaloneVMs.
Please consult the guides below for specific instructions:
We strongly recommend that you update **all** TemplateVMs and StandaloneVMs before use so that you have the latest security patches from upstream distributions.
In addition, if the default templates have reached EOL (end-of-life) by the time you install R4.0, we strongly recommend that you upgrade them before use.
Please see [Supported Versions](/doc/supported-versions/) for information on supported OS versions and consult the guides below for specific upgrade instructions:
* [Upgrading Fedora TemplateVMs](/doc/templates/fedora/#upgrading)
* [Upgrading Debian TemplateVMs](/doc/templates/debian/#upgrading)

10
managing-os/hvm.md
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@ -17,8 +17,14 @@ What are HVM domains?
HVM domains (Hardware VM), in contrast to PV domains (Paravirtualized domains), allow one to create domains based on any OS for which one has an installation ISO. For example, this allows one to have Windows-based VMs in Qubes.
Interested readers might want to check [this article](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2012/03/03/windows-support-coming-to-qubes.html) to learn why it took so long for Qubes OS to support HVM domains (Qubes 1 only supported Linux based PV domains). As of
Qubes 4, every VM is HVM by default ([see here](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2017/07/31/qubes-40-rc1.html)).
Interested readers might want to check
[this article](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2012/03/03/windows-support-coming-to-qubes.html)
to learn why it took so long for Qubes OS to support HVM domains
(Qubes 1 only supported Linux based PV domains). As of
Qubes 4, every VM is PVH by default, except those with attached PCI devices which are HVM.
[See here](https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2017/07/31/qubes-40-rc1.html) for a discussion
of the switch to HVM from R3.2's PV, and [here](/news/2018/01/11/qsb-37/)
for changing the default to PVH.
Creating an HVM domain
----------------------

37
managing-os/templates.md
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@ -45,7 +45,23 @@ By installing these templates, you are trusting not only ITL and the distributio
* [Archlinux](/doc/templates/archlinux/)
Important Notes
Important Notes (R4.0)
---------------
* Whenever a TemplateBasedVM is created, the contents of the `/home`
directory of its parent TemplateVM are *not* copied to the child TemplateBasedVM's
`/home`. The child TemplateBasedVM's `/home`
is always independent from its parent TemplateVM's `/home`, which means that any
subsequent changes to the parent TemplateVM's `/home` will not affect
the child TemplateBasedVM's `/home`.
* Template VMs are created in a thin pool, making `qvm-trim-template`
no longer necessary.
The root filesystems in Standalone VMs can employ
TRIM/discard on the root fs using normal tools and configuration options.
Important Notes (R3.2 and earlier)
---------------
* Whenever a TemplateBasedVM is created, the contents of the `/home`
@ -55,6 +71,16 @@ Important Notes
subsequent changes to the parent TemplateVM's `/home` will no longer affect
the child TemplateBasedVM's `/home`.
* Template VMs can occupy more space on the dom0 filesystem than necessary
because they cannot employ automatic TRIM/discard on the root fs. The
`qvm-trim-template` command in dom0 is used to recover this unused space.
Conversely, the root filesystems in Standalone VMs *can* employ
TRIM/discard on the root fs using normal tools and configuration options.
Important Notes (all versions)
---------------
* Once a TemplateBasedVM has been created, any changes in its `/home`,
`/usr/local`, or `/rw/config` directories will be persistent across reboots,
which means that any files stored there will still be available after
@ -71,19 +97,12 @@ Important Notes
update a template from dom0 (and thereby lose any user modifications in the
existing template), you must first uninstall the existing template from dom0:
$ sudo yum remove qubes-template-fedora-25
$ sudo dnf remove qubes-template-fedora-25
* Standalone VMs using Template VMs as a basis can be created easily. These
VMs receive a *copy* of the operating system and do not get automatically
updated when Template VMs are updated--they must be updated individually.
* Template VMs can occupy more space on the dom0 filesystem than necessary
because they cannot employ automatic TRIM/discard on the root fs. The
`qvm-trim-template` command in dom0 is used to recover this unused space.
Conversely, the root filesystems in Standalone VMs *can* employ
TRIM/discard on the root fs using normal tools and configuration options.
* On XFCE based Dom0, a manual action may be required to remove the "Start Menu"
sub-menu of the removed TemplateVM. For example, to remove a dangling sub-menu
for a removed "fedora-25" template, open a Dom0 Terminal and type:

2
managing-os/templates/debian.md
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@ -114,5 +114,5 @@ More information
* [Debian wiki](https://wiki.debian.org/Qubes)
[stretch]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/template/debian/upgrade-8-to-9/
[stretch]: /doc/template/debian/upgrade-8-to-9/

7
privacy/anonymizing-your-mac-address.md
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@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ privacy](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/design/MAC_address/#index1h1). Curren
Newer versions of Network Manager have a robust set of options for randomizing MAC addresses, and can handle the entire process across reboots, sleep/wake cycles and different connection states. In particular, versions 1.4.2 and later should be well suited for Qubes.
Network Manager 1.4.2 or later is available from the Fedora 25 repository as well as the Debian 9 repository, which you can install by [upgrading a Debian 8 template to version 9.](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/debian-template-upgrade-8/)
Network Manager 1.4.2 or later is available from the Fedora 25 repository as well as the Debian 9 repository, which you can install by [upgrading a Debian 8 template to version 9.](/doc/debian-template-upgrade-8/)
In the Debian 9 or Fedora 25 template you intend to use as a NetVM, check that Network Manager version is now at least 1.4.2:
@ -34,10 +34,11 @@ wifi.scan-rand-mac-address=yes
[connection]
wifi.cloned-mac-address=stable
ethernet.cloned-mac-address=stable
connection.stable-id=${CONNECTION}/${BOOT}
~~~
`stable` generates a random address that persists for each boot session.
`random` generates a random address each time a link goes up.
* `stable` in combination with `${CONNECTION}/${BOOT}` generates a random address that persists until reboot.
* `random` generates a random address each time a link goes up.
