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2
developer/general/gsod.md
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@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ Below is an example of the content (which is already [documented](/doc/)) that t
- Passwordless root
- Anti Evil Maid
- Split GPG
- U2F proxy
- CTAP proxy
- YubiKey
- Whonix
- How to install and use a VPN in Qubes

4
introduction/intro.md
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@ -136,9 +136,9 @@ title: Introduction
</p>
</div>
<div class="col-lg-4 col-md-4 col-xs-12">
<h3>U2F proxy</h3>
<h3>CTAP proxy</h3>
<p>
Operate <a href="/doc/u2f-proxy/">Qubes U2F proxy</a> to use your
Operate <a href="/doc/ctap-proxy/">Qubes CTAP proxy</a> to use your
two-factor authentication devices without exposing your web browser to the
full USB stack.
</p>

2
user/how-to-guides/how-to-use-usb-devices.md
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@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Examples of valid cases for USB-passthrough:
- [external audio devices](/doc/external-audio/)
- [optical drives](/doc/recording-optical-discs/) for recording
(If you are thinking to use a two-factor-authentication device, [there is an app for that](/doc/u2f-proxy/).
(If you are thinking to use a two-factor-authentication device, [there is an app for that](/doc/ctap-proxy/).
But it has some [issues](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4661).)
## Attaching And Detaching a USB Device

