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Merge branch 'dksmiffs-master'
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commit
649babd88c
@ -498,15 +498,28 @@ can be confident that these hash values came from the Qubes devs.
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## How to Verify Qubes Repos
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Whenever you use one of the [Qubes repositories](https://github.com/QubesOS),
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you should verify the PGP signature in a tag on the latest commit or on the
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latest commit itself. (One or both may be present, but only one is required.)
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If there is no trusted signed tag or commit on top, any commits after the
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latest trusted signed tag or commit should **not** be trusted. If you come
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you should use Git to verify the PGP signature in a tag on the latest commit or
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on the latest commit itself. (One or both may be present, but only one is
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required.) If there is no trusted signed tag or commit on top, any commits after
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the latest trusted signed tag or commit should **not** be trusted. If you come
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across a repo with any unsigned commits, you should not add any of your own
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signed tags or commits on top of them unless you personally vouch for the
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trustworthiness of the unsigned commits. Instead, ask the person who pushed the
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unsigned commits to sign them.
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You should always perform this verification on a trusted local machine with
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properly validated keys (which are available in the [Qubes Security
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Pack](/security/pack/)) rather than relying on a third party, such as GitHub.
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While the GitHub interface may claim that a commit has a verified signature
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from a member of the Qubes team, this is only trustworthy if GitHub has
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performed the signature check correctly, the account identity is authentic, the
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user's key has not been replaced by an admin, GitHub's servers have not been
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compromised, and so on. Since there's no way for you to be certain that all
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such conditions hold, you're much better off verifying signatures yourself.
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Also see: [Distrusting the
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Infrastructure](/faq/#what-does-it-mean-to-distrust-the-infrastructure)
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To verify a signature on a Git tag:
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```shell_session
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@ -531,19 +544,6 @@ or
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$ git verify-commit <commit ID>
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```
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You should always perform this verification on a trusted local machine with
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properly validated keys (which are available in the [Qubes Security
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Pack](/security/pack/)) rather than relying on a third party, such as GitHub.
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While the GitHub interface may claim that a commit has a verified signature
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from a member of the Qubes team, this is only trustworthy if GitHub has
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performed the signature check correctly, the account identity is authentic, the
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user's key has not been replaced by an admin, GitHub's servers have not been
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compromised, and so on. Since there's no way for you to be certain that all
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such conditions hold, you're much better off verifying signatures yourself.
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Also see: [Distrusting the
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Infrastructure](/faq/#what-does-it-mean-to-distrust-the-infrastructure)
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## Troubleshooting FAQ
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### Why am I getting "Can't check signature: public key not found"?
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