To see all the available configuration options, refer to the man page: `man nm-settings`

1
privacy/signal.md
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@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ Always obtain a trusted key fingerprint via other channels, and always check any
6. Create an AppVM based on this TemplateVM
7. With your mouse select the `Q` menu -> `Domain: "AppVM Name"` -> `"AppVM Name": Add more shortcuts`
(or `"AppVM Name": VM Settings` -> `Applications`).
Select `Signal` from the left `Available` column, move it to the right `Selected` column by clicking the `>` button and then `OK` to apply the changes and close the window.
-----

4
privacy/tails.md
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@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Despite this, in case that method becomes cumbersome, Tails can be used inside v
To run Tails under Qubes:
1. Read about [creating and using HVM qubes](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/hvm/)
1. Read about [creating and using HVM qubes](/doc/hvm/)
2. Download and verify Tails from [https://tails.boum.org](https://tails.boum.org) in a qube, (saved as `/home/user/Downloads/tails.iso` on qube "isoVM" for purposes of this guide).
@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ The Tails qube will not shut down cleanly.
Kill it from the GUI Manager or ```qvm-kill Tails``` in Konsole.
### Security
You will probably want to implement [MAC spoofing](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/anonymizing-your-mac-address/).
You will probably want to implement [MAC spoofing](/doc/anonymizing-your-mac-address/).
There are added security concerns for Tails users when running it in a virtual machine.
If you intend to do this, you should read [the warnings](https://tails.boum.org/doc/advanced_topics/virtualization/) from the Tails team about it.

8
privacy/torvm.md
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@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Qubes TorVM (qubes-tor)
Qubes TorVM is a deprecated ProxyVM service that provides torified networking to
all its clients. **If you are interested in TorVM, you will find the
[Whonix implementation in Qubes](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/privacy/whonix/) a
[Whonix implementation in Qubes](/doc/privacy/whonix/) a
more usable and robust solution for creating a torifying traffic proxy.**
By default, any AppVM using the TorVM as its NetVM will be fully torified, so
@ -273,9 +273,9 @@ transparent torified solutions. Notably the following:
[stream-isolation]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/HEAD:/proposals/171-separate-streams.txt
[stream-isolation-explained]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-May/024403.html
[tor-threats]: https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#adversary
[qubes-net]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/QubesNet/
[qubes-net]: /doc/QubesNet/
[dns]: https://tails.boum.org/todo/support_arbitrary_dns_queries/
[tor-browser]: https://www.torproject.org/download/download-easy.html
[tor-verify-sig]: https://www.torproject.org/docs/verifying-signatures.html
[dispvm]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/DisposableVms/
[dispvm-customization]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/UserDoc/DispVMCustomization/
[dispvm]: /doc/DisposableVms/
[dispvm-customization]: /doc/UserDoc/DispVMCustomization/

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@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ a **"workstation"**. Qubes security architecture makes use of Whonix's isolation
by using the gateway as a ProxyVM to route all network traffic through Tor,
while the workstation is used for making AppVMs.
Whonix in Qubes replaces the deprecated [TorVM](/doc/torvm) service used in earlier
versions of Qubes.
## Getting Started with Whonix
* Note: To install Whonix in Qubes, you must already have a working Qubes machine.
* [Installing Whonix in Qubes](/doc/whonix/install/)

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@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
---
layout: doc
title: Dom0 Tools
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/
redirect_from:
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/
- /doc/DomZeroTools/
- /wiki/DomZeroTools/
---
QVM-tools:
- [qubes-dom0-update](/doc/dom0-tools/qubes-dom0-update/)
- [qubes-prefs](/doc/dom0-tools/qubes-prefs/)
- [qvm-add-appvm](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-add-appvm/)
- [qvm-add-template](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-add-template/)
- [qvm-backup-restore](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-backup-restore/)
- [qvm-backup](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-backup/)
- [qvm-block](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-block/)
- [qvm-clone](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-clone/)
- [qvm-create-default-dvm](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-create-default-dvm/)
- [qvm-create](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-create/)
- [qvm-firewall](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-firewall/)
- [qvm-grow-private](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-grow-private/)
- [qvm-ls](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-ls/)
- [qvm-kill](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-kill/)
- [qvm-pci](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-pci/)
- [qvm-prefs](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-prefs/)
- [qvm-remove](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-remove/)
- [qvm-revert-template-changes](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-revert-template-changes/)
- [qvm-run](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-run/)
- [qvm-service](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-service/)
- [qvm-shutdown](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-shutdown/)
- [qvm-start](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-start/)
- [qvm-sync-appmenus](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-sync-appmenus/)
- [qvm-template-commit](/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-template-commit/)

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@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ The main principle of Qubes OS is security by compartmentalization (or isolation
VM
--
An abbreviation for "virtual machine."
A software implementation of a machine (for example, a computer) which executes programs like a physical machine.
A software implementation of a machine (for example, a computer) that executes programs like a physical machine.
Qube
----
@ -62,34 +62,38 @@ By default, most domUs lack direct hardware access.
TemplateVM
----------
Template Virtual Machine.
Any [VM](#vm) which supplies its root filesystem to another VM.
Any [VM](#vm) that supplies its root filesystem to another VM.
TemplateVMs are intended for installing and updating software applications, but not for running them.
* Colloquially, TemplateVMs are often referred to as "templates."
* Since every TemplateVM supplies its *own* root filesystem to at least one other VM, no TemplateVM can be based on another TemplateVM.
In other words, no TemplateVM is a [TemplateBasedVM](#templatebasedvm).
* Since every TemplateVM supplies its *root* filesystem to at least one other VM, no [DVM Template](#dvm-template) is a TemplateVM.
TemplateBasedVM
---------------
Any [VM](#vm) which depends on a [TemplateVM](#templatevm) for its root filesystem.
Any [VM](#vm) that depends on a [TemplateVM](#templatevm) for its root filesystem.
Standalone(VM)
--------------
Standalone (Virtual Machine).
In general terms, a [VM](#vm) is described as **standalone** if and only if it does not depend on any other VM for its root filesystem.
(In other words, a VM is standalone if and only if it is not a TemplateBasedVM.)
More specifically, a **StandaloneVM** is a type of VM in Qubes which is created by cloning a TemplateVM.