144
user/security-in-qubes/ctap-proxy.md Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
---
lang: en
layout: doc
permalink: /doc/ctap-proxy/
redirect_from: /doc/u2f-proxy/
ref: 167
title: CTAP proxy
---
The [Qubes CTAP Proxy](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-app-u2f) is a secure proxy intended to make use of CTAP two-factor authentication devices with web browsers without exposing the browser to the full USB stack, not unlike the [USB keyboard and mouse proxies](/doc/usb/) implemented in Qubes.
## What is CTAP, U2F, FIDO2?
CTAP, U2F, and FIDO2 are all related to authentication protocols and standards developed by the FIDO Alliance. CTAP has two versions: CTAP1 and CTAP2:
1. [CTAP1/U2F](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_2nd_Factor) (Universal 2nd Factor): U2F is an earlier protocol developed by the FIDO Alliance as part of the FIDO U2F standard. It provides a strong second-factor authentication method using dedicated hardware security keys. U2F allows users to authenticate to online services by simply plugging in a U2F-compliant security key and pressing a button, providing a higher level of security compared to traditional passwords.
2. [CTAP2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Client_to_Authenticator_Protocol) (Client to Authenticator Protocol): CTAP2 is a protocol within the FIDO2 framework that enables communication between a client device (e.g., a computer or smartphone) and an authenticator (e.g., a hardware device). CTAP allows for secure and convenient authentication using public key cryptography and strong authentication factors.
3. [FIDO2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIDO_Alliance): FIDO2 is a set of standards and protocols developed by the FIDO Alliance for passwordless and strong authentication. It combines two main components: CTAP (Client to Authenticator Protocol) and WebAuthn (Web Authentication API). FIDO2 enables users to authenticate to online services using various authentication methods, such as biometrics, PINs, or hardware tokens, instead of relying on passwords.
The aim of these protocols is to introduce additional control which provides [good protection](https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/07/google-security-keys-neutralized-employee-phishing/) in cases in which the passphrase is stolen (e.g. by phishing or keylogging).
While passphrase compromise may not be obvious to the user, a physical device that cannot be duplicated must be stolen to be used outside the owner's control.
Nonetheless, it is important to note at the outset that CTAP cannot guarantee security when the host system is compromised (e.g. a malware-infected operating system under an adversary's control).
The CTAP specification defines protocols for multiple layers from USB to the browser API, and the whole stack is intended to be used with web applications (most commonly websites) in browsers.
In most cases, authenticators are USB dongles.
The protocol is very simple, allowing the devices to store very little state inside (so the tokens may be reasonably cheap) while simultaneously authenticating a virtually unlimited number of services (so each person needs only one token, not one token per application).
The user interface is usually limited to a single LED and a button that is pressed to confirm each transaction, so the devices themselves are also easy to use.
Both CTAP1 and CTAP2 share the same underlying transports: USB Human Interface Device (USB HID), Near Field Communication (NFC), and Bluetooth Smart / Bluetooth Low Energy Technology (BLE).
Currently, the most common form of two-step authentication consists of a numeric code that the user manually types into a web application.
These codes are typically generated by an app on the user's smartphone or sent via SMS.
By now, it is well-known that this form of two-step authentication is vulnerable to phishing and man-in-the-middle attacks due to the fact that the application requesting the two-step authentication code is typically not itself authenticated by the user.
(In other words, users can accidentally give their codes to attackers because they do not always know who is really requesting the code.) In the CTAP model, by contrast, the browser ensures that the token receives valid information about the web application requesting authentication, so the token knows which application it is authenticating (for details, see [here](https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-u2f-v1.2-ps-20170411/fido-u2f-overview-v1.2-ps-20170411.html#site-specific-public-private-key-pairs)).
Nonetheless, [some attacks are still possible](https://www.wired.com/story/chrome-yubikey-phishing-webusb/) even with CTAP (more on this below).
## The Qubes approach to CTAP
In a conventional setup, web browsers and the USB stack (to which the authenticator is connected) are all running in the same monolithic OS.
Since the CTAP model assumes that the browser is trustworthy, any browser in the OS is able to access any key stored on the authenticator.
The user has no way to know which keys have been accessed by which browsers for which services.
If any of the browsers are compromised, it should be assumed that all the token's keys have been compromised.
(This problem can be mitigated, however, if the CTAP device has a special display to show the user what's being authenticated.) Moreover, since the USB stack is in the same monolithic OS, the system is vulnerable to attacks like [BadUSB](https://www.blackhat.com/us-14/briefings.html#badusb-on-accessories-that-turn-evil).
In Qubes OS, by contrast, it is possible to securely compartmentalise the browser in one qube and the USB stack in another so that they are always kept separate from each other.
The Qubes CTAP Proxy then allows the token connected to the USB stack in one qube to communicate with the browser in a separate qube.
We operate under the assumption that the USB stack is untrusted from the point of view of the browser and also that the browser is not to be trusted blindly by the token.
Therefore, the token is never in the same qube as the browser.
Our proxy forwards only the data necessary to actually perform the authentication, leaving all unnecessary data out, so it won't become a vector of attack.
