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Trusted_parts changed
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@ -23,9 +23,11 @@ Trusted non-Qubes-specific components
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- Xen hypervisor
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- xenstore
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- network PV frontends (exposed to potentially compromised netvm) and backends
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- VMs networking stack. Note that in order to take control over VM without its cooperation (e.g. enticing user to visit a malicious web page) the attacker would have to compromise two firewalls first. Also, dom0 has no network connectivity, thus it is not exposed.
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- block backend implemented in dom0 kernel
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- integrity of Fedora packages (meaning, they are not trojaned)
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- rpm and yum (both in dom0 and in VMs) must correctly verify signatures of the packages
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- terminal emulators and file editors used in dom0 to view VM-influenced logs (although somehow exotic, in the past there were vulnerabilities in terminal emulators allowing for arbitrary code execution by just displaying malicious content on the terminal).
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At the current project stage, we cannot afford to spend time to improve them - all we can do is to limit the number and extent of these components.
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