More specifically, a **StandaloneVM** is a type of VM in Qubes that is created by cloning a TemplateVM.
Unlike TemplateVMs, however, StandaloneVMs do not supply their root filesystems to other VMs.
(Therefore, while a TemplateVM is a type of standalone VM, it is not a StandaloneVM.)
AppVM
-----
Application Virtual Machine.
A [VM](#vm) which is intended for running software applications.
A [VM](#vm) that is intended for running software applications.
Typically a TemplateBasedVM, but may be a StandaloneVM. Never a TemplateVM.
NetVM
-----
Network Virtual Machine.
A type of [VM](#vm) which connects directly to a network and provides access to that network to other VMs which connect to the NetVM.
A type of [VM](#vm) that connects directly to a network.
Other VMs gain access to a network by connecting to a NetVM (usually indirectly, via a [FirewallVM](#firewallvm)).
A NetVM called `sys-net` is created by default in most Qubes installations.
Alternatively, "NetVM" may refer to whichever VM is directly connected to a VM for networking purposes.
@ -98,18 +102,18 @@ For example, if `untrusted` is directly connected to `sys-firewall` for network
ProxyVM
-------
Proxy Virtual Machine.
A type of [VM](#vm) which proxies network access for other VMs.
Typically, a ProxyVM sits between a NetVM and another VM (such as an AppVM or a TemplateVM) which requires network access.
A type of [VM](#vm) that proxies network access for other VMs.
Typically, a ProxyVM sits between a NetVM and another VM (such as an AppVM or a TemplateVM) that requires network access.
FirewallVM
----------
Firewall Virtual Machine.
A type of [ProxyVM](#proxyvm) which is used to enforce network-level policies (a.k.a. "firewall rules").
A type of [ProxyVM](#proxyvm) that is used to enforce network-level policies (a.k.a. "firewall rules").
A FirewallVM called `sys-firewall` is created by default in most Qubes installations.
DispVM
------
[Disposable Virtual Machine]. A temporary [AppVM](#appvm) based on a [DVM Template](#dvm-template) which can quickly be created, used, and destroyed.
[Disposable Virtual Machine]. A temporary [AppVM](#appvm) based on a [DVM Template](#dvm-template) that can quickly be created, used, and destroyed.
DVM
---
@ -117,12 +121,18 @@ An abbreviation of [DispVM](#dispvm), typically used to refer to [DVM Templates]
DVM Template
------------
TemplateBasedVMs on which [DispVMs](#dispvm) are based.
A type of [TemplateBasedVM](#templatebasedvm) on which [DispVMs](#dispvm) are based.
By default, a DVM Template named `fedora-XX-dvm` is created on most Qubes installations (where `XX` is the Fedora version of the default TemplateVM).
DVM Templates are neither [TemplateVMs](#templatevm) nor [AppVMs](#appvm).
They are intended neither for installing nor running software.
Rather, they are intended for *customizing* or *configuring* software that has already been installed on the TemplateVM on which the DVM Template is based (see [DispVM Customization]).
This software is then intended to be run (in its customized state) in DispVMs that are based on the DVM Template.
DVM Templates are not [TemplateVMs](#templatevm), since (being TemplateBasedVMs) they do not have root filesystems of their own to provide to other VMs.
Rather, DVM Templates are complementary to TemplateVMs insofar as DVM Templates provide their own user filesystems to the DispVMs based on them.
There are two main kinds of DVM Templates:
* **Dedicated** DVM Templates are intended neither for installing nor running software.
Rather, they are intended for *customizing* or *configuring* software that has already been installed on the TemplateVM on which the DVM Template is based (see [DispVM Customization]).
This software is then intended to be run (in its customized state) in DispVMs that are based on the DVM Template.
* **Non-dedicated** DVM Templates are typically [AppVMs](#appvm) on which DispVMs are based.
For example, an AppVM could be used to generate and store trusted data.
Then, a DispVM could be created based on the AppVM (thereby making the AppVM a DVM Template) so that the data can be analyzed by an untrusted program without jeopardizing the integrity of the original data.
PV
--
@ -139,12 +149,12 @@ Although HVMs are typically slower than paravirtualized VMs due to the required
StandaloneHVM
-------------
Any [HVM](#hvm) which is standalone (i.e., does not depend on any other VM for its root filesystem).
Any [HVM](#hvm) that is standalone (i.e., does not depend on any other VM for its root filesystem).
In Qubes, StandaloneHVMs are referred to simply as **HVMs**.
TemplateHVM
-----------
Any [HVM](#hvm) which functions as a [TemplateVM](#templatevm) by supplying its root filesystem to other VMs.
Any [HVM](#hvm) that functions as a [TemplateVM](#templatevm) by supplying its root filesystem to other VMs.
In Qubes, TemplateHVMs are referred to as **HVM templates**.
TemplateBasedHVM
@ -157,6 +167,12 @@ Service Virtual Machine.
A [VM](#vm) the primary purpose of which is to provide a service or services to other VMs.
NetVMs and ProxyVMs are examples of ServiceVMs.
SystemVM
--------
System Virtual Machine.
A synonym for [ServiceVM](#servicevm).
SystemVMs usually have the prefix `sys-`.
PVHVM
-----
[PV](#pv) on [HVM](#hvm).