This is depicted in the diagram below (click for full size).
[![Qubes CTAP Proxy diagram](/attachment/doc/ctap.svg)](/attachment/doc/ctap.svg)
The Qubes CTAP Proxy has two parts: the frontend and the backend.
The frontend runs in the same qube as the browser and presents a fake USB-like HID device using `uhid`.
The backend runs in `sys-usb` and behaves like a browser.
This is done using the `fido2` reference library.
All of our code was written in Python.
The standard [qrexec](/doc/qrexec3/) policy is responsible for directing calls to the appropriate domains.
The `vault` qube with a dashed line in the bottom portion of the diagram depicts future work in which we plan to implement the Qubes CTAP Proxy with a software token in an isolated qube rather than a physical hardware token.
This is similar to the manner in which [Split GPG](/doc/split-gpg/) allows us to emulate the smart card model without physical smart cards.
One very important assumption of protocol is that the browser verifies every request sent to the authenticator --- in particular, that the web application sending an authentication request matches the application that would be authenticated by answering that request (in order to prevent, e.g., a phishing site from sending an authentication request for your bank's site).
With the WebUSB feature in Chrome, however, a malicious website can [bypass](https://www.wired.com/story/chrome-yubikey-phishing-webusb/) this safeguard by connecting directly to the token instead of using the browser's CTAP API.
The Qubes CTAP Proxy also prevents this class of attacks by implementing an additional verification layer.
This verification layer allows you to enforce, for example, that the web browser in your `twitter` qube can only access the CTAP key associated with `https://twitter.com`.
This means that if anything in your `twitter` qube were compromised --- the browser or even the OS itself --- it would still not be able to access the CTAP keys on your token for any other websites or services, like your email and bank accounts.
This is another significant security advantage over monolithic systems.
(For details and instructions, see the [Advanced usage](#advanced-usage-per-qube-key-access) section below.)
For even more protection, you can combine this with the [Qubes firewall](/doc/firewall/) to ensure, for example, that the browser in your `banking` qube accesses only one website (your bank's website).
By configuring the Qubes firewall to prevent your `banking` qube from accessing any other websites, you reduce the risk of another website compromising the browser in an attempt to bypass CTAP authentication.
## Installation
These instructions assume that there is a `sys-usb` qube that holds the USB stack, which is the default configuration in most Qubes OS installations.
In dom0:
```
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update qubes-ctap-dom0
$ qvm-service --enable work qubes-ctap-proxy
```
The above assumes a `work` qube in which you would like to enable ctap. Repeat the `qvm-service` command for all qubes that should have the proxy enabled. Alternatively, you can add `qubes-ctap-proxy` in VM settings -> Services in the Qube Manager of each qube you would like to enable the service.
In Fedora templates:
```
$ sudo dnf install qubes-ctap
```
In Debian templates:
```
$ sudo apt install qubes-ctap
```
As usual with software updates, shut down the templates after installation, then restart `sys-usb` and all qubes that use the proxy.
After that, you may use your CTAP authenticator (but see [Browser support](#template-and-browser-support) below).
## Advanced usage: per-qube key access
If you are using Qubes 4.0, you can further compartmentalise your CTAP keys by restricting each qube's access to specific keys.
For example, you could make it so that your `twitter` qube (and, therefore, all web browsers in your `twitter` qube) can access only the key on your CTAP token for `https://twitter.com`, regardless of whether any of the web browsers in your `twitter` qube or the `twitter` qube itself are compromised.
If your `twitter` qube makes an authentication request for your bank website, it will be denied at the Qubes policy level.
To enable this, create a file in dom0 named `/etc/qubes/policy.d/30-user-ctapproxy.policy` with the following content:
```
policy.RegisterArgument +u2f.Authenticate sys-usb @anyvm allow target=dom0
```
Next, empty the contents of `/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/u2f.Authenticate` so that it is a blank file.
Do not delete the file itself.
(If you do, the default file will be recreated the next time you update, so it will no longer be empty.) Finally, follow your web application's instructions to enroll your token and use it as usual.
(This enrollment process depends on the web application and is in no way specific to Qubes CTAP.)
The default model is to allow a qube to access all and only the keys that were enrolled by that qube.
For example, if your `banking` qube enrolls your banking key, and your `twitter` qube enrolls your Twitter key, then your `banking` qube will have access to your banking key but not your Twitter key, and your `twitter` qube will have access to your Twitter key but not your banking key.
## Non-default USB qube name
If your USB qube is named differently than `sys-usb`, then do the following in the appropriate template(s):
```
systemctl enable qubes-ctapproxy@USB_QUBE.service
systemctl disable qubes-ctapproxy@sys-usb.service
```
Replace `USB_QUBE` with the actual USB qube name.
Do not forget to change the sys-usb qube name in the policy `/etc/qubes/policy.d/30-user-ctapproxy.policy`.
## Template and browser support
The large number of possible combinations of template (Fedora 37, 38; Debian 10, 11) and browser (multiple Google Chrome versions, multiple Chromium versions, multiple Firefox versions) made it impractical for us to test every combination that users are likely to attempt with the Qubes CTAP Proxy.
In some cases, you may be the first person to try a particular combination.
Consequently, (and as with any new feature), users will inevitably encounter bugs.
We ask for your patience and understanding in this regard.
As always, please [report any bugs you encounter](/doc/issue-tracking/).

