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fix typos

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William Robinet 2016-02-21 19:07:55 +01:00
parent 61ced3aa60
commit 7347b38834
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common-tasks/backup-restore.md
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@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ redirect_from:
Qubes Backup, Restoration, and Migration
========================================
**Caution:** The Qubes backup system currently relies on a [weak key derivation scheme](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/971). It is *strongly recommended* that users select a *high-entropy* passphrase for use with with Qubes backups.
**Caution:** The Qubes backup system currently relies on a [weak key derivation scheme](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/971). It is *strongly recommended* that users select a *high-entropy* passphrase for use with Qubes backups.
* [Creating a Backup](#creating-a-backup)
* [Restoring from a Backup](#restoring-from-a-backup)

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common-tasks/software-update-vm.md
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@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ As long as template's compromise is considered, it doesn't really matter whether
- But why trusting Fedora?
Because we chose to use Fedora as a vendor for the Qubes OS foundation (e.g. for Dom0 packages and for AppVM packages). We also chose to trust several other vendors, such as Xen.org, kernel.org, and a few others whose software we use in Dom0. We had to trust *somebody* as we are unable to write all the software from scratch ourselves. But there is a big difference in trusting all Fedora packages to be non-malicious (in terms of installation scripts) vs. trusting all those packages are non-buggy and non-epxloitable. We certainly do not assume the latter.
Because we chose to use Fedora as a vendor for the Qubes OS foundation (e.g. for Dom0 packages and for AppVM packages). We also chose to trust several other vendors, such as Xen.org, kernel.org, and a few others whose software we use in Dom0. We had to trust *somebody* as we are unable to write all the software from scratch ourselves. But there is a big difference in trusting all Fedora packages to be non-malicious (in terms of installation scripts) vs. trusting all those packages are non-buggy and non-exploitable. We certainly do not assume the latter.
- So, are the template VMs as trusted as Dom0?