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@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
---
layout: doc
title: Command-Line Tools
permalink: /doc/tools/
---
Command-Line Tools
==================
Please see the page for your version of Qubes OS:
* [Qubes 4.0 Command-Line Tools](/doc/tools/4.0)
* [Qubes 3.2 Command-Line Tools](/doc/tools/3.2)

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---
layout: doc
title: Dom0 Command-Line Tools for Qubes 3.2
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/
redirect_from:
- /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/
- /en/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/
- /doc/DomZeroTools/
- /wiki/DomZeroTools/
---
Dom0 Command-Line Tools for Qubes 3.2
=====================================
* [qubes-dom0-update](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qubes-dom0-update/)
* [qubes-prefs](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qubes-prefs/)
* [qvm-add-appvm](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-add-appvm/)
* [qvm-add-template](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-add-template/)
* [qvm-backup-restore](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-backup-restore/)
* [qvm-backup](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-backup/)
* [qvm-block](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-block/)
* [qvm-clone](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-clone/)
* [qvm-create-default-dvm](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-create-default-dvm/)
* [qvm-create](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-create/)
* [qvm-firewall](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-firewall/)
* [qvm-grow-private](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-grow-private/)
* [qvm-ls](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-ls/)
* [qvm-kill](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-kill/)
* [qvm-pci](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-pci/)
* [qvm-prefs](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-prefs/)
* [qvm-remove](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-remove/)
* [qvm-revert-template-changes](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-revert-template-changes/)
* [qvm-run](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-run/)
* [qvm-service](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-service/)
* [qvm-shutdown](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-shutdown/)
* [qvm-start](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-start/)
* [qvm-sync-appmenus](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-sync-appmenus/)
* [qvm-template-commit](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-template-commit/)

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---
layout: doc
title: qubes-dom0-update
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qubes-dom0-update/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qubes-dom0-update/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qubes-dom0-update/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qubes-dom0-update/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QubesDom0Update/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QubesDom0Update/

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title: qubes-prefs
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qubes-prefs/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qubes-prefs/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qubes-prefs/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qubes-prefs/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QubesPrefs/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QubesPrefs/

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title: qvm-add-appvm
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-add-appvm/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-add-appvm/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-add-appvm/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-add-appvm/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmAddAppvm/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmAddAppvm/

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title: qvm-add-template
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-add-template/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-add-template/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-add-template/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-add-template/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmAddTemplate/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmAddTemplate/

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title: qvm-backup-restore
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-backup-restore/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-backup-restore/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-backup-restore/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-backup-restore/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmBackupRestore/
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title: qvm-backup
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-backup/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-backup/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-backup/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-backup/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmBackup/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmBackup/

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title: qvm-block
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-block/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-block/
redirect_from:
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- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-block/
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title: qvm-clone
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-clone/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-clone/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-clone/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-clone/
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- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmClone/

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title: qvm-create-default-dvm
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-create-default-dvm/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-create-default-dvm/
redirect_from:
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permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-create/
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permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-firewall/
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permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-grow-private/
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permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-kill/
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---
layout: doc
title: qvm-shutdown
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-shutdown/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-shutdown/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-shutdown/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-shutdown/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmShutdown/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmShutdown/

3
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@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
---
layout: doc
title: qvm-start
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-start/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-start/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-start/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-start/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmStart/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmStart/

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@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
---
layout: doc
title: qvm-sync-appmenus
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-sync-appmenus/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-sync-appmenus/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-sync-appmenus/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-sync-appmenus/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmSyncAppmenus/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmSyncAppmenus/

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@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
---
layout: doc
title: qvm-template-commit
permalink: /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-template-commit/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/dom0/qvm-template-commit/
redirect_from:
- /doc/dom0-tools/qvm-template-commit/
- /en/doc/dom0-tools/qvm-template-commit/
- /doc/Dom0Tools/QvmTemplateCommit/
- /wiki/Dom0Tools/QvmTemplateCommit/

19
reference/tools/3.2/domU.md Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
---
layout: doc
title: DomU Command-Line Tools for Qubes 3.2
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/domU/
redirect_from:
- /doc/tools/3.2/domU/
- /en/doc/tools/3.2/domU/
- /doc/VmTools/
- /wiki/VmTools/
---
DomU Command-Line Tools for Qubes 3.2
=====================================
* [qvm-copy-to-vm](/doc/tools/3.2/domU/qvm-copy-to-vm/)
* [qvm-open-in-dvm](/doc/tools/3.2/domU/qvm-open-in-dvm/)
* [qvm-open-in-vm](/doc/tools/3.2/domU/qvm-open-in-vm/)
* [qvm-run](/doc/tools/3.2/domU/qvm-run/)

3
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@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
---
layout: doc
title: qvm-copy-to-vm
permalink: /doc/vm-tools/qvm-copy-to-vm/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/domU/qvm-copy-to-vm/
redirect_from:
- /doc/vm-tools/qvm-copy-to-vm/
- /en/doc/vm-tools/qvm-copy-to-vm/
- /doc/VmTools/QvmCopyToVm/
- /wiki/VmTools/QvmCopyToVm/

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@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
---
layout: doc
title: qvm-open-in-dvm
permalink: /doc/vm-tools/qvm-open-in-dvm/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/domU/qvm-open-in-dvm/
redirect_from:
- /doc/vm-tools/qvm-open-in-dvm/
- /en/doc/vm-tools/qvm-open-in-dvm/
- /doc/VmTools/QvmOpenInDvm/
- /wiki/VmTools/QvmOpenInDvm/

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@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
---
layout: doc
title: qvm-open-in-vm
permalink: /doc/vm-tools/qvm-open-in-vm/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/domU/qvm-open-in-vm/
redirect_from:
- /doc/vm-tools/qvm-open-in-vm/
- /en/doc/vm-tools/qvm-open-in-vm/
- /doc/VmTools/QvmOpenInVm/
- /wiki/VmTools/QvmOpenInVm/

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---
layout: doc
title: qvm-run
permalink: /doc/vm-tools/qvm-run/
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/domU/qvm-run/
redirect_from:
- /doc/vm-tools/qvm-run/
- /en/doc/vm-tools/qvm-run/
- /doc/VmTools/QvmRun/
- /wiki/VmTools/QvmRun/

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@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
---
layout: doc
title: Dom0 Command-Line Tools for Qubes 4.0
permalink: /doc/tools/4.0/dom0/
---
Dom0 Command-Line Tools for Qubes 4.0
=====================================
Reference pages for these tools are being written.
This page will be updated when they're available.
Tracking issue: <https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3538>

14
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@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
---
layout: doc
title: DomU Command-Line Tools for Qubes 4.0
permalink: /doc/tools/4.0/domU/
---
DomU Command-Line Tools for Qubes 4.0
=====================================
Reference pages for these tools are being written.
This page will be updated when they're available.