2
user/security-in-qubes/device-handling-security.md
View File

@ -71,4 +71,4 @@ Locking the screen (with a traditional password) does not solve the problem, bec
One possibility is to set up the screen locker to require an additional step to unlock (i.e., two-factor authentication).
One way to achieve this is to use a [YubiKey](/doc/YubiKey/), or some other hardware token, or even to manually enter a one-time password.
Support for [two factor authentication](/news/2018/09/11/qubes-u2f-proxy/) was recently added, though there are [issues](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4661).
Support for [two factor authentication](/news/2018/09/11/qubes-ctap-proxy/) was recently added, though there are [issues](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4661).

135
user/security-in-qubes/u2f-proxy.md
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@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
---
lang: en
layout: doc
permalink: /doc/u2f-proxy/
ref: 167
title: U2F proxy
---
The [Qubes U2F Proxy](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-app-u2f) is a secure proxy intended to make use of U2F two-factor authentication devices with web browsers without exposing the browser to the full USB stack, not unlike the [USB keyboard and mouse proxies](/doc/usb/) implemented in Qubes.
## What is U2F?
[U2F](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U2F), which stands for "Universal 2nd Factor", is a framework for authentication using hardware devices (U2F tokens) as "second factors", i.e. *what you have* as opposed to *what you know*, like a passphrase.
This additional control provides [good protection](https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/07/google-security-keys-neutralized-employee-phishing/) in cases in which the passphrase is stolen (e.g. by phishing or keylogging).
While passphrase compromise may not be obvious to the user, a physical device that cannot be duplicated must be stolen to be used outside of the owner's control.
Nonetheless, it is important to note at the outset that U2F cannot guarantee security when the host system is compromised (e.g. a malware-infected operating system under an adversary's control).
The U2F specification defines protocols for multiple layers from USB to the browser API, and the whole stack is intended to be used with web applications (most commonly websites) in browsers.
In most cases, tokens are USB dongles.
The protocol is very simple, allowing the devices to store very little state inside (so the tokens may be reasonably cheap) while simultaneously authenticating a virtually unlimited number of services (so each person needs only one token, not one token per application).
The user interface is usually limited to a single LED and a button that is pressed to confirm each transaction, so the devices themselves are also easy to use.
Currently, the most common form of two-step authentication consists of a numeric code that the user manually types into a web application.
These codes are typically generated by an app on the user's smartphone or sent via SMS.
By now, it is well-known that this form of two-step authentication is vulnerable to phishing and man-in-the-middle attacks due to the fact that the application requesting the two-step authentication code is typically not itself authenticated by the user.
(In other words, users can accidentally give their codes to attackers because they do not always know who is really requesting the code.) In the U2F model, by contrast, the browser ensures that the token receives valid information about the web application requesting authentication, so the token knows which application it is authenticating (for details, see [here](https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-u2f-v1.2-ps-20170411/fido-u2f-overview-v1.2-ps-20170411.html#site-specific-public-private-key-pairs)).
Nonetheless, [some attacks are still possible](https://www.wired.com/story/chrome-yubikey-phishing-webusb/) even with U2F (more on this below).
## The Qubes approach to U2F
In a conventional setup, web browsers and the USB stack (to which the U2F token is connected) are all running in the same monolithic OS.
Since the U2F model assumes that the browser is trustworthy, any browser in the OS is able to access any key stored on the U2F token.
The user has no way to know which keys have been accessed by which browsers for which services.
If any of the browsers are compromised, it should be assumed that all of the token's keys have been compromised.
(This problem can be mitigated, however, if the U2F device has a special display to show the user what's being authenticated.) Moreover, since the USB stack is in the same monolithic OS, the system is vulnerable to attacks like [BadUSB](https://www.blackhat.com/us-14/briefings.html#badusb-on-accessories-that-turn-evil).
In Qubes OS, by contrast, it is possible to securely compartmentalise the browser in one qube and the USB stack in another so that they are always kept separate from each other.
The Qubes U2F Proxy then allows the token connected to the USB stack in one qube to communicate with the browser in a separate qube.
We operate under the assumption that the USB stack is untrusted from the point of view of the browser and also that the browser is not to be trusted blindly by the token.
Therefore, the token is never in the same qube as the browser.
Our proxy forwards only the data necessary to actually perform the authentication, leaving all unnecessary data out, so it won't become a vector of attack.
This is depicted in the diagram below (click for full size).
[![Qubes U2F Proxy diagram](/attachment/doc/u2f.svg)](/attachment/doc/u2f.svg)
The Qubes U2F Proxy has two parts: the frontend and the backend.
The frontend runs in the same qube as the browser and presents a fake USB-like HID device using `uhid`.
The backend runs in `sys-usb` and behaves like a browser.
This is done using the `u2flib_host` reference library.
All of our code was written in Python.
The standard [qrexec](/doc/qrexec3/) policy is responsible for directing calls to the appropriate domains.
The `vault` qube with a dashed line in the bottom portion of the diagram depicts future work in which we plan to implement the Qubes U2F Proxy with a software token in an isolated qube rather than a physical hardware token.
This is similar to the manner in which [Split GPG](/doc/split-gpg/) allows us to emulate the smart card model without physical smart cards.
One very important assumption of U2F is that the browser verifies every request sent to the U2F token --- in particular, that the web application sending an authentication request matches the application that would be authenticated by answering that request (in order to prevent, e.g., a phishing site from sending an authentication request for your bank's site).
With the WebUSB feature in Chrome, however, a malicious website can [bypass](https://www.wired.com/story/chrome-yubikey-phishing-webusb/) this safeguard by connecting directly to the token instead of using the browser's U2F API.
The Qubes U2F Proxy also prevents this class of attacks by implementing an additional verification layer.
This verification layer allows you to enforce, for example, that the web browser in your `twitter` qube can only access the U2F key associated with `https://twitter.com`.
This means that if anything in your `twitter` qube were compromised --- the browser or even the OS itself --- it would still not be able to access the U2F keys on your token for any other websites or services, like your email and bank accounts.
This is another significant security advantage over monolithic systems.
(For details and instructions, see the [Advanced usage](#advanced-usage-per-qube-key-access) section below.)
For even more protection, you can combine this with the [Qubes firewall](/doc/firewall/) to ensure, for example, that the browser in your `banking` qube accesses only one website (your bank's website).
By configuring the Qubes firewall to prevent your `banking` qube from accessing any other websites, you reduce the risk of another website compromising the browser in an attempt to bypass U2F authentication.
## Installation
These instructions assume that there is a `sys-usb` qube that holds the USB stack, which is the default configuration in most Qubes OS installations.
In dom0:
```
$ sudo qubes-dom0-update qubes-u2f-dom0
$ qvm-service --enable work qubes-u2f-proxy
```
The above assumes a `work` qube in which you would like to enable u2f. Repeat the `qvm-service` command for all qubes that should have the proxy enabled. Alternatively, you can add `qubes-u2f-proxy` in VM settings -> Services in the Qube Manager of each qube you would like to enable the service.
In Fedora templates:
```
$ sudo dnf install qubes-u2f
```
In Debian templates:
```
$ sudo apt install qubes-u2f
```
As usual with software updates, shut down the templates after installation, then restart `sys-usb` and all qubes that use the proxy.
After that, you may use your U2F token (but see [Browser support](#template-and-browser-support) below).
## Advanced usage: per-qube key access
If you are using Qubes 4.0, you can further compartmentalise your U2F keys by restricting each qube's access to specific keys.
For example, you could make it so that your `twitter` qube (and, therefore, all web browsers in your `twitter` qube) can access only the key on your U2F token for `https://twitter.com`, regardless of whether any of the web browsers in your `twitter` qube or the `twitter` qube itself are compromised.
If your `twitter` qube makes an authentication request for your bank website, it will be denied at the Qubes policy level.
To enable this, create a file in dom0 named `/etc/qubes/policy.d/30-user-u2fproxy.policy` with the following content:
```
policy.RegisterArgument +u2f.Authenticate sys-usb @anyvm allow target=dom0
```
Next, empty the contents of `/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/u2f.Authenticate` so that it is a blank file.
Do not delete the file itself.
(If you do, the default file will be recreated the next time you update, so it will no longer be empty.) Finally, follow your web application's instructions to enroll your token and use it as usual.
(This enrollment process depends on the web application and is in no way specific to Qubes U2F.)
The default model is to allow a qube to access all and only the keys that were enrolled by that qube.
For example, if your `banking` qube enrolls your banking key, and your `twitter` qube enrolls your Twitter key, then your `banking` qube will have access to your banking key but not your Twitter key, and your `twitter` qube will have access to your Twitter key but not your banking key.
## Non-default USB qube name
If your USB qube is named differently than `sys-usb`, then do the following in the appropriate template(s):
```
systemctl enable qubes-u2fproxy@USB_QUBE.service
systemctl disable qubes-u2fproxy@sys-usb.service
```
Replace `USB_QUBE` with the actual USB qube name.
Do not forget to change the sys-usb qube name in the policy `/etc/qubes/policy.d/30-user-u2fproxy.policy`.
## Template and browser support
The large number of possible combinations of template (Fedora 27, 28; Debian 8, 9) and browser (multiple Google Chrome versions, multiple Chromium versions, multiple Firefox versions) made it impractical for us to test every combination that users are likely to attempt with the Qubes U2F Proxy.
In some cases, you may be the first person to try a particular combination.
Consequently (and as with any new feature), users will inevitably encounter bugs.
We ask for your patience and understanding in this regard.
As always, please [report any bugs you encounter](/doc/issue-tracking/).