Tracking issue: <https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3538>

13
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@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
---
layout: doc
title: Qubes 3.2 Command-Line Tools
permalink: /doc/tools/3.2/
---
Qubes 3.2 Command-Line Tools
============================
Please see the page for your desired domain:
* [Dom0 Command-Line Tools](/doc/tools/3.2/dom0/)
* [DomU Command-Line Tools](/doc/tools/3.2/domU/)

13
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@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
---
layout: doc
title: Qubes 4.0 Command-Line Tools
permalink: /doc/tools/4.0/
---
Qubes 4.0 Command-Line Tools
============================
Please see the page for your desired domain:
* [Dom0 Command-Line Tools](/doc/tools/4.0/dom0/)
* [DomU Command-Line Tools](/doc/tools/4.0/domU/)

17
reference/vm-tools.md
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@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
---
layout: doc
title: VM Tools
permalink: /doc/vm-tools/
redirect_from:
- /en/doc/vm-tools/
- /doc/VmTools/
- /wiki/VmTools/
---
VM tools:
- [qvm-copy-to-vm](/doc/vm-tools/qvm-copy-to-vm/)
- [qvm-open-in-dvm](/doc/vm-tools/qvm-open-in-dvm/)
- [qvm-open-in-vm](/doc/vm-tools/qvm-open-in-vm/)
- [qvm-run](/doc/vm-tools/qvm-run/)

4
releases/3.2/release-notes.md
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@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ You can get detailed description in [completed github issues][github-release-not
Known issues
------------
* [Fedora 23 reached EOL in December 2016](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/End_of_life). There is a [manual procedure to upgrade your VMs](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2016/11/15/fedora-24-template-available/).
* [Fedora 23 reached EOL in December 2016](https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/End_of_life). There is a [manual procedure to upgrade your VMs](/news/2016/11/15/fedora-24-template-available/).
* Windows Tools: `qvm-block` does not work
@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Installation instructions
-------------------------
See [Installation Guide](/doc/installation-guide/).
After installation, [manually upgrade to Fedora 24](https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2016/11/15/fedora-24-template-available/).
After installation, [manually upgrade to Fedora 24](/news/2016/11/15/fedora-24-template-available/).
Upgrading
---------

2
releases/4.0/release-notes.md
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@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ Upgrading
There is no in-place upgrade path from earlier Qubes versions. The only
supported option to upgrade to Qubes R4.0 is to install it from scratch and use
[qubes backup and restore tools][backup] for migrating of all of the user VMs.
We also provide [detailed instruction][upgrade-to-r4.0] for this procedure.
[backup]: /doc/backup-restore/
@ -77,3 +78,4 @@ supported option to upgrade to Qubes R4.0 is to install it from scratch and use
[qsb-24]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-024-2016.txt
[backup-format]: /doc/backup-emergency-restore-v4/
[api-doc]: https://dev.qubes-os.org/projects/qubes-core-admin/en/latest/
[upgrade-to-r4.0]: /doc/upgrade-to-r4.0/

2
releases/4.0/schedule.md
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@ -21,5 +21,5 @@ This schedule is based on [Version Scheme](/doc/version-scheme/#release-schedule
| 27 Nov 2017 | 4.0-rc3 release |
| 11 Dec 2017 | decide whether 4.0-rc3 is the final 4.0 |
| 1 Jan 2018 | current-testing freeze before 4.0-rc4 |
| <strike>8 Jan 2018</strike><br/>TBD | 4.0-rc4 release |
| <strike>8 Jan 2018</strike><br/>31 Jan 2018 | 4.0-rc4 release |
| <strike>22 Jan 2018</strike><br/>TBD | decide whether 4.0-rc4 is the final 4.0 |

53
security-info/security.md
View File

@ -17,38 +17,53 @@ redirect_from:
Qubes OS Project Security Center
================================
- [Security FAQ](/faq/#general--security)
- [Security Goals](/security/goals/)
- [Security Pack](/security/pack/)
- [Security Bulletins](/security/bulletins/)
- [Canaries](/security/canaries/)
- [Xen Security Advisory (XSA) Tracker](/security/xsa/)
- [Why and How to Verify Signatures](/security/verifying-signatures/)
- [PGP Keys](https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/)
- [Security FAQ]
- [Security Goals]
- [Security Pack]
- [Security Bulletins]
- [Canaries]
- [Xen Security Advisory (XSA) Tracker]
- [Why and How to Verify Signatures]
- [PGP Keys]
Reporting Security Issues in Qubes OS
-------------------------------------
If you believe you have found a security issue affecting Qubes OS, either directly or indirectly (e.g. the issue affects Xen in a configuration that is used in Qubes OS), then we would be more than happy to hear from you!
We promise to treat any reported issue seriously and, if the investigation confirms that it affects Qubes, to patch it within a reasonable time and release a public [Qubes Security Bulletin][Security Bulletins] that describes the issue, discusses the potential impact of the vulnerability, references applicable patches or workarounds, and credits the discoverer.
We promise to treat any reported issue seriously and, if the investigation confirms it affects Qubes, to patch it within a reasonable time, release a public Security Bulletin that describes the issue, discuss potential impact of the vulnerability, reference applicable patches or workarounds, and credit the discoverer.
The list of all Qubes Security Advisories published so far can be found [here](/security/bulletins/).
The Qubes Security Team
-----------------------
The Qubes Security Team can be contacted via email using the following address:
The Qubes Security Team can be contacted via email at the following address:
~~~
security at qubes-os dot org
~~~
security at qubes-os dot org
### Qubes Security Team GPG Key ###
Please use [this GPG key](https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-os-security-team-key.asc) to encrypt any emails sent to this address. Like all GPG keys used by the Qubes project, this key is signed by the Qubes Master key. Please see [this page](/security/verifying-signatures/) for more information on how to verify the keys.
### Security Team PGP Key ###
Please use the [Security Team PGP Key] to encrypt all emails sent to this address.
This key is signed by the [Qubes Master Signing Key].
Please see [Why and How to Verify Signatures] for information about how to verify these keys.