4
user/security-in-qubes/yubi-key.md
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@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ Most use cases for the YubiKey can be achieved exactly as described by the
manufacturer or other instructions found online. One usually just needs to
attach the YubiKey to the corresponding app qube to get the same result (see the
documentation on how to use [USB devices](/doc/how-to-use-usb-devices/) in Qubes
OS accordingly). The recommended way for using U2F in Qubes is described
[here](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/u2f-proxy/).
OS accordingly). The recommended way for using CTAP in Qubes is described
[here](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/ctap-proxy/).
## Multi-factor login for Qubes OS

4
user/templates/minimal-templates.md
View File

@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ are:
Also, there are packages to provide additional services:
- `qubes-gpg-split`: For implementing split GPG.
- `qubes-u2f`: For implementing secure forwarding of U2F messages.
- `qubes-ctap`: For implementing secure forwarding of CTAP messages.
- `qubes-pdf-converter`: For implementing safe conversion of PDFs.
- `qubes-img-converter`: For implementing safe conversion of images.
- `qubes-snapd-helper`: If you want to use snaps in qubes.
@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ are:
Also, there are packages to provide additional services:
- `qubes-gpg-split`: For implementing split GPG.
- `qubes-u2f`: For implementing secure forwarding of U2F messages.
- `qubes-ctap`: For implementing secure forwarding of CTAP messages.
- `qubes-pdf-converter`: For implementing safe conversion of PDFs.
- `qubes-img-converter`: For implementing safe conversion of images.
- `qubes-snapd-helper`: If you want to use snaps in qubes.