### Members of the Security Team ###
- Joanna Rutkowska \<joanna at invisiblethingslab dot com\>
- Marek Marczykowski \<marmarek at invisiblethingslab dot com\>
- [Joanna Rutkowska]
- [Marek Marczykowski-Górecki]
[Security FAQ]: /faq/#general--security
[Security Goals]: /security/goals/
[Security Pack]: /security/pack/
[Security Bulletins]: /security/bulletins/
[Canaries]: /security/canaries/
[Xen Security Advisory (XSA) Tracker]: /security/xsa/
[Why and How to Verify Signatures]: /security/verifying-signatures/
[PGP Keys]: https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/
[Security Team PGP Key]: https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-os-security-team-key.asc
[Qubes Master Signing Key]: https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
[Joanna Rutkowska]: /team/#joanna-rutkowska
[Marek Marczykowski-Górecki]: /team/#marek-marczykowski-górecki

45
security/firewall.md
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@ -32,6 +32,11 @@ Manager and press the "firewall" button:
![r2b1-manager-firewall.png](/attachment/wiki/QubesFirewall/r2b1-manager-firewall.png)
*R4.0 note:* ICMP and DNS are no longer accessible in the GUI, but can be changed
via `qvm-firewall` described below. Connections to Updates Proxy are no longer made
over network so can not be allowed or blocked with firewall rules
(see [R4.0 Updates proxy](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/software-update-vm/) for more detail.
Note that if you specify a rule by DNS name it will be resolved to IP(s)
*at the moment of applying the rules*, and not on the fly for each new
connection. This means it will not work for servers using load balancing. More
@ -48,11 +53,33 @@ This equates to somewhere between 35 and 39 rules.
If this limit is exceeded, the qube will not start.
It is possible to work around this limit by enforcing the rules on the qube itself
by putting appropriate rules in `/rw/config`. See [below](#where-to-put-firewall-rules).
by putting appropriate rules in `/rw/config`.
See the "Where to put firewall rules" sections below for [R4.0](#where-to-put-firewall-rules-r40) and [R3.2](#where-to-put-firewall-rules-r32).
In complex cases, it might be appropriate to load a ruleset using `iptables-restore`
called from `/rw/config/rc.local`.
Reconnecting VMs after a NetVM reboot
Reconnecting VMs after a NetVM reboot (R4.0)
----------------------------------------
Normally Qubes doesn't let the user stop a NetVM if there are other qubes
running which use it as their own NetVM. But in case the NetVM stops for
whatever reason (e.g. it crashes, or the user forces its shutdown via qvm-kill
via terminal in Dom0), Qubes R4.0 will often automatically repair the
connection. If it does not, then there is an easy way to restore the connection to
the NetVM by issuing:
` qvm-prefs <vm> netvm <netvm> `
Normally qubes do not connect directly to the actual NetVM which has networking
devices, but rather to the default sys-firewall first, and in most cases it would
be the NetVM that will crash, e.g. in response to S3 sleep/restore or other
issues with WiFi drivers. In that case it is only necessary to issue the above
command once, for the sys-firewall (this assumes default VM-naming used by the
default Qubes installation):
` qvm-prefs sys-firewall netvm sys-net `
Reconnecting VMs after a NetVM reboot (R3.2)
----------------------------------------
Normally Qubes doesn't let the user stop a NetVM if there are other qubes
@ -70,7 +97,7 @@ issues with WiFi drivers. In that case it is only necessary to issue the above
command once, for the sys-firewall (this assumes default VM-naming used by the
default Qubes installation):
` qvm-prefs sys-firewall -s netvm netvm `
` qvm-prefs sys-firewall -s netvm sys-net `
Enabling networking between two qubes
--------------------------------------
@ -344,7 +371,17 @@ fi
This time testing should allow connectivity to the service as long as the
service is up :-)
Where to put firewall rules
Where to put firewall rules (R4.0)
---------------------------
Implicit in the above example [scripts](/doc/config-files/), but worth
calling attention to: for all qubes *except* AppVMs supplying networking,
iptables commands should be added to the `/rw/config/rc.local` script. For
AppVMs supplying networking (`sys-firewall` inclusive),
iptables commands should be added to
`/rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script`.
Where to put firewall rules (R3.2)
---------------------------
Implicit in the above example [scripts](/doc/config-files/), but worth

12
security/multifactor-authentication.md
View File

@ -67,24 +67,24 @@ Optional Preparation Steps
[minimal Fedora template][FedoraMinimal]. Get it if you haven't already done
so:
[user@dom0 ~]$ sudo qubes-dom0-update qubes-template-fedora-25-minimal
[user@dom0 ~]$ sudo qubes-dom0-update qubes-template-fedora-26-minimal
2. Since we'll be making some modifications, you may want to clone the minimal
template:
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-clone fedora-25-minimal fedora-25-min-mfa
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-clone fedora-26-minimal fedora-26-min-mfa
3. Since this is going to be a minimal environment in which we run `oathtool`
from the command line, we'll install only a couple of packages:
[user@fedora-25-min-mfa ~]$ su -
[user@fedora-25-min-mfa ~]# yum install oathtool vim-minimal
[user@fedora-25-min-mfa ~]$ poweroff
[user@fedora-26-min-mfa ~]$ su -
[user@fedora-26-min-mfa ~]# dnf install oathtool vim-minimal
[user@fedora-26-min-mfa ~]$ poweroff
4. Create an AppVM and set it to use the TemplateVM we just created:
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-create -l black mfa
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-prefs -s mfa template fedora-25-min-mfa
[user@dom0 ~]$ qvm-prefs -s mfa template fedora-26-min-mfa
5. Isolate the new AppVM from the network:

17
security/security-guidelines.md
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@ -27,12 +27,12 @@ While your connection to the Qubes website and download mirrors is encrypted, me
Signature verification allows us to validate for ourselves that these files were the ones authored and signed by their creators (in this case the Qubes development team).
Because it's so easy for a hacker who manages to tamper with the downloaded iso files this way to patch in malware, it is of the utmost importance that you **verify the signature of the Qubes iso** you use to install Qubes.
See the page on [Verifying Signatures](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/) for more information and a tutorial on how to accomplish this.
See the page on [Verifying Signatures](/security/verifying-signatures/) for more information and a tutorial on how to accomplish this.
Once you have Qubes installed, the standard program installation command for Fedora and Qubes repositories
~~~
sudo yum install <program>
sudo dnf install <program>
~~~
automatically accomplishes this verification.
@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ qubes-hcl-report <userVM>
where \<userVM\> is the name of the VM within which the report will be written (but the report will also be displayed in the Dom0 terminal). If it displays that VT-d is active, you should be able to assign **PCIe devices to an HVM** and **enjoy DMA protection** for your driver domains, so you successfully passed this step.
If VT-d is not active, attempt to activate it by selecting the **VT-d flag** within the BIOS settings. If your processor/BIOS does not allow VT-d activation you still enjoy much better security than alternative systems, but you may be vulnerable to **DMA attacks**. Next time you buy a computer consult our **[HCL (Hardware Compatibility List)](https://www.qubes-os.org/hcl/)** and possibly contribute to it.
If VT-d is not active, attempt to activate it by selecting the **VT-d flag** within the BIOS settings. If your processor/BIOS does not allow VT-d activation you still enjoy much better security than alternative systems, but you may be vulnerable to **DMA attacks**. Next time you buy a computer consult our **[HCL (Hardware Compatibility List)](/hcl/)** and possibly contribute to it.
Updating Software
-----------------
@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ sudo qubes-dom0-update
and run in templates and standalone VM
~~~
sudo yum update
sudo dnf update
~~~
or use the equivalent items in Qubes Manager, which displays an icon when an update is available.
@ -154,12 +154,6 @@ As explained [here](/getting-started/#appvms-qubes-and-templatevms), dom0 should
TemplateBasedVM Directories
---------------------------
* Whenever a TemplateBasedVM is created, the contents of its `/home`
directory is copied from its parent TemplateVM. From that point onward, the child TemplateBasedVM's `/home`
is independent from its parent TemplateVM's `/home`, which means that any
subsequent changes to the parent TemplateVM's `/home` will no longer affect
the child TemplateBasedVM's `/home`.
* Once a TemplateBasedVM has been created, any changes in its `/home`,
`/usr/local`, or `/rw/config` directories will be persistent across reboots,
which means that any files stored there will still be available after
@ -167,3 +161,6 @@ TemplateBasedVM Directories
TemplateBasedVMs persist in this manner. If you would like to make changes
in other directories which *do* persist in this manner, you must make those
changes in the parent TemplateVM.
* See [here](/doc/templates) for more detail and version specific information.

4
security/split-gpg.md
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@ -86,11 +86,11 @@ In dom0, make sure the `qubes-gpg-split-dom0` package is installed.
If using templates based on Debian or Whonix, make sure you have the `qubes-gpg-split`
package installed.
[user@debian-8 ~]$ sudo apt-get install qubes-gpg-split
[user@debian-8 ~]$ sudo apt install qubes-gpg-split
For Fedora.
[user@fedora-25 ~]$ sudo yum install qubes-gpg-split
[user@fedora-25 ~]$ sudo dnf install qubes-gpg-split
Start with creating a dedicated AppVM for storing your keys (the GPG backend
domain). It is recommended that this domain be network disconnected (set its

2
security/yubi-key.md
View File

@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ Using YubiKey to Qubes authentication
=====================================
You can use YubiKey to enhance Qubes user authentication, for example to mitigate
risk of snooping the password. This can also slightly improve security when you have [USB keyboard](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/usb/#security-warning-about-usb-input-devices).
risk of snooping the password. This can also slightly improve security when you have [USB keyboard](/doc/usb/#security-warning-about-usb-input-devices).
There (at least) two possible configurations: using OTP mode and using challenge-response mode.

42
system/networking.md
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@ -15,9 +15,9 @@ VM network in Qubes
Overall description
-------------------
In Qubes, the standard Xen networking is used, based on backend driver in the driver domain and frontend drivers in VMs. In order to eliminate layer 2 attacks originating from a compromised VM, routed networking is used instead of the default bridging of `vif` devices. The default *vif-route* script had some deficiencies (requires `eth0` device to be up, and sets some redundant iptables rules), therefore the custom *vif-route-qubes* script is used.
In Qubes, the standard Xen networking is used, based on backend driver in the driver domain and frontend drivers in VMs. In order to eliminate layer 2 attacks originating from a compromised VM, routed networking is used instead of the default bridging of `vif` devices and NAT is applied at each network hop. The default *vif-route* script had some deficiencies (requires `eth0` device to be up, and sets some redundant iptables rules), therefore the custom *vif-route-qubes* script is used.
The IP address of `eth0` interface in AppVM, as well as two IP addresses to be used as nameservers (`DNS1` and `DNS2`), are passed via xenstore to AppVM during its boot (thus, there is no need for DHCP daemon in the network driver domain). `DNS1` and `DNS2` are private addresses; whenever an interface is brought up in the network driver domain, the */usr/lib/qubes/qubes\_setup\_dnat\_to\_ns* script sets up the DNAT iptables rules translating `DNS1` and `DNS2` to the newly learned real dns servers. This way AppVM networking configuration does not need to be changed when configuration in the network driver domain changes (e.g. user switches to a different WLAN). Moreover, in the network driver domain, there is no DNS server either, and consequently there are no ports open to the VMs.
The IP address of `eth0` interface in AppVM, as well as two IP addresses to be used as nameservers (`DNS1` and `DNS2`), are passed via QubesDB to AppVM during its boot (thus, there is no need for DHCP daemon in the network driver domain). `DNS1` and `DNS2` are private addresses; whenever an interface is brought up in the network driver domain, the */usr/lib/qubes/qubes\_setup\_dnat\_to\_ns* script sets up the DNAT iptables rules translating `DNS1` and `DNS2` to the newly learned real dns servers. This way AppVM networking configuration does not need to be changed when configuration in the network driver domain changes (e.g. user switches to a different WLAN). Moreover, in the network driver domain, there is no DNS server either, and consequently there are no ports open to the VMs.
Routing tables examples
-----------------------
@ -32,12 +32,40 @@ Network driver domain routing table is a bit longer:
||
|Destination|Gateway|Genmask|Flags|Metric|Ref|Use|Iface|
|10.2.0.16|0.0.0.0|255.255.255.255|UH|0|0|0|vif4.0|
|10.2.0.7|0.0.0.0|255.255.255.255|UH|0|0|0|vif10.0|
|10.2.0.9|0.0.0.0|255.255.255.255|UH|0|0|0|vif9.0|
|10.2.0.8|0.0.0.0|255.255.255.255|UH|0|0|0|vif8.0|
|10.2.0.12|0.0.0.0|255.255.255.255|UH|0|0|0|vif3.0|
|10.137.0.16|0.0.0.0|255.255.255.255|UH|0|0|0|vif4.0|
|10.137.0.7|0.0.0.0|255.255.255.255|UH|0|0|0|vif10.0|
|10.137.0.9|0.0.0.0|255.255.255.255|UH|0|0|0|vif9.0|
|10.137.0.8|0.0.0.0|255.255.255.255|UH|0|0|0|vif8.0|
|10.137.0.12|0.0.0.0|255.255.255.255|UH|0|0|0|vif3.0|
|192.168.0.0|0.0.0.0|255.255.255.0|U|1|0|0|eth0|
|0.0.0.0|192.168.0.1|0.0.0.0|UG|0|0|0|eth0|
IPv6
----
Starting with Qubes 4.0, there is opt-in support for IPv6 forwarding. Similar to the IPv4, traffic is routed and NAT is applied at each network gateway. This way we avoid reconfiguring every connected qube whenever uplink connection is changed, and even telling the qube what that uplink is - which may be complex when VPN or other tunneling services are employed.
The feature can be enabled on any network-providing qube, and will be propagated down the network tree, so every qube connected to it will also have IPv6 enabled.
To enable the `ipv6` feature use `qvm-features` tool and set the value to `1`. For example to enable it on `sys-net`, execute in dom0:
qvm-features sys-net ipv6 1
It is also possible to explicitly disable IPv6 support for some qubes, even if it is connected to IPv6-providing one. This can be done by setting `ipv6` feature to empty value:
qvm-features ipv4-only-qube ipv6 ''
This configuration is presented below - green qubes have IPv6 access, red one does not.
![ipv6-1](/attachment/wiki/IPv6/ipv6-1.png)
In that case, system uplink connection have native IPv6. But in some cases it may not be true. Then some tunneling solution can be used (for example teredo). The same will apply when the user is connected to VPN service providing IPv6 support, regardless of user's internet connection.
Such configuration can be expressed by enabling `ipv6` feature only on some subset of Qubes networking, for example by creating separate qube to encapsulate IPv6 traffic and setting `ipv6` to `1` only there. See diagram below
![ipv6-2](/attachment/wiki/IPv6/ipv6-2.png)
Besides enabling IPv6 forwarding, standard Qubes firewall can be used to limit what network resources are available to each qube. Currently only `qvm-firewall` command support adding IPv6 rules, GUI firewall editor will have this ability later.
### Limitations ###
Currently only IPv4 DNS servers are configured, regardless of `ipv6` feature state. It is done this way to avoid reconfiguring all connected qubes whenever IPv6 DNS becomes available or not. Configuring qubes to always use IPv6 DNS and only fallback to IPv4 may result in relatively long timeouts and poor usability.
But note that DNS using IPv4 does not prevent to return IPv6 addresses. In practice this is only a problem for IPv6-only networks.

2
troubleshooting/install-nvidia-driver.md
View File

@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ Support for newer cards is limited until AMDGPU support in the 4.5+ kernel, whic
Built in Intel graphics, Radeon graphics (between that 4000-9000 range), and perhaps some prebaked NVIDIA card support that i don't know about. Those are your best bet for great Qubes support.
If you do happen to get proprietary drivers working on your Qubes system (via installing them). Please take the time to go to the
[Hardware Compatibility List (HCL)](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/hcl/#generating-and-submitting-new-reports )
[Hardware Compatibility List (HCL)](/doc/hcl/#generating-and-submitting-new-reports )
Add your computer, graphics card, and installation steps you did to get everything working.
## RpmFusion packages

2
troubleshooting/macbook-troubleshooting.md
View File

@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ Please see [this thread o the qubes-devel mailing list][macbook-air-2012-5-1].
[1]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/794
[2]: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1261
[3]: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/assigning-devices/
[3]: /doc/assigning-devices/
[bluetooth-replacement]: https://www.ifixit.com/Guide/MacBook+Air+13-Inch+Mid+2011+AirPort-Bluetooth+Card+Replacement/6360
[macbook-air-2012-5-1]: https://groups.google.com/d/topic/qubes-devel/uLDYGdKk_Dk/discussion

17
troubleshooting/uefi-troubleshooting.md
View File

@ -7,6 +7,23 @@ permalink: /doc/uefi-troubleshooting/
Troubleshooting UEFI related problems
========================================
Change installer kernel parameters in UEFI
---------------------
If you've installed successfully in legacy mode but had to change some kernel parameters for it to work, you should try installing in UEFI mode with the same parameters.
**Change the xen configuration on a USB media**
01. Attach the usb disk, mount the EFI partition (second partition available on the disk)
02. Edit your xen config (`xen.cfg/BOOTX64.cfg`) changing the `kernel` key to add your kernel parameters on the boot entry of your choice
03. Install using your modified boot entry
**Change xen configuration directly in an iso image**
01. Get EFI partition boundaries `parted Qubes-R4.0-rc4-x86_64.iso unit B print`
02. Using the start address and the size of the EFI partition, setup a loop device for it `sudo losetup -o 524288 --sizelimit 30562304 /dev/loop0 Qubes-R4.0-rc4-x86_64.iso`
03. Mount the loop device `sudo mount /dev/loop0 /mnt`
04. Edit `EFI/BOOT/BOOTX64.cfg` to add your params to the `kernel` configuration key
05. Save your changes, unmount and dd to usb device
Cannot start installation, installation completes successfully but then BIOS loops at boot device selection, hangs at four penguins after choosing "Test media and install Qubes OS" in GRUB menu
---------------------